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“Getting Out: Parole, Politics, and Risk Assessment Before the Carceral State” uses 
Illinois as a case study to explore the extension of carceral power into free society with the 
passage of parole and indeterminate sentencing laws. From its beginnings, the diffuse and 
immediately controversial institution of parole forced prison officials, social reformers, and 
former prisoners to fight for their interests both within the criminal justice system and outside of 
official political channels. In the Progressive Era, the state relied on private individuals, 
businesses, and voluntary organizations to conduct much of the actual work involved in 
maintaining a supervisory network in cities and towns across Illinois. The parole board 
determined release dates for prisoners based largely on its members’ ‘hunches’—often swayed 
by classist and racist assumptions or an inmate’s political connections. But as the twentieth 
century progressed, a new actuarial prediction process allowed the board to justify its decisions 
scientifically. For all of the justice system’s effort to pivot toward reliance on empirical 
evidence, however, the parole system still hinged on older assumptions about who was worthy 
and who was not. To tell this story, the project uses a synthetic approach that integrates labor 
history, urban history, and the history of state and local politics to demonstrate how actuarial 
calculations of risk got wedded to notions of race, class, and the provision of social services. The 
dissertation advances our understanding of how inequality in the American criminal justice 
system is rooted not only in older exploitative practices stemming from slavery and the 
workhouse, but also in the ways in which racism, classism, and sexism were bound up with 
prison reform and scientific management.  
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Joseph Schuster took his last breath in the electric chair shortly after midnight on April 
16, 1937.1 It is unclear who was responsible for pulling the lever that carried the lethal current, 
taking Schuster’s life as payment for the murder of policeman, husband, and father Arthur J. 
Sullivan. Four guards were assigned to pull four switches at exactly the same time on the large 
panel near the execution chamber in the Cook County Jail, but only one of them carried out the 
state-sanctioned killing by sending the electric current to the chair.2 Following Schuster’s death 
at 12:11 AM, the four switches were pulled twice more for the currents to claim Stanley 
Murawski and Frank “Doc” Whyte. Murawski and Whyte were sentenced to death for the 
murder of policeman Michael Toth.3 In a period of twenty-nine minutes, Schuster, Murawski, 
and Whyte were pronounced dead before 147 witnesses. This represented but a fraction of the 
5,000 people who applied to watch the executions.4 In one of its last printed outcries against 
Joseph Schuster’s offense, the Chicago Tribune described the three deaths and their significance 
with one line: “Thus, with the flick of an electric switch, ended the criminal careers of three 
beneficiaries of the Illinois parole system.”5 
As this statement clarifies, Schuster, Murawski, and Whyte had something else in 
common besides the crimes they were put to death for committing. All three were out on parole 
when they shot and killed Chicago policemen. By the 1930s, state parole systems developed 
earlier in the 20th century suffered criticism and condemnation. In 1937, the year Schuster was 
 
1 “Three Police Killers Put to Death: Crime Career of Parolees Ends in Chair,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 16, 
1937, 1. 
2 Associated Press, “Three Convicts Meet Death in ‘Humane’ Chair: Killers of Policemen Die in Chicago Jail for 
Double Crime,” The Washington Post, April 16, 1937, 5.  
3 “Police Slaying Confessed by Two Ex-Convicts: One Desperado Seized Through Clever Ruse,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, December 20, 1936, 13.  
4 “Three Police Killers Put to Death,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 1. 




sentenced to die in the electric chair, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover 
called the parole system “one of the greatest disgraces America has ever known.”6 In making this 
statement, Hoover echoed the opinion advanced by most major newspapers and by many 
Americans who were “convinced that parole represented nothing more than coddling of the 
criminal.”7 The public revulsion inspired by parole and the men these policies released from 
prison was perhaps the one of the reasons why many of the 5,000 people who applied for tickets 
to the execution were so eager to watch the state kill Joseph Schuster.  
While the slaying of any patrolman would have attracted newspaper attention, Schuster 
rode a wave of headlines to the death house. His case did contain several sensational elements. 
Arthur Sullivan was a married father of four young children, and photographs of his grieving 
family appeared often in publications pertaining to his murder.8 Even former prisoners hated 
him, perhaps for different reasons. After Schuster’s capture, a burglary suspect and fellow 
parolee handcuffed to Schuster in the police “showup” room easily recognized him: “You’re the 
guy that killed the copper, huh? Yes, and you’re the guy that turned ‘the heat’ on all us paroled 
convicts.”9 Schuster had also inadvertently turned the heat on himself. He stashed the gun he 
used to kill Sullivan inside the oven in his apartment, where the flat’s subsequent tenant 
inadvertently set it off as she heated the stove.10 Also, Schuster had evidently robbed his own 
 
6 J. Edgar Hoover, “The Truth About Parole: A New Article in the Series ‘For a Crime-Free America,” Los Angeles 
Times, October 3, 1937, J2.  
7 David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 160. 
8 “Seize Paroled Police Killer: Ex-Convict Is Caught in Trap and Confesses,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 16, 
1937, 1. Also see “Parolee, Seized as Bandit, Hangs Himself in Jail: Push Ex-Convict Drive; Vote to Indict Killer,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, January 21, 1937, 2; “Three Police Killers Put to Death: Crime Career of Parolees Ends in 
Chair,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 16, 1937.  
9 “Paroled Police Slayer Cursed,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 4. 
10 “Explosions Lead to Police Death Gun—In a Stove: Heat Fires Shells; Parolee Identifies Weapon,” January 27, 




sister, who nevertheless continued to defend him during his trial.11 All of these elements 
combined made for great newspaper sales. But the consistent coverage of Schuster’s crime, trial, 
and sentencing was perhaps due instead to timing.  
Police apprehended the parolee for Arthur Sullivan’s murder in the midst of a nationwide 
crime war, and Joseph Schuster’s story raises themes integral to our understanding of it. Parole 
was central to the crisis surrounding this first war on crime and to the expansion of carceral 
bureaucracy that came with it. Lurid headlines alerted the public to the violent, improperly 
supervised parolees roaming the state, crying out against the parole board that had released them. 
Vulnerable to bad publicity in the 1920s and 1930s and armed with an actuarial tool that rated 
the risk of paroling each incarcerated man, the board soon came to use this new technology to 
justify keeping prisoners incarcerated rather than releasing them on parole. But how did parole 
and the indeterminate sentence, once crucial components of progressive reforms focused on 
rehabilitating lawbreakers and reintegrating them into free society, come to fuel carceral growth 
through intensive risk mitigation? And what did this mean for the men caught up in the criminal 
justice system? “Getting Out” traces this story, from the early expansion of carceral surveillance 
to the evolution of risk management strategies in the lead up to the growth of carceral 
bureaucracy during the interwar period.  
 
Historiography and Interventions 
 The historical subfield focused on the rise of the carceral state and mass incarceration in 
the second half of the twentieth century is thriving. The urgency behind this literature is clear—
one has only to look to the devastating effects of the wars on drugs and crime in communities of 
color, the incarceration of undocumented children at the border, and the mass warehousing of 
 
11 “Paroled Police Slayer Cursed by Prison Mate: Seek Indictment Today for Vicious Killer,” Chicago Daily 




African American men, women, and children in this century to understand why. The vast funds 
and military equipment allocated to the nation’s police forces and the deep divide between rich 
and poor visible within the American court system drives the caging of many millions within its 
borders. Some of the most important work that has emerged from this subfield in the past decade 
explores the causes and impact of the expansion of the carceral state, following historian Heather 
Ann Thompson’s call to action in her 2010 essay “Why Mass Incarceration Matters.”12 
Historians seek to understand the meteoric rise in incarceration rates and the ways in which 
prisons, police, and the courts have, in Elizabeth Hinton’s words, “functioned as a central engine 
of American inequality.”13 Scholarship within the subfield has exposed the bipartisan 
commitment to law-and-order politics and uncovered the resultant extensive and broad-reaching 
punitive policies, federal investment in local law enforcement, and colossal prison-building 
project that began in the 1960s and continues to shape the lives of countless low-income 
Americans.14 Much of this work also adds to our understanding of the severe consequences of 
 
12 Heather Ann Thompson, “Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in 
Postwar American History,” Journal of American History 97, no. 3 (December, 2010), 703-734. 
13 Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1.  
14 Most of the work on the contributions of Democratic and Republican politicians to the expansion of the carceral 
state developed in response to Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2012, 2020). Alexander’s groundbreaking bestseller speaks powerfully to 
the experience of people impacted by mass incarceration, has inspired “conscious-raising activism” such as The 
Marshall Project, and presents the history of the War on Drugs and rise of human caging in accessible narrative and 
statistical form. Historians of the carceral state argue for a lengthening of Alexander’s causal narrative, contending 
that explaining the rise of mass incarceration requires consideration of the period before Reagan’s War on Drugs and 
looking beyond law, policy, and practice related to narcotics enforcement. On the bipartisan commitment to law-
and-order rhetoric and policymaking, see Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime; 
Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 1970s America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2017); and, though written before The New Jim Crow, Jonathan Simon, Governing Through 
Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (New York: 




carceral state expansion for black Americans and Latinos, as the racial disparity in arrest rates 
and within prisons, jails, and immigrant detention centers attests.15  
 As Dan Berger points out, much of the recent work in carceral history focuses on prisons 
and policing in two distinct moments in the past: the post-1945 moment of carceral state 
expansion and the post-bellum period of convict leasing in the American South.16 Perhaps the 
most compelling recent trend in the history of convict leasing illuminates the once-overlooked 
histories of African American women within the convict leasing system, offering historians new 
ways to think through “histories of gendered violence and black female resistance.”17 Other 
significant works expose the instrumental role of convict labor in the construction of the modern 
South, both in terms of physical infrastructure and the logics of race that operated in the Jim 
 
15 Both Elizabeth Hinton and Julilly Kohler-Hausmann also link new penal and law enforcement policy to welfare 
programming in urban centers, leading to greater surveillance and policing of already marginalized African 
Americans and Latinos. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime and Kohler-Hausmann, Getting 
Tough. Loïc Waquant also explores the ways in which the carceral state stepped in as the welfare state shrank in the 
postwar period. See Waquant, “Class, race, and hyperincarceration in revanchist America,” Daedalus 139, no. 3 
(Summer 2010), 74-90. For a sampling of the many other studies focused on historicizing racial disparities in 
incarceration, see Alexander, The New Jim Crow; Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The Attica Prison 
Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy (New York: Pantheon Books, 2016); Heather Schoenfeld, Building the Prison 
State: Race and the Politics of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018); Robert Perkinson, 
Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire (New York: Picador, 2010); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden 
Gulag: Prisons, Supplies, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007); and Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the incarceration and deportation of immigrants, especially 
Latinx immigrants, see Torrie Hester, “Deportability and the Carceral State,” Journal of American History 102, no. 
1 (June, 2014), 141-151; Torrie Hester, Deportation: The Origins of U.S. Policy (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra!: A History of the U.S. Border 
Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 
16 Dan Berger, “Finding and Defining the Carceral State,” Reviews in American History 47, no. 2 (June 2019), 281.  
17 Quote from Talitha LeFlouria, “‘Under the Sting of the Lash’: Gendered Violence, Terror, and Resistance in the 
South’s Convict Camps,” The Journal of African American History 100, no. 3 (Summer, 2015): 366-384. Early 
works in this vein include Mary Ellen Curtin, Black Prisoners and their World, Alabama, 1865-1900 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), chapter 7 and Mary Ellen Curtin, “The ‘Human World’ of 
Black Women in Alabama Prisons, 1870-1900,” in Hidden Histories of Women in the New South, ed. Virginia 
Bernhard, Betty Brandon, Elizabeth Fox Genovese, Theda Purdue, and Elizabeth Hayes Turner (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1994). More recent works include: Talitha L. LeFlouria, Chained in Silence: Black 
Women and Convict Labor in the New South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015) and Sarah 
Haley, No Mercy Here: Gender, Punishment, and the Making of Jim Crow Modernity (Chapel Hill, University of 




Crow era.18 But before the publication of Douglas Blackmon’s Slavery by Another Name and 
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow attracted public attention to the Reconstruction era 
South and the Reagan era War on Drugs—before Thompson’s essay set the agenda for the 
subfield— historical scholarship on the criminal justice system had another temporal focus.  
 The Progressive era, where this dissertation begins, marked a new age of prison and 
court-reform movements in non-Southern states, as a generation of social reformers worked to 
transform the prison into an institution that could truly change its wayward inhabitants. Forty 
years ago, David J. Rothman turned a critical eye to these “new penologists.” He argues in 
Conscience and Convenience that well-intended Progressive efforts to “cure crime, delinquency, 
and insanity” with individualized treatment both expanded the authority of the state and 
empowered officials to curtail the liberty of the “deviant” classes in the name of the “welfare of 
the individual and the security of society.”19 Since the publication of this work in 1980, scholars 
have presented research that takes up the thread of conflict between “conscience” and 
“convenience”—the gap between reform ideals and reality.20 This dissertation speaks to more 
 
18 Sarah Haley, No Mercy Here. Also see Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy 
of Convict Labor in the New South (New York: Verso, 1996); Matthew Mancini, One Dies, Get Another: Convict 
Leasing in the American South, 1866-1928 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); Douglas 
Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II 
(New York: Doubleday, 2008); and David M. Oshinsky, “Worse than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of 
Jim Crow Justice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).  
19 David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 5, 6. This work was a response to earlier scholars, who portrayed the juvenile court 
and other institutions as an embodiment of progressive ideals. Rothman contends that the asylum, prison, and 
juvenile justice reforms that proliferated across the northern states were a complete nightmare resulting only in new 
mechanisms of state control that had disastrous effects on institutional populations. His book proved both deeply 
flawed and provocative—and a cohort of historians in the 1990s stepped in to challenge and build on his argument.  
20 Newer work, however, takes a more nuanced stance on progressive criminal justice reform, leaving Rothman’s 
generalizations behind As Gerald N. Grob’s review of Conscience and Convenience points out, Rothman glosses 
over or distorts historical context that does not fit within his predetermined characterization of the asylum, the 
prison, and the reformatory. Moreover, Rothman assumes that the clients and inmates of these institutions are 
completely passive—their voices, perspectives, and actions are almost entirely absent from his narrative. He is also, 
as Nicole Hahn Rafter indicates, totally oblivious to gender. A sampling of historians who explicitly acknowledged 
and built upon Rothman’s work on the gap between intent and execution, while cognizant of the many omissions 
and flaws in Conscience and Convenience include Alexander Pisciotta, Benevolent Repression: Social Control and 




recent scholarship focused on criminal justice in the Progressive era. Historians mind the gap 
identified by Rothman while remaining attentive to gender, race, and class as well as the public-
private partnerships that characterized local and state governance.21  
My research on the Progressive era workings of the parole system in Illinois contributes 
to a body of literature that explores the public-private partnerships driving state surveillance and 
the development of the criminal justice system during the first part of the twentieth century. 
Scholars including Jessica R. Pilely and Jennifer Fronc show how white, middling-class 
reformers working with voluntary organizations helped monitor working-class city communities 
and persons the state marked as deviant.22 These social reformers believed that the data they 
gathered during observations of institutions and social groups would help them find solutions for 
poverty, criminality, juvenile delinquency, and other social ills. While many urban voluntary and 
charitable organizations operated outside of government at their founding, they soon partnered 
with the state to enforce gendered, racialized, and class boundaries in urban areas. Public-private 
 
Women in State Prisons, 1800-1935 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Nicole Hahn Rafter, “Gender, 
Prisons, and Prison History,” Social Science History 9, no. 3 (Summer 1985), 233-247; Nancy Tomes, The Art of 
Asylum-Keeping: Thomas Story Kirkbride and the Origins of American Psychiatry (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994); and David Wolcott, “‘The Cop Will Get You’: The Police and Discretionary Juvenile 
Justice, 1890-1940,” Journal of Social History 35, no. 2 (Winter, 2001), 349-371, among others too numerous to 
count. Grob, of course, had his reasons to proffer a scathing review of Conscience and Convenience. He viewed 
Progressive-era mental patients as the beneficiaries of humanitarian reforms within asylums. Gerald N. Grob, 
“Distorting History: Conscience and Convenience by David J. Rothman,” Commentary, July 1980, 
https://www.commentarymagazine. com/articles/gerald-grob/conscience-and-convenience-by-david-j-rothman/. 
21 Literature in this vein with a focus on Chicago and Illinois includes L. Mara Dodge, “Whores and Thieves of the 
Worst Kind”: A Study of Women, Crime, and Prisons, 1835-2000 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2002); Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Tera Eva Agyepong, The Criminalization of Black Children: Race, Gender, and 
Delinquency in Chicago’s Juvenile Justice System, 1899-1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2018); Victoria Getis, The Juvenile Court and the Progressives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Michael 
A. Rembis, Defining Deviance: Sex, Science, and Delinquent Girls, 1890-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2011); David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and 
Cynthia M. Blair, I’ve Got to Make My Livin’: Black Women’s Sex Work in Turn-of-the Century Chicago (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010).  
22 Jessica R. Pliley, Policing Sexuality: The Mann Act and the Making of the FBI (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014) and Jennifer Fronc, New York Undercover: Private Surveillance in the Progressive Era (Chicago: 




partnerships like these shaped the early parole system in Illinois. Illinois passed parole and 
indeterminate sentencing laws long before state funding and bureaucratic expansion provided the 
infrastructure necessary for parole supervision.23 Still, the parole system emerged thanks to 
constantly negotiated relationships between penal officials, private individuals, businesses, and 
voluntary organizations. Though Progressive era public-private partnerships like this one enabled 
state and local governments to exercise power over the poor and marginalized, government 
interests could not always control how social reformers used state-sanctioned authority.24 The 
individual ways employer-supervisors and representatives of voluntary organizations interpreted 
the Illinois parole agreement—the informal systems of assessment they developed to evaluate the 
paroled men and women in their charge—shaped how parole in Illinois worked, and didn’t. I 
argue that although parole laws represented a nod to progressive penology in Illinois, the 
system’s practical reliance on social reformers and business interests wove older class and 
gender ideals into this new approach to release and reentry.  
Tugging at the thread of state partnerships with businesses, voluntary organizations, and 
academia helps scholars understand the operation of power in carceral institutions in the first half 
of the twentieth century as well as in our own moment. Most historians who examine the 
linkages between the prison and the private sector in the early twentieth century study convict 
 
23 Historians researching parole in other states have also acknowledged the importance of voluntary organizations to 
early parole systems. Carolyn Strange’s work on the Prison Association of New York’s critical role in the formation 
of that state’s discretionary justice policies is a good example of this. Carolyn Strange, Discretionary Justice: 
Pardon and Parole in New York From the Revolution to the Depression (New York: NYU Press, 2016), especially 
chap. 6. Also see Cheryl D. Hicks, Talk with You Like a Woman: African American Women, Justice, and Reform in 
New York, 1890-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), especially chaps. 8 and 9 and Ethan 
Blue, Doing Time in the Depression: Everyday Life in Texas and California Prisons (New York: NYU Press, 2012).  
24 See especially Carol Nackenoff and Kathleen S. Sullivan, “The House that Julia (and Friends) Built: Networking 
Chicago’s Juvenile Court,” in Statebuilding from the Margins: Between Reconstruction and the New Deal 




labor—through the Southern convict lease and Northern contract labor systems.25 But exploring 
other partnerships at the state level, some of which were intertwined with progressive prison 
reform, shows how governments could enhance policing power and penal control both within 
and outside of prison walls before the New Deal-era buildup of carceral bureaucracy. These 
relationships blossomed in many states during the perceived crime wave of the 1920s. During 
these years, the American public lost faith in legal institutions following popular fears of 
mounting robbery and homicide rates, shocking exposés of corruption and inefficiency, and 
changing ideas about the role of government in the interwar period.26 In response, state and 
municipal governments often took what historian Claire Bond Potter calls “the commission 
route” to investigate societal issues and offer potential solutions. Investigative commissions were 
generally appointed when “the government’s authority was under attack” and were comprised of 
persons publicly considered “citizens of the utmost integrity.”27  
Illinois used this strategy in the wake of the 1926 parole mill scandal. Governor 
Lennington (Len) Small and several of his top parole and penal administrators were suspected of 
selling early releases to well-connected and affluent prisoners. Discovery of Small’s corruption 
 
25 While many states abolished contract labor by 1911, Maryland maintained a contract labor system well into the 
1930s. The convict lease, despite reforms that professed to replace the system with chain gang labor for state use, 
continued in many areas of the south until the 1930s. As Henry Kamerling argues in his comparative study of South 
Carolina and Illinois, which focuses on the lived experience of inmates, systems of punishment and profit in the 
North and South were not fundamentally different in the post-bellum period and the Gilded Age. For studies of the 
convict lease system, see the works cited in footnote 6 of this introduction. For work on contract labor, see Henry 
Kamerling, Capital and Convict: Race, Region, and Punishment in Post-Civil War America (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2017) and Rebecca M. McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and 
the Making of the American Penal State, 1776-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially 
chaps. 2 and 3. For a description of the day-to-day workings of a contract labor system in New York, see Timothy 
Gilfoyle, A Pickpocket’s Tale: The Underworld of Nineteenth-Century New York (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2006), 44-49.  
26 Jeffrey S. Adler, “Less Crime, More Punishment: Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice in Early Twentieth 
Century America,” Journal of American History 102, no. 1 (June, 2015), 37-38. Also see Claire Bond Potter, War 
on Crime: Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics of Mass Culture (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998).  
27 Potter, War on Crime, 25. Potter cites several state-level commissions appointed to study crime waves as well as 
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission), appointed by President 




leveled a blow to public trust in the parole board and to the institution of parole itself. To salvage 
the system, the new Chairman of the Parole Board appointed three university professors to a 
Committee on the Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and of Parole in Illinois. Though 
the state delayed the adoption of many of the Committee’s suggested reforms until the 1930s, the 
Committee’s 1928 report brokered partnerships between academic sociologists and prison 
bureaucrats, ushering in a new age of classification and reliance on the social and mind sciences 
within Illinois prisons.28  
This development took place during the height of the country’s first war on crime, which 
ran from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s.29 Historians argue that this crime war, much like the 
War on Crime and War on Drugs to come, provided state and local policymakers with a reason 
to pass harsher laws, expand prosecutorial authority, and partner with federal agencies to beef up 
local law enforcement.30 This first crime war also witnessed legislators playing on public fears of 
 
28 Similar developments occurred within Chicago’s Municipal Court during the Progressive era. Willrich, City of 
Courts. 
29 Though many historians have noted the centrality of crime and punishment to political discourse, the changing 
role of the federal government in local law enforcement, and the growing power of police during the 1920s and 
1930s, the greatest influence on my thinking about this first twentieth century war on crime goes to Jeffrey S. Adler. 
Adler argues that the war on crime of the interwar period foreshadowed late twentieth century developments, 
including a “surge in imprisonment,” rising “racial disparities in punishment,” and a spike in capital punishment 
even as rates of violent crime dropped. Adler, “Less Crime, More Punishment,” 46. Prohibition, of course, was a 
major force driving federal partnerships with local law enforcement agencies. 
30 Much of the historical literature focuses on the federal government’s role in this first war on crime. See 
Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows, especially chap. 3; Potter, War on Crime; Michael Willrich, “Criminal 
Justice in the United States,” in The Cambridge History of Law in America, vol. III: The Twentieth Century and 
After (1920), ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
especially 199-211; Rebecca McLennan, “Punishment’s Square Deal: Prisoner’s and Their Keepers in 1920s New 
York,” Journal of Urban History 29, no. 5 (July 2003), 597-619; Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and 
the Rise of the American State (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016; Simon Balto, Occupied Territory: Policing Black 
Chicago from Red Summer to Black Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019); Kenneth 
O’Reilly, “A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and National Security,” Journal 
of American History 69, no. 3 (December 1982), 638-658; Carolyn Strange, Discretionary Justice; Ethan Blue, 
Doing Time in the Depression, introduction; Janis Appier, “ ‘We’re Blocking Youth’s Path to Crime’: The Los 
Angeles Coordinating Councils During the Great Depression,” Journal of Urban History 31, no. 2 (January 2005), 
190-218; and Carl Suddler, Presumed Criminal: Black Youth and the Justice System in Postwar New York (New 




violence and property crime, working to “shore up a shaky racial hierarchy.”31 Prison 
populations skyrocketed. The U.S. incarceration rate grew 67% over the fourteen-year period 
from 1926 to 1940 and the proportion of African American prisoners increased by one third. 
States embarked on prison-building projects to accommodate their new wards, and the number of 
federal and state corrections facilities almost doubled from 1923 to 1933—though the rate of 
prison-building would slow dramatically as the Great Depression wore on.32 Illinois was no 
exception to these patterns. Funding for carceral institutions increased sharply during the early 
and mid-1920s as the state struggled to combat rising robbery and homicide rates, and 
expenditures only grew even as crime rates dropped later in the decade.33 Illinois state and local 
 
31 Adler, “Less Crime, More Punishment,” 46-7. Racial disparities in incarceration rose during the interwar period.  
32 Institutional population statistics can be found in Adler, “Less Crime, More Punishment,” 44. Statistics on the 
number of federal and state corrections facilities can be found in Margaret Werner Cahalan, “Table 3-35, Number of 
Federal and State Institutions Reported by Census Bureau and Justice Department, Selected Years: 1880-1982/3,” 
Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 (Rockville: Westat Inc., 1986), 69. In 1923, there 
were three federal prisons and 61 state prisons. By 1933, there were 16 federal prisons and 101 state prisons. Illinois 
built three new facilities between 1920 and 1930: Vandalia State Farm opened in 1921, Stateville in 1925, and the 
Illinois State Penitentiary for Women at Dwight began operations in 1930.  
33 While Figures 1 and 2 focus on corrections and the parole system, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) also 
expanded during the period following the Red Summer of 1919. In 1922, the Chicago City Council voted to allot an 
Figure 1 This chart shows the biennial legislative appropriations for the Illinois parole board and, 
beginning in 1927, funds earmarked for the supervision of parolees. Sources for the compilation of 
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government spending on law enforcement and corrections allowed for the expansion of 
institutional bureaucracies, including a newly robust parole system with over a million dollars in 
funding for the 1927 biennium—as compared with just over two hundred thousand dollars 
allotted for a two year period less than a decade before (see Figure 2).34 Legislative 
 
additional $675,000 to the CPD’s annual budget to support hiring 1,000 additional officers. This move increased the 
size of the department by almost 20 percent. The CPD also placed additional policewomen on the force to engage in 
“crime prevention work” with Chicago women and children. Nora C. Krinitsky, “The Politics of Crime Control: 
Race, Policing, and Reform in Twentieth Century Chicago” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2017), 129, 178. As 
budgets shrank during the Great Depression, the CPD cut down on administrative work and instead assigned as 
many officers as possible to lengthy foot patrol shifts. New divisions sprang up to address vagrancy, auto theft, vice, 
and gambling. The vice and gambling unit targeted the policy enterprise in the Black Belt, arresting hundreds of 
people per day. Historian Simon Balto reports that 87% of all CPD raids conducted in 1932 took place in African 
American neighborhoods. Balto, Occupied Territory, 72. 
34 Omar H. Wright and William H. McLain, State of Illinois Second State Budget for the Biennium Beginning July 1, 
1921 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., 1921), 238, 242, 247, 259; A.C. Bollinger and William H. McLain, 
State of Illinois Third State Budget for the Biennium Beginning July 1, 1923 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., 
1923), 163-168, 174; A.C. Bollinger and James M. Kittleman, State of Illinois Fourth State Budget for the Biennium 
Beginning July 1, 1925 (Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., 1925), 164-176; A.C. Bollinger and James M. 
Kittleman, State of Illinois Fifth State Budget for the Biennium Beginning July 1, 1927 (Springfield: Illinois State 
Journal Co., 1927), 167-172; G. DeF. Kinney and James M. Kittleman, State of Illinois Sixth State Budget for the 
Biennium Beginning July 1, 1929 (Springfield: Journal Printing Company, 1929), 176-182, 186; G. DeF. Kinney and 
James A. Watson, State of Illinois Seventh State Budget for the Biennium Beginning July 1, 1931 (Springfield: 
Journal Printing Company, 1931), 217-219; K.L. Ames, Jr., Seventeenth Annual Report of the Department of 
Finance, July 1, 1933 to June 30, 1934 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1934), 22; K.L. Ames, Jr., Eighteenth Annual 
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Figure 2 This chart shows the biennial legislative appropriations for the Illinois parole board, the 
supervision of parolees (beginning in 1927), and the three Illinois prisons for adult men. Note the 





appropriations directed towards the policing, 
imprisonment, and surveillance of Illinois’s citizens grew 
over the course of the interwar period, even as the state’s 
prison population plateaued.35 The expanded penal 
bureaucracies the state funded did not disappear as the 
number of prisoners reached its peak and began to 
decrease in the early 1940s, but instead remained to set 
the stage for massive carceral growth in the postwar 
period. Indeed, many of the structures that seemed to 
drive incarceration in the second half of the century were 
built up decades before the 1970s. The birth of the 
carceral state was a gradual process, as state-level prison 
systems and law enforcement expanded with “each 
campaign for law and order and against certain crimes 
 
Ames, Jr., Nineteenth Annual Report of the Department of Finance, July 1, 1935 to June 30, 1936 (Springfield: State 
of Illinois, 1936), 52; S.L. Nudelman, Twenty-First Annual Report of the Department of Finance, July 1, 1937 to 
June 30, 1938 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1938), 57; A.M. Carter, Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Department 
of Finance, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1940 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1940), 66; George B. McKibbin, Twenty-
Fifth Annual Report of the Department of Finance, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 
1942), 96, 110; M.A. Saunders, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Department of Finance, July 1, 1944 to June 
30, 1945 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1945), 91-96; M.A. Saunders, Thirty-First Annual Report of the Department 
of Finance, July 1, 1947 to June 30, 1948 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1948), 150-152. Funds from the 
penitentiaries’ industrial working capital fund are included in the numbers from the 1941 and 1943 biennial reports. 
35 The number of persons incarcerated at the three branches of the Illinois State Penitentiary for adult men rose 
sharply during the 1920s, but remained relatively stable from 1933 to 1943, hovering between 10,000 and 11,000 
men. By contrast, the legislative appropriation for Joliet-Stateville, Menard, and Pontiac increased from $4,560,988 
to $11,110,972 during that time frame. Statistics compiled from sources in note X; from Department of Public 
Welfare, Statistical review of prisons, reformatories, and correctional institutions (Springfield: State of Illinois, 
1939), 13; and from Department of Public Safety, Annual Report of the Department of Public Safety, July 1, 1941 to 
June 30, 1942 (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1942), 52. Prison construction image is from Illinois Department of 
Public Welfare, Fourth Annual Report of the Department of Public Welfare, July 1, 1920 to June 30, 1921 
(Springfield: Illinois State Journal Co., 1922), 24.  
Figure 3 Images of two panopticon-style cellhouses at 
Stateville, showing one finished circular cellhouse and its 
interior, including cell doors and a cell interior. The bottom 
two images show the construction of an additional circular 
cellhouse. By the time the prison opened in March 1925, it 
boasted four cellhouses like those pictured above. Joliet 




and vice.” Though these campaigns always receded, the institutions they created and the 
increased carceral capacity they demanded usually endured.36 
“Getting Out” shows how the frenzy over the crime war in Illinois contributed to the 
buildup of carceral bureaucracy at the state level, culminating in the expansion of the parole 
system (even as the number of paroles actually granted dipped), the centralization of the prison 
system, and the institution of intensive classification procedures at the penitentiaries and 
reformatory. These new, purportedly objective classification systems were based on research 
conducted using institutional records and served to harden and provide a gloss of objectivity to 
the racial and class biases that drove parole decision-making in the Progressive era and the 
postwar period. Social scientists wrote race and class into ostensibly neutral classification 
procedures, including an actuarial parole prediction system that would evolve over the next four 
decades to become a model for national crime risk assessment in the 1970s. In the meantime, 
African American, Latinx, and poor prisoners in Illinois found their already narrowed chances at 
parole becoming slimmer still. The persistence of class and race-based ideologies in the 1930s 
administration of discretionary justice occurred in part because of the influence of science and 
social science, rather than in spite of it. Prison populations grew and ex-prisoners spent longer 
periods of time under the supervision of state parole agents, while parole releases—hampered by 
a parole board terrified of risk—stayed the same. The following chapters show that to understand 
the expansion of the criminal justice system during the first war on crime, historians must 
explore changes to release procedures as well as the role of social scientists in penal bureaucracy 
at the state level—both integral parts of the political project of crime control in Illinois.  
 




 “Getting Out” also explores how attention to risk as a category of analysis can change our 
understanding of criminal justice history. As social theorists and, later, professional historians 
have argued, the need to identify and manage social risks has become a critical role for the 
modern state.37 Though managing risk is and was a central project for carceral institutions, which 
are responsible for both locking away and releasing criminal suspects and offenders, criminal 
justice histories rarely center the concept. Carceral historians’ neglect of risk as an analytic tool 
obscures the ways the news media, penal administrators, policymakers, and social scientists 
thought about the project of criminal management in the interwar period, especially in relation to 
parole. “Getting Out” takes Illinois as a case study to consider how these groups assessed and 
attempted to control the risks posed by individuals through the institution of informed release 
practices. Looking at the risk management calculations inherent in parole board decision-making 
offers insight into the institutionalization of classification processes that began to structure penal 
management and influence parole decisions during the first war on crime.38 The risk ideologies 
undergirding first parole board members’ and then sociologist-actuaries’ construction of the poor 
parole risk involved preexisting ideas about race and class which comprised the underlying logic 
 
37 Social theorist Ulrich Beck famously coined the term ‘risk society’ to characterize the way modern societies 
organize and mobilize resources to manage risk. Changes in understandings of risk and in perceptions of who can 
best assess and handle it are key to the transition to modernity, in Beck’s understanding. See Arwen P. Mohun, 
“Constructing the History of Risk: Foundations, Tools, and Reasons Why,” Historical Social Research/Historische 
Sozialforschung 41, no. 1 (2016), 34-35; Soraya Boudia and Nathalie Jas, “Introduction: Risk and ‘Risk Society’ in 
Historical Perspective,” History and Technology 23, no. 4 (September 2007), 317-331. Historical studies using risk 
as an analytic largely focus on credit and financial markets, insurance, disasters, and the welfare state (including 
worker and consumer safety). For a sampling of the literature, see Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered: 
Risk and the Rise of the Statistical Individual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Caley Dawn Horan, 
“Actuarial Age: Insurance and the Emergence of Neoliberalism in the Postwar United States” (PhD diss., University 
of Minnesota, 2011); Julia Moses, The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origins of European Social 
States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Arwen Mohun, Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); and Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of 
Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
38 This development in Illinois follows a trend observed in historical studies of risk management within the modern, 
administrative state: the rise of a “new expert culture that generated knowledge in order to find solutions that 
could… help to reduce risks or make them more acceptable.” Peter Itzen and Simone M. Müller, “Risk as a 
Category of Analysis for a Social History of the Twentieth Century: An Introduction,” Historical Social 




of parole decision-making, as illustrated in chapters three and four.39 I posit in the following 
pages that while penal administrators and social scientists understood the institution of 
classification processes and institutional segregation as progressive practices, the risk ideologies 
overlaid onto Illinois’s diagnostic and actuarial procedures served to reduce already slim 
opportunities for the most marginalized men within the prison population.  
Chapters two and five introduce a competing risk ideology constructed by political 
interests and powerful newspapers, mainly the Chicago Daily Tribune, that would challenge 
these evolving social scientific conceptions of risk and the social scientists who created them. 
The critique of parole seemed an almost natural outgrowth from the daily newspaper’s “focus on 
violence and sensation,” which set the stage for its clamor for punishment and positioning of 
lengthy sentences as a measure of public protection.40 Though the Tribune railed against the 
parole system long before the 1920s crime wave, chapter two chronicles an exposé of parole 
board corruption that marked the beginning of its more strident calls for law and order. The 
paper began to advance a more cohesive risk ideology, both defining the criteria necessary to 
make an adequate assessment of criminal risk and calling for that power to be vested in the 
state’s judiciary. Various state legislators, judges, and law enforcement officers supported this 
policy change and the abolition of the parole board at politically convenient times, and the 
 
39 I borrow the term “risk ideologies” from sociologist Robin Bartram’s article “Emplacing Risks in the City.” 
Bartram defines risk ideologies as “sets of ideas about [who], what and where is dangerous.” The “who” is my 
addition. There may be multiple risk ideologies in play and competing with each other at any one time. For instance, 
while one parole board member might conceive of a prisoner’s history of sexually motivated crimes as a serious risk 
factor, another might believe that sex offenders generally do not exhibit recidivism and are therefore good parole 
risks. Additionally, risk ideologies are malleable and capable of evolution. Though Bartram claims to have coined 
the term, criminologist Keramet Reiter is among the social scientists who have leveraged it in similar ways. Robin 
Bartram, “Emplacing Risks in the City: Class, Politics, Risk, and the Built Environment of Women’s Residential 
Clubs, 1896-1917,” Journal of Urban History 44, no. 2 (2018), 219. Also see Keramet Reiter, “Reclaiming the 
Power to Punish: Legislating and Administrating the California Supermax, 1982-1989,” Law & Society Review 50, 
no. 2 (2016), especially 491-497.  
40 John Carter Wood, "Crime News and the Press," in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Crime and Criminal 




Tribune amplified their voices. But the newspaper’s critique remained the most consistent and 
likely the most threatening to the institution of parole in Illinois.41 It maintained that judges were 
best equipped to assess the danger posed by each convicted offender, and that this risk 
assessment and the sentence handed down should be determined by the defendant’s crime and 
criminal history.  
The paper’s criticisms evolved as the parole board adopted new technologies in the 
1930s. By then, the parole board was not just vulnerable to politics but also inappropriately 
“engaged in complicated ‘social’ and humanitarian purposes, highly theoretical and far beyond 
the present knowledge end competence of parole agencies.”42 A holistic assessment of the 
prisoner and a risk score based on his comparison to an aggregate was worse than useless—it 
was a danger to the public. The Tribune’s fiery opposition to and constant coverage of the 
institution in the late 1920s, and again in the late 1930s, swayed the board enough to 
dramatically reduce the number of paroles granted for brief periods. But in the end, the state’s 
actuarial system survived for decades and inspired the risk assessment tools adopted across the 
country in the age of mass incarceration. From 1933 to 1978, when parole was abolished in 
Illinois, sociologist-actuaries monopolized the definition of risk. They located risk in the history 
of particular bodies, continually using the past to actively shape the future for many prisoners—
 
41 The Tribune’s stories had the potential to incense large swaths of Illinois readers, who might then express their 
disapproval of the parole board by voting the governor who controlled appointments to it and politicians who 
supported it out of office. It was Chicago’s most widely read newspaper by 1925, with a daily circulation of 
650,000. Distribution figures were also impressive—the paper served a five-state area and its distribution was 
greater than any other paper in the Midwest in 1918. It catered to such a large market that even national advertisers 
bought space in the Tribune’s pages. The enterprise expanded further under the leadership of Robert R. McCormick 
between the 1910s and the 1950s. McCormick founded a radio station in 1924 and a television channel in 1948. 
Though McCormick’s editorial opposition to the New Deal earned the paper enemies in the 1930s, this official 
stance did not reduce readership. By 1942, the Tribune’s circulation reached one million, double that of any other 
paper in Chicago. Mark R. Wilson, “Chicago Tribune,” in The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago, eds. Janice L. 
Reiff, Ann Durkin Keating, and James R. Grossman (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society, 2005): 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/275.html. Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great 
American Newspaper (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1979), 434, 624. 




determining institutional assignments and transfers as well as release on parole. The very 
practice of risk-mitigation within the penal system allowed carceral institutions to make and 
justify ever more drastic interventions into prisoners’ lives.  
 Greater attention to risk assessment within carceral history might also mean greater 
attention to parole within the historical literature. Most histories of parole have been written by 
criminologists and socio-legal scholars, including Jonathan Simon, Joan Petersilia, and Bernard 
Harcourt.43 In his Foucauldian study of parole, Poor Discipline, Simon argues that the driving 
purpose behind the institution shifted from controlling prisoners through the promise of early 
release and preparing them for reintegration into capitalist society’s disciplinary labor regime to 
supporting the exclusion of formerly incarcerated persons from the workforce and political life. 
Like most studies, Simon concentrates almost exclusively on administrative changes, the 
evolution of penal officials’ management strategies, and shifts in understandings of criminality 
and rehabilitation. He also bases his work entirely on published sources and assumes that his 
arguments about the history of parole in California can be applied nationwide.44 David 
Rothman’s chapter on parole in Conscience and Convenience is similarly ambitious.45 More 
recent historical scholarship on parole, by contrast, follows historian Carolyn Strange’s 
admonition that “state-by-state” studies of discretionary justice—attentive to political and 
 
43 Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), especially chap. 3; and Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, 
and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
44 Simon, Poor Discipline, 12-13.  
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economic conditions as well as the individuals involved in parole decision-making—must build 
the “foundation for a nationwide analysis” of pardoning and parole.46 As Strange argues, systems 
of discretionary justice differed by state. Florida’s pardon board, for example, functioned 
essentially as a parole board prior to 1941 when that state passed its first parole law. “Getting 
Out” provides a state-level study for Illinois, highlighting the unique aspects and evolution of its 
parole system while fitting these changes into national level stories: the war on crime, the 
expansion of penal bureaucracy in the 1920s and 1930s, and the eventual adoption of Burgess-
type predictive models in criminal justice administration.  
 “Getting Out” also moves beyond law and administrative practice in its exploration of the 
Illinois state parole system.47 Two of its five chapters center the experiences of parolees 
themselves. My work builds on several recent studies that show how the experiences of men and 
women on parole reveal differences in state practices and expose the many ways penal authority 
extended beyond prison walls. In some states, parole agents watched over formerly incarcerated 
individuals, while understaffed and underfunded parole systems might partially relegate 
supervision to employers or family members.48 Others abdicated much of the responsibility for 
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parole supervision by sending former prisoners out-of-state—New York often “deported” black 
women with relatives in the South to southern states, even if the paroled woman had never lived 
there herself.49 Prioritizing the actions of paroled individuals shows that these men and women 
could sometimes work the system to their own advantage, but also that the structure of state 
parole systems often made parolees vulnerable to exploitative employers. Historians Cheryl 
Hicks, Ethan Blue, and James Campbell use the experiences of parolees to expose the racialized 
workings of the parole system in New York, California, and Texas from the 1920s through the 
Depression era. Chapter one of “Getting Out” approaches the Illinois parole system in a similar 
manner, finding that partnerships between employers, voluntary organizations, businesses and 
the paroled men and women they sponsored wove middling-class conceptions of respectability 
into the early parole system. Chapter five picks up this thread, examining the later expansion of 
the state’s policing function through parolee-agent relationships and paroled men’s encounters 
with the Chicago police in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Ultimately, as “Getting Out” argues, a 
parole system’s evolution must be traced through the relationships between paroled men and 
women, their employers, parole agents, and penal officials—as well as top-down administrative 
policies.  
 
Sources and Methodological Approaches 
Most historians reflect on the making of the archival repositories where we do our 
research—the assembly of (if we are lucky) meticulously filed and labeled materials in acid-free 
boxes—and the actors represented and not represented within collections. Historians of carceral 
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institutions, in particular, are confronted immediately with what Kelly Lytle Hernández refers to 
as an “archival void.”50 The scarcity of accessible prison records may be due to the destruction of 
documents related to incarceration and policing, the closure of records to researchers, or the 
calculated inertia of modern bureaucrats interested in obscuring an unflattering history. When I 
arrived in Springfield, Illinois, I confronted the void on my first day in the State Archives. The 
collection I hoped would form the foundation of my dissertation project was no longer open to 
researchers. The Parole and Pardon Board’s institutional jacket files were restricted not only 
under the Freedom of Information Act and the Unified Code of Corrections for the State of 
Illinois, but as I found out later, by state legislation barring researchers from any documents 
created during the provision of mental health services.51 As I conducted research for this project, 
I often longed for access to the institutional jackets that might bring me slightly closer to the 
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people whose voices I try to amplify as much as possible 
in the pages of this dissertation.  
Though archival limitations can seem to stymie a project at first, as Hernández, Kali 
Nicole Gross, Talitha L. LeFlouria and so many other historians of incarceration in America 
have shown, there are ways to work around and with the gaps and silences.52 I found myself 
inspired by the work of these scholars to push ahead with this project, reading official records 
with a skeptical eye, finding prisoners’ writings in unexpected places, and locating some of the 
documents contained in the institutional jacket files in personal papers collections. As I carefully 
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unfolded crumpled papers documenting a plea for clemency or leafed through a ledger smudged 
with red rot, I thought about the documents’ origins and remembered that someone made the 
conscious choice to preserve them. These are things long-ago state actors deemed important and 
squirreled away, albeit in a place that would give any archivist nightmares—somewhere dark and 
dank.53 It is fortunate that some Illinois prison records survived as long as they did.  
Within the state’s records, the most compelling accounts of men and women on parole 
are located in the Penitentiary Mittimus Files. Forms, letters, arrest warrants, parole reports, 
photographs, and other materials included within gave me a window into the everyday 
negotiations that defined the parolee experience in the early part of the twentieth century. 
Clemency requests occasionally added details to this picture. Prison registers, alongside annual 
reports from the Department of Public Welfare and other state agencies provide the quantitative, 
demographic information crucial to writing the history of discretionary release. These official 
sources helped me understand the administrative structure of the parole system and its evolution 
from the 1890s through the 1940s. My analysis of formerly incarcerated men’s interactions with 
the parole system picks back up in Chapter five thanks to sociologists Donald Rasmussen and 
Hans W. Mattick. Rasmussen’s 1938 dissertation, found in the personal papers of Joliet-
Stateville warden Joseph Ragen, contains writings by hundreds of anonymous Depression-era 
inmates. Sociologist and Cook County Jail assistant warden Hans W. Mattick saved the 
transcripts of dozens of interviews with former parolees from each of the three men’s branches 
of the Illinois State Penitentiary. The archival digging required to unearth the often-mediated 
voices of paroled men and women that appear in this study was frustrating at times, but I could 
not tell much of this story without them. The following brief paragraphs discuss the major source 
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bases “Getting Out” uses to reconstruct and analyze the experiences of formerly incarcerated 
individuals.  
As rich as these sources are, much of what is preserved in the Illinois State Archives must 
be read cautiously. My approach to the penitentiary mittimus files and clemency records 
accounts for the ways these sources were constructed for their intended audience—often prison 
officials—and what may go unwritten within them as a result. The letters to prisoners from 
family members, friends, and former employers often included in mittimus files were meant to 
be read not only by their eventual recipient, but also by prison censors. Relatives, friends, and 
community members also sent reams of letters intended for the parole board, usually written in 
support or opposition of a prisoner’s parole, which must be read with this purpose in mind. The 
aging parents hoping for their child’s release and the young wives struggling to make ends meet 
in free society might exaggerate their plight or the virtues of their son or husband in 
correspondence with the board. Still, these epistolary portrayals of prisoners lend insight into the 
kinds of stories and expressions of norms and values the letter-writers believed would appeal to 
penal officials. Once released, formerly incarcerated men and women sometimes corresponded 
with prison administrators as well as their parole agents. Many of their messages are also 
preserved in the mittimus files. The greatest volume of correspondence from formerly 
incarcerated individuals comes from parolees in crisis—looking to change jobs or fighting a 
parole agent or employer’s allegations that could send them back to prison. These 
communications help reveal how the constant negotiations between parolees, employer-




Using Donald Rasmussen and Hans W. Mattick’s sociological studies of prisoners and 
formerly incarcerated men presents a very different set of challenges.54 When interviewing 
participants in their studies, both Rasmussen and Mattick had their own purposes—to ascertain 
prisoners’ attitudes towards the parole system and to compare civilian and military parole 
experiences, respectively. These purposes and the background knowledge possessed by both 
sociologists are different than my aims when reading answers to their interview questions and 
attempting to contextualize their studies within my own research. Rasmussen, for instance, 
collected prisoner opinions about parole over the course of two summers at the Stateville branch 
of the Illinois State Penitentiary. He believed this would better inform the “policies of 
administrators and the principles of professional penologists,” which he argued were often 
“based upon their conceptions of the attitudes of prisoners.”55 As such, the questionnaire he 
distributed to incarcerated men asked for fairly specific policy opinions rather than providing 
space for prisoners to structure their own assessments of the system. His approach to the study, 
including the directions he gave to the men filling out the questionnaires, his physical presence 
when conducting oral interviews, and the choice of the “articulate” incarcerated men he chose to 
write unguided essays all shape the responses he received.56 Moreover, Rasmussen’s 
interviewees were anonymous, which may have encouraged some men to air their grievances 
without fear of reprisal, but which also obscures any perspective that might be gained by 
understanding participants’ socioeconomic and racial backgrounds. Given these considerations, 
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“Getting Out” uses Rasmussen’s work to explore incarcerated men’s understanding of the 
workings of the parole board. Their perspective lends insight into how prisoners responded to 
parole board reforms and newspaper publicity, what effects those developments had on their 
prison experience, and how they approached the release process.  
While Rasmussen’s completed dissertation remains the only archival trace of his research 
endeavors, many components of Hans W. Mattick’s “Parole to the Army” study are well-
preserved in his personal papers collections at Chicago History Museum’s Research Center. 
Dozens of interview transcripts contain verbatim conversations with former parolees—both men 
paroled directly to the army and men who spent time on parole in civilian life before their 
induction. These transcripts are full of details about each interviewee, the interview environment, 
and the rapport established during the conversation. In often lengthy prefaces to the text of each 
interview, Mattick describes men’s attitudes toward him and his study. He notes any reticence to 
answer questions and suspicions expressed regarding the purpose of the interview. Mattick was a 
state employee working in the field of corrections when he conducted these interviews, and knew 
that the formerly incarcerated men he spoke with for his study might not be inclined to admit to 
violational behavior during their parole or to contacts with law enforcement after their discharge 
from the armed forces. Fear of arrest and re-incarceration may have kept these men from 
detailing any illegal activity they engaged in following their release from prison. Worry that their 
responses might affect current prisoners seeking parole also motivated interviewees to present 
their stories in the best possible light. Mattick’s questions, too, shaped the course of these 
conversations. Still, Mattick’s work lends insight into the day-to-day relationships between 
paroled men, their employers, and the state—the parole agents and local law enforcement 




individuals in the 1930s and 1940s. His study allows “Getting Out” to move beyond official 
assessments of the parole system to expose its practical workings.  
 
Chapter Outline 
“Getting Out: Parole, Politics, and Risk Assessment before the Carceral State, 1895-
1939” traces the development of indeterminate sentencing laws and parole systems that allowed 
for the extension of the early carceral state into free society. Moving across time from the 
Progressive era to the beginning of World War II, I analyze the constant formal and informal 
negotiations between the state and those involved in the administration of parole—voluntary 
organizations, businesses, social scientists, and ex-prisoners and their families.  
Chapter one, “Making Good: On Parole in Early Twentieth Century Illinois,” explores 
the public-private partnerships that comprised the parole system in Illinois in its first two 
decades. The state legislature passed Illinois’s first parole law in 1895, but underfunding left 
parole agents and wardens dependent on partnerships with private individuals, businesses, and 
charitable organizations. While the law indicated that parole agents would watch over ex-
prisoners and aid in their rehabilitation, the state instead relied on private individuals, businesses, 
and voluntary organizations to supervise parolees. Agreements forged between prison officials 
and these supervisors illustrate the extent to which the private sector took on the functions of the 
state during the Progressive Era. As a result, employers and voluntary organizations developed a 
range of surveillance practices to maintain control over former prisoners, using informal systems 
of assessment and notions of success to evaluate the parolees in their charge. Though the parole 
system represented innovation on the part of the Illinois state government—a nod to emergent 
rehabilitative frameworks in penology—the reliance on voluntary organizations and businesses 




institution. Chapter one illuminates the everyday challenges of life on parole, tracing the 
experiences of ex-prisoners during the process of reentry and exposing the constant negotiations 
between employers, voluntary organizations, prisons, and parolees.   
Chapter two, “The ‘Parole Evil’: Murder, Scandal, and Reform in the Illinois Parole 
System” finds that by the 1920s, parole had become a scapegoat charged with exacerbating 
rising crime rates. For years, Chicago papers blamed parole for allowing serious offenders to 
escape punishment. Affluent or well-connected prisoners, the media charged, could serve short 
sentences before resuming their illicit activities. A newspaper uproar connected with suspicious 
documents found at a grisly murder scene at Stateville Penitentiary thus became a moment of 
reckoning for the parole system in Illinois. Bad publicity during the “parole-mill” scandal proved 
a real threat to the board as its members were political appointees reliant on Governor 
Lennington Small’s administration for job security. The scandal harmed prisoners, too, as the 
board responded by cutting down on the number of men, women, and juveniles released from the 
state’s prisons and reformatory. As the decade came to a close and the appointment of a new 
parole board head failed to win the media’s trust, the state turned to social science for a solution, 
forming the Committee on the study of the Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Lawn and of 
Parole in the State of Illinois. Chapter two ends with this first step in Illinois’s modernizing 
initiative to root out corruption and centralize bureaucratic control within its rapidly expanding 
carceral system, a measure that would lead to efforts to legitimate parole decision-making by 
quantifying risk.  
Chapter three, “Back to the Future: Ernest W. Burgess, Prison Paperwork, and the 




board’s work “on a scientific… basis.”57 The academic believed firmly in the essential 
predictability of human behavior and set out to create a statistical model that would both 
legitimize and improve release decisions, allowing the board to better manage the risks 
associated with parole. Chapter three examines Burgess’s efforts to identify an “objective” set of 
factors that would reveal the likely recidivist. He examined the board’s methods, pored over 
interviews with prison staffers and administrators, and read through prison records as he 
searched for information that might help separate men who would make good from men who 
would violate their parole contracts. Even as Burgess sought to remove subjectivity from the 
parole process and distance the board from the 1926-7 scandal, his recommendations perpetuated 
many of the same assumptions and biases that had informed parole decisions for years. His 
actuarial prediction method—a numerical score for institutionalized men designed to predict 
success or failure on parole—did not revolutionize the selection process. Instead, it solidified and 
institutionalized understandings of risk as located in static factors lying within each individual 
prisoner’s past. The predictive weight of the past ensured that men would be marked as good or 
poor parole risks from the moment they set foot in the penitentiary. 
Chapter four, “Who Makes Good?: Ernest W. Burgess and the ‘Science of Prediction,’” 
unpacks Burgess’s predictive method, showing that many of the categories chosen as part of the 
factor analysis procedure relied heavily on social scientific assumptions about poverty, ethnicity, 
and race. This section explains how actuarial prediction wrote poverty and blackness, always 
liabilities for men caught up in the criminal justice system, into more efficient and standardized 
Illinois release procedures. I examine why Burgess associated elements of each man’s criminal 
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history, socioeconomic status, family and residential background, and mentality with recidivism, 
how these categories would have been applied to prospective parolees, and who would have 
remained incarcerated under the predictive method. The chapter draws on secondary scholarship 
to contextualize the factors and their probable effects in practice. Ultimately, I argue that 
Burgess’s statistical portrait of a high-risk individual hardened a particular risk ideology that 
worked to keep poor men and men of color incarcerated for longer periods of time. The actuarial 
prediction method imbued categories based on race and economic status with greater power, 
cementing them within the release process in ways that had immediate effects on already 
marginalized incarcerated men and provided a quantitative gloss of objectivity to release 
procedures.  
Chapter five, “‘Don’t Turn ‘Em Loose:’ Prison, Publicity, and Parole in an Age of 
Carceral Expansion” traces efforts to centralize corrections in Illinois, the development and 
revision of the Burgess system over the course of the 1930s, and the effects of these changes on 
incarcerated men and parolees. As prison populations rose over the course of the 1920s and 
1930s, Illinois worked towards new management solutions. The centralized Illinois State 
Penitentiary installed diagnostic depots at Joliet-Stateville and Menard prisons, expanded and 
professionalized parole supervision, and extended the time convicted men spent in institutional 
custody. Though state officials may have hoped that the scientization of the parole decision-
making process could ameliorate overcrowding, the rate of paroles never kept pace with 
admissions due to widespread panic over a perceived increase in violent crime—especially 
highly-publicized vicious acts committed by paroled men. Still, Illinois committed to Burgess’s 
predictive model, and newly installed sociologist-actuaries worked to refine it while guiding 




influenced new classification processes within the centralized correctional system, shaping the 
way officials thought about rehabilitation prospects as well as the risks associated with release. 
Chapter five first explores the absorption and evolution of the risk ideology connected with 
actuarial prediction as the state struggled towards management solutions to maintain control over 
those incarcerated and under parole supervision. The second half of the chapter considers 
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated men’s experiences with changes in the parole system and 
the newly expanded prison bureaucracy. I use qualitative data from Donald Rasmussen and Hans 
W. Mattick’s research to explore prisoner encounters with the scientized parole board, increased 
state policing of parolees, and the ways race and class continued to shape the parole experience. 
The central role played by thrill-killer Nathan F. Leopold both in parole prediction research and 
in preparing incarcerated men for their eventual transition to free society helps form the narrative 






Making Good: On Parole in Early Twentieth-Century Illinois 
 
In May of 1898, Charles S. Bain made a promise he could not keep. He added his 
signature to the bottom of a parole agreement with a flourish, bound himself to the eight rules 
listed above his name, and left Joliet Penitentiary for a new life in Chicago. On the surface, Bain 
appeared more likely to succeed on parole than most men released from Joliet. He was a college-
educated Scottish immigrant and worked as a clerk in Kane County at the time of his arrest for 
embezzlement in October, 1896.58 But in his first month in free society, Bain’s inability to keep a 
job tested the patience of his employer, Reverend A.C. Dodds. In the parole agreement, Dodds 
indicated that he would “counsel and direct [Bain] in that which is good” and report any 
“absence from work, any tendency to low and evil associations, or any violation of the 
conditions of his parole” to Joliet’s warden.59 
As Superintendent of the Illinois Industrial Association, an organization meant to 
“provide temporary employment for discharged prisoners who manifest a disposition to lead 
correct lives,” Dodds regularly mailed parole reports for the men in his charge to Warden Robert 
W. McClaughry.60 Many parolees Dodds supervised required that he send only one letter per 
month to McClaughry, detailing how much the man earned and what his expenses were for the 
four week period. Keeping McClaughry abreast of Bain’s activities required more than quick 
mental math and a signature. The young Scotsman’s first few days on parole were tumultuous—
he could not perform tasks required of him in the Association’s broom factory and proved an 
“utter failure” in his next job with a publisher. Four positions later, Bain informed his landlady 
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that he was canvassing for books and making $3.00 per day. The landlady soon contacted 
Reverend Dodds. Bain, she said, was not busy selling books from door to door, but instead could 
be found “lying around the house, or out riding the bicycle of another boarder.”61 This idleness 
nearly cost Bain his freedom. 
Bain himself was not the typical Joliet inmate. His education, occupation, and the crime 
he committed probably inspired the warden’s reluctance to arrest and re-imprison him for 
violating his parole agreement. His experience on parole, however, serves quite well as a 
representation of the workings of the early system of indeterminate sentencing and supervised 
release in Illinois.62 The epistolary traces left by Dodds, Bain, Warden McClaughry, and others 
like them offer entrée into the sprawling, nebulous network of public-private partnerships that 
characterized the institution of parole in the last few years of the 19th century and the first 
decade of the 20th.63  While the 1895 Illinois parole law stipulated that wardens would watch 
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over ex-prisoners, the state legislature quickly recognized that wardens were unable to manage 
those inside prison walls in addition to paroled men and women on the outside. In 1899, 
lawmakers granted officials from each of the three prisons the power to choose, appoint, and 
compensate a parole agent and outline his duties.64 Geographical distances between many parole 
agents, who were based at each prison, and the men and women under their supervision 
combined with excessive caseloads led Illinois to depend on employers and voluntary 
organizations they considered worthy to supervise ex-prisoners. As part of an emergent class of 
professionalized prison administrators, Illinois wardens and early parole officers used their 
experience, education, and connections in the field of corrections to establish their expertise and 
vet employer-supervisors using an ostensibly scientific set of standards. The markers used to 
evaluate potential employers, however, were malleable and often based upon classist judgments.  
The state’s reliance on private citizens to manage paroled men and women also meant 
that the employers and voluntary organizations it deemed suitable developed a range of informal 
supervisory and surveillance practices to maintain control over parolees. The Illinois parole 
contract included eight rules to structure life on parole, but these were vague and often viewed 
by employers, paroled men and women, and sometimes even prison officials as subject to 
interpretation. The absence of a state-run bureaucratic hierarchy designed to provide oversight 
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and recourse for employer-supervisors and their paroled charges could be advantageous for some 
ex-prisoners, including those supervised by sympathetic family members or inclined to return to 
criminal activity upon release. These former prisoners manipulated the strictures placed upon 
them, forcing prison officials to recalibrate the expansion of carceral power and innovate in their 
attempts to maintain control over the men and women the government deemed dangerous to the 
public. Thus, it is crucial to examine the actions of the parolees themselves when tracing the 
parole system’s development.  
The combination of an imprecise parole contract and lack of administrative structure also 
proved detrimental to men and women on parole. Employer-supervisors could interpret vague 
language within the parole contract to their advantage, and signing a parole agreement imbued 
those who agreed to supervise paroled prisoners with state power. This flexibility combined with 
the absence of significant administrative oversight enabled a range of employer-supervisors with 
a variety of motivations to help shape the early parole system. Some more charitable employer-
supervisors, especially those connected to voluntary organizations, wished to make productive 
citizens out of ex-prisoners and reduce recidivism in the process. Often, these men and women 
projected class-based understandings of morality and propriety on to paroled prisoners, many of 
who were unused to operating within middling-class norms. Supervisors frequently relied on 
moral categories to assess the behavior of the parolees in their care.65 Other employers signed 
 
65 Both Jessica Pliley and Jennifer Fronc detail similar criteria in their recent work. In Policing Sexuality: The Mann 
Act and the Making of the FBI, Pliley notes that the FBI often selected white slave officers based on their conformity 
to contemporary understandings of respectable masculinity. Moreover, the text of the Mann Act was vague and open 
to interpretation, leaving white slave officers to define its parameters for themselves based on their personal moral 
ideals. Like FBI officials’ evaluations of white slave officers, Warden McClaughry and other prison officials in 
Illinois often assessed employer suitability based on investigations of their living conditions, demeanor, and general 
reputation in their local community. Fronc explores a similar extension of political surveillance through social 
programs administered by voluntary associations in New York, arguing that the ways in which middle class 
observers perceived working class life created legal problems for working class people in the Progressive Era. See 




parole supervision contracts to obtain laborers who might work for lower-than-average wages, 
capitalizing on prejudice against ex-offenders. While states instituted parole laws in part because 
of the rise of social-scientific understandings of criminality and rehabilitative methods linked to 
these views, partnerships with private citizens and voluntary organizations wove conceptions of 
respectability into the institution of parole.  
U.S. historians, particularly those interested in questions related to race, labor, sexuality, 
and criminal justice, have explored the extension of political surveillance through social 
programs operated by voluntary associations during the Progressive era. Scholars reveal how 
white, often middle-class administrators and volunteers working with these organizations helped 
monitor working class city communities and individuals the state marked as deviant or 
potentially deviant, including sex workers, vagrants, immigrants, and persons of color. These 
social reformers believed that the quantitative and qualitative data they gathered during 
observations of city neighborhoods, schools, prisons, and other social groups and institutions 
“could lead to solutions for any social ill.”66 Jennifer Fronc examines the archival traces left by 
Progressive era social research endeavors in New York, turning a critical eye to the materials left 
by reform organizations. Groups such as the Committee of Fifteen conducted social 
investigations and used undercover informants from the working class to suppress the sex trade, 
gambling, miscegenation, and other activities they considered offensive. While these voluntary 
organizations operated outside of government in their nascence, Fronc argues that they soon 
partnered with business interests and the state to enforce gendered and racialized boundaries in 
city communities.67 Historian Jessica R. Pliley surveys the federal government’s concern with 
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University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
66 Pliley, Policing Sexuality, 3.  




the maintenance of similar boundaries, tracing the work of the Bureau of Investigation as it 
enforced the 1910 Mann Act, passed to fight the transportation of women across state lines for 
“immoral purposes.” The Bureau of Investigation’s agents paid community-based white slave 
officers a small wage to address commercial vice in locales across the country, curtailing the 
mobility of sex workers and identifying vulnerable girls and young women who could be 
reformed. Like many men who employed and supervised paroled prisoners in Illinois, these 
white slave officers were “middle-class, respectable white men who had some standing in the 
community.”68 Pliley contends that the actions of these deputized men comprised a significant 
expansion of federal policing power, just as the employer-supervisors and voluntary association 
officers in this chapter extended state power over prisoners beyond the walls of the penitentiary.  
As the literature on Progressive era Chicago demonstrates, however, federal and state 
government interests could not always control the social reformers they imbued with state 
authority. Carol Nackenoff and Kathleen S. Sullivan demonstrate how Chicago activists worked 
hand-in-hand with government interests to deploy state policing power, but also emphasize how 
women reformers like Julia Lathrop built their own institutions to solve municipal problems, thus 
pressuring the state to take on new kinds of public authority.69 Lathrop and the activists who 
established and fostered the Juvenile Court in its infancy pushed outside of their state-sanctioned 
roles in the municipality to force Illinois to address social ills in the metropolis.  
This chapter builds upon aspects of what Fronc, Pliley, Nackenoff, Sullivan, and others 
have observed and argued about public-private partnerships and state formation in the 
Progressive era. Just as the private citizens who became white slave officers allowed the federal 
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Juvenile Court,” in Statebuilding from the Margins: Between Reconstruction and the New Deal (Philadelphia: 




government to police local communities, the Illinois parole system emerged long before the state 
developed the necessary infrastructure thanks to constantly negotiated relationships between 
state institutions, private individuals, businesses, and voluntary organizations.70 But while 
Pliley’s white slave officers extended the Bureau of Investigation’s policing power, interactions 
between employer-supervisors and ex-prisoners outside of the state’s purview constituted much 
of the nascent parole system. Private citizens conducted the surveillance work required to 
manage paroled men and women as they transitioned to life outside of the penitentiary. While 
employer-supervisors and social reformers conducting work on behalf of voluntary organizations 
took up the mantle of state authority, they also interpreted the terms of the early parole 
agreement on a case-by-case basis. These interpretations and the individual ways in which 
employer-supervisors used state power shaped the early parole system. As such, the operation of 
parole in the Progressive era depended on the ways in which individual employer-supervisors 
used informal systems of assessment and notions of success to evaluate the parolees in their 
 
70  Historians of criminal justice have acknowledged the importance of voluntary organizations and private citizens 
to the early operation of state parole systems. In Discretionary Justice, Carolyn Strange highlights the Prison 
Association of New York’s critical role in the formation of the state’s discretionary justice policies and references its 
efforts to aid discharged prisoners as they transitioned back to free society. PANY’s Discharged Prisoners 
Committee boasted of finding jobs and housing for more than a thousand parolees from Elmira Reformatory 
released between 1877 and 1895. Like this dissertation, Strange’s work reveals the gap between reform ideals and 
criminal justice practice as well as the incorporation of older class and gender-based ideologies into the modern 
justice system. Her interests, however, lie more with policy evolution and the process of paroling a prisoner from 
New York institutions in the Progressive era rather than with the relationships between ex-prisoners, the state, 
businesses, and voluntary organizations necessary to realize the supervisory function of the early parole system. 
Scholars also demonstrate the opportunities for business and familial interests inherent in early state pardoning and 
parole practices. Historian Ethan Blue exposes the exploitation of pardoned offenders in Texas, arguing that white 
plantation owners often agreed to employ formerly incarcerated men and women in order to maintain their control 
over African American laborers. Cheryl D. Hicks explores a particularly disturbing function of the parole system in 
New York: the practice of sending African American women prisoners to live and work with relatives in the South. 
Using records from two New York State reformatories, Hicks also shows how working-class black families relied on 
the parole system to control the behavior and mannerisms of female ex-prisoners. See Carolyn Strange, 
Discretionary Justice: Pardon and Parole in New York from the Revolution to the Depression (New York: New 
York University Press, 2016), especially chapter 6; Ethan Blue, Doing Time in the Depression: Everyday Life in 
Texas and California Prisons (New York: New York University Press, 2012); and Cheryl D. Hicks, Talk With You 
Like a Woman: African American Women, Justice, and Reform in New York, 1890-1935 (Chapel Hill: The 




charge. Though the parole system represented innovation on the part of the Illinois state 
government—a nod to emergent rehabilitative frameworks in penology— the reliance on 
voluntary organizations and businesses wove older class and gender ideals into this newer, 
purportedly more scientific and objective institution.   
By delving into the archival remnants of relationships between wardens, ex-prisoners, 
and employers, this chapter examines the often-turbulent translation of turn of the century reform 
impulses into practice. Ideally, parole systems were supposed to determine when to release those 
incarcerated under indeterminate sentences, to ensure that they were gainfully employed before 
releasing them, and to monitor them once they were released. But as underfunded state 
corrections systems pushed their authority outside prison walls, they realized the policing and 
supervisory functions of parole through the efforts of private individuals, businesses, and 
voluntary organizations. To understand the extension of the prison into free society under the 
auspices of humanitarian reform, historians must look to the agreements brokered between 
prisons and private citizens as well as the management, experiences, and actions of paroled men 
and women.   
 
Guidelines for Freedom: The Terms of an Early Parole Agreement 
By 1900, five years after the passage of the original Illinois parole legislation, each 
potential parolee signed a contract agreeing to abide by eight rules intended to guide their 
transition into capitalist society. Some of these rules prohibited activities like drinking alcohol or 
spending free time at “improper places of amusement and recreation” that prison officials 
assumed caused men and women to fall back into criminal pursuits. Others stated the obvious: 




citizen.”71 Most, however, involved the ways the individual on parole should communicate with 
the penitentiary he or she most likely wished to forget. The contract first compelled released men 
and women to travel to their place of employment and report to their employer immediately 
following their discharge from the prison. On arrival, they completed a written report signed by 
their employer and sent directly to the warden. When employers signed parole papers for a given 
prisoner, they promised to give that person work for the 12-month period of his or her parole. If 
the ex-prisoner wished to leave this first employer for a new position, the rules stipulated that 
they must notify and obtain permission from the Warden. The submission of the arrival report, 
the subsequent monthly reports required of the parolee, and applications for permission to 
change employment constituted the bulk of the supervision of parolees conducted directly by 
penal institutions before a legislative appropriation to the Department of Public Welfare 
earmarked for the Board of Pardons and Paroles in 1919.72 From 1899 to 1919, Illinois employed 
only 9 parole agents to supervise around 2,000 individuals. As mentioned, the original 1895 
parole law did not allocate funding for corrections institutions to appoint parole officers, but an 
1899 parole law placed one agent at each of the three penitentiaries in Illinois.73 In order to 
conduct the actual work of supervising men and women (rather than simply processing reports) 
agents traveled constantly throughout the state. Due to time and monetary constraints, the agents 
could not meet face-to-face with most of the individuals paroled from their respective 
 
71 Board of Pardons, State of Illinois, “Parole Agreement: Rules Governing Prisoners on Parole,” Penitentiary 
Mittimus Files, 1857-1916, ISA. 
72 In 1919, the Illinois state legislature made an appropriation of $194,000 for the year to pay the salaries and travel 
costs for eleven additional agents. These twenty parole agents also would no longer be assigned to one of three 
prisons to supervise released men from that specific institution. They would instead supervise all parolees within ten 
districts in the state of Illinois, which cut down on travel time and expenses. Most of these districts encompassed 
eight to ten counties, though the geographic expanse of District No. 1 (which included Chicago) was much smaller. 
73 Will Colvin, “After Care,” in Illinois Parole Law: Accomplishments, Statistical Data, Papers and Addresses on 
Its Provisions and Its Administration (Springfield: Department of Public Welfare, 1921), 31. Joliet soon had 5 parole 




institutions. A report published by the Department of Public Welfare in 1921 asserted that many 
former inmates paroled between 1899 and 1917 never saw a parole agent during the time they 
were on parole.74  
In practice, therefore, employers conducted much of the day-to-day supervision of the ex-
prisoner and ensured that he or she adhered to the stipulations set out in the parole agreement. 
Employers of men and women on parole endorsed monthly reports, which included an 
accounting of the parolee’s finances—how much money they made that month, what they spent, 
and how much money they had on hand. In addition to these reports, employers often sent their 
own letters to the warden describing the activities of the paroled prisoner. This occurred most 
frequently when the former prisoner violated one or more of the rules listed at the top of each 
parole agreement. Violation of any of the directives listed on the parole agreements could result 
in immediate arrest and re-incarceration for the remainder of the maximum sentence.  
Most parolees likely wished to avoid this, as they probably struggled to meet the 
conditions for release in the first place. Prior to parole, prisoners needed a written promise of 
steady work for 12 months and an employer willing to sign parole papers.75 Here the accounts 
and motivations get a little murky. While employers were often wary of hiring parolees, others 
jumped at the chance to sign a parole agreement. Family members who could promise 
employment often agreed to supervise paroled men and women. Some employers believed they 
could pay desperate ex-convicts wages below the going market rate. To avoid this kind of 
exploitation, incarcerated individuals who completed their minimum sentence and were eligible 
 
74 Ibid.  
75 Men and women were often paroled to urban areas, partly because farm work was seasonal. In a Sept. 1900 letter 
to Warden E.J. Murphy, the father of a parolee complained about the difficulty of finding a year round position for 
his son near the family: “… they will only have about two months of work for a man this fall and then they will not 
need help untill [sic] next Spring, and as farming is the only kind of employment there is here for a laboring man, I 
think it will be impossible for me to find employment for him.” Ben Olson to Warden E.J. Murphy, Sept. 10, 1900, 




for often asked people they knew on the outside to help them get jobs. Many inmates obtained 
parole under employers they worked for prior to their arrest. Others enjoyed the support of 
family members or friends eager to sign their parole papers. The friendless, meanwhile, turned to 
organizations like the Illinois Industrial Association or the Central Howard Association to help 
them obtain steady work for fair wages.76  The Board of Pardons always approved agents of 
these organizations when they applied to employ paroled prisoners, even if jobs were not 
necessarily set up for the parolee yet.  
Once released, many men and women on parole changed jobs frequently. Sometimes they 
were fired, or they did not have the skills necessary to perform assigned tasks, but more often 
their employers simply ran out of things for them to do. This could involve business failure or 
the cyclical unemployment that accompanied seasonal labor, such as farm work. Parolees also 
attempted to obtain the warden’s permission to change jobs when they were dissatisfied with 
their work in some way—usually with the wages or with their employer—but without an 
employer’s consent this was a time-consuming process.  
 
“A Friendly Interest”: The Evaluation and Role of Employer-Supervisors  
 
76 Reverend A.C. Dodds founded the Illinois Industrial Association to help ex-convicts secure employment years 
before the state legislature passed indeterminate sentencing and parole laws. Officers of the Association included a 
bank executive, an ex-judge, and several religious leaders, all of whom routinely signed parole documents assuring 
prison officials that they would secure employment for paroled prisoners. The Association also operated a broom 
factory where each released man began his parole period. Once other employment could be found, the paroled man 
would leave a place vacant for “a brother prisoner who wishe[d] a chance at release and reform.” See “Aid Ticket-
o’-Leave Men: Chicago’s Unpretentious Charity for Paroled Prisoners,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec. 6, 1896, p. 25. 
F. Emory Lyon established the Central Howard Association (CHA) in 1900. The CHA’s mission was to “awaken 
public sentiment in behalf of worthy ex-prisoners… to secure employment for them; to facilitate the organization of 
local and state prisoners’ aid societies” and to keep tabs on the conditions in state corrections facilities. Though the 
organization’s supervision of parolees is not mentioned in its initial mission statement, the CHA quickly stepped 
into this role. As early as 1901, prison officials and chaplains from Illinois and neighboring states looked to CHA 
founder F. Emory Lyon to monitor and find jobs for paroled offenders. See “Original Constitution, Amendments, 
and Minutes of the Central Howard Association, Organized January 5th, 1900,” Box 2, ledger, John Howard 
Association Records, 1898-1976, The Chicago History Museum Research Center (hereinafter CHMRC); A.H. 
Jessup to F. Emory Lyon, 28 December 1901, Box 17, Folder 1, John Howard Association Records, CHMRC; and 
“Gives Aid to Ex-Convicts: Central Howard Association Furnishes Employment to 250 in Year Just Ended,” 




Employer involvement in the release process began long before the prisoner’s first parole 
board hearing. Once Joliet Penitentiary completed the intake process for a prisoner, an 
investigation into his or her past began and prison officials sent the information they uncovered 
to the parole board. Prior to the Department of Public Welfare’s institution of parole prediction 
schemas in 1933, the Board of Pardons evaluated prospective parolees based on a narrow and 
mostly qualitative data set.77 The initial information sent to the Board often included the inmate’s 
criminal and prison records; statements from the judge and prosecuting attorney; details of an 
“examination of the convict” made upon admittance to the institution; a form completed by the 
inmate detailing the crime for which he or she had been incarcerated; and another form where the 
inmate could record his or her employment history.78 From these documents, the Board could 
conduct its own investigation into a given inmate’s past, and it usually began by writing to the 
prisoner’s former employers. The Board of Pardons consisted mostly of part-time political 
appointees, rendering investigation into an inmate’s past difficult, but a few letters could quickly 
glean information from cooperative former employers. Warden McClaughry endorsed this 
approach, writing in 1898 that “no one is so apt to know the amount of risk in taking the ex-
 
77 The Illinois state legislature abolished the original Board of Pardons and created the Department of Public 
Welfare under the auspices of a new Civil Administrative Code in July of 1917. Under this Code, the legislature 
charged the Department of Welfare with overseeing the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Parole prediction schemas in 
Illinois used an actuarial method developed by University of Chicago sociologist Ernest W. Burgess to estimate the 
risk of releasing a given individual.   
78 This intake sheet allowed prison authorities to record many self-reported details about an inmate, including: (1) 
date the inmate was received; (2) sentence length; (3) crime committed; (4) the county in which the crime was 
committed; (5) “color,” nationality, and nativity; (6) age, height, and weight; (7) whether the inmate used profanity, 
smoked, chewed tobacco, or drank; (8) condition of the inmate’s heart; (9) occupation and employment status when 
arrested; (10) religious affiliation; (11) marital status and number of children; (12) education level; (13) whether the 
inmate’s associates were “good” or “bad”; (14) names and addresses of correspondents; and (15) nativity of father 
and mother. These categories are duplicated on each intake sheet from the 1890s to the early 1910s: “Examination of 




convict as his former employer” and suggested that the Board should be wary of paroling a man 
or woman who did not make a favorable impression at their former workplace.79  
Once prisoners became eligible for parole after serving the minimum sentence, employers 
became an integral part of the release and reentry process. Financial constraints, the scattered 
location of parolees within Illinois, and large caseloads made it impossible for parole agents to 
maintain regular contact with the people they were tasked with supervising. Agents left that 
responsibility to employers. While some bosses attempted to sign parole papers in an effort to 
obtain cheap and malleable labor, others took their roles in the supervisory process seriously. 
Indeed, the parole process ensured that employers had an economic stake in coaxing good 
behavior out of their charges because steady and diligent workers led to greater profit for their 
businesses. 
Before releasing each prisoner, the warden sent Special Officers to evaluate his or her 
proposed employers. These Special Officers assessed the employer who applied for a prisoner 
eligible for parole, ideally at the job site where the paroled man or woman would work. Since 
responsibility for finding employment usually fell to the prisoners approved for supervised 
release, officers were on the lookout for any suspicious activity on the part of employers. 
Officers also assessed the neighborhoods in which employers resided to ensure that they did not 
present recently paroled men and women with illegal temptations that might encourage them to 
violate the terms of their release agreement. Joliet’s wardens took the recommendations of 
Special Officers quite seriously in evaluating potential employers. In an assessment of Jerry 
McIntyre, desirous of hiring James Winston #5061 in 1898, Special Officer Matthew Wilson 
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McClaughry urged caution.80 McIntyre’s wife told Special Officer McClaughry that her husband 
worked for the Street Department of the City of Chicago and that she did not know if he had 
anything to do with hiring new workers for the city.81 McClaughry also disapproved of 
McIntyre’s neighborhood, writing in his report that “the neighborhood of #83 Aberdeen Street” 
did not seem “very respectable owing to the numerous houses having signs ‘furnished rooms to 
rent’ and appearance of their patrons.”82 The presence of rooms for let in McIntyre’s 
neighborhood indicated that many lower-income, single residents of the city lived there—the 
kind of potentially disreputable neighbors potentially involved in vice sectors as patrons or 
providers. Warden Robert W. McClaughry rejected McIntyre’s application. 
Joliet’s warden and some of its Special Officers assessed potential employers based on 
their conformity to middling class standards of respectability. This was perhaps due in part to the 
influence of the officials’ own, largely middle class, backgrounds.83 As members of a new 
professional class of prison administrators and officers, the McClaughry men would have 
considered their assessments of employers and city environments borne of a combination of 
commonsense judgment, experience, and understanding of the latest innovations in criminology 
 
80 M.W. McClaughry was the son of Joliet’s warden, Robert W. McClaughry. He served as a Special Officer at 
Joliet after working for the Chicago Police Department. Joliet employed McClaughry Jr. before the allocation of 
funding for parole agents, but he served much the same function and bore the same title as later parole officers. See 
“Discharged from the Police Force,” Chicago Daily Tribune Aug. 15, 1897, p. 1. 
81 M.W. McClaughry, “Report of Special Officer,” Oct. 11, 1898, Penitentiary Mittimus Files, 1857-1916, ISA.   
82 Ibid.  
83 While only the McClaughry family background is detailed here, the two wardens appointed after R.W. 
McClaughry left Joliet in 1899 touted similar middle-class upbringings, educational backgrounds, and professional 
experience. Born in Nashville Illinois in 1852 to county Judge William Murphy, Everett Jerome Murphy was 
warden of Joliet from 1899 to 1913 and 1917-1922. After graduating from high school, Murphy enjoyed a 
moderately successful political career. He served in the Illinois House of Representatives and was elected as a 
Republican to the 54th U.S. Congress (1895-1897). After Murphy’s unsuccessful run for reelection, Governor 
Tanner appointed him to the state Board of Pardons where he served before accepting his position at Joliet in 1899. 
Murphy’s successor, Edmund M. Allen, possessed “a comfortable fortune inherited from his father” which probably 
helped to finance his mayoral run in Joliet in 1912. He won, but a month before his term expired Governor Dunne 
appointed him warden of the penitentiary. Allen resigned after his wife was murdered in her bed at the warden’s 
residence at Joliet. See “Everett J. Murphy, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary for Twenty Years, Dies,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 15 (1922-1923): 558-559 and “Allen Father of Many Reforms in State 




and penology. Born to a prosperous farming family in 1839, Robert W. McClaughry grew up in 
Illinois and attended Monmouth College as a young adult.84 He was appointed Warden of the 
Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet in July of 1874 and pushed the institution into the national 
spotlight with his dedication to the “reformation of criminals and their restoration to society.”85 
As Warden, Robert McClaughry was the subject of glowing profiles in newspapers and 
magazines throughout the country and even received accolades from former President 
Rutherford B. Hayes upon his first departure from Joliet in 1888.86 Among other innovations 
made during his first stint as warden, McClaughry instituted the Bertillon system of criminal 
identification and agitated for the separation of first-time offenders from more seasoned 
prisoners. After leaving Joliet, the former warden worked for a short time as superintendent of a 
reformatory in Pennsylvania before returning to Illinois in 1891 to serve as Chicago’s Chief of 
Police.87 When McClaughry senior accepted the title of Warden of Joliet once again in 1897, he 
was firmly established among an emergent class of professional prison wardens—men who 
“presented themselves as professionals by emphasizing their expertise and their connections to 
national networks” of fellow prison officials.88 Three of McClaughry’s sons followed their father 
into the field of corrections and two accepted jobs at Joliet soon after their father returned to 
 
84 Later in life, McClaughry traced his family history back to the American Revolution, providing the required 
documentation to join the Sons of the American Revolution in 1893.  
85 “Practical Prison Reform,” The Daily Inter-Ocean, March 18, 1891, p. 4. 
86 President Hayes commended McClaughry senior for his tireless labor at Joliet “which [had] done so much to 
elevate the science and progress of prison reform.” Franz Amberg and Omar H. Wright, Commissioners, “Prison 
Reformers,” Daily Inter-Ocean, Nov. 24, 1888.  
87 “Chicago’s Chief of Police,” The Milwaukee Journal, May 18, 1891, p. 2. As warden, McClaughry introduced the 
good-time allowance at Joliet, a popular prison management technique soon adopted by penitentiaries across the 
United States. 
88 Ashley T. Rubin, “Professionalizing Prison: Primitive Professionalization and the Administrative Defense of 
Eastern State Penitentiary, 1829-1879,” Law and Social Inquiry 43 no. 1 (Winter 2018): 184. Rubin’s article 
challenges the theory that professionalization “requires large-scale, field-wide organization” and argues that Eastern 
State Penitentiary administrators professionalized prior to the 1890s despite the fact that they did not exhibit 
traditional markers of professionalization. These markers include college education, specialized training, and 
national affiliations—all identifying characteristics that apply to Warden McClaughry, Matthew W. McClaughry, 




head the institution for a second time.89 Special Officer Matthew W. McClaughry shared his 
father’s interest in criminal identification technology and became well-versed in the Bertillon 
system of identification before studying fingerprinting with an expert from Scotland Yard.90 
Warden McClaughry and his sons positioned themselves as advocates for parole throughout the 
country, provided that nascent parole systems functioned on a “scientific basis—the 
unimpassioned investigation and conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the 
prisoner” would make good upon release given his or her background and employment 
prospects.91  
  This emergent class of professional prison administrators had more to consider in their 
investigations than how each prospective employer measured up to their internalized standards of 
respectability—they also needed to ensure that employers would treat paroled men and women 
fairly. Wardens and the Board of Pardons quickly discovered that overworked and underpaid 
parolees were most likely to return to the penitentiary because they had violated the terms of 
their parole agreement or committed a new crime out of desperation. While many prospective 
parolees like James Winston wrote to trusted former employers to find positions for the duration 
of their parole period, other prisoners did not have such contacts. These lonely inmates either 
waited for employment from a charitable organization or were sent to an employer who wrote to 
Joliet to request laborers. For instance, a man from Grinnell wrote Warden McClaughry to 
 
89 Charles Chase McClaughry worked for his father in 1887 as master mechanic and chief engineer at Joliet before 
moving to the Chicago House of Correction as deputy superintendent. In 1899 he became warden of the Wisconsin 
State Penitentiary in Madison. When McClaughry senior returned to Joliet in 1897 he employed his sons Arthur 
Cooper and Matthew Wilson, as private secretary to the warden and Special Officer to the penitentiary, respectively. 
See “Charles Chase McClaughry,” The Annals of Iowa 16 (1927): 76 and Report of the Commissioners of the Illinois 
State Penitentiary at Joliet for the Two Years Ending September 30, 1898 (Springfield, State Printers, 1899).  
90 T.H. McMichael, “Robert Wilson McClaughry, 1839-1920,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 13:4 
(Jan. 1921): 605.  




inquire if he could employ a woman from 
Joliet for the duration of her parole to assist 
in his housework. McClaughry’s reply 
included an application for the parole of 
Myrtle Farman, who could be released “as 
soon as suitable employment is secured.”92 
The Grinnell man would need to pass muster 
with a Special Officer before the warden 
could parole Farman.  
Some employment opportunities were easy for the warden to sign off on, such as offers 
from established charitable organizations. Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, one of the founding fathers 
of the breakfast cereal industry and the head of the nationally famous Battle Creek Sanitarium in 
Michigan, contacted Warden McClaughry to inform him that the Sanitarium regularly employed 
parolees on two of the farms that provided foodstuffs for patients. A member of the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church, Kellogg practiced what he called “medical missionary” work at Chicago city 
missions, Battle Creek, and elsewhere. Lending a hand to those he considered “down-and-
outers” became a part of his religious expression. In an 1896 speech at Northwestern University, 
Kellogg spoke of poverty and homelessness in medicalized terms and asserted paternalistically 
that, “the destitute man is always a sick man” in need of “brotherly kindness, encouragement, 
and instruction.”93  Kellogg professed to offer these farm jobs out of a desire to facilitate the 
 
92 R.W. McClaughry to Unknown, Dec. 3, 1898, Penitentiary Mittimus Files, 1857-1916, ISA. 
93 Dr. John H. Kellogg and his brother Will Keith Kellogg are best known today as the inventors of breakfast cereal. 
Dr. Kellogg as quoted in “The Workingmen’s Home,” Medical Missionary VI (Oct., 1896), 299, excerpted in 
Richard W. Schwarz, “Dr. John Harvey Kellogg as a Social Gospel Practitioner,” Journal of the Illinois State 
Historical Society 57:1 (Spring 1964), 6.  
Figure 4 Mugshot of Myrtle Farman, sentenced from one year to 




rehabilitation of released prisoners, as he indicated that these positions often acted as a “stepping 
stone for something better.”94  
Voluntary associations and philanthropists like Kellogg could not provide all friendless 
prisoners with a reliable employer willing to sign their parole agreement. Many inmates 
desperate for release and estranged from family members or former employers struggled to find 
warden-approved positions. One disgruntled prisoner convicted of the theft of $2.40 wrote the 
Board of Pardons in 1898 to request assistance, indicating that he held “the opinion that 
something more” could be done to assist him.95 Thomas Donovan served two years in Joliet and 
when granted parole in October of 1897, the warden suggested that he should contact the 
Reverend A.C. Dodds of the Illinois Industrial Association to secure viable employment. Dodds 
did not reply to Donovan’s letters, nothing materialized, and Donovan had no friends to help him 
find a position. He stayed in Joliet, stewing, as men locked away “for more than I was” were 
released after serving only a year in prison.96 When “99 men out of a hundred” refused to “sign a 
parole to give a man work that comes out of prison,” wardens and inmates had to get creative.97 
And employers found themselves with chances to game the system. 
 
Risky Business: Employers and the Exploitation of Ex-Prisoners 
For some employers, the parole system meant an opportunity to hire laborers who could 
be compelled to work for lower-than-average wages. This opportunity, though, was not without 
its drawbacks. The yearlong commitment required in the parole contract must have seemed 
daunting for farmers and other business owners who tended to hire seasonal workers. In urban 
areas, some industries were infamous for irregular employment cycles— Chicago’s meat and 
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pork plants often laid off thousands of workers for two or three months per year.98 Employers 
balked at offering jobs to paroled men and women they had never met, perhaps worrying that 
they might be more likely to dip into the company coffers or leave without giving notice. 
Besides, the parole agreement contractually tasked employers with keeping closer watch on 
parolees than would have been necessary for an ordinary employee. Those offering jobs to 
prospective parolees did not have to house them or record their movements, but they did sign 
papers indicating that they would: watch over the paroled individual, “counsel and direct” them 
in “that which is good,” and report any violation of the parole law, in addition to any absences 
from work or associations with “low and evil” persons.99  
While some might have been leery of these conditions, other employers signed many 
similar agreements, hiring several parolees over a short period of time. A few of these 
supervisors, like Dr. Kellogg at Battle Creek Sanitarium, perhaps intended for men and women 
to move on quickly and transfer the responsibility of parole to another employer who might pay 
them higher wages. This was also the case with heads of voluntary organizations like Reverend 
Dodds and the Central Howard Association’s F. Emory Lyon. Others, though, applied for 
supervision of parolees they intended to underpay and overwork. Bound by parole agreements 
and marked by criminal records, these men and women experienced greater difficulty leaving 
exploitative positions for better job opportunities. Despite behavioral restrictions and ties to 
employers, however, there were many ways in which parolees were able to work within the 
system even when facing abuse from police or employers.  
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In the spring and summer of 1905, a flurry of letters addressed to Warden Everett J. 
Murphy arrived at Joliet, including one by ex-convict Frank Morris. Morris wrote to express 
discontent with the actions of the employer who signed his parole papers. Morris believed that 
W.H. Wright had “faled [sic] to keep his word,” and that he had not abided by the terms of the 
contract he signed with the penitentiary. Warden Murphy likely distrusted Morris—who had 
already been returned from parole two times—but Morris claimed that he felt “determined to do 
what is right and work for an honest living.” 100 
 It is unlikely that Morris and Wright knew one another before Morris was paroled. Morris 
failed to abide by parole agreements twice before 1905, which likely meant that he could not find 
a position with his previous employers. Shortly after Morris’ inquiry, Wright wrote to assure the 
prisoner of his new opportunity to make good, promising to assist Morris in any way he could to 
set him back on the path to productive citizenship.101 But when he signed Morris’ parole 
agreement, he agreed to pay the ex-prisoner only $7.50 per month plus board. He recognized that 
this was a small amount of money unlikely to satisfy the warden, so he scrawled a note 
underneath the number: “If he is a good man… I will pay him more. I will do the fair thing with 
him.”102  
 Though Wright eventually agreed to pay Morris $15.00 per month, conflict over fair 
wages continued, prompting Morris to complain of unfair treatment.103 Soon after Morris’ arrival 
in Danville, he wrote to Warden Murphy to inform him that Wright was withholding his wages. 
Morris also alleged that his employer hired him out to other businessmen in the community and 
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illegally pocketed the payment Morris received for this outside work. When Warden Murphy 
responded to Morris’ initial complaint, he requested proof. In reply, Morris suggested that the 
Joliet warden write to the Southern Illinois Penitentiary at Chester, “where Mr. Wright got 4 men 
out and ask the warden what became of them.”104 These four men perhaps complained to 
Chester’s warden about the work Wright required of them and the low wages they received for 
their labor. Or maybe they simply disappeared, skipping town to reinvent themselves, look for 
higher paying jobs, or seek out better living conditions. Subsequently, Chester’s warden barred 
Wright from signing parole contracts to employ any additional ex-offenders. Morris theorized 
that Wright then turned to Joliet for a new source of inexpensive laborers, lamenting to Warden 
Murphy in a lengthy epistle that he was a “poor unfortunate” who fell “victim” to Wright’s 
schemes.105 According to Morris, Wright defined parole as an extended form of punishment for 
men who had been in prison, and claimed that parolees worked for lower-than-average wages for 
one year as a way to pay their debts to society.106 While there is no way to assess the veracity of 
these claims, Wright himself admitted to paroling at least two men from Chester at very low 
wages. He also informed Warden Murphy that he would withhold Morris’ wages until the 
parolee could prove himself trustworthy.107 As Morris would have been sent back to Joliet if he 
left Wright without permission from Murphy, the ex-prisoner was stuck until he could convince 
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the warden that employment under Wright was intolerable. Fortunately for Morris, Murphy 
sensed a flight risk and transferred him after three months.108 
While Morris convinced the warden to allow him to leave Wright’s employ and continue 
his parole, others could not stand the indignity of low wages, restrictions on their movements, 
and the supervision of bosses who took advantage of them. Often, the experience of working for 
demanding or abusive bosses became too onerous to bear. Between 1895 and 1910, 289 men and 
women out of 783 captured parole violators were sent back to Joliet for leaving their employers 
without permission.109 Many parolees who left their employers probably did have cause to 
complain, as employers often paid laborers on parole less for their work than the national 
average wage for their industries. For example, a man paroled in 1899 received $6.85 per week, 
or roughly $356 per year, for his work in a shop that made drill bits and other tools. The average 
yearly wage for a laborer working in manufacturing was $412.110 While the average worker in 
the gas and electricity industry made $620 in 1900, the American Electrical Company hired 
paroled man John Rice for $1.20 per day. If he worked six days per week every week in 1900, he 
would only have made $374 that year. A significant wage gap also existed between paroled farm 
workers and non-paroled farm workers. Paroled farmworker Edwin Holt made $8 per month in 
1898. In a letter to the warden, Holt wrote that he worked for a “nice man” who treated him well, 
but he expressed concern that his parole prevented him from earning more and complained that 
other farm laborers nearby brought in around $22 per month.111 Parolees employed in white-
collar positions, such as clerking, also earned wages lower than the national average. In 1900, the 
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L.C. Krueger Company, Building Raisers and Movers hired parolee Louis Marshall as a clerk for 
$12 per week.112 Assuming Marshall worked every week that year, he could make only $624, a 
sum $387 less than the national average of $1,011 per year for those in clerking positions.113  
 
“To Maintain and Protect Her”114: Women and Parole Supervision 
While men on parole struggled to navigate new workplaces, paroled women usually 
returned from the institution to their own households or the homes of relatives. The supervisory 
structures created by parole imbued the (usually) male head of the house with still more authority 
than that already granted him by traditional patriarchal norms. As such, the experiences of 
women on parole in the early years of the system’s evolution were generally quite different than 
those of men. This held true even for single women who entered into employment, rather than 
familial, relationships. Women made up a small fraction of the prison population in the early 
20th century: in 1910, Joliet’s population hovered around 1,500 from month to month, but the 
institution only held around 60 women at any given time that year.115 While women were a tiny 
population within the state prison system, their experiences on parole provide insight into the 
intentions and policing strategies of progressive officials who supported indeterminate 
sentencing.116  
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Men who signed parole agreements promising to supervise and employ female relatives 
acquired significant state-sanctioned power over them. Wardens expected the grandfathers, 
fathers, brothers, uncles, cousins, and husbands who signed parole agreements to report not only 
on the paroled woman’s diligence, ability, and attendance at work, but also on her adherence to 
certain emotional, sexual, and moral standards. Female prisoners paroled to un-related employers 
found that state agents imposed a regime of discipline designed to monitor their morality and 
sexuality. While men were most likely to receive admonition from Special Officers and wardens 
for switching employment without notice, the consumption of alcohol, or general idleness, 
warnings issued to women usually concerned behavior towards male relatives, “inappropriate” 
emotional reactions, and sexual practices.  
Available records for women paroled from Joliet indicate that most entered domestic 
service positions where they earned wages, or labored for room and board. Women compensated 
with room and board rather than monetary wages were usually those released to the care of 
family members, like Mrs. Florence Margette, paroled to perform general housework for her 
brother. The brother agreed to provide Margette with “such money necessary for her proper 
care,” but did not indicate that she would receive regular compensation for her labor.117 By 
contrast, Nettie Austin, the 24-year-old wife of fellow Joliet inmate William A. Brown, did 
housework for contractor Arthur R. Clark at $1.00 per week. Clark indicated on his application 
that he would not have full charge of Austin—rather, Brown’s father would provide “aid and 
assistance.”118  
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Clark, though, felt empowered by the institution of parole to police Nettie Austin’s 
private life. He hired Austin and her husband in 1897. Brown received $5.00 per week for 
“general work about buildings.” After nearly a year, just as Clark expected the board to send 
discharge papers for the couple, Brown violated his parole agreement by skipping town. The 
paroled man soon returned, however, and blamed his mistake on his young wife’s behavior. As 
Clark described it, Brown’s depression and despair over the state of his marriage caused him to 
run away. The young man apparently understood that this was a violation of his parole 
agreement but did “not care what became of him.” He told Clark that he could not see any way to 
reform while still tied to Nettie Austin and thought that his only option was to leave and start a 
new life without her. He begged Clark to intervene with the warden so that he would not be 
punished for leaving town without permission. Clark obliged, writing to Warden Murphy that 
Austin caused Brown’s “down-fall” by first causing him to commit the crime that sent him to 
Joliet in the first place and later making it impossible for him to abide by the terms of his parole 
agreement.119 Brown’s father and a number of his friends also wrote to blame his delinquency on 
the “degraded” Austin.120 Though other community members praised Austin, parole agents 
returned her to the penitentiary after receiving Clark’s message and a barely legible letter from 
someone accusing Austin of sending “one man to the Grave” and another to prison before 
engaging in sex work in a house of ill fame.121 As Austin’s case shows, assumptions officers 
made concerning a woman’s  “respectability, reputation, and moral character” often determined 
her experience on parole.122 Penitentiary officials did not bother to investigate any of these 
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claims before bringing Austin back to prison—mere rumors of her conduct combined with her 
employer’s assessment were all the evidence they needed. Exhibiting a gendered double 
standard, the Board permitted Brown to resume his parole after the period of delinquency his 
friends blamed on Austin. 
Prison officials often intervened at the behest of employer-supervisors when they had 
cause to question a paroled woman’s behavior or rumored behavior. Actions as seemingly benign 
as taking a job outside the home, visiting a saloon, or entering a dwelling house alone with an 
unmarried man could be cause for intrusion into a woman’s personal life. These interventions 
betrayed employer-supervisors’ understandings of morality, deeply rooted in their ethnicity, 
gender, and class background. Working-class understandings of respectable womanhood often 
ran contrary to values held by middle-class reformers. A working-class woman’s view of the 
world was mediated by her relationships with female neighbors, forged by exchanging local 
news and gossip about neighborhood scandals, native ne’er-do-wells, and wayward children. 
Groups of women recalled wrongdoing and insults, shared their stories of cheats and 
blackguards, and ultimately engaged in a continual process of defining right and wrong. Social 
theorists demonstrate that these interactions are far from innocuous. Rather, they authorize one 
set of truths that make “certain acts and behaviors understandable to some, while incredible and 
even inconceivable to others.”123 For working-class women and new immigrants, this comprised 
a negotiated set of beliefs that influenced their way of being in the world—a way of being that 
greatly worried middle-class employers and reformers like Wardens McClaughry and Murphy 
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and ultimately shaped the parole agreement. At the turn of the twentieth century, working class 
women frequented dance halls, saloons, and cabarets in urban areas, experimented with their 
sexuality, and enjoyed inexpensive forms of public entertainment like vaudeville and moving 
picture shows. These women were active participants in public life “as workers and consumers” 
in a way native-born, white, middle-class prison officials and members of prisoner aid 
organizations did not comprehend.124 Reformers saw working-class leisure activities, courtship 
behaviors, and women’s employment both inside and outside of the home as a sign of loosening 
morals. They interpreted these actions as a transgression of the white American woman’s role as 
a respectable, morally irreproachable housewife. 
 Husbands, fathers, and brothers could exploit these biased assessments, as they 
recognized parole agents and wardens as persons with power over their paroled wives’ 
movements, employment choices, and sexuality. Men who signed parole agreements or who 
married female ex-offenders sometimes used these officials to help curb the behavior of the 
women in their charge. Moreover, wardens and parole agents often attempted to intervene in 
paroled women’s relationships, as they could use their authority to return women to the 
penitentiary as leverage. Rosella Soots, convicted of bigamy in 1896, faced opposition from 
officials who attempted to prevent her from marrying Gus Jordan after she was paroled in 
1897.125 In his reply to an inquiry sent by Rosella’s employer, Warden McClaughry wrote that he 
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was unsure if she was able to wed anyone “without committing again the same crime for which 
she was sent here,” and further, that he did not think that Jordan could support himself.126 
McClaughry ordered Soots to complete one year on parole, obtain her final discharge, and then 
marry. Soots presumably considered one year an unreasonable amount of time, and married Gus 
Jordan in Decatur without permission.  
An exasperated McClaughry considered bringing Soots back to Joliet, but instead 
transferred Soots’ parole to her new husband. By the summer of 1898, however, Soots had left 
her husband and a disgruntled Jordan wrote to McClaughry to request his help. During the 
months after the marriage, Jordan dutifully signed Soots’ parole reports, but he now asked 
McClaughry to arrest Soots because she was “conducting herself improperly” and “running 
around town with other fellers.”127 Jordan trusted that his report of Soots’ activities, which 
included socializing with men without her husband’s supervision, indicated Soots’ willful 
rejection of the conditions of her parole. Perhaps Jordan read the portion of Soots’ parole 
contract specifying that she must “avoid evil associations and improper places of amusement.”128 
Rather than replying to Jordan, the warden consulted the Decatur Chief of Police. Chief Mason 
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wrote back in August that he did not know of “a more worthless man” than Rosella’s husband.129 
Mason recommended, however, that the warden hold off acting on Jordan’s plea for Soots’ 
arrest, as he “took very little stock in anything he [Jordan] might say about the woman.”130 
Rosella Soots was illiterate, unable even to sign her name to her parole reports, and neither the 
warden nor the police chief bothered to contact her when considering whether or not to return her 
to Joliet. Perhaps Jordan’s complaint about his wife was routine—and the question of his 
reputation mattered more than asking Rosella Soots to tell her story. 
 
Gaming the System: A Delinquent Avoids Arrest  
Unlike the illiterate Soots, who could not weigh in as the warden determined her fate, 
well-educated men on parole often used the leeway inherent in the system of parole supervision 
to their advantage, much to the chagrin of their employers. Just as frequently, though, employers 
or agents of voluntary organizations contacted the warden with information regarding a man’s 
delinquency. Aside from the commission of a crime while on parole, parole agents most often 
arrested and transported paroled men back to the penitentiary for poor job performance or 
idleness reported by their employers. As Superintendent of the Illinois Industrial Association, 
Reverend A.C. Dodds often found himself writing to Warden McClaughry to notify him of an 
ex-convict’s delinquency. Charles S. Bain (alias Charles Wilson) caused Reverend Dodds more 
trouble than many of the parole cases he shouldered as Superintendent. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Bain appeared more likely to make good on parole than most men in Joliet. But 
following his parole in May of 1898, Bain lost seven different jobs in his first three weeks in free 
society before pretending to canvas for books as a cover for his daily regime of naps and bicycle 
 
129 W.W. Mason, Chief of Police, to Warden R.W. McClaughry, Aug. 27, 1898, in Penitentiary Mittimus Files, 





rides. An exasperated Dodds wrote to Warden McClaughry recounting Bain’s deception, calling 
the Scottish immigrant “a brilliant and successful liar.”131 Bain remained on the streets despite 
Dodd’s assessment. 
The Warden perhaps concluded that it was not worth his time and expense to arrest and 
re-imprison Bain, given that his initial crime was a nonviolent one. As a college educated ex-
convict among a majority of common-school educated parolees, though, Bain possessed several 
advantages in the highly subjective parole system. It is crucial to remember here exactly how 
much weight the Warden’s opinion carried in parole cases: while the Board of Pardons approved 
or rejected initial applications for parole, the Warden issued orders for the arrest of delinquent 
parolees.132 These warrants were not often issued in cases where the ex-prisoner missed work 
once or changed jobs without notifying the warden. For cases in which the parolee failed to send 
in monthly reports, was arrested on new charges, left town, consumed alcohol, or continually 
skipped out on work, arrest and re-incarceration was a common form of recourse. Bain’s 
offenses seemed chiefly to consist of changing jobs without notice and of periods of 
unemployment.  
After a few months on parole, Bain found himself pleading for the continuation of his 
freedom despite his inability to hold a job and his penchant for languorous afternoons on his 
fellow boarder’s bicycle. Bain recognized that sending in his report to indicate that he changed 
jobs more than a few times might cause his return to the penitentiary. But unlike most parolees, 
Bain was a skilled wordsmith. Along with his parole report for the period during which he 
exhibited delinquent behavior, he sent an elegantly written letter, claiming that he recently 
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obtained permanent employment and begging the warden to give him a second chance. Bain 
acknowledged that he “behaved very foolishly” and associated with disreputable men while on 
parole. He expressed remorse for his actions, assuring the warden that he was “not wholly evil 
believe me,” but that he was “easily led.”133 Perhaps he believed that these claims allowed him to 
shift part of the blame for his idleness. Or maybe this admission about his natural inclination to 
follow his peers—and in doing so, fall into bad behavior—simply enabled Bain to argue that he 
would make good provided he kept away from “evil companions and bad places.”134 With 
rhetorical flourish that may have served as a nudge towards leniency for the warden, Bain 
acknowledged that he might “feel that perhaps these promises are mere words” but asked him to 
accept the assurance that “I will try to behave from this on.”135 This flowery prose and Bain’s 
elegant penmanship surely stood out to Warden McClaughry, a man used to receiving letters 
peppered with crossed out words and misspellings from men who only made it past a few grades 
in common school before dropping out for factory work or farming. Bain’s ethnicity, social 
class, inherited wealth, and education would have helped to disarm McClaughry senior, who 
would not have seen Bain as part of the class of “habitual” or “professional” criminals to be 




The regime of surveillance developed under the early years of the parole system was 
characterized by both cooperation and conflict between those ostensibly responsible for the 
rehabilitation and reentry of ex-prisoners, on the one hand, and the individuals from voluntary 
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organizations, businesses, and local law enforcement who actually watched over parolees, on the 
other. Illinois passed parole legislation without funding and without bureaucratic infrastructure 
necessary for the operation of a state-run system. Whenever possible, prison officials vetted the 
employers and representatives of voluntary associations responsible for the day-to-day 
requirements of the parole system based on their own understandings of respectability. Officials 
scrutinized the neighborhoods potential supervisors lived in, the businesses they engaged in, the 
people they associated with, and local gossip to gauge their ability to supervise and guide paroled 
men and women. Those employers who kept close watch on their paroled workers engaged in a 
similar evaluative process to determine their charge’s progress. Thus, employers’ moral 
judgment, classist assumptions, and xenophobia colored their supervisory relationships with 
paroled prisoners and influenced their use and abuse of the prison’s policing power.  
As a consequence, the parole system relied from the beginning on long-established, more 
informal systems of assessment and notions of “success.” These informal evaluation systems 
would later receive a gloss of objectivity as parole fell out of favor in the 1920s. Following a 
very public scandal involving the alleged sale of pardons and paroles, Illinois Governor 
Lennington Small appointed social scientists to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data 
collected by prison officials, parole agents, and employers over the previous decades. These 
academics believed that details culled from past intake records, letters, reports from parole 
agents, and other documents could reveal the makeup of a successful potential parolee and show 
why another might fail. As this chapter has shown, however, standards for “making good” 
changed on a case-by-case basis. In their attempt to develop a prognostic scoring process to 
determine release dates for each inmate, researchers perpetuated the classism, sexism, 




methods of evaluation that employer-supervisors, wardens, and parole agents used to assess 
parolees. Despite actuarial prediction’s claim to objectivity, the statistical model developed and 
employed by the Illinois parole system legitimized the Board’s assumptions that white, wealthy, 
and well-connected prisoners were more likely to succeed on parole. Familiar, value-driven class 
and gender-based ideals thus formed the marrow of purportedly objective and scientific 
innovations in criminal justice. 
Throughout the system’s evolution, ex-prisoners themselves challenged these evaluative 
frameworks and struggled for control over their experiences on parole. During the Progressive 
Era, this meant navigating and sometimes exploiting state relationships with private employers 
and reformers. These on-the-ground negotiations within state systems, rather than top-down 
administrative or legislative machinations, shaped the early development of parole in the United 
States. The experiences of Charles Bain, Frank Morris, Nettie Austin, and the excavated histories 
of other paroled men and women examined in this paper expose the constantly changing 






The “Parole Evil”: Murder, Scandal, and the Reform of the Illinois Parole System 
Captain Michael Keeley stared down at the lifeless form of Stateville Penitentiary’s 
Deputy Warden Klein, then up into the eyes of his killers. Klein’s prone body was riddled with 
cuts and puncture wounds, injuries inflicted by the seven prisoners crowded into Klein’s office, 
all of who now pointed their bloodied weapons directly at Keeley. The captain’s shock at the 
gruesome scene before him rendered him helpless as the armed men surrounded him, demanding 
his keys. Minutes before 22-year-old prisoner Gregerio Rizo led Keeley to the bloody scene, he 
and six fellow convicts had descended on the Warden, “hacking, slashing, and cutting” him with 
knives and the sharp points of a pair of scissors.136 Keeley quickly realized that the seven would 
not mind leaving another body in their wake as they fled the solitary confinement cellblock. The 
papers scattered around Klein’s body would have been the least of Captain Keeley’s worries 
upon his arrival at the Warden’s office.  
Keeley was probably more concerned about his set of keys, which were useless. He could 
not open the grates and doors between the armed desperadoes and the flattish woodlands 
surrounding Stateville Penitentiary. Luckily, the captain and his prisoners, their roles now 
reversed, obtained keys to the cellblock from another guard. Rizo and his companions then 
marched Keeley to the south gate of Stateville, where the Captain would inform his superiors 
that he was accompanying the group out of the prison to do roadwork.137 What followed was a 
harrowing and deeply embarrassing afternoon for Keeley, who spent much of the day handcuffed 
 
136 “Flee Prison: 1 Dead 4 Shot: Warden Slain in Escape of Seven at Joliet,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 6, 1926, 1. 
The seven involved in the escape plot were: Charles Shader (or Schader), convicted of the murder of a policeman; 
Charles Duschowski, convicted of the murder of a policeman; Bernardo Roa, convicted of committing a murder 
with the help of Robert Torrez and Gregerio Rizo, who were also involved in the escape; Walter Staleski, serving 10 
years to life for a robbery; and James B. Price, also serving 10 years to life for robbery. 




to a tree, and weeks of sensational headlines for the Chicago Daily Tribune and other 
newspapers throughout the state. Eventually, these headlines would spread throughout the nation.  
 While initially dominated by the particulars of the prison break, newspaper coverage 
would soon shift to the papers Captain Keeley might have noticed upon his arrival at the scene of 
Klein’s brutal murder. The setup seems too perfect: Klein’s prone form atop a scattering of 
letters implicating him in a scandal that reached out from Stateville to Chicago, and all the way 
to the Governor’s mansion in Springfield. The letters at the crime scene implicated Warden 
Klein, Commissioner of Pardons and Parole Will Colvin, and Major M.A. Messlein, 
Commissioner of the Chicago Hope Hall138 and head of the Major Engineering Corporation in a 
scheme that made the parole system into a lucrative business. Supervised release on parole could 
now allegedly be purchased, with cash or with political pull. Under Colvin’s administration of 
the Division of Pardons and Paroles, many inmates believed that obeying the rules no longer 
mattered because they were unlikely to be paroled unless they could pay a bribe or convince an 
influential politician to go to bat for them. The discovery at the scene of Klein’s murder 
prompted first a grand jury investigation into possible corruption within the Illinois parole 
system and later forced the governor to commission a report on the workings of the 
indeterminate sentencing law in the state. This chapter explores a moment of reckoning for the 
parole system in Illinois. Once a progressive initiative championed by social reformers, parole 
became a source of graft for corrupt politicians. Newspapers often blamed parole for contributing 
to rising crime rates in Chicago.  
By the 1920s, much of the public shared the belief that the Parole Board had become a 
means for criminals with money or powerful friends to circumvent indeterminate sentences 
 




designed to facilitate their reform—and if unsuccessful, to keep them off the street for as long as 
possible. Parole, once a promising social experiment, became by mid-decade a scapegoat 
charged with exacerbating rising crime rates and contributing to the difficulty of policing in 
urban areas, a way for bootleggers, gangsters, and other criminals with pull to serve short 
sentences and resume their illicit activities. What reformers considered a benefit of indeterminate 
sentencing—the ability to hold an individual prisoner until the board, in concert with the warden, 
determined that the rehabilitative process had been successful—became detrimental to inmates 
as public suspicion and disapproval of the board increased in the 1920s. The threat the 
newspapers posed to the Division of Pardons and Paroles existed because board officials were 
political appointees who depended on the Governor’s administration for job security and had 
incentive to keep him in office.139 As such, board members were responsive to the voting public. 
 














Figure 5 Graph showing number of persons (men, women, and children) paroled from Illinois state 
penitentiaries and reformatories. These include the Illinois State Penitentiary (Joliet, Stateville, Women's Prison 
before 1930), Menard, Chester, Dwight (Women’s Prison after 1930), Pontiac, the State Farm at Vandalia, the 
Illinois State Training School for Boys at St. Charles, and the Illinois State Training School for Girls at Geneva. 
The dip in the graph coincides with the years 1926 and 1927, during which newspaper coverage of parole was 





If the newspaper coverage of the board was negative, board members responded by cutting down 
on the number of men, women, and juvenile delinquents they released from corrections 
institutions (see Figure 5). Many prisoners lost hope of being released before the expiration of 
maximum terms set by law. As the decade came to a close and the Klein scandal opened the 
parole system to public investigation, government officials turned to statistical prediction 
strategies to preserve parole, even as prisoners and the public expressed growing dissatisfaction 
with the system—for opposite reasons. 
The workings of the Division of Pardons and Paroles under Will Colvin may never be 
fully illuminated. But it is clear that public perception of the institution of parole, however 
truthful the allegations of corruption advanced by prosecutors and newspapers, shaped the way 
ordinary people thought about criminality and its cures. Even early in the 20th century, the 
project of prison building and warehousing was considered a solution to rising crime rates. The 
public questioned the efficacy of reform-oriented prison programming and called for longer, 
determinate sentences for violent crimes, eager to eliminate the risks they associated with parole. 
But parole laws somehow survived. And they did not just persist because of their advantages for 
wardens and legislators. Indeed, they often proved to be more of a burden than a boon for 
corrections officials and politicians. Parole laws weathered rising crime rates, explosive 
accusations of corruption directed toward board members, and the impetus to warehouse in part 
because they allowed prisons to hold on to the rehabilitative ideal, even if only symbolically. 
Getting rid of parole would mean an admission of the failure of reform in prisons that had 
become apparent to the public by the end of the Progressive Era. It would also be expensive. 




corrections facilities to accommodate new inmates.140 Liberal use of parole, administered by a 
trustworthy board, might solve this costly problem. Moreover, abolishing parole would also 
force the state relinquish laws that provided for the potentiality to manage, track, and monitor 
those it had identified as deviant.141 Legitimating the retention of parole laws in Illinois, 
however, meant that the state had to undertake serious revision of parole board policy and 
practice—the Board’s decisions needed to be easily justifiable and transparent in order to limit 
accusations of corruption from law enforcement and the urban public. In the political climate of 
the 1920s, American social and economic ills were increasingly seen as quantifiable, predictable, 
and curable through better bureaucratic management backed by social scientific study, and 
political actors turned to social scientists to legitimate government processes. Supported by a 
legendary cadre of social scientists at the University of Chicago, Illinois embarked on a 
modernizing initiative to root out corruption and strengthen centralized bureaucratic control 
within its carceral system. As part of these efforts, state officials instituted the first parole 
prediction system in America, relying on social scientific methods developed for their use by 
leading Illinois sociologists and criminologists. It is in these moves towards professionalization, 
 
140 For cost concerns, see for example “Parole Board Facing Biggest Problem of Day,” Twin City Review, July 20, 
1927, 1; “Board Has Problem: Population in Penal Institutes Increasing Four Per Day, 1,300 Now Eligible to 
Parole,” DeKalb Daily Chronicle, July 25, 1927, 7; B.P. Bolton “Paroles from State Prisons are Declining: This is 
One Reason For the Overcrowded Condition in Illinois,” The Freeport Journal Standard, August 16, 1929, 7; and 
“Clabaugh Hits at Present Paroling System in Speech: Talks to Legislature on Either New Prisons or Pardon Board,” 
The Jacksonville Daily Journal, April 28, 1927, 1.  
141 Andrew A. Bruce, Ernest W. Burgess, and Albert J. Harno, The Workings of the Indeterminate- Sentence Law 
and the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh, Chairman, Parole Board of 
Illinois (Chicago: Committee on the Study of the Workings of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 1928), 48. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, parole supervision in the early 20th century was curtailed by lack of sufficient funding, the 
limitations of surveillance technology, and other factors. The legal provision for the supervision of persons with 
criminal records who had previously been incarcerated opened the possibility for close surveillance in the name of 




bureaucratization, and scientization where we can see the roots of the framework for penal 
practices later adopted at the national level.142  
The Reckoning: Parole and Crime in the Roaring Twenties 
The way Americans thought about crime, its causes, and its cures changed substantially 
over the course of the period historians call the Progressive Era, or the Jazz Age. Many 
administrators of corrections institutions, some who identified with the cadre of progressive 
reformers,143 responded to the environmental explanations of criminal behavior advanced by 
social scientists. In the midst of rising city populations and rising crime rates, criminologists and 
penologists experimented with programs designed to rehabilitate white criminals and release 
 
142 We can see many of the features of later trends that would make mass incarceration a national trend in the 1960s 
and 1970s in some of the carceral practices that developed at the state level between the Progressive Era and the 
New Deal. These include partnerships between corrections institutions and charitable community organizations that 
allowed for state policing of lower-income communities in urban areas (as discussed in Chapter 1). For a masterful 
discussion of similar links between social welfare programming and carceral institutions, see Elizabeth Hinton, 
From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2016). Later, as Julilly Kohler-Hausmann outlines, politicians committed to law and order in both 
rhetoric and policy, swapping welfare programs built around individual rehabilitation for the expansion of the penal 
system. Policymakers funded strategies for the management of poor communities and communities of color that 
relied on surveillance and confinement. See Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, Getting Tough: Welfare and Imprisonment in 
1970s America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). In the period discussed in this chapter, we see the 
emerging adverse effects of crime statistics on African Americans in everyday life and within criminal justice policy 
and practice. A national view of the ideas of black criminality that gained traction in social science and everyday 
parlance during the Progressive Era can be found in Khalil Gibran Muhammad’s study, The Condemnation of 
Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010). 
Following the 1926 “parole mill” scandal, I also identify the move away from relying on employers and voluntary 
organizations to supervise ex-offenders and the greater commitment to a centralized, well-funded state parole 
system. As we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, the centralization of the parole system, along with the adoption of a 
statistical prediction system, intensified and institutionalized disadvantages for poor prisoners and prisoners of color.  
143 There has been much debate in the historiography over progressivism, whether it constituted an ideology, and 
who can be classified as a progressive reformer. These sets of questions are not ones that I will attempt to address 
with any particular eloquence here, but for the sake of clarity, I acknowledge my indebtedness to Ronald G. 
Walters’s definition of ‘reformer,’ and my own working definition of who I think the progressives were. Reformers 
are “those who wish to improve individuals or existing social, economic, and political arrangements” without 
changing the fundamental structure of society. For the purposes of this dissertation, progressive reformers were 
those persons who (a) bought into an ideology of positive statism but were dissatisfied with local, state, and national 
government performance under corrupt regimes of parties and bosses; (b) had faith in the power of people to 
progress and create a better world through collective action; (c) often described themselves as progressives or their 
actions as progressive; and (d) drew from three “social languages of discontent” identified by Daniel Rodgers to 
describe their world. Rodgers’s three “clusters of ideas” that comprise the social languages are: the language of 
antimonopolism, the language of social bonds, and the language of efficiency. Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of 
Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10 (December, 1982), 113-132. I owe the development of parts (a) 
and (b) of this working definition in part to Glen Gendzel, “What the Progressives Had in Common,” The Journal of 




them as reformed and productive citizens. Progressive Era changes did not just extend to 
corrections institutions. Reform of the criminal justice system, especially of the municipal courts, 
made great strides in Chicago in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The city became a 
model for new approaches to criminal justice, even as reformers worked cheek-by-jowl with 
corrupt city officials. But as the first two decades of the new century slipped away and the 
country found itself caught up in feverish preparation for war, disdain for the perceived naiveté 
of progressive reformers (especially women reformers) boiled to the surface.  
Societal anxieties about crime were a driving factor behind many progressive reform 
efforts, especially with growing acceptance of the view that criminals were shaped by their 
upbringing and surroundings rather than marked from birth. Settlement houses, educational 
reform efforts, and the temperance movement were all concerned with shaping immigrants and 
the poor into upstanding, productive American citizens, and preventing crime and other deviant 
behavior in the process. For those unfortunate souls who were convicted of crimes and 
incarcerated, the reformatory-prison model promised to pick up where settlement houses, social 
workers, and city court systems left off in order to rehabilitate deviant men and women before 
returning them to their communities. The passage of parole laws was considered the logical 
culmination to this theoretical ideal of reform rather than punishment as the prison’s objective 
and purpose. Parole was intended as both the ultimate test the prison-as-reformatory and the 
ultimate safeguard for society. But parole and the indeterminate sentence rarely enjoyed the 
support of the American public.  
Following World War I, a time when parolees had been a source of cheap labor for war 




concerned with rising crime rates in urban areas.144 Newspapers and politicians seeking reasons 
for the rise in violent crime in Chicago and other major cities across the country pointed to the 
release of convicted offenders into the care of busy employers and overworked parole officers. 
Parole was not viewed as the culmination of the reform process and instead was considered an 
easy way for dangerous men to return to the streets. In Chicago, a city in which reformers had 
spent decades sponging the stain of corruption from the municipal court, judges no longer had 
the power to lock criminals away for lengthy periods of time.145 Sentences were indeterminate 
and often prescribed for persons convicted of common crimes like robbery (1-14 years), and the 
power to release prisoners lay with the parole board.  
Despite the vilification of the parole board, parole brought many advantages to prison 
wardens and state legislatures. Wardens used indeterminate sentencing as a means of extracting 
cooperation from prisoners—with the presumption that good behavior led to early release. As 
David Rothman contends in his sweeping study of state parole systems, wardens ardently 
 
144 During World War I, Illinois faced labor shortages in some state institutions. To combat these shortages, the state 
experimented with paroling prisoners to work in civil service—at first in a state-run home for aging or infirm war 
veterans and later on various government projects throughout Illinois. The Division of Pardons and Paroles sent men 
from Joliet, the Southern Illinois State Penitentiary, and the state reformatory at Pontiac to essential industries, 
calling this process “industrial parole.” Men released on industrial paroles worked on construction and industrial 
projects throughout the state. For example, parolees from the Southern Illinois Penitentiary built a street car line in 
the city of Alton and paroled men from Joliet constructed a sewer at Dixon State Hospital. By August, 1918, the two 
prisons and the reformatory had released over 400 men to civil service jobs and anticipated releasing at least 250 
additional men to Rock Island for work in the arsenal there. December 1918 found 800 parolees working in Rock 
Island alone. The Quincy Daily Herald reported that the paroled men wished to do their part to help the war effort 
and took “great pride” in their new jobs. While some newspapers published glowing articles on industrial parole, 
prompting visits from Massachusetts officials eager to observe the program in practice, others were less optimistic. 
State’s Attorney Floyd Thompson blamed a spate of burglaries in Rock Island on the new arrivals and accused 
Superintendent Will Colvin of sending “incorrigible criminals” to the city without proper supervision. See “State 
Prisoners in Essential Industrial Work,” The Advertiser, August 31, 1918, unpaginated; “Patriotic Prisoners,” The 
Quincy Daily Herald, July 6, 1918, 9; “Approves Call for Prisoners Out on Parole,” The Rock Island Argus, August 
24, 1918, unpaginated; “Seek to Bring More Convicts Here for Work,” The Rock Island Argus, December 6, 1918, 
unpaginated. 
145 Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago (New York: Cambridge 




championed parole and sat on parole boards in many states until the 1920s.146 Parole board 
membership was not extended to wardens in all state systems, however, and was only partially 
true for Illinois—though wardens were required to be physically present at meetings of the 
parole board, they were not given power to pass judgment on cases. However, the Illinois Civil 
Administrative Code of 1899 required wardens to attend each meeting of the Board of Pardons to 
advise its members and also to compose written reports concerning each prisoner the Board 
considered for release. Moreover, all prisoners on parole were “considered in the legal custody of 
the warden of the penitentiary from which they were paroled… and considered as remaining 
under conviction for the crime of which they were convicted and sentenced.”147 Wardens were to 
correspond with parolees and their employers in order to determine when it was appropriate to 
recommend the former inmate to the Board for a final discharge. The 1899 laws also enabled 
wardens at Joliet and Chester to re-imprison any parolee at any time by sending a warrant for 
their arrest to officers of the law or agents of the penitentiary. While wardens were never 
guaranteed direct paroling power, their recommendations still carried weight with the Board and 
could be used as a carrot to keep inmates in line.  The warden offered the Board a peek behind 
the prison walls, and because he was often the Board’s source of information regarding the 
conduct of inmates hoping for parole, prisoners knew he could greatly impact their chances for 
 
146 David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1980): 183, 178. Though Rothman claims to cover parole systems throughout the United 
States, he largely fails to acknowledge the differences between early state systems beyond disparities in parole and 
indeterminate sentencing laws. This attempt to come to generalized conclusions about parole systems in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century obscures many differences between state parole systems and ignores the 
partnerships between state institutions and voluntary organizations that enabled states to supervise men and women 
on parole (see Chapter 1). As such, Rothman concludes: “the exercise of parole’s policing function was feeble and 
ineffectual.”  
147 Harvey B. Hurd, ed., The Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois 1899 (Chicago: Chicago Legal News Company, 




release. Indeed, eligibility for parole hearings was determined by a prisoner’s record within the 
penitentiary or reformatory—presumably as determined by the warden and guards.148  
While wardens used parole as a means to enforce penitentiary rules and keep control over 
prisoners, state legislatures could use early release to prevent prison overcrowding. Rothman 
contends that by the time parole laws were nearly ubiquitous in the United States, the public and 
many government officials assumed that state prisons were overflowing.149 A 1928 report to the 
Illinois legislature compiled by a three scholars of criminology and the law concludes that by 
April of 1927 the penitentiaries at Joliet, Pontiac, and Menard were “overcrowded to such an 
extent that their proper management is greatly interfered.”150 To address the management issues, 
Illinois would either have to build new prisons or provide for the supervision of a greater number 
of parolees. Moreover, inmates were far more expensive to keep and manage than were parolees. 
As the report outlined, the yearly cost for each inmate at Joliet was $286—the total male 
population of just two state prisons, Joliet and Stateville, cost Illinois $849,224 in 1927.151 Each 
parolee, by contrast, cost the state about $74 per year.152 Despite the Illinois State Legislature’s 
defense of indeterminate sentencing and parole, it is unclear if the Division of Pardons and 
Paroles attempted to ameliorate real or perceived prison overcrowding through early release.  
What is clear is that by the end of the world war, the state legislature had been forced to 
appropriate funds for prison construction in spite of the expansion and professionalization of the 
 
148 John L. Whitman, “Operation of a New Parole Law in Illinois,” Journal of the American Institute of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 9, no. 3 (November 1918), 388.  
149 Rothman, Conscience and Convenience, 188.  
150 Bruce et al., Workings, 47.  
151 Ibid. There were 2,869 prisoners in the Joliet and Stateville facilities in 1927. See E.R. Amick, Sixth Report of 
Statistician, Year Ending June 30, 1927 (Springfield: Journal Printing Co., 1928), 77. 
152 There were 2,631 total persons on parole in Illinois in 1927 and the state legislature authorized an appropriation 




Division of Pardons and Paroles .153 This prison-building project did not solve the problem, as 
the head of the parole board complained in 1927 that the three penitentiaries were much too 
crowded.154 Despite reforms including the appointment of social scientists to the Department of 
Public Welfare and to the Board itself, the new Division of Pardons and Paroles was still as 
unpopular with the public as the earlier, nakedly political Board of Pardons had been. Though 
accused of contributing to rising crime rates, indeterminate sentencing had long enjoyed the 
support of criminologists, penologists, corrections officials, and progressive reformers—people 
directly connected to its administration with incentive to improve the system rather than abandon 
it. The rise in crime in the early to mid-1920s coupled with the “parole mill” scandal explored in 
this chapter catalyzed a pitched battle between parole’s supporters and detractors, which the 
institution of parole in Illinois might not have survived. As Chapter 3 reveals, however, the 
state’s response to the scandal was to boost legislative appropriations for the parole system, 
expanding the arm of carceral bureaucracy focused on selection for release and the surveillance 
of former prisoners.  
The “Crook’s Paradise:” Understanding the Postwar Crime Wave155 
The 1926 “parole mill” scandal broke in a decade when reported crime rates in the city of 
Chicago and other major cities were rising drastically. Law-abiding citizens searched for 
solutions, wanting someone, or something, to blame for the perceived criminal chaos around 
them. From 1918 to 1919, murder cases in the Chicago Municipal Court rose by 71%, and 
 
153 Prisoners began construction of the Stateville Correctional Center in 1917, and the new prison opened in 1925. In 
1921, the state authorized the opening of the Vandalia prison farm colony, a minimum-security facility for men 
convicted of misdemeanors. 
154 Hinton G. Clabaugh, “Statistical Data Supporting Special Report and Recommendations Parole System of 
Illinois,” April 27, 1927, Lennington Small Papers Series II: Legislation and Departmental Files, Box 134, Folder 1, 
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library (hereafter ALPL). By “three penitentiaries,” Clabaugh meant both the old 
Joliet Prison and the new Stateville Prison as well as Menard, Chester, and Pontiac.  
155 The quoted segment of this section heading is taken from “The Crook’s Paradise,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 
December 16, 1925, 8. The following section heading is also borrowed from the Tribune: “Crime Gets All the 




robbery cases rose by 56%.156 By 1925, Chicago was labeled the “Murder Capital” of America, 
with 108 homicides in the first three months of the year. 157 A report on the parole law in Illinois 
contended that “vast crime waves have followed great wars” and that rising crime in America 
could be attributed to the effects of the world war “in which people were taught to fight and 
kill.”158 But despite this contention and the excellent reputation of Illinois’s parole board among 
leading penologists, it was not long before Illinoisans turned against the Board of Pardons and 
Parole, believing that the crime rate had soared in part because of the Board’s leniency.159  
For a city in which Progressive reformers had spent years cleaning up the criminal justice 
system, the bastardization of the original intent of the indeterminate sentencing laws connected 
to the parole system was a major blow.160 Supervised release under the parole law was initially 
 
156 Willrich, City of Courts, 287. As Willrich argues, this rising crime rate was due to a number of factors, including 
a spike in unemployment and fierce competition for jobs coupled with rising inflation. Sociologist Charles S. 
Johnson argued in 1922 that the crime conditions in Chicago were “even worse” than these figures suggest, as 
reported numbers were based on incomplete police records. The 1920 Chicago Crime Commission report estimated 
that there were over 10,000 professional criminals residing in the city of Chicago, and that the annual loss from theft 
(robberies, larcenies, and burglaries) was $12 million. Evidence indicated that police officials sometimes 
underreported the number of criminal complaints made in their districts. See Chicago Commission on Race 
Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1922): 327.  
157 “This is the Murder Capital,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 12, 1925, 8. Also see “Murder a Day Plus, Chicago’s 
Record So Far: Slaying Jump 50% Over Previous Marks,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 3, 1925, 18.  
158 Will Colvin, “Introductory,” in Illinois Parole Law: Accomplishments, Statistical Data, Papers, and Addresses 
on Its Provisions and Its Administration (Springfield: The Department of Public Welfare, State of Illinois, 1921), 4. 
159 Illinois’s parole law was considered to be “the best parole law in the United States” by the American Prison 
Association. The law was passed by a unanimous vote in favor of a new Civil Administrative Code in both houses of 
the state legislature in July of 1917. The Code abolished the original State Board of Pardons, which had been in 
charge of paroles since 1899, and created the Department of Public Welfare, a division of government charged with 
overseeing the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The new law also included provisions for the closer supervision of 
parolees, allowed prisoners serving definite sentences to be paroled after serving the minimum time set by law for 
their crime, and set measures to ensure cooperation between the committing authorities in each county and the state 
parole agents. “Illinois Has the Best Parole Law in the United States—Parole Agents Know Where Men Are 
Working,” The Monmouth Daily Atlas, January 23, 1918, 5. For a description of how the law was administered, see 
Whitman, “Operation,” 385-394.  
160 The indeterminate sentence enabled corrections institutions to keep convicted criminals behind bars until the 
institution decided that the prisoner no longer posed a risk to society. In theory, indeterminate sentences were to be 
combined with reformatory methods within the prison designed to rehabilitate the inmate. Once the prisoner was 
released, he or she would then serve out the remainder of the sentence under the supervision of parole officers 
outside of the prison. See S.J. Barrows, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Parole Law: Reports Prepared for the 




supposed to afford greater protection to society. Statistically, “recidivists and dangerous 
criminals” generally served longer periods in correctional institutions on indeterminate sentences 
than they had under definite sentencing laws.161 But with the power to determine sentence length 
transferred from the courtroom to the Division of Pardons and Paroles in 1917, the court system 
was somewhat relieved of its responsibility to hand down longer sentences in response to the 
public’s perception of crime rates. According to an address by Illinois State Senator James J. 
Barbour, the parole law “took away from the individual judge, or a motley jury, acting upon the 
limited information and restricted latitude permitted under the rules of evidence and the hurry of 
a legal procedure, the right to impose a definite sentence.”162 Barbour called juries “untrained 
and inexpert,” unfit to decide how long a given defendant should be locked away, and argued 
that the parole law rendered corrupt judges powerless to hand down “light punishments, as a 
matter of favor and pull.”163 Citizens of Illinois and other states that had passed indeterminate 
sentencing laws were no longer so quick to blame local courts for failing to hold defendants 
accountable for their perceived debts to society or for incorrectly estimating how much time it 
might take for a criminal to reform. Instead, when Chicagoans were confronted with a spike in 
reported crime following World War I, they directed their fear and anger south to Springfield and 
the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
In 1918, the Chicago City Committee of Aldermen and other city officials visited 
Springfield to ask for a temporary suspension of the parole law, which they believed released a 
large number of the “desperadoes” terrorizing their city at night. State government officials 
 
161 “Defense of Parole System,” The Rock Island Argus, August 9, 1916, 4.  
162 James J. Barbour, “The Illinois Parole Law,” in Illinois Parole Law: Accomplishments, Statistical Data, and 
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denied this request. Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles Will Colvin and Superintendent of 
Prisons John Whitman fired back, blaming Cook County courts and the probation law for rising 
crime rates in Chicago.164 Chicago was not alone in its efforts to restrict parole. The Chamber of 
Commerce for Rock Island, a city near the Iowa border, sent a resolution to Will Colvin and 
then-Governor Frank O. Lowden stating that while “public interest [was] in sympathy with the 
parole idea,” it did not approve of the “action of the parole board in loading on a single 
community the number of paroled prisoners that have been unloaded on this one.”165 The 
Chamber of Commerce was most likely correct in their estimation that their community was 
receiving a greater number of parolees than other similarly sized cities due to the use of paroled 
laborers by federal contractors located in Rock Island during the war.166 The law was not 
restricted or suspended, but city officials, prominent citizens, and newspapers kept the 
Department of Public Welfare on the defensive.  
As the year came to a close, the Chicago Association of Commerce organized the 
Chicago Crime Commission, pledging to make the city inhospitable for lawbreakers. Its stated 
mission was also inhospitable to those reformers who hoped to work against crime by way of the 
rehabilitation of convicted criminals. In making his recommendation for the setup of the 
Commission, the chairman of the committee charged by the Association of Commerce to look 
into crime conditions in the city assured the Chicago Tribune that the new commission would in 
“no sense [be] an organization for the reform of criminals… Its purpose is solely to secure the 
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punishment of the guilty and to make the punishment adequate to the crime.”167 The 
businessmen who donated to the Commission described it as a neutral body, “free from political, 
social, or religious bias” and therefore able to “avoid the mistakes of professional reformers” 
with their concessions to sentiment and religion.168 The Commission began with a budget of 
$10,000 per month, and it wasted no time in criticizing the parole system.169 But the 
Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles persisted in shifting responsibility for Chicago’s 
lawlessness to local courts and police departments. Colvin wrote that he had “no desire to 
criticize any public official” but that he believed that the State’s Attorney’s policy of granting 
immunity to criminals who testified against other persons was “to a very large degree responsible 
for crime conditions as they exist at this time in Chicago.”170  
From Picket Lines to Prohibition-Era Gangland: Unrest in Post-WWI Chicago 
Anxieties surrounding the parole system heightened in response to large-scale changes 
taking place in Chicago by the end of World War I. This section of the chapter will focus on two 
case studies to illustrate the visibility of violent urban unrest, gang-related crime, and their 
connections to public concerns about criminal recidivism, indeterminate sentencing, and so-
called “early release” policies. The Chicago race riot of 1919 and the seemingly meteoric rise of 
gang activity once the 18th Amendment took effect in January of 1920 each intensified Illinois 
residents’ perceptions of law enforcement and municipal and state government as corrupt—on 
the side of rioters and criminals rather than law-abiding citizens.  
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During the war, anti-immigration legislation stanched the previously steady flow of 
European immigration to Chicago and jobs were plentiful for first, second, and third generation 
white ethnic Americans. Even the stream of African Americans headed North to escape crushing 
poverty, racist violence, and discriminatory Jim Crow laws171 found steady employment in 
industries where they were usually the last hired and first fired.172 When the war ended, however, 
working-class men and women across the country feared layoffs and declining wages. Over the 
course of the “Red Summer” of 1919, four million American workers participated in the largest 
wave of strikes in United States history. Some of the most significant collective actions occurred 
in Chicago’s mass production industries, where laborers worried about retrenchment by their 
employers after the boom in wartime production.173 Racial and ethnic conflict also increased 
during this period, as native whites pushed for restrictions on European immigration, violent 
white racists responded to the influx of black migrants from the South, and foreign-born 
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Chicagoans “played out Old World antagonisms” within the city.174 Ethnic communities were 
deeply segregated, but jammed close together in the impoverished city center.175 These Loop 
neighborhoods allowed recent immigrants access to Old World language, food, and customs. 
Due to slum conditions in the inner city, however, most immigrants moved away from the Loop 
as soon as they could afford to. Black migrants from the South, however, were usually unable to 
move out of the Black Belt and into areas with better housing conditions due to restrictive 
covenants and fear of violent backlash from white neighbors. For white ethnic workers, leaving 
the Loop often meant moving closer to ethnic enclaves near their workplaces.176 Though 
different communities were clustered close together around Chicago’s steel plants, ethnic 
boundaries there were sharply defined and respected by all residents. Ultimately, as historian 
Lizabeth Cohen argues, “race, ethnicity, job, and neighborhood served as boundaries… among 
industrial workers in Chicago.”177 The steel strike of 1919 and the conflicts between 
packinghouse workers and their employers, therefore, culminated in defeat rather than the 
triumph of a working-class revolution as ethnic and racial tensions grew. 
Instead of the revolution laborers hoped for, a race riot began on July 27, a hot, sticky 
Sunday. Black Chicago residents headed to the segregated 26th Street beach, while white city-
dwellers swarmed to the string of beaches that extended along the shoreline from 29th Street. 
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Black teenager Eugene Williams went swimming with his friends and at some point in the day 
drifted farther and farther away from the coastline on a raft. The lake’s current picked up, and 
pushed Williams’ craft across an invisible boundary line separating the black beach from the 
white beach. Twenty-five-year-old George Stauber hurled rocks and racial epithets at the boys 
from shore. Tragically, one of these rocks struck Williams in the head. The young man fell off 
the raft and drowned.178 His friends ran for a black policeman, who urged a white officer to 
arrest Stauber. Intent on shielding this murderous, rock-throwing defender of segregation, the 
white officer refused to make the arrest or to allow the African American officer to take Stauber 
into custody. A crowd gathered to watch as the two patrolmen argued over Stauber, and a black 
onlooker was arrested, “spark[ing] a general melee” in which hundreds of African Americans 
chased the policemen from the beach.179 The crowd then marched southwest, setting off a wave 
of violence that persisted until Wednesday, July 30. By this midweek point, thirty-eight people 
lay dead, hundreds more were injured, and rioters had damaged or stolen millions of dollars of 
property.180 Most of the injured and dead were African American. 
 Government officials saw the riot as emblematic of the bad elements that marred the 
fabric of Chicago society, with Governor Frank O. Lowden declaring that, “Hoodlum elements 
of both races are to blame.”181 Chicago newspapers argued that city hall cultivated these 
“hoodlum elements,” drawing connections between city politicians and white and black leaders 
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of the underground economy in the city’s Black Belt.182 White newspapers portrayed the black 
Belt as the very center of vice in the city, a place where saloons and cabarets were open all night 
and “the rattle of dice and the click of poker chips were seldom stilled.”183 Democratic State’s 
Attorney Maclay Hoyne condemned mayor William “Big Bill” Hale Thompson’s City Hall for 
fostering these immoral and criminal activities in the Black Belt, but ultimately blamed African 
Americans for the violence of the riot. He argued that the mayor’s administration “preached to 
the Negro… the doctrine of special rights and privileges, provided they have a political pull.”184 
Hoyne told the Chicago Herald-Examiner that Thompson’s favoritism toward African 
Americans meant that “negro hoodlums” had no fear of the law and believed only in the rule of 
“graft and politics.”185 The State’s Attorney believed that a fight over a craps game, rather than 
the murder of Eugene Williams, caused the riots. Incredulous black leaders pushed back against 
Hoyne’s view that African Americans were responsible for the violence that rocked the city from 
Sunday to Wednesday, reminding the official of the frequent racially motivated attacks on black 
residents that went neglected, unsolved, and unprosecuted by white politicians and law 
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enforcement.186 Both sides agreed, however, that “criminals and violators of the law [found] in 
Chicago a haven of rest for all their kin and kind.”187  
Once Governor Lowden withdrew state militia troops from Chicago in August, a 
gathering of Chicago social, civic, and professional organizations urged him to form an official 
body to study the “causes underlying the conditions resulting in the present race riots.”188 
Following the view that conflict between white and African American city residents might cease 
if the “two races [were] brought to understand each other better,” Lowden appointed 
“distinguished representatives of both races” to a Commission on Race Relations.189 The first 
order of business for the twelve black and white civic reformers who comprised the Commission 
was to appoint researchers who could conduct an investigation into the causes of the riot. The 
Commission chose Graham Romeyn Taylor, a progressive journalist who had once been active 
in the settlement house movement, to lead the investigation. Charles S. Johnson, a black graduate 
student in Sociology at the University of Chicago, would be second in command.190 Taylor and 
Johnson released their report in 1922. Though Johnson was officially Taylor’s subordinate, the 
graduate student authored much of The Negro in Chicago, which quickly became (for a time) the 
most influential study of black life in the urban north.191 The sweeping final report chronicles the 
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events of the riot and dispels many of the myths taken as fact during those tense days at the end 
of July. As Khalil Gibran Muhammad indicates, however, the most significant piece of The 
Negro in Chicago emerges within Johnson’s evisceration of crime statistics—his claim that 
racial crime statistics could not be trusted. With this critique, Johnson spurred other social 
science researchers to question the widespread perception that blacks were inherently more 
criminal, whether as a result of their genetics or lived experiences, than any other racial or ethnic 
group. While some social science researchers revised their view of African American criminality 
and of crime statistics in general in the wake of Johnson’s research, Muhammad’s work indicates 
that the myth of black predisposition to criminality lasted through the social scientific trend of 
“liberal environmentalism.”192 The racial fears exacerbated by the riot and the racial assumptions 
expressed by the white Chicagoans Johnson and Taylor’s team interviewed were written into 
social science work and widely believed by white Americans long after the publication of The 
Negro in Chicago.  
Inflammatory newspaper reports exacerbated fear of black criminality, which mixed with 
distrust for the criminal justice system. Johnson and Taylor, along with the grand and coroner’s 
juries charged with investigating the riot, emphasized the need to root out corruption in 
Chicago’s police force, to revise Illinois criminal justice practices, and to end toleration of vice 
districts in African American neighborhoods. The grand jury report echoed the widespread belief 
that “hoodlum elements” of both races were responsible for the riot, calling for the state 
government to revise its policy towards criminal recidivists. The grand jurors offered eleven 
recommendations to prevent further large-scale violent uprisings, six of which related to law 
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enforcement and criminal justice administration. One among these read: “The parole law should 
be amended so that a criminal once paroled and subsequently arrested may not a second time be 
paroled.”193 Such a revision of the law would mean that once parole agents returned a parolee to 
prison, that person would need to serve out the remainder of his or her sentence within the 
institution. Johnson and Taylor’s investigatory team spent only a small fraction of the study 
looking into the release of recidivists and the comparative conduct of white ex-prisoners and 
black ex-prisoners on parole. The Negro in Chicago addressed the grand jury’s recommendation, 
exposing the racial disparity in the reentry process. Compared to white prisoners, black prisoners 
served longer portions of indeterminate sentences, were less likely to be paroled, and had more 
difficulty finding suitable employment and lodging once released from the institution.194 Experts 
interviewed, including the Central Howard Association’s head F. Emory Lyon (see Chapter 1), 
concluded that while he found “greater difficulty in dealing with colored men,” he estimated that 
“a little larger percentage of colored men make good on their paroles.”195 Johnson’s report 
concluded that the “general lawlessness, crime, and vice in the whole population,” rather than in 
any specific subset of the population, was responsible for the escalation of the riots.196 While The 
 
193 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 51. 
194 Ibid, 338.  
195 According to Lyon, this was because they could not afford housing in areas the Association considered reputable. 
Presumably, the reputable areas African American men and women on parole could afford to live in were white 
working-class neighborhoods where they were unable to rent units. See ibid, 337. For information on inflated 
housing prices and the presence of vice in African American neighborhoods, see Margaret Garb, Freedom’s Ballot: 
African American Political Struggles in Chicago from Abolition to the Great Migration (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), especially Chapter Five. According to Garb, black tenants paid rents from 10 to 50% more 
than those charged whites, and housing stock in black neighborhoods was poorly maintained (108).  
196 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, 327. The Chicago Defender concurred, but 
expressed concern over the speedy release several notorious white criminals obtained from Joliet shortly before the 
riots, and the privileged treatment white criminals received from police. The newspaper indicated that States 
Attorney Hoyne, who headed the grand jury investigation of the riots, “contributed to the laxity of law and order” in 
Chicago by failing to prosecute major criminal cases and granting immunity to notorious gangsters and thieves. See 




Negro in Chicago addressed the corruption and racism rampant in Chicago’s courts and police 
force, the investigation did not search the ranks of paroled prisoners for riot instigators.   
 Chicago’s problems with criminal violence would only worsen as a new decade 
began.197 On January 16, 1920, the 18th Amendment prohibiting the manufacture, transportation, 
and sale of alcohol in the United States went into effect, opening up a host of business 
opportunities for organized criminals and corrupt politicians in Chicago. Brooklyn-born gangster 
Johnny Torrio of the Chicago Outfit became the first kingpin to benefit from the highly 
profitable distribution of alcohol in the city’s underground economy. Torrio paid the city’s 
politicians and policemen to look the other way as he built an empire of bars, brothels, and 
gambling dens. By the end of 1920, the Outfit had organized “a city-wide syndicate for the 
operation of breweries” and the transportation of alcohol throughout Chicago.198 This network of 
breweries, bottling facilities, trucking operations, and speakeasies remained immensely 
profitable so long as Torrio and his right hand man, Alphonse Capone, gave a cut of the profits to 
mayor Thompson and other members of his administration.  
Attention to crime and perception of rising rates of lawlessness in Chicago following the 
institution of Prohibition increased hostilities toward parole and probation throughout the state of 
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Illinois.199 In 1920, when Len Small was enjoying his position as Governor-elect, Chicago Chief 
of Police Charles Fitzmorris requested that the new governor suspend the parole law upon 
entering office to reduce crime in the city. Fitzmorris complained that the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles released far too many prisoners and that the “present operation of the parole board 
constitutes an absolute interference with the Chicago police department.”200 The Chicago 
Tribune concurred that same year with the publication of an opinion piece starting that the 
“principal effect [of the parole law] is to release professional criminals to prey upon the 
community.”201 The paper bemoaned the release of “old offenders,” reprinting an editorial from 
the Illinois State Register that declared: “to parole a criminal with a ‘record’ is worse than an 
outrage.”202 Resentment of the board would only grow as the 1920s progressed, especially 
because homicide rates doubled in the city in the first half of the decade alone.203 Early in 1921, 
the Los Angeles Times declared that the “parole system has a sad string of failures behind it” and 
that the greatest difficulties faced by urban police chiefs were “furnished them by the army of 
paroled prisoners who flock to the great towns.”204 Later that year, Chief Fitzmorris shared his 
department’s “new slogan” with the Chicago Daily Tribune: “Keep them in the penitentiaries 
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and the citizens are safe.”205 Despite the chief’s declarations and apparent good faith efforts to 
clean up the department, it was an open secret that policemen were usually tolerant of vice 
because profitable gangsters meant larger payouts to officers who studiously avoided enforcing 
the laws.206 During Prohibition, police sold their feigned ignorance and protection to the highest 
bidders among “alky-cookers” and bootleggers. And when Fitzmorris left office in 1923, gang 
murders increased as mobsters hustled for the greatest slice of profits from liquor sales.  
As neighborhood violence escalated with gang struggles over the vice trade, so did public 
disapproval of mayor “Big Bill” and his good time ways. Thompson chose not to run for 
reelection in 1923. In his place, reformer William E. Dever—who fully intended to enforce the 
prohibition law—assumed the mayoralty. This boded ill for Chicago’s gang leaders, and as 
Dever’s administration cracked down, Torrio and Capone moved their activities to Cicero, a 
suburb outside of the city. Even so, Dever was almost completely unable to enforce Prohibition 
laws and collusion between politicians and gangsters continued.207 When Big Bill returned for 
another mayoral term in 1927, Capone moved back into the city, establishing headquarters at 
22nd and Michigan on the south end of the Loop. With a political ally, Thompson, in the mayor’s 
office and Len Small in the Governor’s mansion, Capone found Chicago milder than it had been 
in 1923. In the latter half of the 1920s, gangs fought their wars and plied their trades openly on 
the streets of Chicago: gang leaders were gunned down while walking across major intersections, 
the Chicago Tribune’s crime reporter was shot while heading to the train station, and the Sicilian 
Genna brothers maintained a massive bootlegging operation just four blocks from a city police 
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station.208 Gang-related incidents accounted for some of the shocking crime reports and statistics 
from Chicago, but historian Jeffrey S. Adler finds that many urbanites were alarmed less by gang 
turf wars than by other crimes.209 Despite the lasting fascination with Capone and other 
bootleggers, the city’s robbery rate—mostly unrelated to the illicit production of alcohol—
accounted for much public concern over rising crime in the 1920s. Crime surveys and 
sensational exposés like the Leopold and Loeb case in 1924 highlighted the shortcomings of 
legal institutions just as many Americans came to expect their governing institutions to act in 
their best interest.210  
“Crime Gets All the Breaks”: Politics and Parole Under Len Small 
The Division of Pardons and Paroles maintained that negative coverage of Governor 
Lennington “Len” Small and the Board was unfair, but critical reports flourished as the 
newspapers and the public contended with the “new breed of criminal” that ruled the streets in 
the 1920s.211 Even during Small’s first term, before the grand jury investigation in 1926, 
newspapers affiliated with the Republican party and generally favorable to the Kankakee 
politician published articles and editorials demanding that “prompt action needs to be taken”212 
to reform the parole system. DeKalb County’s True Republican avoided hints that Small might 
be responsible for monitoring the actions of the Board, but despite its party affiliation blamed the 
“workings of the lax parole law of this state” for allowing criminals to avoid punishment.213  
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Rumors about the Board swirled as the first years of the Small administration slipped away. 
Disparaging newspaper articles increased, and it was commonly believed by the public that 
paroles could be purchased with political influence or cash even before the scandal broke. 
Governor Small himself received at least one letter from a citizen suggesting that convicted 
persons with “proper connections to gang leaders” could obtain paroles easily and no longer had 
to fear “justice.”214 Many more men and women bombarded Small with letters asking for his 
help to release their friends and family members, and in some cases, hinting at possible illicit 
traffic in pardons and paroles. One Philip Blumenthal, “a citizen + resident of the State of 
Illinois” and brother of an inmate at Joliet, wrote the Governor to say that he had been informed 
by several lawyers “that a certain amount of money would put [his] brother on the street.”215 
Mrs. Albert Johnson sent Small five dollars with the note “buy yourself some cigars,” hoping to 
ingratiate herself with the governor and obtain a pardon or parole for her husband.216 While these 
letters do not directly implicate the Governor, they do offer snippets of the widespread rumors 
behind the allegations that would be evaluated by a grand jury in 1926.  
Small’s penchant for pardoning had been subjected to public scrutiny years before 
Klein’s death.217 In 1924, as the governor wrestled with Brundage in chancery court, the Tribune 
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ran an article suggesting that Small could be subject to impeachment for pardoning and 
commuting the sentences of convicted criminals for “personal and political reasons.”218 These 
rumors probably damaged Small’s campaign for reelection in 1924, though he still won over the 
Democratic candidate, Norman L. Jones. The Chicago Crime Commission, a special committee 
formed by the Chicago Association of Commerce in 1919, argued in the midst of the 
gubernatorial race that law enforcement was struggling to combat the effects of Small’s abuse of 
the pardon power.219 Small’s supporters also reached out to warn him of the damage that pardons 
and the parole system were inflicting upon his reputation. One ally wrote: “the pardon and parole 
system has created strong sales resistance and cost you more votes than any other thing that has 
happened since you took office.”220 
During the 1924 election, Small’s political supporters and opponents tried to use or twist 
his pardon record and the Board’s parole record to achieve their own ends. In campaign rhetoric, 
Len Small was portrayed as either a generous soul bestowing mercy on unfortunates or a grafter 
making deals with corrupt politicians and the criminal underworld. Anti-Small canvassers re-
printed articles from the Chicago Daily Tribune as a pamphlet to distribute in black 
neighborhoods. The pamphlet was designed to remind African Americans that the governor often 
paroled or pardoned white criminals convicted of felonies, leaving black men convicted of lesser 
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crimes in prison to serve the maximum penalty for their acts.221 Other pamphleteers targeted 
women voters. In March of 1924, the Independent Women’s Anti-Small Committee released a 
leaflet refuting statements made by Governor Small that minimized his responsibility for the 
actions of the Division of Pardons and Paroles. The Committee presented the parole law as a 
“righteous and generous” one, but claimed that the Governor had misused it to “let loose upon 
the community unregenerated [sic] criminals to endanger the honor of women and children.”222 
The Tribune printed excerpts from the leaflet in March of election year. Small’s abuses of the 
parole system to advance his own interests may or may not have involved granting paroles and 
pardons in return for political or monetary favors, but it certainly included the use of parole 
agents for the purpose of advancing his campaign.  
In a strange twist, Small’s campaign management deputized parole agents to gauge 
“political conditions”—read: level of support for Governor Small—in each district.223 From 
Streator, a small city 81 miles south of Chicago, Parole Agent Bert Carter reported an interaction 
he had with a telegraph operator while sending a parole violation report to the Warden at Joliet: 
“The young man… remarked ‘Well this is some of the old stuff that Mr. Essington [Thurlow G. 
Essington, Small’s opponent in the primary] was fighting.’” Carter then engaged the operator in 
conversation and “found that he had absorbed the stories which the Tribune had been 
printing.”224 Seeing an opportunity to both defend his profession and win a vote for Small, Carter 
launched into the stories of “several men and boys who had made good upon parole” and 
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promised to mail the telegraph office a pamphlet on the parole system.225 Many of the extant 
reports describe the parole agents’ work countering the accusations made by the Tribune, 
Essington’s campaign, and various Democratic candidates at the state and local level. Despite the 
Tribune’s fiery campaign against Small, a parole agent deputized to ascertain the level of support 
for the Governor found that many neighborhoods in Chicago favored him, the newspaper’s 
impressive circulation numbers aside.226  
Republican-leaning newspapers in favor of the incumbent candidate also did their part, 
working to minimize Small’s association with the parole board administered by Will Colvin 
during the campaign. These papers proudly announced that the incumbent pardoned fewer 
convicts than had Governor Lowden before him.227 But by 1925, well into Small’s second term, 
The True Republican ran a front-page story entitled “Justice Fails in This County” reporting that 
officials across the state were “disgusted with the method used by the Board” and that many 
were “firm in the belief that the terrific record of crime in this state is largely due to the influence 
of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”228 Tribune reporter Oscar Hewitt, who probably wrote 
many of the stories printed in the pamphlet distributed to black voters during the campaign, 
continued to assail Small following his reelection.229 Though Hewitt’s stories were intensely 
critical of what he called the governor’s “pardon habit” and intimated that the parole board might 
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be more lenient on men with political connections, the Tribune did not seriously advance the idea 
that officials in Springfield might be taking illicit bribes until late in 1925. Even then, lack of 
evidence seemed to require that the story take the form of a short editorial. 
The decision to print the suggestion that Small’s administration and the Division of 
Pardons and Paroles might be guilty of more than leniency that contributed to rising crime rates 
followed a busy month for parole in the press. Early in December, Chicago was shocked by the 
parole of convicted double murderer and prolific hold-up artist Ira D. Perry, Jr., following 
Small’s commutation of his sentence. Under the weight of two murder convictions, Perry was 
originally sentenced to live out the remainder of his natural life in prison, but only spent three 
years inside before his sentence was commuted to “the equivalent of a manslaughter conviction” 
by Small and he was released on parole.230 Perry’s father was a wealthy businessman and 
inventor of the Perry automobile lock; one of the most popular steering wheel locks in the United 
States and advertised as “The Only Lock That Thieves Won’t Touch.”231 The elder Ira D. Perry’s 
wealth and influence caused newspapers to speculate that his son’s release might have been 
obtained through political influence, and the younger Ira’s parole was deeply unpopular.232 One 
states attorney declared that if Perry were released, Chicago law enforcement would arrest him 
as he left Joliet and try him on new charges. In fear of being sent back to prison, Perry Jr. 
violated the terms of his parole almost immediately by failing to report to his employer in Des 
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Moines, Iowa. He was soon captured and sent to Menard to serve out the remainder of his 
sentence. 
In the wake of Perry’s return to prison, Parole Commissioner Colvin spoke to the annual 
convention of Illinois state attorneys explaining the particulars of the procedure and conduct of 
his division. By the Tribune’s account, the convention was not a receptive audience and Colvin’s 
speech elicited some sharp replies, though the attorneys agreed that parole laws could benefit 
society if properly implemented.233 The lawyers present for Colvin’s address suggested that the 
Board should notify prosecutors when cases they tried in the past were to be heard by the Board, 
and that they be able to present arguments against releasing prisoners if they considered it 
necessary. State’s Attorney Charles F. Evans told the Decatur Herald that if “the state’s 
attorneys knew when to combat the applications” of “murderers, bandits and thugs” for parole, 
“fewer of them would be turned loose.”234 Colvin evidently dismissed these concerns, asking 
“what is the use of such notice if the state’s attorney has put all his facts in the record?”235 
Recounting Colvin’s response gave the editor an opening anecdote for his critique of the board. 
And a contemporary parole scandal in Kansas allowed him to suggest: “The experience of sister 
states in which paroles have been bought and sold is a reminder that a dishonest administration 
of the parole law is not unknown in this country.”236 While the use of the Kansas case as a device 
allowed the Tribune to cultivate public suspicion, Kansan Governor Jonathan M. Davis’s sale of 
executive clemency was far less complex than the scandal that would hit Springfield only a year 
later.237 
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Three days after Rizo and his companions stabbed the Stateville Deputy Warden to death 
and made off with his automobile, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that a Cook County grand 
jury called to investigate gang wars and a Will County grand jury investigating conditions at 
Joliet penitentiary were cooperating to sift through new evidence contained within the letters 
found close to Klein’s body. The Tribune promised “sensational disclosures” from “new clews 
[sic]” in the correspondence, which consisted of communications between Klein and imprisoned 
men.238  Though the text of most of the documents was never explicitly revealed in the pages of 
the newspaper, they would eventually be submitted to the grand juries for perusal. The Tribune 
did, however, offer a stirring description of the scene by attesting that the letters were “scattered 
about the slain Warden Klein.”239 The warden was lying on top of evidence that would later be 
introduced in court to suggest that he was instrumental in drumming up inmate clients for an 
alleged “parole mill” supposedly operated by Klein, Messlein, and Colvin. According to a later 
story, there was evidence in the Warden’s office that indicated that he had attempted to destroy 
the letters before he died.240 
The positioning of the letters could have been due to Klein’s dying struggle to dispose of 
them, or it could have been pure chance. Perhaps they were knocked off his desk during the 
struggle. But the arrangement of the scene might have been a deliberate action of the convicts 
who stabbed him. According to Warden Whitman, prisoners at Stateville and Joliet believed that 
“they had to have money or powerful political friends to get out of the penitentiary” and that if 
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they did not have access to capital or to politicians, they “couldn’t get out” no matter how good 
their record was.241 Captain Keeley, the guard kidnapped by the seven escapees, later testified 
that the prisoners told him that it was worth it to chance being sentenced to death for killing the 
warden and fleeing Stateville: “The only way we would ever get out of here is this way.”242 
Other inmates who believed they would never be released on parole had climbed over the wall 
surrounding the prison to seek their freedom, and some had even left notes behind explaining 
their actions. In one case, a prisoner wrote to Warden Whitman that he had paid $600 to ensure 
his release, but that he had not yet received a parole and was fleeing the prison to see Governor 
Small to find out what was happening with his case.243  
Rizo and his companions may have made sure to place incriminating evidence where any 
observers of the scene could not fail to notice it—next to the body of the man it implicated. This 
theory becomes all the more compelling when we consider that the Will County grand jury 
assigned to make a routine inspection of Stateville was scheduled for the very morning that the 
seven inmates escaped. The grand jury, while touring the grounds, actually saw the seven 
prisoners and Keeley drive off in the warden’s car.244 In addition, the notes around Klein’s body 
provide a clear motive for his murder. It was not necessary for the seven prisoners to kill Klein in 
order to escape, and they did not kill anyone else, including several guards and trusties they 
incapacitated and locked in solitary cells. They could have knocked the deputy warden 
unconscious if he had attempted to prevent their escape. Moreover, there is no sign that Klein 
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possessed any of the keys they needed to aid their escape in the first place, and no reason he 
would have put up a fight on his own to try to stop the fleeing prisoners. The inmates had all 
asked to meet with Klein that morning to discuss prison conditions, which may have been a plot 
to ensure that they were all in the same place at the same time to set the escape in motion. Or 
perhaps they needed to be in the solitary building to free Nathan Leopold, as they claimed early 
in the grand jury investigation. Either way, they would have had no reason to enter Klein’s office 
once they were all in his waiting room.  
But by all accounts, they did choose to meet with Klein and waited until the deeply 
unpopular warden called them into his office. Former guard Julius Horney testified to the Will 
County grand jury that several different inmates had told him “that it was going to be only a 
question of time before they were going to get him [Klein].”245 Though the seven escapees 
denied planning to kill Klein, they may have done so to avoid the death penalty. If this was their 
aim, it was unsuccessful. Duchowski, Shader, Stalesky, Roa, Rizo, and Torrez were sentenced to 
hang for Klein’s murder.246 Still, a silenced Klein would no longer be able to keep incriminating 
correspondence under wraps. The escape plot itself may have involved both the exposure of 
Warden Klein’s illicit activities and his murder. It is very possible that the seven men wished to 
draw the touring grand jury’s attention to documents that could reveal the secret business 
arrangements that drove them to free themselves rather than take a chance on the Board of 
Pardons and Parole. 
Whatever their motivations—or lack thereof—Klein’s murder gave the States Attorneys 
“another strong link... in the chain of evidence” they had already collected and prompted the 
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prosecutors to release information to the press.247 The bulk of this information concerned former 
head of the Volunteers of America’s Hope Hall, Major M.A. Messlein, and originated from 
Messlein’s own records, which were seized for inspection by a Cook County grand jury called to 
investigate “all causes of crime, including the parole evil.”248 The initial body of evidence 
suggested that Messlein’s company, the Major Engineering Corporation (sometimes referred to 
as the Messlein Engineering Company), served as a shield for the illicit purchase of release from 
the penitentiary. The Major allegedly dealt with friends and family members of inmates looking 
to buy paroles, requesting that they purchase stock in his company before he used his influence 
with the Board to reunite them with their convicted friend or relative. His company’s 
connections to the Board were apparently visible on the Corporation’s letterhead: Will Colvin, 
who had been given $25,000 worth of stock by Messlien, was treasurer of the company, and 
Deputy Warden Peter M. Klein was vice president.249  
When prosecutors seized the Corporation’s records and interviewed Messlein, the Major 
appeared proud of his connections with the Board and revealed that he had sponsored 8,000 men 
released from prison over the course of his career. He claimed that, “he had helped many 
wrongdoers back to a new, orderly life… and expected to continue doing so.”250 Among 
Messlein’s papers were copies of letters detailing attempts to obtain the release of Pete McCann, 
a man associated with the Egan’s Rats bootlegging gang of St. Louis. Major Messlein was very 
deliberately not referenced by name in the letter from the head of Chicago’s Institution Supply 
Company, John W. Gibbons, to Alex R. Meier of St. Louis concerning McCann’s release, but 
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was praised as “the very best in Illinois on this class of work.” Gibbons promised Meier that if 
the unnamed man (whom, from contextual details, the press assumed to be Major Messlein) was 
given $10,000 plus funds sufficient for “two or three trips” to Springfield to confer with “the 
powers that be,” Pete McCann would soon be “out on the street.”251 
The papers surrounding Warden Klein, as the Tribune would later report, further 
implicated Will Colvin and the Major in what state prosecutors referred to as a pardon and parole 
syndicate. States Attorney Hjalmar Rehn released material contained in Klein’s documents on 
May 8, including a note attesting to the ability of Messlein to obtain paroles for convicts who 
could pay for it. An ex-prisoner authored this note and sent it to an inmate named “Red” in an 
apparent attempt to explain how Red could purchase release from prison. Red’s “old pal” assured 
him that he would “put whatever dough as need up for you” and that he was working to obtain 
Red’s release through Major Messlein. This ex-inmate, who signed off as “Larry,” was 
optimistic in the note, and wrote to Red that Messlein had already assisted him in a similar 
manner:  
I intend to see M. Messlein as he took care of me when I was out. He squared a rap for 
me and got my discharge… You know he is in business with W. Colvin and he stands 
strong with him. If you want me to see some other party why let me know. But I am 
certain Messlein can spring you.252 
 
Without the evidence that Klein had attempted to destroy the letters surrounding his body; the 
documents authorities seized from Major Messlein’s personal files; the financial connections 
between Messlein, Colvin, Deputy Warden Klein, and parolees discovered in the Major 
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Engineering Corporation; and testimony from Warden Whitman during the grand jury 
investigation into Klein’s death, those at the scene may have assumed that the documents near 
Klein were pieces of illicit correspondence confiscated from Stateville inmates. This context 
placed the letters in a more sinister light and may have caused authorities to read criminal 
activity into all of the written material found near Klein.  
After chasing several false trails, the State’s Attorney’s questioning of members of the 
Flat Janitor’s Union in relation to their purchase of stock in the Major Engineering Company 
gave investigators a promising lead.253 During the 1910s, the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union 
organized most of the city’s janitors who worked in buildings with apartments.254 By 1921, the 
Flat Janitors were an influential political force, allied with Republican mayor Thompson. But as 
labor struggled to maintain the gains of the war years, big business and property interests in 
Chicago sought to undermine union influence.255 While these efforts were perhaps most visible 
in “industrialists’ rejection of social legislation” and promotion of welfare capitalist programs,256 
a grand jury investigation of city property owners’ allegations against unionized janitors made 
headlines across the country in 1921.257 Complainants charged that President of the Flat Janitors’ 
Union William Quesse and nine other union officials masterminded a campaign of “labor 
terrorism,” threatening tenants with physical violence and engaging in property destruction when 
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building owners refused to pay penalty fees for violations of union rules.258 Building owners also 
objected to the strikes the Flat Janitors’ Union mounted each time the union’s agents could not 
resolve disputes between janitors and property owners. Union pickets halted janitorial services 
and stopped teamsters’ deliveries of coal, ice, milk, and groceries. What owners and many 
leading newspapers called corruption and extortion was the union’s attempt to enforce “a 
collectively bargained labor agreement” endorsed by the city’s political leaders.259 These strikes, 
however, often escalated in a way that must have been extremely onerous for apartment 
tenants—members of the Flat Janitors Union picketed outside front doors, dumped garbage in 
building entryways, and set off stink bombs during collective actions. Investigation of Quesse’s 
organizing tactics landed him in prison in 1922.  
While the Los Angeles Times maintained that this verdict was the “greatest victory the 
State has so far won in its fight against union labor terrorists,” Small soon negated the ruling by 
extending clemency to the convicted union leaders.260 This decision followed several months of 
petitions and letters from labor movement allies on the one hand, and real estate interests on the 
other.261 Thanks to Small’s pardon, by 1926 Quesse became president of the Illinois Federation 
of Labor and held more power than ever. The Tribune alleged that Quesse paid Small for his 
pardon by throwing his political weight behind the governor’s 1924 campaign for reelection. The 
Flat Janitors’ Union leadership sent pledge cards to its members, urging them to promise their 
votes to Governor Small, and Quesse also used the connections he made during years of alliance 
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with Chicago’s Mayor Thompson to garner additional support for Small.262 Small pardoned 
Quesse and his fellow Janitors’ Union leaders just four days after his victory in the 1924 
election, raising the suspicions of Small’s political enemies.  
The Flat Janitors’ Union did not escape further scrutiny during Small’s second 
gubernatorial term. State’s Attorney Crowe found records of stock purchases that linked the 
union’s rank-and-file to Major Messlein’s Major Engineering Company. Evidently, most men in 
this union bought stock in the company at the behest of union officials, including Quesse, who 
praised and promoted the stock at union meetings.263 All of the janitors questioned told 
investigators that they bought the stock as a speculative investment and denied that they had any 
interest in obtaining pardons or paroles for friends in the penitentiary. But former convicts who 
testified before the grand jury claimed that it was common for Messlein to request that 
prospective parolees purchase stock in his company. According to the Tribune, stock in the 
Major Engineering Company qualified as a highly speculative investment. The only brick-and-
mortar location operated by the company, the paper reported, was a “small shack at 3411 Indiana 
Avenue.”264 Despite its unimpressive façade, Messlein’s company certainly attracted powerful 
investors: investigators found that purchasers of Major Engineering Corporation stock included 
Klein, Governor Small, Colvin, and Illinois Director of Public Welfare Chauncey Jenkins. 
“To Ascertain the Truth:” The Grand Juries Investigate265  
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The investment histories of unionized janitors and Springfield politicians soon took a 
backseat as investigators pored over prison records, reconstructing Klein’s professional past, 
parsing his relationship to Messlein and Colvin, and searching for a motive for his murder. At the 
center of these efforts were two grand juries, convened just days before the Deputy Warden’s 
death. In Cook County, State’s Attorney Frank Crowe and Attorney General Oscar Carlstrom 
tasked the first of these assemblies of men with investigating gang warfare, with specific 
attention to an alleged alliance between gang members and politicians blamed for “a breakdown 
in law enforcement.”266 The second grand jury, called in Will County to make a routine 
inspection of Stateville before Klein’s death, was reconvened after May 5 to probe the killers’ 
motives and the circumstances surrounding the murder. As mentioned earlier, this grand jury was 
actually in the process of touring the penitentiary at the time of Klein’s murder.267 Following a 
two-week process, the grand jurors weighed in on the motives behind the grisly crime, declaring 
that they lay in prisoner dissatisfaction with the mismanagement of the institution—the very 
situation they were originally organized to investigate. 
Deputy Warden Klein’s death at the hands of men in his charge gave the Will County 
grand jury their first question to answer as well as their first clue. The motive for the crime and 
the reasons for carrying out the murder in such a brutal way remained unclear, but the mere fact 
that seven armed men could escape supervision long enough to enter Klein’s office at the same 
time demonstrated to the jury that “there was something wrong with conditions at the prison.”268 
This was by no means a novel revelation. The number of prisoner escapes from Joliet, Pontiac 
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Reformatory, the new prison at Stateville, and the Vandalia Honor Farm—with its comparatively 
lax security—were notoriously high.269 But the grand jury’s access to the prisons’ records and 
the 110 witnesses summoned to give sworn testimony revealed that problems at Joliet and 
Stateville went beyond lax supervision, the prevalence of physical violence, and bad food. Poor 
conditions within these institutions, however, may have been the product of the corruption the 
grand jury worked to uncover. Bafflingly, the grand jury report attempts to separate these 
accusations of corruption from reports of poor conditions at the penitentiary. In addition, the 
report steered away from discussions of Klein’s murky past and negligent management style 
(though this management style likely hastened his demise), perhaps because they wished to 
foreground discussions of potentially corrupt officials who remained alive and in power.  
As deputy warden, however, Klein had direct access to the kinds of prisoners prosecutors 
worried were going free after minimal time served to resume their lives of crime. Moreover, 
reports emerged that Klein secured his position at the prison through the political pull of Frank 
Parker, a Chicago bootlegger, and ran the prison to cater to the needs and desires of Parker’s 
friends and associates, “the most notorious prisoners in the penitentiary.”270 The deputy warden 
allowed his favorite prisoners to roam the Stateville grounds freely, to eat better food than the 
majority of the prison population, and to transfer to the honor farm.271 And money apparently did 
change hands.  
 
269 The grand jury even reported that prisoners were “entrusted with the work of repairing cell door locks, without 
the supervision of anyone in authority.” See Ibid.  
270 Dean Albert J. Harno, “Memorandum, [of interview with Frank Kness]” March 22, 1927, in the Ernest Watson 
Burgess Papers, Box 34 Folder 8, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (hereafter 
SCRC-UCL). 
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The investigation also uncovered conflicts between prison officials, but poor conditions 
at the prisons and these power struggles were not at the heart of the turmoil at Joliet and 
Stateville. Rather, the grand jury believed that the prisoners lost the flicker of hope they relied 
upon: the faith that they would one day leave the institution, and that they could shorten their 
own sentences by cooperating with prison officials. The inmates and former inmates called to 
testify expressed the conviction that “money and influence” could buy “favors, transfers to the 
[Honor] farm, and paroles.”272 While only one witness to the Will County grand jury claimed 
that he himself had paid for his release on parole, the jurors concluded that men who succeeded 
in obtaining their paroles through bribery or graft would be largely unwilling to risk re-
incarceration by testifying. The assembled jurors sat through hours of hearsay evidence and 
concluded that the “circumstances… seem[ed] to confirm that these privileges and releases have 
been bought and paid for.”273 As prisoners widely believed that Deputy Warden Klein was 
involved in the subversion of the merit system, he was not popular at Stateville. Klein’s 
successor, Frank Kness, said that large sums of “money passed through [Klein] to prisoners, and 
from prisoners and their affiliations to him.”274  While it is unclear if Kness—a man with 20 
years of experience in corrections relegated to guarding the cold storage unit under Klein—was 
ever interviewed by the grand jury, he spoke extensively about his predecessor to University of 
Illinois researchers who visited the prison in 1927. He recalled hearing that “grands,” or 
thousands of dollars, changed hands for the purpose of “springing” inmates from the 
penitentiary. Kness also remembered that Klein had a few dangerous habits, including a 
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penchant for carrying and flashing a bill case “with a $50 bill on top, and a $50 bill below” 
within the prison.275 
Despite these reports, the Will County grand jury issued no indictments beyond those it 
returned for the seven men allegedly involved in Klein’s murder. It did, however, call for the 
resignation of several high-ranking officials within the Department of Welfare: Warden John L. 
Whitman and Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles Will Colvin. The grand jury blamed 
Whitman, a man with decades of experience managing penal institutions, for condoning “loose 
discipline,” failing to provide work for inmates, and generally disgracing the penitentiary.276 
Though the penitentiary professed to reform its wards, members of the grand jury dismissed 
these claims. Inmates at Joliet and Stateville simply were not given enough honest labor to 
occupy their time and heal their souls.277 While Whitman ran a “Devil’s Workshop” filled with 
idle hands, Colvin presided over an institution of random guesswork. The grand jury did not 
uncover damning evidence suggesting that Colvin himself took bribes or that he practiced 
favoritism during the release process, but jurors seemed shocked by the process of the parole 
board. In their eyes, Colvin and the Board paroled prisoners according to their own personal 
discretion. Statistically speaking, the Board did not parole too many inmates, but due to its 
“haphazard guesses” untethered to scientific processes it released too many persons who were 
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not ready to return to society.278 Illinois needed to restore confidence in its release procedures, 
and the grand jury argued that this would only be possible if the “board and the system that has 
lost it” were eliminated.279  
Conclusion 
Soon after the grand jury sent its report to Governor Len Small, Will Colvin resigned. 
The Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles tendered his resignation against the advice of a great 
many of his political allies, who warned him that quitting under suspicion would be tantamount 
to an admission of wrongdoing. Some even contacted Governor Small, urging him to ignore the 
negative press from the Chicago Tribune and refuse Colvin’s plea to be relieved from his post. 
The Tribune would pit its editorial page and reporting against the governor “no matter what” and 
this “present attack on the Pardon Board” was no different than previous charges of corruption, 
all of which left Small virtually unscathed.280 State’s Attorney Henry E. Pratt admonished the 
governor against accepting Colvin’s letter of resignation, asserting that this would “be a 
recognition of some unfaithfulness, directly or indirectly, on his part towards you” and an 
admission that “something must be wrong somewhere.”281 Others mailed their letters to Colvin 
directly, praising his long record of public service and claiming that the grand jurors’ critique 
was unfounded. State Senator John Daily dismissed the jurors’ conclusions, writing that, “the 
only intelligent conclusion any reasonable person could draw from these published reports was 
that they were most unreasonable, unfounded and the rankest kind of idle gossip.” Daily urged 
the Superintendent to remain at his post: “A good soldier never retires under fire.”282 Detectives, 
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attorneys, and ordinary citizens also expressed gratitude for Colvin’s work, clearly hoping that 
their compliments could carry the disgraced official through the fallout from the grand jury 
proceedings. Former Chief of Detectives P.D. O’Brien penned a lengthy letter, crediting the 
Board’s actions under Colvin with his faith in the parole system. And another friend of Colvin’s 
dashed off a short note to say that, “this late uproar was BUNK, pure and simple.”283 Whether 
short and punchy, or long-winded and flowery, the flood of supportive letters did not prevent 
Colvin from stepping down. Moreover, he seemed convinced that no one could possibly take his 
place without experiencing the same criticism and intense scrutiny he had. Colvin wrote to the 
Governor that the two concurrent grand jury investigations proved “conclusively that no man’s 
integrity is safe, nor can his honesty be safeguarded, who holds the position of supervisor of 
paroles.”284  
While the grand jury proceedings threatened Will Colvin’s reputation and livelihood, the 
Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles must have sat quietly and stewed, ruminating on the 
incompetence of the jurors and ungratefulness of the public. How could the grand jury take “thief 
talk and gossip” as sworn testimony? Why were these men paying close attention to the words of 
disreputable individuals where there were plenty of respectable people who could tell them that 
the Board performed its work “fairly and honestly”? And above all else, why was the grand jury, 
a group of “untrained” men, “probably no one of whom has ever spent a day in his life-time in 
the study of criminal matters” even called to assess his performance in the first place?285 A 
disgruntled Colvin expressed all of these concerns in his letter of resignation, and then, having 
had the last word, attempted to sink into obscurity. Predictably, the Tribune pounced on this 
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news, mocking Colvin for attempting to portray himself as an abused, yet noble civil servant, and 
claiming that the Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles would never have given up his position 
unless he was guilty of something. Historians may never uncover the full story of the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles under Will Colvin, but the grand jury investigation into Warden Klein’s 
death, the scandal surrounding the possible purchase of pardons and paroles, and Colvin’s 
resignation marked a significant shift towards scientization in the Illinois parole system.   
 Warden Klein’s murder and the scandal that followed forced the state government to 
reevaluate the implementation of the Illinois parole system. For a state still paying lip service to 
progressive penology, dismantling the parole system did not seem like a valid option. 
Eliminating parole would mean abandoning the state’s professed commitment to helping 
individuals reenter society smoothly following their prison terms, relinquishing the power to re-
arrest and easily re-incarcerate paroled men and women without the hassle of due process, and 
forgoing the chance to establish a system of surveillance dedicated to the supervision of potential 
recidivists. But for the parole system to regain a modicum of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, 






Back to the Future: Ernest W. Burgess, Prison Paperwork, and the Origins of the 
Predictive Model 
 
When Governor Lennington Small appointed Hinton Graves Clabaugh as head of the 
parole board following Colvin’s resignation, the specter of the paroled man had loomed large in 
the Illinois public imagination for years. The state’s newspapers described predatory offenders 
with no fear of the penitentiary, who could call upon powerful friends to secure their release after 
serving mere fractions of their lengthy sentences. These hardened men no doubt returned to their 
sinister enterprises once paroled. At best, critics alleged, the parole board was too sentimental or 
too ignorant, “guessing” vicious men out of prison and blind to the dangers they posed. At worst, 
the parole system was “a catspaw of politics,” yet another way for Governor Small and his 
cronies to enrich themselves and dispense favors to their supporters.286   
 Though Clabaugh assured Illinoisans that “no political influence of any kind shall be 
permitted to operate for or against a prisoner” during his tenure as head of the parole board, 
“deep-seated distrust” of the parole system could not be vanquished with a mere change of 
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leadership.287 The Chairman needed to re-establish public trust in parole. By commissioning 
what he saw as a politically neutral committee to explain the purpose of parole laws, study the 
changes he made to the board, and lay bare the honesty and integrity of his decision to release 
each parolee, Clabaugh aimed to demonstrate the value of the institution and build confidence in 
his guidance. He went on to offer his Committee on the Study of the Workings of the 
Indeterminate-Sentence Law and of Parole in the State of Illinois (hereafter “the committee”) 
unfettered access to parole board records, board hearings, and prison staffers and administrators. 
He also allowed committee members Judge Andrew A. Bruce, Dean Albert J. Harno, and 
Professor Ernest W. Burgess to set the parameters of the study.  
The committee quickly determined that Illinois’s system of parole should remain in 
place. As Bruce, Harno, and research assistant John Landesco interviewed prison administrators, 
however, they concluded that major reform was needed to eliminate any hint of “influence” from 
the Board’s decision-making process and place its work “on a scientific and professional 
basis.”288 Sociologist Ernest W. Burgess, of the University of Chicago, took up this charge. The 
professor believed firmly in the essential predictability of human behavior—in applying the 
kinds of categorizations and statistical forecasting used in the physical sciences to the social 
sciences. Given time off from his teaching duties at the university, he set out to create a 
statistical model to predict success or failure on parole. 
To do so, Burgess looked to Clabaugh’s board. He observed parole hearings, listening 
closely to the questions board members posed to prisoners, and pored over notes from interviews 
conducted with the Chairman. The sociologist’s keen eye assessed Clabaugh’s reforms. Perhaps 
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more than any other committee member, he needed to determine where the Chairman’s changes 
had fallen short—when the board might make an ill-informed decision, or where political 
influence could seep into the system. His statistical model might then patch the chinks in the 
board’s armor. Burgess identified institutional shortcomings, exposing flaws in the prison 
record-keeping process that could potentially blind the parole board to a prisoner’s past criminal 
record, or the severity of his crime. He also noted the level of personal intuition that guided 
board members’ choices, a practice that could not be standardized nor passed down from more 
seasoned members of the board to their junior colleagues.  
Yet despite what Burgess considered glaring shortcomings, the sociologist respected 
Clabaugh’s investigative experience. So did his predictive model. To identify an “objective” set 
of factors that would expose the potential recidivist to quantitative evaluation and shield the 
parole board from criticism, he relied on the Chairman’s more qualitative methods, interviews 
with prison staffers and administrators, and an analysis of prison records. The results were 
contradictory: even as Burgess sought to de-personalize the parole process and distance the 
board from the sins of the past, his recommendations perpetuated the same subjective 
assumptions, inherent biases, and intuitive judgments that had governed parole decisions for 
years. These assumptions and biases were closely related to the professor’s own racist 
association of blackness with criminality and his “impoverished appreciation of racism’s effects” 
on Illinois’s African American citizens.289 Far from escaping the parole system’s flaws, then, the 
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professor lent them a veneer of scientific respectability and predictive power that would persist 
unchallenged for more than a generation.  
This chapter explains how Burgess pioneered a social scientific approach to parole. His 
methods, I argue, reflected his association with the University of Chicago, blending the case 
study and statistical research methods that dominated the Sociology Department in the late 
1920s. Burgess’s approach was also shaped by his own background and prejudices. Burgess, a 
congenitally quiet and unobtrusive observer who fell into his academic discipline by accident, is 
usually glossed over in the many histories of the Chicago School of Sociology, and no historian 
has yet attempted more than a brief biographical sketch of the scholar despite his undeniable 
influence in his field. But it is important to understand Burgess—both as a man and as a social 
scientist staking dangerous claims to the objectivity that was once the provenance of the natural 
sciences. Burgess’s personal life, his scholarly development, and his view of the deeply 
segregated city of Chicago conditioned his thinking and fed into his actuarial prediction 
model.290 The factors he chose, the points of information in a prisoner’s past that were correlated 
with parole outcome, emerged from the ecological approach to sociology embraced by the 
Chicago School and nodded toward the focus on culture and personality that would surface in the 
social sciences during the Great Depression.291 Burgess looked for clues to a prisoner’s past 
deviance and potential for future law-breaking in his personal history and behavior, as well as in 
the environmental influences that acted upon him. All the while, his attempts to identify likely 
recidivists and scientize the board’s decision-making process prioritized efficiency and 
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emphasized the problem of deviant individual behavior rather than social inequity or institutional 
inadequacy—the failure of the prison to treat and rehabilitate. For Burgess, the prevention of 
recidivism ultimately lay in the prison and parole board’s ability to assess the individual prisoner 
and his past actions.  
The Lawman and the Committee 
 Governor Small appointed Hinton G. Clabaugh—without ever meeting him in person—to 
head the Board of Pardons and Paroles following Colvin’s departure in July of 1926.292 The 
governor likely hoped that Clabaugh’s reputation as a courageous lawman of integrity could 
restore public faith in the parole system.293 Clabaugh’s career in criminal justice began in 1910, 
when he started work at the federal Bureau of Investigation (BOI) in Chicago, and he quickly 
rose through the ranks.294 After opening a Cincinnati office for the BOI in 1913, Clabaugh 
moved east, where the BOI appointed him Assistant Superintendent of the New York office. The 
start of the Great War found Clabaugh back in Illinois, where he became Chief of the BOI’s 
Chicago office. As head of the Chicago office of the Bureau of Investigation during World War 
I, Clabaugh cracked down on political radicalism, battled vice in the city, and caught thousands 
of army deserters and draft dodgers.295 The Tribune wrote approvingly of his work, especially 
 
292 Clabaugh himself stressed this fact and also mentioned that he belonged to a different political party than Small, 
probably to further indicate that his administration of the parole and pardon board would be vastly different than 
Colvin’s. See “Clabaugh Rules Politics Out of Parole Board; Criminals are to Stay in Prison, He Says,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, August 18, 1926, 3.  
293 On Clabaugh’s reputation, see especially “His Work Done, Clabaugh Quits Government Job: Will Go into 
Business in Chicago; Thanks the City for Help,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 12, 1918, 17. 
294 Clabaugh New Parole Chief; Shift Colvin, Chicago Daily Tribune, July 20, 1926, 1. The agency we now know as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was founded as the Bureau of Investigation, or BOI, in 1908, and 
remained under that name until 1935. 
295 During his time at the Bureau, he may have met Ernest W. Burgess while investigating a sensational case 
involving an affair between “elderly” sociology Professor William I. Thomas and the young wife of a soldier 
stationed overseas in France. The case, which must have been the talk of the department for years, captured public 
attention after Clabaugh gathered evidence that Thomas and Mrs. R.M. Granger violated the Mann Act by falsely 
registering as man and wife at hotel in downtown Chicago. “Professor Is Quizzed; Elderly Sociologist and Young 
Wife of Soldier Held,” The Washington Post, April 13, 1918, 4. The University of Chicago fired Thomas in the 
wake of this scandal. Federal charges against Thomas were eventually dropped, and the professor went on restore 




regarding his actions against labor unions—the BOI used evidence Clabaugh gathered to build a 
case against the Industrial Workers of the World in 1918.296 Though he resigned from the Bureau 
that same year, the lawman continued to fight corruption in Chicago in his work as an 
investigator for a committee organized by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office. This committee 
sifted through records in the Chicago District Attorney’s office and eventually uncovered 
evidence pointing to the office’s involvement in attempts to hinder prosecution in prohibition 
violation cases.297 Clabaugh subsequently worked for Samuel Insull, who ran a vast holding 
company with stake in public utilities and railroads. Insull granted Clabaugh a “temporary leave 
of absence… to reorganize the Board of Pardons and Paroles of Illinois” in July of 1926.  
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 In light of his work at the BOI and as a private investigator, Clabaugh admitted that his 
view of the parole system was grim: “My first impression was that indeterminate sentences and 
parole laws were an asset to criminals.”298 He detailed his problems with the administration of 
the parole law in the press, assuring reporters in a press conference held soon after his 
appointment that he would remove politics from parole and institute a merit-based system to 
assess a prisoner’s suitability for parole based on either “newly discovered evidence” about their 
conviction or “circumstances occurring subsequent to conviction.”299 Under his leadership, 
Clabaugh asserted, the board would make the safety of Illinois citizens its first priority and that 
“the tough ones,” or those prisoners most dangerous to the public, would serve out their 
 
298 Hinton G. Clabaugh, “Foreword,” in The Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in 
Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh (Springfield: Department of Public Welfare, 1928), iv.  
299 Hinton G. Clabaugh, quoted in “Paroling Now is On Merit Basis, Clabaugh Says; No Politics, New Chief Tells 
His Aids,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 6, 1926, 11.  
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maximum sentences.300 He also stated that all meetings of the board would be open to newspaper 
reporters. The guidelines Clabaugh set out for the board’s assessment of cases, however, soon 
changed. Though he still believed firmly that “the pendulum of justice and mercy [had] swung to 
the extreme in favor of criminals” in the 1920s, he took steps toward incorporating new insights 
into the criminal mind and behavior as pioneered by social scientists. Learning to distinguish 
between “vicious and habitual criminals” and those prisoners capable of becoming “good 
citizens” would be key to the administration of parole laws. The Committee on the Study of the 
Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and of Parole in the State of Illinois could help the 
newly created Illinois Parole Board do just that.301 
 Clabaugh carefully avoided accusations of harboring any kind of political motive when 
appointing committee members. He requested that the presidents of the major universities in 
Illinois—David Kinley of the University of Illinois, Walter Dill Scott of Northwestern 
University, and Max Mason of the University of Chicago—select faculty to conduct a study of 
the parole system. Each president chose one faculty member from his university for the 
committee. In January, 1927, Clabaugh met with Burgess, Dean Harno of the University of 
Illinois Law School, and Judge Bruce of the Northwestern University Law School.302 The 
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Chairman of the Board of Paroles granted this committee of three full access to all records of the 
parole board and meetings of the board itself, stating that the study would not be hindered in any 
way. A sweeping study of this kind, however, promised to be a significant commitment for these 
three academics, presumably already quite busy with research and teaching. As such, the 
universities released Burgess and another unspecified member of the committee from their 
instructional obligations, and Clabaugh approved the hiring of two assistants to support the 
committee’s work.303  
 Bruce, Harno, and Burgess introduced two research queries at the beginning of the study, 
and busied themselves with answering these questions from 1927 to 1928, when they published 
their study. These questions were: 
1. Should the indeterminate sentence and the parole system be abandoned or continued? 
2. If abandoned, what substitute should be found for it; if continued, what changes, if any, 
should be made?304 
 
An academic study, however, can never escape the onslaught of sub-questions, which branch out 
continually from its original research questions. The Bruce-Burgess-Harno committee developed 
several lines of inquiry to satisfactorily answer its two central questions: Bruce researched the 
history and evolution of indeterminate sentencing and parole in Illinois; Harno parsed the present 
workings of the parole board and its relationship to the court; Landesco focused on parole as a 
way to rehabilitate offenders; and Burgess conducted a statistical study to determine the factors 
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that might indicate whether a given prisoner would make good on parole or become a 
recidivist.305 Many of the results of the committee’s research would be unsurprising to a reader 
of this dissertation. Harno concluded that the general public knew virtually nothing about the 
actual operation of the parole system, and that widespread confusion about what the criminal 
justice system intended for parole laws to accomplish contributed to a general hostility towards 
the indeterminate sentence.306 Moreover, the public believed that the parole system worked in 
favor of prisoners through the curtailment of actual time served. The committee instead found 
that those under indeterminate sentences were held for longer periods of time than those held 
under determinate sentences. While the committee as a whole concluded that Illinois should 
continue the indeterminate sentence and the parole system, Burgess, Harno, and Bruce all agreed 
that the parole board could not work effectively without public trust.307 
The new, expanded board also could not work effectively without adequate funding. In 
his first year on the job, Clabaugh convinced the legislature to increase the appropriation for the 
Division of Pardons and Paroles from $349,000 to $1,466,200 for the biennium, enabling the 
creation of a nine-member board independent from the Department of Public Welfare.308 He 
inherited a sizable backlog of cases eligible for parole from his scandal-mired predecessor, Will 
Colvin, admitting even a few months after he took office that “we have got a bad situation there 
[in the state’s prisons].” In last months of Colvin’s administration, paroles slowed to a trickle. 
But with the new, nine-member board installed and the committee’s study underway, Clabaugh 
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hoped to “get the parole started… get more men on parole, and improve this congestion” within 
Illinois institutions.309 To expedite the work, the new Chairman divided this nine-member Board 
into three subcommittees of three board members, one for each of the state’s major correctional 
facilities. These three subcommittees met at their assigned institutions three days out of the 
week, reviewing jacket files, interviewing prisoners, and making reports for the entire Board to 
first review and then rule on as a whole once per month. Clabaugh was quick to express pride in 
the changes he made to the board in his first year of service and solicited public recognition for 
his achievements. By the end of his first year as Chairman, he wrote to social reformer Lawrence 
Veiller, then Secretary of the Committee on Criminal Courts in New York City, assuring Veiller 
that the parole system was “working splendidly.” Characterizing the board prior to the 1927 
legislative appropriation as a “paper organization,” he boasted that “Illinois now has the best 
system in the country” and that the parole board was an aid to law enforcement rather than a 
force undermining the court system.310 
Still, Clabaugh continued to guard the board against ongoing charges of corruption and 
incompetency. All the structural changes he made and legislative appropriations he solicited 
could not convince the citizens of Illinois that the parole board operated with reason and 
integrity. He needed to legitimate parole in the eyes of the public. Clabaugh addressed this 
challenge by mounting a visible defense of the parole system, writing in an open letter to 
Governor Small that “under attack, an individual is entitled to defense; precisely so with 
administrative bodies.” In this particular case, where the critique of parole was so “frequently 
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unintelligent and unjust,” the proper defense would lie in “an impartial, intelligent, and 
constructive consideration of the indeterminate sentence laws and of the parole administration” 
conducted by representatives of Illinois’s leading universities.311  
Burgess Observes: Common Sense, Integrity, and Reform in Clabaugh’s Board 
Despite Clabaugh’s reforms, his decision-making process revealed that the new 
Chairman considered many of the same factors as Colvin when ruling in any given case. The 
former investigator relied heavily on common sense judgement, prioritizing his gut feelings 
above current research on the criminal mind, the causes of crime, and the characteristics of the 
recidivist. The Chairman’s conviction that rational parole decisions could be made by a 
combination of this commonsense assessment and deep investigation into a prisoner’s past 
remains apparent throughout his interview with Dean Albert J. Harno. While Harno and his 
committee members praised the structural changes Clabaugh made to the board and the parole 
system, they continued to highlight similarities between Clabaugh’s board and the previous 
parole administration. Aside from the addition of long-winded and often paternalistic 
explanations of his decision-making process, the questions Clabaugh asked of prospective 
parolees were similar to those had Colvin asked, and Clabaugh relied on the same limited 
selection of jacket materials. In each board hearing, Clabaugh, like Colvin, asked questions about 
the nature of the crime committed, whether the prisoner was innocent or guilty of the offense, if 
this was his or her first offense, and if the prisoner planned to stay out of trouble if paroled. The 
materials gathered by the board and the nature of the lines of questioning pursued during its 
hearings illustrated the extent to which releasing men on parole was still a game of chance. In his 
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conversation with Harno, the Chairman stressed that his extensive “contact with human nature,” 
ability to “secure all the facts,” and application of “plain common sense” informed his decision 
in prisoners’ cases that came before the board. Clabaugh also told Harno, “I do not believe there 
is any such thing as expertness in the particular kind of work I am referring to.”312  
 Still, Clabaugh emphasized the importance of making a study of each individual case by 
way of records accumulated in the institutional jacket files, a practice that had proved impossible 
for Colvin’s smaller board.313 When asked about the most important factors the board considered 
when deciding whether to grant or deny a parole, Clabaugh asserted that decisions were largely 
based on jacket materials containing information about a prisoner’s past history, his “attitude 
toward discipline and toward society, as evidenced by his institutional record,” and the nature of 
his crime. Each parole board member claimed that they read each prospective parolee’s jacket in 
its entirety before a hearing. Members paired their assessment of the written record with “[their] 
own conclusion” or judgment of the prisoner after speaking with them “three or four times.”314  
 The 1927 separation of the Board of Pardons from the Illinois Parole Board and the 
concurrent increase in staff allowed Clabaugh and the other members of the parole board more 
time to familiarize themselves with jacket materials, which they consulted for details about 
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prisoners’ criminal records and social histories. Clabaugh insisted that the organization of the 
board into subcommittees split the work up enough so that members could read all of the 
materials in the jacket files and conduct in-depth interviews with each prisoner from their 
assigned institution before making their report to the full parole board.315 Materials available to 
board members for review also increased under Clabaugh’s administration. By 1927, each 
institutional jacket reviewed by the board included a mittimus containing the names and 
addresses of complaining witnesses and jurors involved in court proceedings, plus statements 
from state’s attorneys and judges. Clabaugh told Harno that the board often contacted jurors and 
witnesses to fill out the details of the case and that he attempted to work in “cooperation with the 
prosecutors and the courts” to obtain more detailed statements. Before ruling in each case, 
Clabaugh’s board supposedly reviewed all of these materials. They also considered the details of 
the prisoner’s crime to “determine what would be a proper punishment,” justice for the prisoner 
and society. However, Burgess later noted that reading the jackets would have been a lengthy 
process for board members, as materials were not arranged by date or in any other logical way. It 
often took “a member of the Committee a day, sometimes two and even three days,” to reorder, 
read, and assess the papers in one jacket.316 The task of arranging and reading through all of the 
papers in all of the jackets in advance of each parole hearing would have been almost impossibly 
taxing even for Clabaugh’s larger parole board. 
 At the same time, a perusal of the committee’s notes reveals that some jackets held little 
information regarding the prisoner’s offense and previous history. One Pontiac jacket for a boy 
sentenced for larceny in 1923 held only a single sheet of paper containing a statement from the 
reformatory’s superintendent. The board members’ decisions in every case were only as good as 
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their instincts and the qualitative information given them. The disparity between near empty 
jackets and jackets stuffed full of life histories, police reports, attorney statements, petitions, and 
other materials probably meant that some prisoners received fuller consideration than others. 
Prisoners with more extensive jackets were most likely literate, native-born white men with 
strong ties to their neighborhoods and to wealthy, influential, and respected men who made an 
effort to vouch for them. They had mothers, fathers, wives, and employers who wrote letters to 
the board and circulated petitions for release among community residents. Before the widespread 
use of fingerprint identification, better connections between police departments, and greater 
reliance on psychiatric diagnoses, prisons and the parole board-based assessment of a given 
offender’s identity and character upon his or her acquaintances and friends. Relying on this 
information, contained in institutional jackets, meant that prisoners with thin case files either 
made a very good impression with the board and prison officials or remained inside.  
 Fortunately for prisoners with thin jacket files, Clabaugh’s larger board and 
subcommittee system also allowed for lengthier interviews with prospective parolees. This tactic 
was in keeping with Clabaugh’s view of the significance of a prisoner’s habits and character 
traits to his parole outcome. The Chairman relied heavily on these interviews before ruling in 
each case—prioritizing his own judgment over other records and assessments. Parole hearings 
began with the imprisoned man giving a chronological history of his life, encompassing his 
school years, family life, employment record, and the details of his criminal history. Clabaugh 
related that he and other board members would “ask him [the prisoner] all sorts of questions; 
questions we would not be permitted to ask in court” in order to “search the fellow thoroughly 
and find out all about him.”317 The Chairman was sure that his background as a criminal 
 




investigator for the Bureau of Identification (BOI) prepared him for speaking with each prisoner 
who came before the Board. When questioning draft dodgers and wartime dissidents for the BOI 
during WWI, he spoke with thousands of people with varied social backgrounds. These men and 
women had one thing in common: “most of [them] were in trouble.” After enough time spent 
talking with people in trouble, Clabaugh contended, “you get accustomed to sizing them up when 
talking to them.” 318  
 Due to the Chairman’s outsize influence over the parole board, prospective parolees with 
lengthy criminal records and social connections board members considered disreputable needed 
to impress Clabaugh. Clabaugh certainly fancied himself an expert in the intricacies of the 
criminal mind—as evidenced by his prolonged Board hearing monologues on the character of 
certain inmates—and had a taste for investigation. He occasionally indulged himself, taking a 
special interest in a few cases recorded for the committee’s files and engaging in background 
research on these prisoners and their crimes. The Chairman even spoke to complaining witnesses 
himself, attempting to convince them to withdraw their objections to a parole when he believed a 
given prisoner deserved a second chance. In one case, Burgess saw Clabaugh place his faith in a 
desperate young man who aroused animosity in the Chicago business community, eliciting 
letters of protest from the successful merchants he had swindled. Clabaugh told Henry Yepsen, 
an egg-broker who attempted to pass bad checks and attached false bills of lading to his egg 
shipments, that he “thought [him] a man” when Yepsen admitted during a parole hearing that he 
had blamed an innocent employee for his crimes at trial. Clabaugh rewarded Yepsen for his 
honesty and went to great lengths to give the broker a second chance in his business, even calling 
a meeting with representatives from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Bankers’ 
 




Association to his office to explain that Yepsen had admitted wrongdoing, made a good record in 
prison, and was “too intelligent a man” to have his talents wasted. Evidently, these 
representatives concurred and withdrew their objections to Yepsen’s parole. In a special hearing 
before the board, however, Clabaugh said that he did not believe that Yepsen was “a criminal at 
heart” and that he would have granted him a parole regardless of protests from the business 
community.319  
 While very few transcripts of parole board hearings are available to archival researchers 
today, the committee had access to all of them. It seems that Burgess included this particular 
transcript in his research notes because it was so well documented. Burgess wrote that the case 
interested him because it showed how much influence the parole hearing had over determining 
the punishment for the offense, and how the Chairman’s personal assessment of probability of 
reform could sway the board’s decision.320 A perusal of the Joliet Register of Prisoners and of 
the materials contained in the average prisoner’s mittimus file—similar to the institutional 
jacket—further highlights the unique features of Yepsen’s case. Though born to German 
immigrant parents, Yepsen was a white-collar worker on the outside, whereas most prison 
inmates worked blue-collar jobs before their arrests.321 Yepsen’s class status certainly increased 
his chances for release. Clabaugh summoned Yepsen’s business associates for a discussion of his 
case, when most prospective parolees found that their family members, friends, and colleagues 
were unable to afford the travel cost of attending a parole Board hearing. Clabaugh even 
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remarked that Yepsen appeared “clean cut” during his parole hearing, and that he made a “good 
impression.”322  
 Clabaugh’s board members, too, certainly placed more faith in “gut feelings” over the 
course of the decision-making process than they wished to admit. The Board’s paper trail 
sometimes revealed little qualitative reasoning behind its decisions. One written report composed 
by the Board to explain why it had denied 
parole to a young man in Pontiac merely 
read: “we feel that this boy should have a 
substantial lesson to the end that he will 
learn that he cannot do the things that he 
has been doing so flagrantly.”323 The 
written statement here could easily be 
applied to nearly any reformatory case—it 
gives no indication of the board’s 
assessment of the individual under 
consideration or why they thought he should stay at Pontiac. Was it the case that this boy was 
making progress in his schooling and learning a trade inside that would give him a better chance 
on parole? Or perhaps he failed to follow reformatory rules and obey orders from his keepers? 
Maybe details of this particular prisoner’s past were still murky and the board felt he might be 
too great a risk if allowed to return to his community. Whatever the actual situation, the brevity 
of this notation and others the committee saw over the course of their research proved worrisome 
to the academics involved.  
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Figure 7 Sam Washington, convicted of killing his common law wife in 
1925, sits at a table with Clabaugh and members of the Parole and Pardon 




 In addition to the interview and the trial materials held in each prisoner’s institutional 
jacket, the parole board also officially considered character references from “business and 
professional men,” an institutional conduct report composed by the warden, statements from 
arresting officers, and an evaluation from the institution’s mental health officer (psychiatrist) 
when available. The warden’s conduct report included his recommendation for or against parole 
in the case along with the imprisoned man’s disciplinary record. It may have also contained 
information on the man’s prison work record, any educational progress made while incarcerated, 
and a report of the prisoner’s attendance at religious services offered in the institution.324 
Clabaugh’s comments regarding wardens’ statements suggest that the opinions of prison officials 
and guards greatly influenced the board’s decision in any given case. These officials and 
deputies, the Chairman contended, knew the prisoners better than any other representative of the 
state.325 By contrast, Clabaugh viewed statements from prison psychiatrists and mental health 
officers with suspicion. He complained that psychiatric assessments submitted to the parole 
board while Will Colvin held office were next to useless: “I do not pay much attention to a report 
that definitely classifies an inmate of having the mental ability of a child of nine years and six 
months.” Psychiatrists wasted too much time placing prisoners in categories and attempting to 
theoretically determine developmental stages instead of carefully studying the individual 
prisoner himself and coming to conclusions the parole board would find useful, Clabaugh told 
Harno. Indeed, the former federal agent doubted the legitimacy of the psychiatric profession as a 
whole. He summed up his views with an anecdote: “The best definition of the usefulness of a 
psychiatrist I ever heard was given by this lady on the staff of the Johns Hopkins Institute in 
 
324 Albert J. Harno, “How the New Parole Board Works,” in Bruce et al., Workings, 71. 




which she said… ‘Any fool can tell a nut.’”326 According to Clabaugh, the authority of 
institutional psychiatrists lay in the sheer volume of their experience with prisoners, though he 
allowed that the mental classifications they devised and applied could sometimes indicate 
whether or not a particular prisoner would pose a risk to society if released.  
 While committee researchers certainly believed that the sort of “common sense 
judgment” Clabaugh praised in prison psychiatrists and exercised in parole interviews was 
valuable, they worried about the influences that might sway this kind of decision-making.327 
Even if paroles were not directly bought and sold, the kind of legal representation and character 
recommendations money could buy certainly might push board members towards leniency. 
Burgess noted that sons of prominent families often secured state senators and representatives to 
come to board hearings on their behalf. These families also hired prominent and wily attorneys 
who collected materials favorable to parole for the institutional jacket. Powerful labor leaders 
also looked out for incarcerated union men. Union officials exerted considerable political and 
social pull, which they used to raise money for lawyers, secure employment for parolees, and 
gather hundreds of signatures in support of their imprisoned comrades. These signed petitions 
could be added to jackets to illustrate community support for the union man’s parole.328 
However, influence over Board decisions did not always work in favor of the prospective 
parolee. As evidenced by public outcry against parole in 1926 and earlier, the “tremendous force 
of public sentiment” could lead to longer sentences for even the most meritorious or well-
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connected prisoner.329 Indeed, during the period from 1921-1926 when Burgess estimated that 
opposition to the parole law was most vigorous, the board released very few prisoners—the 
proportion of men paroled to the prison population as a whole was the lowest it had ever been.330   
 After observing multiple parole hearings and reading countless case files, Burgess 
concluded that Clabaugh’s structural changes—which allowed greater attention to cases and 
lengthier interviews—could not on their own lead to better parole decisions.331 Nor could 
“honesty and good intentions on the part of the members” justify board rulings. To legitimate the 
revamped parole board and justify releasing prisoners, board members’ decisions needed to be 
separated from any kind of monetary, political, and sentimental influence—whether favorable or 
unfavorable to a given case. 
Ernest W. Burgess: “The First Young Sociologist”332 
When Burgess accepted the position on Clabaugh’s committee to investigate the 
workings of the indeterminate sentence and parole law in Illinois, he approached the project with 
an eclectic methodological toolkit shaped both by his own way of being in the world and by the 
intellectual luminaries that surrounded him at the University of Chicago. Burgess was born in 
Canada in 1886, but immigrated to a small town in Michigan with his parents and sister at a 
young age. Perhaps it was this move to Whitehall, with its “conventional middle-class, somewhat 
puritanic, small town setting” that fostered Burgess’s later fascination with deviance—the ability 
to be privy to the sorts of goings on behind closed doors that a small-town busybody might find 
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worthy of gossip.333 Certainly, his rural background would later give him a “strong sense of 
being… [an outsider] to the [urban] phenomena” he studied at the University of Chicago.334 As a 
child, Burgess’s academic inclinations developed early. Teachers recognized his potential from 
his grade school years and called him “the little professor,” a nickname he apparently 
embraced.335 He would later tell a colleague that he could not remember considering any career 
path outside of the professoriate.336 Burgess’s family also supported his scholarly ambitions and 
sent Ernest and his younger sister to Oklahoma’s Kingfisher College after high school. 
Though Ernest’s quiet, dignified demeanor and religious upbringing probably prevented 
boasting, he took pride in his academic achievements while at Kingfisher. This was evidenced by 
a well-worn recommendation letter written on his behalf by a professor of psychology and 
history, which Burgess kept safe among his personal papers for decades.337 The young man 
intended to pursue graduate studies in English at the University of Michigan after graduating 
from Kingfisher, but, as he would later tell a student, this decision was derailed when he stopped 
in Chicago on his way to Ann Arbor. There, a Kingfisher mentor arranged a meeting with 
Professor Albion Small, who convinced Burgess to stay in the city and study sociology. Burgess 
defended his dissertation in 1913, while teaching at the University of Toledo. Following short 
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stints as assistant professor at the University of Kansas and Ohio State University, he returned to 
the University of Chicago, where he would remain until he retired in 1952.338  
He accepted his faculty position at the University of Chicago in 1916, just in time to join 
the scions of the discipline as they worked out sociology’s methodologies, practical applications, 
and relationship to the other social sciences. The fresh-faced and kindly Burgess found a mentor 
in colleague Robert Park, with whom he shared an office in the East Tower of Harper Library.339 
Park and Burgess’s work, as well as the work of their students, adheres to the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks identified as hallmarks of the Chicago school of sociology, a 
“blending of firsthand inquiry with general ideas” and the “integration of research and theory as 
part of an organized program.”340  
The literature on the Chicago School of Sociology tends to emphasize colorful faculty 
members like the outspoken former journalist Park and students like Nels Anderson, whose 
innovations in participant observation for his study of the city’s homeless population became a 
legendary example of the school’s fieldwork methodology. Burgess, who was soft-spoken and 
unassuming, is most often remembered for his collaborations with Park and for his concentric 
zone model, a theory of city expansion.341 While he was famous in his day, in the way that 
academics are known to their colleagues and to graduate students, Burgess followed a linear path 
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to academia with none of the biographically interesting learning experiences Park enjoyed on his 
way to the professoriate.342 He never married and enjoyed a deeply private, quiet existence even 
in his young adulthood. Despite a milquetoast personal life, or maybe because of it, Burgess 
established himself as a valuable instructor and colleague in the department during the heyday of 
the Chicago school of sociology. His students especially appreciated his “knack of [sic] setting 
forth the most complex concepts and ideas in simple language in intelligible form.” For Burgess, 
the study of sociology “mean[t] preparation to become a scientist.”343 He believed students could 
learn more by practicing sociological methods, designing their own projects, and conducting 
their own fieldwork than they could by listening to his lectures. As a gesture of good faith in the 
undergraduates and graduate students he trained, he often invited his pupils to participate in his 
research endeavors.  
 
342 Park spent a decade as a newspaper reporter before attending graduate school in philosophy at Harvard and at 
Heidelberg in Germany. Park completed his doctorate in Europe before working with the American Congo Reform 
Association (ACRA) as a secretary and publicity agent, writing articles about the horrific violence and 
environmental destruction perpetrated by Belgian colonial officials in Africa. While writing for ACRA in 1904, Park 
met Booker T. Washington. Sociologist Zine Magubane recounts that at this first meeting Park shared a theory with 
Washington: that “the evils of Leopold’s regime in the Congo were… one of the more or less inevitable results of 
the civilizing process.” A year later, Park went to work for Washington at Tuskegee Institute, where he would 
remain for nine years. When he began teaching at the University of Chicago in 1914, he worked part-time as an 
instructor. He taught one course there while serving as president of the Chicago Urban League, an organization 
created to help rural African American migrants adjust to urban life. Park was appointed to the University’s faculty 
in 1919. Zine Magubane, “Science, Reform, and the ‘Science of Reform’: Booker T. Washington, Robert Park, and 
the Making of a ‘Science of Society,” Current Sociology 62, no. 4 (July 2014), 569. Also see Davarian L. Baldwin, 
“Black Belts and Ivory Towers: The Place of Race in U.S. Social Thought, 1892-1948,” Critical Sociology 30, no. 2 
(July 2004), 410. 
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Young Burgess also worked closely with his colleagues, co-teaching courses in the 
department and joining forces with more experienced professors to conduct research in Chicago. 
He sought the advice of fellow faculty members from the beginning of his career at the 
University of Chicago. When assigned to teach the introductory course in sociology for 
undergraduates, Burgess contacted Professor Bedford to ask for his course outline. Bedford, then 
in the midst of teaching the introductory class, refused. Burgess returned to his office feeling 
chastened and related the story to Park, who offered to help. 
The two worked together to prepare lecture outlines and 
readings.344 The course became the basis for their first book, 
Introduction to the Science of Sociology, a textbook published 
in 1921. Students would come to know this introductory text 
as the “green bible” because of its green cover and 
significance in setting out the theoretical state of the field.345 
This collaboration along with the two scholars’ 1925 work, 
The City, would shape Burgess’s understanding of race and 
inequality, informing his work for years to come. 
In the green bible, Park and Burgess laid out the 
“interaction cycles” paradigm, a theory that explained the development of race and ethnic 
relations in the modern world. Often called the “race relations cycle,” the theory laid out a 
supposedly universal series of progressive steps ranging from “competition to conflict to 
 
344 Hughes, “Young Sociologist,” 3.  
345 Despite its length (1,040 pages), the book sold over 30,000 copies before its printing plates were repurposed, 
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Figure 8 Undated photograph of Ernest W. Burgess in 
his office at the University of Chicago. Photograph by 




accommodation and finally, assimilation” that characterized contact between social groups.346 
Conflicts like the 1919 riot in Chicago—and even the horrors of violence perpetrated by Belgian 
King Leopold’s officials in the Congo—were apparently natural and crucial to this process. An 
inevitable part of the cycle, conflict occurred along the way to a state of social balance. Still, 
even as he stressed the universality of this cycle, Park realized that the assimilation of persons of 
color was different than the assimilation of white ethnic groups. To explain the dissimilarities, he 
advanced a theory of “‘racial characteristics’ that imposed bio-cultural explanations on social 
conditions and groups.” Both cultural and biological traits determined the rapidity of 
assimilation, Park explained, thus finding a way to “rationalize race without letting racism 
undermine social cohesion.”347 Like his mentor, Booker T. Washington, Park believed that the 
process of assimilation was slow, and that “social changes in race relations occurred only 
gradually, usually over centuries.” The work of activists, politicians, and reformers could not 
change this process.348 
Park and Burgess applied the ideas they worked out in the green bible to their vision of 
urban space, laid out in a 1925 edited volume titled The City. As cultural critic Andrew Ross 
argues, the theory of “human ecology” presented in the volume was “infused with assumptions 
about the pathology of the racial and class compositions of neighborhoods and their 
populations.”349 Moreover, rather than using detached, scientific methodologies to observe, 
record, and interpret social reality, the researchers instead defined the city’s sociocultural and 
 
346 Baldwin, “Black Belts and Ivory Towers,” 411. 
347 Ibid, 412.  
348 Aldon Morris, The Scholar Denied: W.E.B. DuBois and the Birth of Modern Sociology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2015), 103, 115. Morris further argues that Park’s view was wrapped up in evolutionary social 
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spatial infrastructure themselves and slotted urban changes into a biological framework. Cities, 
Park insisted, were “product[s] of nature, and particularly of human nature.”350  Though Park, 
Burgess, and their coeditor believed they were describing a socio-ecological process that could 
explain change in the city’s settlement patterns over time, the three sociologists were not so 
much describing a process as “prescribing” an organization of urban space in order to “codify the 
city for observation and ‘administration.’”351 The biological framing of this process turned the 
operations of private enterprise to “a natural force” that both pushed the city’s boundaries ever 
outward and divided urban space into “its residential and industrial districts.”352 As Park put it, 
neighborhoods inevitably divided people on the basis of “personal tastes and convenience, 
vocational and economic interests… an organization and distribution of the population which is 
neither designed or controlled.”353 Burgess’s theory of concentric zones, laid out first in 
Proceedings of the American Sociological Society and later reprinted in The City, physically 
mapped Park’s “stereotypes, mythologies, and pre-conceived notions” about each neighborhood 
and “embedded them [into] the physical landscape.”354 Historian Davarian Baldwin dissects the 
concentric zones model and its explanatory essay, showing that Burgess condemned the “most 
visibly racial” groups to slum living and low-level occupations—fates Burgess conceptualized as 
the result of these persons’ “racial temperament” rather than unequal access to residential 
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neighborhoods and well-paying jobs. Most significantly, the sociologist made African Americans 
“the naturalized standard in measuring disorganization.”355 Burgess’s collaborations with Park, 
especially his mapping work, reveal his understanding of race and urban areas, contextualizing 
the construction of his parole prediction model. 
Burgess and Park’s scholarly collaborations—Introduction to the Science of Sociology 
and The City—also attracted talented graduate students to the University of Chicago. As those 
students remember it, Park’s charm, his zeal for his discipline, and his apparently spellbinding 
lectures—sometimes delivered during long rambles through the streets of Chicago—drew young 
scholars to the department. Burgess’s quiet kindness and immediate acceptance of students as 
colleagues helped to keep them there. Together, the two professors taught students to see 
Chicago as a great sociological laboratory and encouraged them to step out of the confines of the 
campus to explore the city. Burgess remembered years later that he had made “contact with 
agencies throughout the city in search of the data they could furnish” to expand the scope of 
student research.356 The community ties he cultivated gave faculty and students entrée to stores 
of social information held by the Chicago Juvenile Court, the city’s Health Department, the 
Council of Social Agencies, the Urban League, the Association of Commerce, and the various 
social settlements. Students analyzed this trove of data, mapping data points, reading social 
histories, and—in the case of graduate students—obeying Park’s command to “go get the seats 
of your pants dirty in real research.”  
As the 1920s came to a close, however, an ageing Park lost some of his influence as the 
department more fully embraced advanced quantitative methods. To exercise “powers of 
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prediction and control” and claim objective authority, sociologists borrowed techniques from the 
natural sciences to craft new methodological standards for the profession.357 While Burgess 
dipped into quantitative techniques when he mapped data points in his studies of urban areas, he 
felt unfamiliar with the new direction of his discipline—so much so that he made the trope of the 
professor as eternal student a reality. As a tenured faculty member, Burgess sat in on at least one 
of his colleague William F. Ogburn’s courses in statistics in 1927. He was one of the first 
Chicago faculty members to bridge the gap between proponents of the case study and life history 
techniques espoused by Park and the champions of the newer statistical methods Ogburn brought 
to the department.  
The sociological work that emerged from the University of Chicago the 1920s, whether 
produced by Park’s case-studiers or Ogburn’s statisticians, espoused a value-neutral scientific 
study of social problems. Students and faculty cultivated this aura of expert neutrality, distancing 
their discipline from social reform work despite their liberal use of techniques from the social 
survey and settlement house models of the Progressive Era.358 Though sociologists shied away 
from reform work, the rise of scientism combined with the efforts of organized philanthropy to 
build a “more academic, theoretically grounded social science as a knowledge base for policy” 
meant that they and their fellow social scientists were more enmeshed in policy networks than 
ever before. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation showered University of Chicago 
 
357 Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 390. 
358 In keeping with the earlier ties between Chicago sociologists and social reformers, the young Burgess lived for a 
time at Hull-House and greatly admired Jane Addams, though he never recognized her work as anything 
approximating sociological research. He and Robert Park used techniques developed by Chicago women involved in 
social survey work, but obscured their influence. The two men were eager to separate themselves from social 
reformers and never credited Addams, Sophonisba Breckinridge, Edith Abbott, and other influential women scholars 
who shaped the Chicago school methodology presented in the green bible and used in The City. As Mary Jo Deegan 
argues, Burgess saw Addams not as a scholar or intellectual equal to be cited, but rather as the “ideal of traditional 
womanhood embodied.” Mary Jo Deegan, Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918 (New 




sociologists with research money. Chicago’s well-funded sociologists became particularly visible 
in policy circles, publishing frequently and advancing their ideas about poverty, delinquency and 
social disorganization, and appropriate responses to social problems.  
Burgess’s activities off campus, however, indicated continued personal investment in 
certain kinds of social reform work—anti-vice initiatives and the prevention of juvenile 
delinquency—which he conveniently omitted from his critique of reform movements. 
Ultimately, Burgess struggled to keep his reformer’s instincts and desires private and separate 
from his sociological thought.359 We can see hints of this internal wrestling match throughout his 
professional career, and a potential title for his proposed autobiography suggests his cognizance 
of it. He passed away before he could write I Renounce Reform and the Reformer: The Story of a 
Conflict of Social Roles, but this title perhaps illustrates Burgess’s conviction that his “objective” 
and “scientific” sociological side dominated his reformist impulses in the end.360 In reality, 
Burgess’s scholarly work merely evolved to address concerns he had as a reformer.361 His 
professional dismissal of reform work solidified in the late 1920s as his increasing use of 
statistical methods allowed him to both generate the “objective” knowledge of interest to 
policymakers and suggest how they might use it to improve the work of government. Despite his 
close working relationship with Park, Burgess maintained his intellectual independence and was 
more flexible in his research methods. He encouraged his students to map social phenomena and 
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honed his own statistical toolkit even as Park worked to contain the department’s new focus on 
instrumental positivism in their graduate seminar on field work.362 
In keeping with his methodological training, Burgess approached the task of creating a 
predictive model for Clabaugh and the Illinois State Parole Board with qualitative and 
quantitative tools. The final prediction tool combined case study and life history methods with 
statistical techniques in a method known as factor analysis. This prediction technique itself, 
which would help the Board assess the risk of releasing prisoners, is a neat representation of 
Burgess’s response to the feud between the “case studiers” and the “statisticians” within his 
department. He borrowed from both camps, acting as an intellectual and sometimes practical 
peacemaker for his feuding colleagues.  
 
Good Risks: Institutional Knowledge and Factor Selection in Burgess’s Parole Study 
Drawing on his observations of Clabaugh’s process and of institutional jackets and parole 
outcomes for 3,000 paroled men from Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet, Burgess compiled a list of 
social, behavioral, and juridical details that he considered probable indicators of each man’s 
future conduct.363 As Clabaugh needed the report on the Illinois parole system within a short 
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previous work record; (18) his punishment record in the institution; (19) his age at time of parole; (20) his mental 
age according to psychiatric examination; (21) his personality type according to psychiatric examination; (22) his 
psychiatric prognosis.” Ernest W. Burgess, “Factors Determining Success or Failure on Parole,” in the Illinois Crime 
Survey, Illinois Association for Criminal Justice and the Chicago Crime Commission, comp. (Chicago: Blakely 
Printing Company, 1929), 522. Though Burgess and his research assistants tested 22 factors, the final prediction 
method found that 21 of these factors were correlated with outcome on parole. He removed factor 3, “nationality of 




period of time and as the academics involved in the study needed to return to their university 
posts, Burgess could not rely on exhaustive, long-term case studies to address his research 
questions. His dependence on files maintained by Illinois correctional facilities curtailed the 
factors he could choose from to those characteristics of an offender’s life that previous prison 
authorities identified as significant in some way to custodial and release processes. Burgess 
worked with points of information contained and easily located in each prisoner’s record, or 
classifications a sociologist reading the prisoner’s record could feasibly make. Burgess likely 
selected these specific details after considering the limitations of standardized records included 
in each prisoner’s jacket file, reading and interpreting his fellow researchers’ conversations with 
prison officials, and poring over his research assistants’ interviews with paroled men about going 
straight or returning to criminal activity after release. To a lesser extent, he may have taken 
public assumptions about criminality under advisement.364 The sociologist’s efforts to scientize 
parole board decisions therefore rested upon past practices of prison, board, and law enforcement 
personnel, unselfconsciously reproducing any assumptions and prejudices contained in the 
records they left behind.   
 Alongside limitations within the records, Burgess certainly considered his own 
limitations within the field of penology, using interviews with prison officials and men on parole 
to fill the gaps in his knowledge. Though Burgess was an eclectic researcher interested in a 
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variety of sociological questions, his earlier publications focused on urban studies and social 
pathology. In 1923, he published a brief study of juvenile delinquents, in which he explored 
family dynamics and relationships within children’s play groups in an effort to understand the 
influence of social experience on personality and (to a lesser extent) behavior. His research on 
personal characteristics contributing to delinquency certainly informed his selection of salient 
factors for the parole study.365 However, Burgess was unfamiliar with the inner workings of 
correctional institutions, the structure of society within those institutions, and the effects of 
confinement on men reentering free society. The research materials Burgess bequeathed to the 
University of Chicago show that he worked to correct this deficiency, partly by sitting in on 
Board proceedings and learning what he could from observations of Clabaugh’s process. Further, 
throughout the parole study, Bruce, Harno, their research assistants, and field worker John 
Landesco shared materials with Burgess, which the sociologist used to understand materials 
contained in prisoners’ institutional jacket files. Burgess needed to view jacket materials with a 
skeptical eye—records he considered too unreliable must be excluded from his factor analysis. 
Landesco’s interviews with workers and administrators at Joliet, Pontiac, and Menard, in 
particular, guided Burgess’s selection of factors from prison records to test for correlation with 
parole outcome. Sometime at the outset of the committee’s work, Landesco sent a memo to 
notify Burgess of progress made in the study. The research assistant wrote that he conducted 
initial interviews with prison officials with an eye to “learning qualitatively the value of various 
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recommendations and markings as they appear in the jackets that come before the Parole 
Board.”366  
 Burgess would have studied these interviews and others contributed by Dean Harno 
closely, almost certainly when considering which aspects of a man’s prison record might 
correlate with parole outcome. As Landesco’s memo indicates, the researchers assessed the 
trustworthiness of the prison officials interviewed. Whose judgment could they rely upon? This 
character assessment was crucial to Burgess’s study because it provided a strategy for wading 
through all the material in the jacket files. With an overwhelming amount of information in some 
cases and a dearth of it in others, Burgess had to determine the provenance of each piece of 
information to assess the reliability of each of the notation routinely included in each prisoner’s 
file. To facilitate this process, Landesco asked prison staffers and officials to offer comments and 
recommendations about individual prisoners, then critiqued the qualitative assessments provided 
by each employee. To this end, both Harno and Landesco recorded their opinions of the 
character and competency of prison officials and staffers to tack onto the interview transcripts 
they sent to Burgess.  
 He also needed to determine which of these universally included pieces of information 
could be reasonably assumed to correlate with parole outcome. To what extent might a man’s 
behavior in prison help researchers predict his parole outcome? Prison officials, who routinely 
encountered recidivists, likely had some theory as to which men would be most likely to reoffend 
and why. Men with sound judgment in these positions might help Burgess deduce which facts 
included in the record were most useful for his purposes. For instance, on the basis of his 
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interviews with prison staffers and administrators, John Landesco concluded that the punishment 
records so prominently placed in institutional jacket files were “only vaguely indicative of the 
character of the man, and little can be based upon it in deciding the feasibility of a man as a 
parolee.”367 On the other hand, there might be useful data in the jackets that parole board 
members dismissed. When interviewing staff and officials at Joliet, Harno discovered that the 
mental health officer’s study of inmates did not factor into parole decisions, though each prisoner 
underwent a group mental examination and assessment by a psychiatrist upon admission. This 
mental health officer, Dr. Walter B. Martin, also conducted follow-up examinations with 
potential “mental defectives.” Martin’s work in the penitentiary was an uphill battle against 
administrators, who limited his access to prisoners after the intake process was complete. The 
psychiatrist did not choose the prisoners sent to him for treatment, and most often came into 
contact only with those who proved troublesome for guards. Moreover, Harno wrote that the 
psychiatrist “was told not to make any recommendations to the board at all.”368 Joliet old-timers 
may have rejected Dr. Martin because his was a relatively new role within the prison, a role 
predicated on the treatment of inmates rather than the simpler retributive, custodial role of the 
prison employee accepted by Joliet guards.369  
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 Though they would eventually emphasize the diagnostic work conducted by prison 
mental health professionals like Martin, Burgess and Landesco were particularly interested in the 
opinions of men with unfettered access to prisoners. These men were in a position to observe the 
behavior of each incarcerated man on a daily basis, would make note of recidivists, and might 
take stock of characteristics likely to prevent an offender’s readjustment to civil society. Deputy 
Warden Kness, the official who guided Harno and Landesco through the new prison at Joliet 
(Stateville), impressed the researchers as a man with “valuable” recommendations for the parole 
board.370 A former Joliet city police sergeant and twenty-year veteran of Joliet Penitentiary, 
Kness had been demoted under the corrupt Klein administration, only to be placed in charge of 
the new prison following Klein’s murder. Kness fired 52 of Klein’s “corrupt and incompetent” 
officers and keepers in his first nine months as Deputy Warden. Like the researchers, Kness 
expressed interest in separating first- and second-term prisoners from “incurables” and “moral 
degenerates,” indicating an openness to reform-oriented penology.371 The Austrian also placed 
great stock in conducting one-on-one interviews with prisoners and knew many of their personal 
histories in detail. As he shepherded Harno and Landesco through the new prison, he would 
sometimes remark in his “marked brogue” that certain prisoners should “never be released.” In 
the solitary cell block, Kness predicted that one of the men confined there “will go along for a 
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Superintendent of Industries, Illinois State Penitentiary,” April 1, 1927, in Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Box 34, Folder 
8, SCRC-UCL. Note, too, that researchers considered detachment from the prison administration (presumably 
because this indicated insulation from political patronage) and lack of disciplinary responsibility within corrections 
institutions points in a staffer’s favor. 
370 Landesco to Burgess, “Memorandum,” undated.  





few weeks and then he will do something violent… When he has his spells he will kill without 
hesitation.”372  
 Harno later wrote that these comments made him all the more aware that the prison 
system and criminal code were not sufficiently equipped to manage dangerous lawbreakers, for 
Kness’s comments could not prevent this resident of the solitary block and others like him from 
reentering free society.  These were the kind of prisoners likely to cause harm to society and 
commit headline-making crimes on the outside, men the board must be equipped to identify. 
Harno’s tour of Stateville even led him to conclude that indeterminate sentences should be even 
more indeterminate—rather than from one year to the maximum as defined by the offense, the 
law school dean asserted that all sentences should be from one year to life. Assuming the “matter 
of release were placed in the hands of men of intelligence and training,” men like Deputy 
Warden Kness, the public would then be assured that violent and “potentially dangerous” 
individuals would remain in prison for life.373 Landesco’s comments were less emphatic. A 
memo he sent to Burgess allowed that Kness’s recommendations were useful “for the cases in 
which he knows facts which are relevant in the board’s decision.” Harno and Landesco 
concurred, however, that reliable, well-trained, scientifically-minded men were few and far 
between in prison. This may help explain why Burgess’s twenty-two original factors largely 
omitted assessments of prisoners that would have been generated inside the institutions.  
 If a detail included in the records came from a specific official or staff member Landesco 
considered incompetent or untrustworthy, Burgess might have excluded it from his prediction 
schema or looked for another source to confirm the information. Such was the case with 
 






materials contributed by Joliet’s Protestant chaplain, despite his detachment from potentially 
corrupt political appointees. Records of Harno and Landesco’s visit to Joliet included 
disparaging comments about Chaplain William Albert Frye. The young research assistant and the 
Dean of the University of Illinois Law School recorded their negative impressions of Frye—
Landesco called the chaplain “gullible” and Harno noted that he was a “mediocre man.” Both 
also indicated that the chaplain did not “get cooperation in his work,” was on poor terms with his 
colleagues, and spoke “much too freely” about the prison administration with inmates.374 Luckily 
for Burgess, it seems Frye contributed little to the jacket files. Though Frye described himself as 
the ideal man to proffer recommendations about each prisoner, describing himself as a 
“psychiatrist, a penologist, criminologist, [and] social worker” who had studied prisons for many 
years, Landesco found that the chaplain kept no notes of his interactions with imprisoned men 
and that no one took his evaluations of prisoners seriously.375  
 Landesco and Harno also theorized that men who worked in prison for longer periods of 
time risked becoming inured to their surroundings. Their judgment of prisoners would then be 
clouded by pettier concerns, like their own advancement and power within the institution. 
Unable to examine their surroundings with a critical eye, they would be incapable of describing 
individual prisoners or observing trends over time. For instance, Harno wrote that Joliet’s 
physician “impressed us as a small politician,” “thoroughly institutionalized” and unable to 
consider his work beyond the daily grind. Dr. Fletcher had become so obsessed with prison 
discipline that he could speak of little else but the role he played in punishing prisoners.376 
 
374 Albert J. Harno, “Interview with Chaplain William Albert Frye,” March 31, 1927, p. 2-3, in Ernest Watson 
Burgess Papers, Box 34, Folder 8, SCRC-UCL. John Landesco, “Interview with Chaplain Frye,” April 1, 1927, p. 1, 
in Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Box 34, Folder 8, SCRC-UCL.  
375 Landesco, “Interview with Chaplain Frye,” 1-2.  
376 Albert J. Harno and John Landesco, “Interview with Dr. Fletcher, Prison Physician at Joliet,” April 1, 1927, 1-2 




Shortly after his interview with Harno, Fletcher left to assume to office of Postmaster for the city 
of Joliet.  
 Burgess would have read Harno and Landesco’s interview reports alongside thousands of 
institutional jacket files, considering the value of each official’s recommendation and gauging 
the quality of the written records before choosing reliable factors likely correlated with parole 
outcome. The information available to Burgess came directly from prison administrators and 
staffers, or was filtered through institutional records. Burgess acknowledged that these 
documents were often unreliable and therefore not ideal for creating a prognostic tool.377 
Moreover, the 3,000 cases he used only included record of any violation of the parole agreement. 
The sociologist’s ideal study would have involved extensive interviews with the paroled man, his 
family, and his employer, which would enable Burgess to increase the accuracy of his prediction 
system, determining whether the non-violator of parole had actually “gone straight” or merely 
eluded law enforcement. Due to budgetary and temporal constraints, however, Burgess tallied 
only non-violators, those men who had not been arrested on the basis of a parole violation or the 
commission of a new offense.378 His contemporary academic writings lend insight into his 
probable frustrations in developing his forecasting method: the shortcomings of the jacket files 
for the purpose of an ideal sociological case study, and thus, more accurate predictions. Ideally, 
the prediction method would allow the sociologist to create a picture of each individual in 
 
377 But not because they were produced by the institution, with all of the distortions of each prisoner’s story that 
might imply. He was aware of this, as his article discussed on the next page makes clear, but believed institutional 
practices could be changed in order to verify information offered by prisoners, police, and the courts. The nature of 
the prediction method requires a sociologist to record and interpret extensive life histories. 
378 In the committee’s report, he devoted space to a careful explanation of the difference between non-violation of 
parole and “making good.” To make good, the former prisoner must be “gainfully employed in a legitimate 
vocation” and become a “wholesome” member of his community. Burgess noted that this meant a change of 
attitude, and often the man’s rejection of friends and associates from before his incarceration. See Ernest W. 
Burgess, “What Proportion of Paroled Men Make Good?” in Andrew A. Bruce et al., Workings of the Indeterminate 
Sentence Law and Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh, Chairman, Parole 




question, with close attention to his “acts and habits,” attitudes, and “philosophy of life.” Only 
then could each prisoner be elevated above the recurrent features found in each case file—
poverty, unemployment, parental desertion—and separated from the rest on the basis of his 
individual characteristics and the unique combination of environmental forces acting upon 
him.379 Then, presumably, he would be aggregated again, sorted into the appropriate risk 
category with similar offenders.   
 In a paper published in Social Forces in 1928, Burgess lamented that “existing case 
records seldom, or never, picture people, in the language of Octavia Hill, with their ‘passions, 
hopes, and history.’” The sociologist or social worker perusing the average case file could only 
occasionally catch a glimpse of the person behind the documents—by way of the “direct 
quotation, a flash of individuality.”380 Burgess wanted to take the voice of the social worker or 
case manager out of the interview records by employing the first-person reporting method. This 
way, when the sociologists or social workers conducting larger-scale studies read over the 
records, they could interpret the statements made by the interviewee without worrying that the 
case file had been tainted by what Burgess called “the personal equation of the work.”381 
Burgess, Landesco, and research assistant Clark Tibbitts could not possibly conduct and record 
interviews with the 3,000 men involved in the parole study to avoid viewing each case through 
an institutional lens. But the inadequacy of the materials at hand did not prevent Burgess from 
 
379 Ernest W. Burgess, “What Social Case Records Should Contain to be Useful for Sociological Interpretation,” 
reprinted from Social Forces, Vol. VI, No. 4 (June 1928), 526-527, in Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Box 196, Folder 1, 
SCRC-UCL. 
380 Ibid. British social reformer Octavia Hill (1838-1912) was an authority on urban housing and poverty whose 
views influenced public policy and private philanthropy in Britain and several other countries. She is best known for 
her role in founding the National Trust in 1895. Historians studying her life and work, however, have noted that her 
legacy is mixed due to the moralistic and classist underpinnings of her charity initiatives. For more, see Elizabeth 
Baigent, “Octavia Hill: ‘the Most Misunderstood… Victorian Reformer,’” in Octavia Hill, Social Activism, and the 
Remaking of British Society, eds. Elizabeth Baigent and Ben Cowell (London: School of Advanced Study, 
University of London, 2016), 3-26. 




choosing twenty-two factors from the records that he believed were correlated with success or 
failure on parole: 
“parental status, including broken homes;” “type of criminal;” “social type;” “type of 
neighborhood;” “resident or transient in community when arrested;” “statement of trial 
judge and prosecuting attorney;” “nature and length of sentence imposed;” “months of 
sentence actually served before parole;” “previous criminal record of prisoner;” “previous 
work record;” “punishment record in the institution;” “mental age according to 
psychiatric examination;” “personality type according to psychiatric examination;” and 
“psychiatric prognosis.” 
 
 These categories would add up to a statistical risk profile for each man who came before 
the board, indicating what percentage of ex-prisoners with similar statistical profiles succeeded 
on parole.382 Burgess was not the first social scientist to study parole prediction, but he was the 
first to actually compose an experience table that could be used for prognostic aims.383 He 
created a test comprised of twenty one factors, used to rate each prisoner, and applied the test to 
his 3,000 sample cases, assigning points for each factor correlated with success in parole. For 
instance, though the overall violation rate for prisoners paroled from the Pontiac Reformatory 
was 22.1%, only 8.8% of boys paroled from Pontiac who had been gainfully employed at the 
time of their arrest violated parole. Thus, a prospective parolee was assigned one point in the 
positive category to contribute to his overall score if he worked regularly at the time of arrest. If 
 
382 For the purposes of Burgess’s study, success on parole is defined as non-violation of the parole agreement. By 
non-violation, Burgess “meant that the person has not been apprehended in the violation of any parole regulation or 
of any law.” Burgess clearly preferred to define a successful parolee as one who “made good” on parole, but the data 
available to him precluded this. Burgess’s definition of making good was more expansive than non-violation of the 
parole agreement. An individual who made good on parole underwent a change in attitude, declined to spend time 
with his or her old associates, secured gainful and legal employment, and participated “as a wholesome member of 
the community in its different activities.” All quotes from Ernest W. Burgess, “Factors Determining Success or 
Failure on Parole,” in the Illinois Crime Survey, 518-520.  
383 Professor Sam B. Warner was first, publishing a study of the parole records of ex-prisoners from Massachusetts 
in order to determine which criteria contained in the records were correlated with parolability. See Sam B. Warner, 
“Factors Determining Parole from the Massachusetts Reformatory,” Journal of the American Institute of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 14 (May 1923-Feb. 1924), 172-207. For further review of the literature on parole prediction 
published prior to Burgess’s study, see William F. Lanne [pen name for Nathan Leopold], “Parole Prediction as 




a given case had a positive score on sixteen to twenty-one of these factors, Burgess found, there 
was a 98.5% chance that particular prisoner would not violate his parole agreement. Burgess 
predicted that prisoners who earned positive points on only two to four factors would commit a 
violation or be arrested on a new charge 76% of the time. 
 Prediction tables, with their gloss of scientific objectivity, could increase the efficiency of 
the board and looked a lot less like guesswork than the qualitative methods described by 
Clabaugh. While slotting each prisoner into some of the categories that would determine 
allocation of points did involve qualitative work, the prediction percentages reached in the end 
allowed Board members to point to a definitive risk profile for each prisoner. Assigning points 
for pieces of information already available in the prisoners’ record—and often relating to his or 
her past—meant that little room was left for rehabilitation within the institution. The reformers 
who pushed for parole legislation often stated that parole was the culmination of the 
rehabilitative process: both a chance to see whether or not an ex-prisoner had truly reformed and 
a way to aid the former prisoner in his or her transition to free society. But in parole prediction 
models, a good record made in prison counted for little.384 For the researchers, then, a prisoner’s 




384 Research assistant John Landesco concluded in a memo to Burgess that punishment records were next to useless 
when assessing a man’s character and suitability for parole. During an interview with W.B. Barrowman, then acting 
warden at Joliet, research assistant John Landesco copied out what Barrowman assured him was a “typical” day’s 
list of prisoner rule violations. These included “crime against nature,” “assaulting inmate with an iron bar,” “wasting 
bread, throwing around yard,” “talking in chapel on Sunday,” “insolence,” and “escaping from quarry.” Landesco 
noted that many of these rule violations seemed minor and unrelated to how a man might get along outside prison 
walls. He also observed, apparently after discussion with Barrowman, that men with lengthy criminal histories and 
multiple prison stints were “as likely to have a good record in prison, in fact, a spotless record in prison” as first-
termers. John Landesco interview with W.B. Barrowman, Acting Deputy Warden at the Old Prison, undated, Ernest 
Watson Burgess Papers, Box 38, Folder 4, SCRC-UCL. Also see John Landesco, “Memorandum,” undated, Ernest 




“I’ll Tear the Pen Block from Block”: Unrest, Economic Depression, and the Turn 
Towards Scientific Management 
When the committee’s report, Workings of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Parole 
System in Illinois, was published in 1928, it was not clear that the state would adopt any of 
Burgess’s prescriptions for the parole system. Clabaugh immediately tabled the report, passively 
rejecting the idea of instituting an actuarial prediction system. Perhaps he feared requesting 
additional financial support from the state legislature needed to fund the cost of additional 
changes to the board and to parole supervision. Or maybe he hesitated to adopt the prediction 
system because there was no time to test its accuracy during his administration. After all, it 
would have taken several years and multiple test cohorts of paroled men and women for the 
committee to come to any conclusion as to the reliability of the actuarial method.385 His board 
continued its conservative practice of paroling few prisoners. As a result, institutional 
populations increased dramatically, causing severe overcrowding at Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet-
Stateville. Ultimately, it was the prisoners themselves that convinced Illinois legislators to 
experiment with the Burgess method.  
By the time Clabaugh resigned his post in 1929, he boasted that there were over 1,000 
more prisoners confined in Illinois penal institutions than when he began his term. The Chairman 
praised his board for acting “judiciously and decisively in the public interest” by keeping 
 
385 For this reason, even the committee hesitated to recommend immediate adoption of the predictive method. 
Instead, it suggested that “the Parole Board seriously consider the placing of its work on a scientific basis by making 
use of the method of statistical prediction of the non-violation or violation of parole both in the granting of paroles 
and the supervision of paroled men.” It did not advise Clabaugh to adopt the predictive instrument outlined by 
Burgess. This contrasts with language used in other recommendations advanced by the committee. For instance, in 
another recommendation, the committee asserts that parole officers “should be chosen of persons trained for the 
different divisions of the work who are likely to show progression and insight in this field instead of being merely 
political hangers-on.” The committee’s recommendations generally do not ask Clabaugh or the rest of the board to 
“consider” making a change, but rather outline the current practice of the board and then state what “should” be 
done instead. Andrew A. Bruce, Ernest W. Burgess, Albert J. Harno, and John Landesco, Workings of the 
Indeterminate Sentence Law and Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh, 




prisoners convicted of violent crimes behind bars and for refusing to allow the pressures of 
prison congestion to influence their rulings. He left his post with a word of warning: that 
leniency in the parole system, whether a product of “crooked politics” or “unintelligent 
sentiment,” could undo the work of law enforcement and the public in the fight against organized 
crime. A sustained practice of releasing offenders from prison prematurely could render parole a 
tool for hardened criminals rather than a finely calibrated instrument for social rehabilitation.386  
 Unsurprisingly, word on the cellblock was that Clabaugh was “too hard” on prisoners. 
The prison population skyrocketed, tensions within Illinois prisons rose, and frustrations with the 
parole board mounted during his administration. A seasoned inmate who served time in Joliet 
while Clabaugh headed up the parole board recalled in 1935 that “nine cases out of ten where a 
man would go up before Clabaugh he got all of his time.”387 And despite Clabaugh’s 
endorsement of the reforms called for in Burgess, Harno, and Bruce’s 1928 report, few changes 
were made to the board or the corrections institutions responsible for housing—and ostensibly 
rehabilitating—prisoners.388 Anger with the parole board and the belief that its members often 
left men incarcerated for much longer than necessary was undoubtedly a contributing factor to 
 
386 “Clabaugh Warns Against Lenient Parole System: Sentiment Often Defeats Justice, He Says,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, Sept. 8, 1929, 27.  
387 Eddie Jackson as quoted in John Landesco, “Politics and Administration in the Practise of Penology,” Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology Vo. 26, No. 2 (July 1935), 245.  
388 A bill approved in July of 1927 was responsible for the last substantial changes to the Board of Paroles and its 
administration. The 1927 Act left the Board of Pardons unchanged but separated it from the Board of Paroles, which 
would be composed of the Supervisor of Paroles (then Clabaugh) and nine other members appointed by the 
governor. This Board was not tasked with the supervision of prisoners following their parole from the institution. 
Rather, it was a semi-judicial body that conducted parole hearings and granted or rejected applications for 
supervised release. Burgess, Harno, and Bruce’s report suggested a reorganization of the parole Board with the 
purpose of limiting political influence over its members. As Andrew Bruce reiterated in a 1931 article, the 
committee urged the appointment of well-educated Board members versed in criminal law, psychiatry, education 
and other relevant fields for fixed terms of office. Moreover, Bruce and his fellow academics called for the Board of 
Paroles to be given the discretion and privileges of a court of law because its members actually determined the 
length of time men and women spent in corrections facilities. This would mean that the Board could issue subpoenas 
in order to gather more extensive case histories. See Andrew A. Bruce, “The History and Development of the Parole 
System in Illinois,” in Workings, 45; Andrew A. Bruce, “Penal Administration in Illinois,” Journal of Criminal Law 




violence at Joliet in the 1930s, much as it was a catalyst for Warden Klein’s murder a few years 
earlier. Clabaugh and his successor both found themselves facing a legislative committee 
investigating the causes of prison riots in the spring of 1931, following an uprising that caused an 
estimated $1,000,000 worth of damage to the new prison at Stateville and left three incarcerated 
men dead.  
The new superintendent of pardons and paroles, William Cadet Jones (known as W.C. 
Jones), had quickly gained a reputation among inmates, guards, prison officials, and state 
legislators for imposing even lengthier periods of incarceration on prisoners than Clabaugh. As 
legislative committee investigators passed cellhouses during an inspection of the buildings 
Figure 9 State police survey the damage to Stateville's panopticon-style cellhouse following the 1931 riot. Photo published 




destroyed by the riot at Stateville, prisoners shouted out their oppositions to the parole board 
under Jones’s administration. One man threatened to “tear the pen block from block” unless 
demands for a “new parole board” were met.389 Prisoners were not the only opponents of the 
board—indeed, the committee might have ignored reports of the Board’s approach to sentencing 
if the critiques leveled came only from incarcerated men and women.390 Among those officials 
who testified to the legislative committee was Warden Henry C. Hill. Warden Hill stated that 
indeterminate sentencing was “all right” in theory, but the parole board consistently left men in 
prison for too long because of emphasizing the severity of the offense rather than the “merits of a 
man.”391 The prison’s Catholic priest and Episcopal chaplain agreed, blaming the board members 
for the weeklong uprising at the institution. Reverend George Whitmeyer cited classism on the 
part of board members as a contributing factor, arguing that “well-dressed relatives of inmates 
get every consideration by the parole board,” while “poorly dressed” relatives who “look as 
though they amounted to little” were quickly dismissed from hearings.392 Legislators responsible 
for interviewing guards and prison officials found that many were critical of the board.393 
 
389 “Prison Riot Inquiry Begins: Convicts Quiet as Legislators Study Mutiny,” Chicago Daily Tribune  ̧March 16, 
1931, 1. Some of the anger on the part of prisoners towards the parole board was undoubtedly due to the changes in 
sentencing for armed robbery. Before 1927, the set sentence for the crime was indeterminate, from ten years to life. 
From 1927-1929, the parole Board permitted good time deductions for offenders convicted of armed robbery. This 
meant that many men convicted of robbery with a gun were released after 6 years and 3 months. In the fall of 1929, 
the State Supreme Court ruled that the parole board could no longer allow deduction of time for good behavior until 
the prisoner had served the minimum sentence of ten years. The newly appointed board members, who began their 
jobs only weeks after this decision was handed down, were therefore placed in an awkward position where their 
predecessors had released persons convicted of armed robbery much sooner than they were able to. See Louis L. 
Emmerson, Biennial message and quadrennial report to the 58th General Assembly, Illinois (Springfield: Journal 
Printing Company, 1932), 83-84.  
390 In their report, the legislative committee wrote that prisoner criticisms of the parole Board were “only natural and 
should not be given any considerable weight unless supported by other evidence.” Illinois State Representatives 
Roger F. Little, William G. Thon, Harry M. McCaskrin, Michael L. Igoe, and M.E. Bray, “The Joliet (Illinois) 
Legislative Investigation,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 22, No. 2. (July 1931), 258.  
391 Henry C. Hill as quoted in “Joliet Warden Assails Prison Parole System,” Chicago Daily Tribune, March 21, 
1931, 1.  
392 Reverend George L. Whitmeyer, quoted in “Prison Parole Board Assailed: Chaplains Blame Riots at Joliet on 
Officials,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1931, 4. Unfortunately for Whitmeyer, the press latched onto the fact that 
he had served time in New York’s Elmira Reformatory and he was forced to resign. 




Jones appeared unruffled by the charges, declaring that he paroled a far greater 
percentage of the prison population in a year than Clabaugh had before him (12.4% as opposed 
to 9.2%) and inviting the legislative committee to observe the board in action. Representative 
Michael Igoe attended the first parole board hearing following the riots on behalf of the 
committee. Igoe recalled hostility of prisoners towards the board during his visit, but commented 
after the session that the board treated the friends and relatives of prisoners fairly. The committee 
concluded in its report that the parole board members were “persons of unimpeachable integrity, 
high purpose, [and] unusual ability” with an interest in prisoner welfare as well as an 
understanding that “sympathy must not be allowed to override judgement.”394 Ultimately, the 
investigation found that the greatest ambition of the board was also its greatest problem: to 
determine the ideal time for each prisoner to return to society. But this, according to the 
legislators, was a matter of opinion subject to a great many mitigating factors outside of the 
board’s control. When such an opinion was decided on by any board there would always be the 
danger that it would “be a mistaken one.”395 However, most prisoners had to be released at some 
point, and since nearly all criminal sentences in Illinois were indeterminate, it was likely that the 
board would settle the exact release date for each inmate. 
The advent of the Great Depression pushed the state towards new management and 
classification solutions within its prisons—institutional populations continued to grow in the 
1930s, but state budgets shrank and the federal government showed little interest in prison-
building projects. As was the case in many other states, the number of persons incarcerated in 
Illinois’s prisons, reformatories, and correctional schools rose steadily during the 1920s. Illinois 
initially approached this increase with approved funds for the construction of additional 
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corrections facilities.396 But by 1931, the legislature grew concerned with the rising cost of 
housing and “adequate care” for prisoners and expressed alarm that the “apparent unending 
program of [prison-] building” would unduly burden taxpayers.397 To help ameliorate the unrest 
and expenses associated with an expanding web of correctional institutions, legislators in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate set aside $25,000 for a joint legislative Commission on 
Prisons, Probation, and Parole to make a comparative study of Illinois’s penal system relative to 
prison administration in Europe and Canada.398 Legislators tasked Commission members with 
studying methods used to keep prison populations in check elsewhere.  
After traveling to seven countries during the summer of 1931, the Commission submitted 
a 48-page report to Governor Louis L. Emmerson describing the penal systems they observed, 
recounting conversations with foreign prison administrators, and advancing suggestions to 
improve Illinois’s jails, prisons, parole system, and criminal code. While Commission members 
concluded that if the Illinois parole system were “properly administered” it would be “a great 
improvement upon any prevailing system that has come to our notice,” they also recommended 
that Illinois take a cue from certain policies and practices they observed in Canada and Europe. 
 
396 Vandalia State Farm opened in 1921, prisoners completed the buildings at Stateville Correctional Center in 1925, 
and the Illinois State Reformatory for Women began operations in 1930. 
397 The Illinois Joint Legislative Commission on Prisons, Probation and Parole, Report of the Illinois Joint 
Legislative Commission on Prisons, Probation and Parole, December 1931 (Springfield: Schnepp & Barnes, 
Printers, 1932), 5. This particular Commission formed both by necessity and convenience. A committee comprised 
of members of the Illinois House of Representatives visited New York, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia 
to search for a solution to the idleness among Illinois inmates they believed was responsible for riots at Joliet and 
Stateville in 1931. While visiting a prison in New York, the committee met Alexander Paterson, the Prison 
Commissioner and Director of Prisons in England, who was in the U.S. to conduct a survey of American prisons. As 
the Commission on Prisons, Probation, and Parole recounted in their 1931 report, the House and Senate had already 
made plans to study penal systems that classified offenders on the basis of their “character” rather than their offense. 
As England’s system seemed to fit this description, the House and Senate concluded that the best way to go about  
Commission members were: Lieutenant Governor Fred E. Sterling, Senator Richard J. Barr, Senator Harry G. 
Wright, Senator Arthur A. Huebsch, Senator John J. Broderick, Senator Thomas J. Courtney, Representative Gordon 
W. Childs, Representative Rollo R. Robbins, Representative Edward M. Overland, Representative Michael L. Igoe, 
Representative Michael Fahy, Judge Dennis E. Sullivan, Judge Harry M. Fisher, and clerk William Hart.  
398 In the summer of 1931, the commission embarked on a journey through Canada and Europe, visiting England, 





Commission members asserted that their state failed to adequately acknowledge one essential 
fact: “that… all prisoners will ultimately be returned to society and that the function of the prison 
officials is to make each prisoner as fit for a life of freedom as his mental and moral state will 
possibly allow.”399 To this end, they called for the reform of Illinois institutions and made 17 
recommendations to the legislature and the Department of Public Welfare. They asked that any 
new sentencing legislation allow judges to consider the “character” of the offender as well as the 
crime he or she committed, called upon prisons to segregate offenders “according to type,” and 
beseeched the division of Pardons and Paroles to make changes necessary to grant parole “at the 
earliest possible time” to each prisoner.400 Better prison management, increased attention to the 
classification of prisoners within corrections institutions, and the increased use of probation and 
parole, the Commission found, would combat overcrowding in Illinois prisons and reduce 
recidivism.  
It was only in the wake of this legislative investigation of the prison system and parole 
board that the Division of the Criminologist began to test the Burgess method in earnest. Cases 
coming before the parole board were analyzed according to this method and the psychiatrist’s 
report received by board members included a prediction, reading “This man falls in the group of 
which from –% to –% have been found to violate parole agreement.”401 The 1932 election 
brought reform-minded former probate judge Henry Horner to the governor’s mansion and 
allowed experimentation in the Department of Public Welfare to continue. Horner even 
expressed his approval of the parole prediction studies by appointing John Landesco, Burgess’s 
former research assistant, to the parole board soon after taking office. Through Landesco’s 
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efforts, the Illinois state legislature allocated funding in 1933 for the Division of Pardons and 
Paroles to employ sociologists to “make analyses and predictions in the cases of all men being 
considered for parole” and to improve the existing prediction methods.402 The Burgess system of 
parole prediction could reduce overcrowding and remove any appearance of arbitrariness or 
political favoritism from the parole board’s decision-making process. Even better, it did not 
require significant financial investment—instituting the actuarial prediction system would cost a 
fraction of building a new prison to relieve the effects of overcrowding.  
Under Horner’s administration, Illinois joined the tiny cohort of states that regulated or 
guided parole board decisions in any way beyond the discretion of board members during the 
interwar period.403 When Illinois adopted the Burgess system, the sociologist who created it 
hoped that his prediction model would be used as a guiding tool. It could allow for the instinctual 
judgement of a seasoned investigator, but temper this decision-making with the cool, objective 
eye of the social scientist. Attentive and adaptive to developments in criminology, the mind 
sciences, and penology, the prediction instrument could also be refined over time to help Board 
members respond more effectively to criminal wiles and obfuscation. The predictive model 
would give board decisions the gloss of objectivity needed for the public see parole as force for 
social good, an instrument designed to protect free society. 
 
402 Ibid. 
403 When the Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures was published in 1939, only twelve jurisdictions and 
the federal government investigated prisoners’ “social, physical, educational, and psychiatric record” prior to parole 
hearings. The twelve jurisdictions were: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New 
York, New York City, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. These investigative reports likely 
helped parole board members establish rough guidelines for parole decision-making. United States Department of 
Justice, The Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures, Volume 4: Parole (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1939), 146. States did not begin to adopt actuarial prediction devices until the 1950s 
and 1960s. Minnesota’s St. Cloud Reformatory experimented with Ohlin’s experience tables in the 1950s, but later 
abandoned them. Ohio began testing the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) for use in parole 
prediction in 1961. California, Massachusetts, and Colorado began developing their own experience tables in the 
1960s. Victor H. Evjen, “Current Thinking on Parole Prediction Tables,” in Probation and Parole, eds. Barbara A. 





Who Makes Good?: Ernest W. Burgess and the “Science of Prediction” 
 
Nearly a decade after the publication of Workings of the Indeterminate Sentencing Law 
and Parole System in Illinois, Ernest W. Burgess scribbled a rough outline for a talk assessing 
“The Future of Parole in Illinois.” In large, loosely formed letters at the top of an index card-
sized sheet torn from a notebook, the professor reminded himself to “Take stock.” He also posed 
a question. Was the parole system “better or worse than when Judge Bruce, Dean Harno + I 
made our report 10 years ago?” For Burgess, the answer was “better.” Moreover, because parole 
was only one small part of the criminal justice system a person encountered post-conviction, this 
answer extended to the entirety of prison administration in Illinois. Burgess’s writing became 
hurried and messy as he reminded himself of the ways in which the criminal justice system had 
improved, including references to changes in record-keeping, the prison intake process, parole 
supervision, and prison labor. At the top of the list, Burgess proudly referenced the report he, 
Bruce, and Harno made to Parole Board Chairman Hinton G. Clabaugh in 1928: “I go over our 
recommendations + am amazed at number now in effect.”404  
Burgess had good reason to crow. He claimed responsibility for introducing science to 
the parole decision—the methods behind a dramatic drop in parole violation rates in Illinois. 
From 1929-1930, 31% of men and women on parole violated their agreements, prompting the 
state to issue arrest warrants so they could be returned to prison. In 1933, the first year the state 
officially used the Burgess method of parole prediction, the number of violators fell 
dramatically, comprising just 16.1% of all men and women on parole.405 His suggestion that 
 
404 Ernest W. Burgess, handwritten notes for “Future of Parole in Illinois,” Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Box 193, 
Folder 1, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library (hereinafter SCRC-UCL). 
405 Frank D. Whipp, “Division of Prisons,” in Thirteenth Annual Report of the Department of Public Welfare, July 1, 




parole be placed on “a scientific basis” by way of actuarial forecasting enabled the board to view 
each man’s case through the lens of his personalized risk score. Instead of hazarding a guess 
based on the stacks of papers attached to the prisoner’s institutional jacket file, parole board 
members could examine the facts of the case and the prisoner in front of them while knowing 
exactly how many men like him had violated parole in the past.  
Burgess submitted the initial study outlining his prediction instrument as his section of 
the report to Clabaugh from the Committee on the Study of the Workings of the Indeterminate 
Sentence Law and of Parole in Illinois. As outlined in Chapter 3, he based the instrument on the 
outcomes of 3,000 cases of men paroled from Illinois’s three major correctional facilities—
Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet—prior to December 31, 1924.406 First, he selected details of each 
man’s personal history that could be commonly found in or deduced from material held in each 
prisoner’s institutional jacket file. These factors included previous criminal record, type of crime 
committed, and psychiatric prognosis, among others. Then, he studied his 3,000 cases to 
determine if these factors could be correlated with parole violation. To determine which factors 
were salient, he calculated the probabilities of success or failure on parole associated with the 
variables for each factor by comparing them to the total violation rate for the institution.407 He 
then determined whether a man was a favorable or unfavorable risk overall risk based on the 
combination of his favorable and unfavorable risk scores using these factors. This method is 
 
Sentence,” The Prison System in Illinois: A Report to the Governor of Illinois by the Illinois Prison Inquiry 
Commission (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1937), 618. 
406 The two possible outcomes were violation and non-violation of parole. Ernest W. Burgess, “What Proportion of 
Paroled Men Make Good?” in The Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois: A 
Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh (Springfield: Department of Public Welfare, 1928), 215. 
407 For instance, if about 28% of all men paroled from Pontiac could be expected to violate parole, but only 10% of 





confusing to explain but simple to 
understand visually. In this image of a 1935 
parole prediction report, we can see that 
Joliet prisoner Nathan Berman into 15 
categories associated with unfavorable 
parole outcomes and 12 categories 
associated with success on parole, placing 
him in a risk group with other men who 
scored similarly. To gauge the relationship 
between these scores and violation rates, 
Burgess and his research assistant, Clark 
Tibbitts, constructed an experience table 
based on the data from their 3,000 cases 
and listing the percentage of men who 
could be expected to violate within each 
risk group. What was the probability that a 
man with 15 unfavorable factor scores 
would violate parole? If Burgess compared 
Berman with other prisoners who scored 
similarly, he would find that Berman was 
slightly more likely to violate parole than to receive a final discharge outside prison walls. As the 
image shows, Nathan Berman’s final prognosis reads: “This inmate is in a class in which 54 per 
Figure 10 Prediction report of the Joliet-Stateville sociologist-actuary for 
prisoner number 35-F, Nathan Berman. Note that the factors are slightly 
different from those used in Burgess’s original prediction method. Records 




cent may be expected to violate the parole agreement, 26 per cent may be expected to be minor 
violators, and 28 per cent may be expected to be major violators.”408 
 Burgess’s actuarial prediction system presented penal administrators with a profile of the 
ideal parole risk for the first time—a statistical portrait of the man most likely to receive his final 
discharge without violating the conditions of his release.409 It could also unmask the potential 
recidivist. At the outset, the system was dependent on the recidivists in Burgess’s 3,000 cases: 
the men returned to prison from parole after minor or major violations. These recidivists would 
have disproportionately come from the groups frequently harassed by law enforcement, men of 
color in overpoliced neighborhoods. Ernest W. Burgess decided which factors were salient and 
should weigh into decision-making about prisoners and which were irrelevant based on this 
group of violators, thus reproducing the prejudices and assumptions made by street level police 
officers. He relied on past records even as he worked to devise prediction categories rooted in 
 
408 Berman was convicted of rape by Chicago’s Juvenile Court once before as a young teen and sent to serve time at 
the state reform school, St. Charles School for Boys. Months after being confined to the school, Berman escaped. He 
returned to Chicago, where he and a friend sexually assaulted another young woman at gunpoint. Berman and 
Richard Fitzgerald had jumped up on the running board of a man’s car, and threatened to shoot if he did not exit the 
vehicle. They took the vehicle and kidnapped the young woman inside, later stopping to rob and rape her on a 
railroad embankment. Once caught, Fitzgerald and Berman held in jail with adult suspects. Though the Juvenile 
Protective Association protested the jailing of the two boys, arguing that they should instead be sent to St. Charles, 
the police insisted that the pair were “too tough to be confined with ordinary delinquents.” Fitzgerald and Berman 
were tried and sentenced to twenty and twenty-three years in the penitentiary, respectively. In his closing argument, 
the state prosecutor implored the jury to “send these two away for the safety of womanhood in our city.” See “Seek 
to Prove Captive Morons Attacked Many: Women, Recent Victims, View Young Thugs,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 
December 4, 1924, 3 and “Girl Attackers Get Long Terms in Penitentiary,” Chicago Daily Tribune February 6, 
1925, 3. 
409 Dan Bouk’s How Our Days Became Numbered explores a similar process of “making Americans into risks”—
using statistical information about groups to produce knowledge about an individual. Bouk focuses on life insurers, 
examining the ways in which companies developed methods to determine and manage the risks of policyholders and 
potential clients. While Bouk’s insurers mostly sought to profit from their risk-making, social scientists like Burgess 
saw their research as a cure for society’s ills. Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered: Risk and the Rise of the 
Statistical Individual (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015). Burgess’s approach is perhaps most similar 
to the Federal Housing Administration’s mortgage risk-rating system, in its initial success and the harm it caused to 
already marginalized peoples. Though FDA maps immediately evoke the illegal practice of “redlining” for scholars 
familiar with U.S. history, the FDA officials who used maps in neighborhood risk-rating thought that they had 
developed “a set of objective decision-making aids and a housing program above politics.” It is not coincidental that 
Burgess’s assessment of his own risk rating system mirrors this view. Jennifer Light, “Discriminating Appraisals: 
Cartography, Computation, and Access to Federal Mortgage Insurance in the 1930s,” Technology and Culture 52, 




contemporary sociological and psychological research, categories that could speed the process of 
reading and evaluating institutional jacket files for overworked board members and scientize 
parole in the eyes of the public. Burgess’s prediction categories relied heavily on social scientific 
assumptions about poverty, ethnicity, and race that were undergirded by decades of social survey 
work that equated the effects of racism and class discrimination with an individual’s cultural 
pathology and moral failings. The number of categories dependent on past law enforcement and 
court actions further replicated race and class discrimination written into the system by way of 
Burgess’s methodology and compounded injustice the potential parolee would have endured at 
other levels of the legal system. The predictive significance of each prisoner’s past ensured that 
men were marked as good or poor parole risks from the moment they set foot in the penitentiary.  
 Burgess chose the final twenty-one factors correlated with parole outcome because they 
created two sociological portraits: one of the ideal parole risk, and one of the potential recidivist. 
They would allow the board to know the criminal, to peel back layers of apparent repentance and 
reformation to discover the true criminality at the core of the deceiver. At first, racial and ethnic 
markers were not explicitly included in Burgess’s risk scoring method.410 But the racism that 
permeated each level of the criminal justice system and shaped everyday life in Chicago for men 
of color negatively affected their risk scores in many of the factors used in the original prediction 
system. Economic disadvantages, too, contributed to perceptions of risk. Poverty and blackness, 
always liabilities for men caught up in the criminal justice system, were now written into Illinois 
 
410 Burgess tested “nationality of the inmate’s father,” but ultimately did not include this factor in his final prediction 
method, perhaps because the largest group of violators “was that of the native white of native parents.” African 
Americans comprised the second-largest group of violators, with recent immigrants exhibiting the lowest rate of 
violations. Ernest W. Burgess, “Factors Making for Success or Failure on Parole” in The Workings of the 
Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh 
(Springfield: Department of Public Welfare, 1928), 223. For the final list of factors, see Andrew Bruce, Ernest W. 
Burgess, and Albert J. Harno, “Summary of the Findings and of the Recommendations,” in The Workings of the 
Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh 




release procedures by way of the predictive factors related to potential parolees’ criminal 
histories, institutional records, socioeconomic status, and psychiatric examination results.411 
 This chapter argues that these predictors marked men of color and poverty-stricken 
prisoners in the 1930s as poor parole risks—leading to the supposedly objective actuarial ratings 
that kept these men incarcerated. Negative classifications for factors related to a potential 
parolee’s family and community life, including “parental status,” “type of neighborhood,” 
resident or transient” when arrested, and “previous work record” were correlated with life 
experiences, residential areas, and employment records characteristic of economically 
disadvantaged Illinoisians, recent immigrants, and African Americans. Homes “broken” by 
parental separation, desertion, death, or the long-term confinement of one parent to a prison or an 
asylum were more common in poor white immigrant and African American communities in the 
early twentieth century. While sociologists like Burgess viewed the prevalence of single 
motherhood among impoverished southern European immigrants as a temporary condition that 
would be resolved during the Americanization process, they were less generous with African 
American single mothers. Perceived structural problems in black families were instead 
considered pathological to the African American community, just as crime and vice were 
deemed endemic to black neighborhoods.412  
 
411 As a refresher, the factors are as follows: “parental status, including broken homes;” “type of criminal;” “type of 
neighborhood;” “resident or transient in community when arrested;” “statement of trial judge and prosecuting 
attorney;” “nature and length of sentence imposed;” “previous criminal record of prisoner;” “previous work record;” 
“punishment record in the institution;” “mental age according to psychiatric examination;” “personality type 
according to psychiatric examination;” and “psychiatric prognosis.”  
 
412 Many black Americans, including influential reformers and writers of conduct literature like Josie Briggs Hall, 
thought the same. As Michele Mitchell argues, “the concept of racial destiny” that took hold in the decades 
following Emancipation allowed black men and women to “judge—often harshly—what they perceived as 
weaknesses, failings, and pathologies” in other African American people. Michele Mitchell, Righteous Propagation: 
African Americans and the Politics of Racial Destiny after Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North 




 Burgess and the Illinois sociologist-actuaries who developed prognostic assessments of 
each potential parolee uncritically accepted the vice that flourished on Chicago’s South Side, 
without considering political and social processes that pushed criminal activity into black 
neighborhoods and the white racial violence that kept African Americans from moving to other 
neighborhoods. As detailed in Chapter 3, Burgess believed that competition for space in the city 
rather than state actions and white violence required the segregation of urban space—its division 
into natural areas “functional for sorting out populations and diverse social activities and 
processes.”413 City government and law enforcement are missing in Burgess’s work. Like most 
Americans, the sociologist took segregation for granted and deemed it a settled feature of U.S. 
communities. When assimilation occurred, it would happen slowly and naturally, and was not a 
process that could be pushed for. In the meantime, Burgess and his successors considered 
Chicago’s Bronzeville part of the “criminal underworld,” a neighborhood classification with an 
unfavorable rating. Areas home to impoverished whites, especially those in Burgess’s “zones in 
transition” also received unfavorable scores.  
 The seasonal labor cycle characteristic of even the most supposedly incorruptible rural 
Illinois farming communities proved detrimental for young, cash-strapped white man caught up 
in the criminal justice system.  As the country and the city became ever more connected thanks 
to the Good Roads movement of the interwar years, young men and women traveled to urban 
areas seeking steady employment and the excitement of the metropolis. By the 1920s, transient, 
seasonal labor was the norm for many working-class men, who moved from farms to city 
industries in cycles dictated by harvest time. Though the urbanization of American life in the 
first part of the twentieth century came with some nostalgia for country people in American 
 
413 James B. McKee, Sociology and the Race Problem: The Failure of a Perspective (Urbana: University of Illinois 




culture, positioning them as culturally backward but morally superior to city dwellers, this view 
did not extend to these transient young men who traveled between rural and urban 
communities.414 Transience, too, added a negative point to a prospective parolee’s prognostic 
score. Seasonal workers and former transients also earned another negative mark due to irregular 
work histories. The Burgess method considered the consistency of a man’s work record—his 
ability to hold a steady job prior to imprisonment—an important predictor of his ability to 
succeed on parole. If a potential parolee could get and keep a job long-term, he was more likely 
to fulfill the duties of citizenship upon release. Consideration of this factor harmed working-class 
men used to changing jobs with the seasons and periods of employment that coincided with the 
cycles of farm life. It also further penalized men of color, who were far more likely to work 
intermittently in unskilled, low-paying, and dangerous industrial positions with high turnover 
rates.  
 
414 William Cronon broke down the rural-urban binary in Nature’s Metropolis, showing that Chicago and its 
hinterland were created reciprocally. Similarly, cultural boundaries between city life and country life during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were permeable. The last section of Nature’s Metropolis traces the transport 
of manufactured goods from Chicago to the suburban and rural areas that surrounded it. This is a capitalistic view of 
cultural exchange—the book does not spend much time exploring the human relationships undergirding these 
developments. But there are people behind this capitalistic cultural exchange, and views of rural life drove reform 
efforts like investment in rural schools and health services. Soon, rural modernization agendas would include the 
introduction of new consumer technology that provided unprecedented links between farm families and the rest of 
the world. The affordable, often battery-operated radio—more than the car, telephone, or even electricity—
transformed rural life, “bringing formerly isolated people into the cultural and economic American mainstream.” 
Still, the supposed binary between city and country life, and nostalgia for the latter as American urbanized, persisted 
as a cultural touchstone that can be seen in silent film from the 1920s and 1930s. The 1920 census data revealed that 
for the first time in American history, most of its population lived in urban areas. At the same time, the movies 
became a central component of this new, more urbanized American culture. Historian Hal S. Barron argues that 
silent film played a central role in “establishing new understandings of rural society for a modern, urban nation.” 
While these movies leaned into the nostalgia of city residents who had been raised in rural areas, they also served to 
distance agrarian life from the core of American culture, positioning rural America squarely in an idealized past. The 
“innocence and purity” of rural and small-town American life contrasted with the “corruptions and discontents” of 
urban living. William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1991). On the proliferation of radio sets in rural areas, see Steve Craig, “‘The More They Listen, the 
More They Buy’: Radio and the Modernizing of Rural America, 1930-1939,” Agricultural History 80, No. 1 (Winter 
2006), 3. On visions of the rural-urban divide in silent film, see Hal S. Barron, “Rural America on the Silent 




 The outsized impact of law enforcement on those without political power and funds to 
access legal services further manipulated the parole board’s “objective model,” marking poor, 
black, and Mexican prisoners as potentially dangerous parole risks. Many African Americans 
who grew up in Chicago during the 1910s and 1920s had criminal records dating back to 
childhood due to Juvenile Court policies that funneled dependent and delinquent black youth 
alike to detention facilities. Most of Chicago’s child welfare institutions were segregated and 
refused to offer services for African American children, so Juvenile Court judges sent orphaned, 
abandoned, and abused children of color to detention facilities where they might at least be 
sheltered and fed.415 This practice both exposed vulnerable youth to further trauma and 
effectively fabricated criminal records for dependent black children. These records subsequently 
worked against black youth within Burgess’s scoring method, thus further compounding the 
racism people of color encountered at every level of the criminal justice system in Illinois, from 
street policing to prison discipline. 
 Illinois courts were often hostile spaces for black and brown adults, too, leading to 
disproportionate conviction rates that sent African Americans and Latinos to jail and prison more 
frequently than whites for the same offense. Many judges believed that African Americans and 
immigrants of color were innately criminal, and likely used these views to justify the negative 
assessments of prisoners of color furnished prior to their parole board hearings. Once behind 
bars, men of color were at the mercy of a white, under-educated guard force eager to exact 
punishment for the slightest rule infraction. 
 
415 See especially Marcia Chatelain, South Side Girls: Growing Up in the Great Migration (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015) and Tera Eva Agyepong, The Criminalization of Black Children: Race, Gender, and 




 The final grouping of categories addressed in this chapter were, like disciplinary records, 
also generated during institutionalization. Here, Burgess turned to the aspect of the offender that 
he considered most promising for further research into the causes of crime. As an indication of 
his trust in the mind sciences, Burgess placed great weight on psychiatric criteria, allotting the 
psychiatric assessments culled from prison mental health officers’ records three predictive 
factors within his actuarial system: mental age, personality type, and psychiatric prognosis. The 
tests used and diagnoses given by ISP psychiatrists relied on assessments that pathologized 
perceived racial and class differences. Intelligence testing, for instance, developed alongside and 
in support of racist science and the intelligence-measurement system used by the ISP reflected 
this background. The Army Alpha group test, while designed to measure innate mental ability, 
actually served as a better indication of the educational attainment and cultural background of the 
test subject. Even Burgess’s contemporaries questioned the utility of the Army Alpha for 
prognostic purposes, especially as researchers were beginning to doubt the link between low 
mental ability and criminality. Though the sociologist was well aware of this scholarship, he 
persisted in including Army Alpha test scores within his predictive model, a move that proved 
advantageous for whites with access to quality education in Chicago’s segregated public-school 
system.  
 Psychiatrists also leveraged personality testing to explain perceived differences and 
inequities between the lower class, black, and brown populations and middling-class whites. 
Historians of the mind sciences indicate that mental health professionals in the 1920s and 1930s 
took “the white psyche as the norm.”416 These psychiatric professionals considered the black 
mind different from the “normal” white mind, a common assessment which likely caused ISP’s 
 
416 Martin Summers, Madness in the City of Magnificent Intentions: A History of Race and Mental Illness in the 




mental health officers to search for signs of mental inferiority and psychological maladjustment 
in each black man admitted to an Illinois prison. The adoption of this “maladjustment model” of 
mental health, moreover, stressed economic success as a benchmark for gauging the 
“adjustment” of an individual to society. While only one of the three personality classifications 
at the disposal of the ISP’s mental health officers received a negative mark in Burgess’s 
predictive method, the overall psychiatric prognosis of each man who came before the parole 
board depended on a combination of his personality classification and mental rating. 
“Egocentricity” might be the personality rating of a comparatively large proportion of violators, 
but the “socially inadequate” and “emotionally unstable” men unable to keep jobs, support their 
families, and fulfill the responsibilities of citizenship were just as likely to accrue unfavorable 
prognoses from the institutional psychiatrist.  
The Illinois parole board favored white, well-connected, and comparatively affluent 
prisoners from its inception. So, did the Burgess system actually change parole in Illinois? Or did 
the quantification process merely dress up the proceedings with a gloss of objectivity, making 
the system palatable to Illinois citizens in the wake of the parole mill scandal? The statistics 
presented by the ISP’s sociologist-actuaries certainly indicated at least one change in the parole 
system: the prognostic scores worked and their influence on parole decision-making reduced 
recidivism during the parole period. Our story is thus one of success for Ernest W. Burgess, the 
driving force behind the quantification of parole decision-making. But the prisoners favored by 
prognostic scores were not dissimilar to those released by earlier parole boards. For all of the 
scientific trappings of Burgess’s prognostic scoring system, the sociologist reproduced older 




who was not. The actuarial prediction method only served to imbue categories based on race and 
economic status with greater power, cementing them within the release process in ways that had 
immediate effects on already marginalized prisoners in Illinois, as shown in Figure 11.417 The 
many actuarial models used in policing and punishing later in the twentieth century stemmed 
 
417 Statistics compiled by corrections institutions in Illinois usually do not include information about the length of 
time inmates serve on their sentences, indeterminate or otherwise. For this chart, I compiled information only 
pertaining to persons released on parole before 1933. For 1933 and the following years, I also included persons who 
served out their maximum sentences (minus good time) because the board declined to release them. Persons 
convicted of the following crimes are included in this data pool: burglary, attempted burglary, larceny, attempted 
larceny, grand larceny, larceny of automobile, larceny of horse, robbery, armed robbery, attempted robbery, 
receiving or transporting stolen property, assault with intent to rape, assault with intent to kill, assault with intent to 
rob, manslaughter, abduction (sometimes listed as kidnaping), arson, attempted arson, indecent liberties, bigamy, 
crimes against nature, crimes against children, incest, forgery, confidence game, malicious mischief, malicious 
destruction of property, embezzlement, perjury, conspiracy, receiving deposits after insolvent, uttering fictitious 
check, and child abandonment. All of these crimes were assigned indeterminate sentences. The register books 
containing the cases used to compile this chart are as follows: Joliet Registers of Prisoners committed from Dec. 
1914-Nov. 1915, Nov. 1915-Dec. 1916, Feb. 1918-July 1919, July 1919-Dec. 1919, Aug. 1920-Sept, 1921, Oct. 
1923-Oct. 1924, June 1925-April 1926, April 1929-Sept. 1929, Oct. 1929-April 1930, April 1930-Oct. 1930, Oct. 
1930-April 1931, April 1931-Dec. 1931, Dec. 1931-June 1932, June 1932-Feb. 1933, Feb. 1933-July 1933, July 
1933-Nov. 1933; Menard Registers of Prisoners committed from Jan. 1922-June 1924, June 1924-April 1926, April 
1926-March 1928, March 1928-April 1930, and April 1930-Jan. 1932. 








Average Time Spent Incarcerated Before Parole
Prisoners of Color Native Born White Prisoners
Figure 11 This graph is made up of data from twenty-two prison register books from Joliet and Menard. The 
vertical axis of the chart indicates the average length of time (in months, rounded to the nearest month) 
prisoners paroled in the years listed on the horizontal axis spent incarcerated at Joliet or Menard before 
release. The length of time does not include the time each individual spent in jail awaiting trial. The chart 





from Burgess’s initial identification of these categories, and the quantitative methods that 
granted them objectivity. 
 
From the Broken Home to Hobohemia: Parental Status, Neighborhood, Mobility, and 
Work 
 Incarcerated men interviewed by prison personnel during their first few days inside found 
themselves subjected to invasive lines of questioning. During intake, men were fingerprinted, 
measured, shorn, and dressed in often ill-fitting prison garb, stripped of their physical identity by 
prison staff and their fellow inmates. This traumatic orientation to prison life stripped the self 
away, but it also sought to understand that self. Appointments with prison psychiatrists and 
sociologists required prisoners to open their minds and pasts to strangers. Questions the mental 
health officer and sociologist posed concerned each prisoner’s life history: from childhood to the 
start date of his present prison term. The details revealed during these interviews, which were 
subsequently confirmed by a staff of clerks who wrote to prisoners’ friends and family, ended up 
in the man’s jacket file for later evaluation by those tallying parole prediction scores. These life 
histories and letters would join psychiatric assessments, intelligence test scores, statements from 
prosecutors and judges, disciplinary records, and other documents that determined prisoners’ 
scores for each factor included in the Burgess system. I start, like an Illinois sociologist-actuary 
might while assembling a life history, with factors related to prisoners’ personal and family lives. 
  
Single Mothers, “Broken” Homes, and the Sociological Debate over Parental Status 
 We begin with that most crucial element of life history: the childhood home. Though 
Burgess found the Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet records “very unsatisfactory upon the relations of 




related to parental status and home life, the “broken home” and the “unbroken home.”418 Homes 
could be “broken” by the death of a parent, long term confinement of a parent to an institution, 
divorce, desertion, or the parents’ separation during the prisoner’s childhood. Social scientists 
and reformers had long stressed the importance of the two-parent household, especially during 
the Progressive era, when men and women involved in social welfare work often voiced their 
concern over what they saw as the instability of the working-class family. Much of their 
perception of instability arose from moralistic and patriarchal concerns about the role of women 
in the home and related xenophobic anxieties over immigrant family dynamics and 
assimilability.419 But while Progressive reformers and policymakers wrote working-class white 
immigrant families’ structural problems off as part of their probationary period as “Americans in 
Progress,” they understood African American families’ struggles as pathological.  
 By the 1920s, psychiatrists and noted sociologists in Burgess’s professional orbit made 
the connection between household composition and criminality more explicitly, treating family 
relationships as the foundation for mental and personality formation.420 As one sociologist 
articulated in 1926, “broken homes,” especially single-parent homes, often meant improper 
 
418 Workings, 223.  
419 Martha May, “The ‘Problem of Duty’: Family Desertion in the Progressive Era,” Social Service Review 62:1 
(March 1988), 42. Also see Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, 102. Many progressive reformers also 
acted on these concerns, inserting themselves into working-class family life. See especially Nancy Woloch, A Class 
By Herself: Protective Laws for Women Workers, 1890s-1920s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 
chapter 1 and Eileen Boris, “Reconstructing the ‘Family’: Women, Progressive Reform, and the Problem of Social 
Control,” in Noralee Frankel and Nancy S. Dye eds., Gender, Class, Race, and Reform in the Progressive Era 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 73-86. Some of these assumptions would continue into the 
1930s. For example, the Wickersham Commission’s Report included information from sociological studies 
suggesting that children of immigrant parents were more likely to exhibit delinquent behavior than children of 
native-born American parents. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Causes of 
Crime Vol. 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 68-69. For a long-range view of how 
the American family came to be seen as both the source of and the solution for social problems, see Elaine Tyler 
May, “‘Family Values’: The Uses and Abuses of American Family History,” Revue Française D'études 
Américaines, no. 97 (2003), 7-22.  
420 Stephen Garton, “Criminal Minds: Psychiatry, Psychopathology, and the Government of Criminality,” in Paul 
Knepper and Anja Johansen eds., The Oxford Handbook of The History of Crime and Criminal Justice (New York: 




parental supervision and resulted in both delinquency in youth and “misconduct in adult life.”421 
Social scientists propped up the cultural construction of the nuclear family with a male 
breadwinner, purporting to show scientifically that well-adjusted adults emerged from these 
family structures exclusively. Single motherhood in this period, especially when the child was 
born out of wedlock, was pathologized, criminalized, and racialized.422 Associating single 
motherhood with juvenile delinquency and adult criminality was an example of what historian 
Khalil Gibran Muhammad has called “writing crime into race” and class.423 Increasingly, when 
white sociologists imagined “broken homes” they imagined black and poor homes, correlating 
parental status with racial and cultural deficit rather than the racism and economic inequality 
contributing to desertion, divorce, separation, incarceration, and widowhood.424 The assumption 
that the African American family functions at a “deficit” employed a “European American 
middle-class set of values and ways of being as the norm.”425 
 Still, some challenged the salience of home status to criminality and recidivism. Shortly 
after Burgess published his findings in Workings, his fellow Chicago sociologists cast doubt on 
the statistical correlation of “broken homes” with childhood delinquency. Clifford Shaw and 
Henry D. McKay of the Institute for Juvenile Research argued that sociologists’ underestimation 
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of the commonality of broken homes among nondelinquent boys likely contributed to the linkage 
of home status with delinquency. The two researchers studied the prevalence of broken homes 
among boys in the general population to compare to the incidence of broken homes among 
delinquent children. After conducting interviews with 7,278 boys in twenty-nine Chicago public 
schools, the researchers were surprised by the “absence of any significant relationship between 
rates of broken homes and rates of delinquents.” Indeed, Shaw and McKay’s findings showed 
that home status was much more closely correlated with nationality and race, as African 
American boys were significantly likelier to come from “broken homes” than boys from other 
racial and ethnic groups. These numbers were probably more indicative of the economic status of 
the boys’ families rather than the racial or ethnic makeup of the household. Interview transcripts 
also revealed that many boys from homes classified as “broken” grew up in households they 
considered “harmonious functional unit[s].”426 
 Despite Shaw and McKay’s findings, “home status” continued to feature among factors 
included in revisions of the Burgess method well into the 1950s.427 While rates of delinquency 
are not the same as rates of recidivism, the lack of a correlation between home status and 
criminal behavior in the prediction of delinquency nevertheless might have raised some red flags 
for sociologist-actuaries. But the relation of home status to criminal behavior ultimately 
remained unquestioned by Illinois sociologist-actuaries as they implemented the Burgess system, 
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perhaps because it was linked to race and economic standing throughout the twentieth century. 
Thus, the longevity of the home status factor would justify marks against many economically 
disadvantaged prisoners and men of color in Illinois for decades to come. Households classified 
as “broken” in sociological literature were usually poor.428 Families headed by single mothers 
often lived in poverty—forty-four percent in historian Linda Gordon’s study of hundreds of child 
welfare agency case records, as compared with twenty-six percent of two-parent households.429 
Moreover, African American children were statistically more likely than white children to live in 
single-parent households.430 However, Gordon argues that if historians found a way to control 
for socioeconomic status, the percentage of poor white and black children living with single 
parents might not look so different.431 By 1930, African American children in Chicago were only 
slightly more likely than white children to grow up in households headed by a single mother.432  
Disorganized Neighborhoods: Community and Criminality in the Windy City and Beyond  
 When assembling his list of salient factors, Burgess also displayed considerable interest 
in adult home status and its correlation with recidivism, including two factors related to a 
potential parolee’s residence (or lack thereof). His conclusions about the effects of 
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“neighborhood status” on criminal behavior drew heavily on his earlier work in urban sociology. 
In The City (1925), Burgess and Park laid out one of the most important urban models of the 20th 
century: a theory of neighborhood and industrial development based on Chicago’s growth. The 
two men conceived of the metropolis as an ecological entity, arguing that “forces at work within 
the urban community… [brought] about the orderly and typical grouping of its population and 
institutions” and that these groupings were hierarchical.433 Burgess divided Chicago into a series 
of concentric zones, each with different land values and different usages. Land values in the 
Loop, or central business district, were highest. Grand hotels, skyscrapers, museums, municipal 
buildings, theaters, and department stores studded the city center. Burgess found that much of the 
property surrounding the business district was owned by speculators, who served as landlords as 
they waited for the business district to expand. But these “zones of transition” were deemed 
unstable, classified as slums due to the prevalence of poverty, crime, vice, rooming houses, and 
industry within residential districts. A hodgepodge of working-class migrants inhabited 
Chicago’s zone in transition, residing in dilapidated housing close to their industrial jobs. 
Burgess argued that community institutions crumbled and social control broke down due to the 
blending of different cultures and the constant mobility within transition zones.434  
 As follows from this assessment, Burgess and others who viewed the city from an 
ecological perspective stressed the effects of a neighborhood’s characteristics on its residents. 
Sociologist Mitchell Duneier explains that “those characteristics were thought to exert effects 
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independent of the characteristics of the people who moved into them.” 435 Burgess student and 
Chicago School criminologist Clifford Shaw bolstered this theory with his 1929 monograph, 
Delinquency Areas, suggesting that disorganized neighborhoods generated school truants, 
juvenile delinquents, and adult offenders. Shaw drew heavily on Burgess’s model, especially on 
the older sociologist’s conceptualization of “zones in transition.” As businesses and 
manufacturing interests moved into these zones, Shaw argued, the community “ceases to 
function effectively as a means of social control” and collective resistance “to delinquent and 
criminal behavior is low.”436 Over time, criminal actions in these areas might even meet with 
approval from members of the community. Shaw’s interpretation of the data collected for 
Delinquency Areas indicated that Burgess might expect prisoners from working-class city 
neighborhoods to dominate Illinois prisons, but Burgess needed his own data to correlate 
offenders’ previous residences with recidivism.  
 As he sorted through the institutional jacket files, the sociologist quickly realized the 
difficulty of placing each prisoner’s former residence within a neighborhood category. Burgess 
wrote in the final study that “the material in the records was not so satisfactory for determining 
the type of neighborhood where a man lived at the time of his arrest.”437 This meant that he could 
only identify eight broad neighborhood types, which he applied to prisoners throughout the state: 
“criminal underworld,” “Hobohemia,” “rooming house district,” apartment district, immigrant 
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areas, “residential districts,” and rural areas.438 He notes at the outset that “those whose homes 
had been in the open country” violated parole at a significantly lower rate than persons hailing 
from towns and cities.439 Either way, violation rates for men with former addresses in areas 
Burgess classified as “criminal underworlds,” “Hobohemias,” and “rooming house districts” 
were highest, and the sociologist assigned these unfavorable ratings within his forecasting charts.  
 The terms “Hobohemia,” “criminal underworld,” and “rooming house district” would 
have held specific meaning for Burgess and his colleagues. They were areas within the “zone of 
transition” defined by Burgess and Park in The City. University of Chicago graduate students 
made extensive studies of “Hobohemia” and the “rooming house districts” on the Gold Coast in 
the 1920s. In 1922, the Executive Committee of the Chicago Council of Social Agencies’ 
Committee on Homeless Men commissioned University of Chicago graduate student Nels 
Anderson to produce a study of the hobo based on immersive research conducted in the city. To 
complete the study, Anderson lived Chicago’s “Hobohemia” for one year, collecting dozens of 
life histories from homeless men and recording his observations. Anderson posited that each 
major American city in the early 1920s had a district defined by its homeless population and the 
institutions that arose to serve transient workers, its “Hobohemia.” According to Anderson, the 
institutions that defined these districts included “cheap hotels, lodging-houses, flops, eating-
joints, outfitting shops, employment agencies, missions, radical bookstores, welfare agencies, 
[and other] economic and political institutions.”440 As hobos moved in, crime flourished—
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gamblers, drug traffickers, and bootleggers profited from the business of migratory men looking 
for a momentary thrill or a way to feed their addiction. Anderson identified four distinct areas 
that comprised Chicago’s Hobohemia: West Madison Street, the area of State Street to the south 
of the Loop, Clark Street below Chicago Avenue, and Grant Park.441   
 Anderson’s fellow Chicago school sociologist Harvey W. Zorbaugh ensured that the 
boundaries of the “rooming-house 
district” were similarly well-defined. 
Like Anderson, Zorbaugh quickly 
mapped Chicago’s characteristics onto 
other major cities, believing that each 
urban area contained “rooming house 
districts” similar to the one he 
described on the lower North Side of 
Chicago.442 In The Gold Coast and the 
Slum, which Burgess almost certainly 
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Figure 12 Zorbaugh’s map of the Lower North Side from The Gold Coast and the 





read before its publication in 1929, Zorbaugh characterized the center of the Forty-Second Ward 
as an area of rooming houses.443 He wrote that behind the “ostentatious apartments, hotels, and 
homes” along Lake Shore Drive on the Gold Coast lay “an area of streets that have a painful 
sameness, with their old, soot-begrimed stone houses… their shabby air of respectability.” 
Formerly a wealthy neighborhood akin to the Gold Coast, the rooming-house district found on 
the map in Figure 3 housed mostly “young and unmarried men and women.”444 Here, one could 
find clerks, accountants, stenographers, and secretaries who walked to their jobs in the Loop. 
None of these young, white-collar workers stayed in the area for long—indeed, rooming house 
districts were characterized by the “constant comings and goings of… [their] inhabitants.”445 
Rooming-houses were anonymous, lonely places where workers could come and go as they 
pleased, do as they wished, and remain undisturbed. Zorbaugh found no community there, 
merely a collection of individuals kept company by their unfulfilled dreams and whomever they 
chose as a companion for the night. Because of the “social disorganization,” he argued, 
“behavior [became] impulsive rather than social.”446 Life became about the welfare of the 
individual rather than the community, which Burgess and others likely saw as a condition that 
enabled criminal behavior. Zorbaugh identified three rooming house districts in Chicago: the one 
adjacent to the Gold Coast and two others on the South and West sides of the city that marked 
boundary lines between slum neighborhoods and business districts. Though Zorbaugh insisted 
these districts were common in urban areas, it is unclear exactly how Burgess and the Illinois 
sociologist-actuaries might have applied this category to other cities within the state.   
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  “Criminal underworlds” are slightly more difficult to define geographically. Sociologists 
and others studying crime commonly used the term “underworld” to describe the diffuse 
community of persons involved in criminal activity. The term “criminal underworld,” however, 
likely referred to the vice districts and areas where underground economies were most visible in 
Chicago and other cities. In the early 20th century, police actions and municipal rezoning 
“specifically channeled vice to, and contained it in, [Chicago’s] black neighborhoods” with the 
aim of keeping white residential areas and business districts free of sex work, gambling, and the 
drug trade.447 The Progressive Era campaign to clean up the Levee—a diverse neighborhood 
home to both the city’s Chinatown and its underground economy— temporarily shut down 
dozens of brothels and saloons. These brick-and-mortar institutions and the more diffuse, but still 
booming drug trade that surrounded them soon resurfaced in the center of the Black Metropolis, 
just a few blocks south of their original home.448 Unsurprisingly, then, sociologist Walter Cade 
Reckless’s map of the distribution of the Committee of Fifteen’s cases from 1910-1929 indicates 
high levels of vice activity within black neighborhoods. Over 20% of the Committee’s cases 
involving “evidence of commercialized prostitution” were located in the Douglas tract on 
Chicago’s South Side.449 Dealers peddling cocaine and opiates also moved into black 
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Metropolis’s entertainment district, rubbing shoulders with people of “every class and race” in 
dance halls, cafés, and “black and tan” cabarets on the Stroll.450  
 Still, the lights that shone down on the Stroll, making “midnight… like day,” illuminated 
the blossoming “marketplace intellectual life” that characterized Chicago’s New Negro 
experience in the 1920s.451 The New Negro Renaissance, though most frequently associated with 
Harlem-based African American artists and intellectuals, involved a rise in racial assertiveness 
that reverberated in diasporic communities around the globe and offered a profound challenge to 
white supremacy. As historian Davarian Baldwin argues, this new race consciousness manifested 
in heterogenous ways, shaped by the class position, location, gender identity, and sexuality of the 
men and women who expressed it. Chicago’s New Negro experience emerged from the 
“interface between urban migrant cultural practices and the mass consumer marketplace” in 
leisure spaces resulting in a variety of cultural formations and political expressions as African 
Americans sought to realize their freedom dreams.452 Though Chicago’s South Side was a “key 
nodal site in the making of black modernity”—a hub of exciting intellectual and cultural 
change—life in the so-called “Black Belt” was often stressful or even traumatic for  many 
African Americans.453 The cozy and mutually beneficial relationship between vice lords and city 
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law enforcement allowed bars, drug markets, brothels, 
and gambling venues to spread through the 
neighborhood, even in black residential areas. And 
African Americans who wanted to avoid the visible 
drug use, drinking, sex work, gambling, and violence 
that came with these businesses could not simply 
move out of the South Side.454 
 As a result of municipal efforts to concentrate 
Chicago’s illicit amusements within the parameters of 
the black South Side—regardless of white ownership 
and patronage of vice offerings in the area—Reckless 
found that the percentage of black Americans living in 
vice tracts was much greater than the percentage of 
blacks residing in non-vice tracts by 1930.455 
Municipal racism not only pushed vice into African American neighborhoods, but also allowed 
city officials to turn a blind eye as buildings in these areas fell into disrepair.456 Chicago School 
sociologists chose to ignore the role of city authorities, believing instead that these poor 
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Figure 13 This front-page cartoon depicts a large vulture 
labeled 'Politics' watching over and presumably reaping the 
benefits of vice on the South Side. "A 'Wise' Bird Watches South 




neighborhood conditions allowed criminality to flourish, thus shoring up the classification of the 
Black Belt area as part of Chicago’s “criminal underworld.”457 Segregation also confined other 
nonwhite groups to the dilapidated housing stock on the South Side. When Mexicans immigrated 
to Chicago for work in factories, stockyards, and on the railroads after World War I, those who 
could not rely on company housing found apartments in black neighborhoods or moved to 
makeshift housing near railroad tracks.458  
 The concentration of criminal activity in black neighborhoods intensified during 
Prohibition, as mob bosses set up illicit breweries, distilleries, and bars in places where citizens 
“lacked social [and political] privilege,” where any protests would go unheard. For most city 
politicians, the powerful white saloonkeepers, brothel owners, bootleggers, and other big players 
in the vice industry were the only constituents who mattered on the South Side. They were the 
ones who delivered votes and cash, especially to Chicago’s notoriously corrupt mayor, William 
“Big Bill” Thompson, who ordered the police to “lay off” vice resorts in the Black Metropolis.459 
After decades of permitting sex work and the drug trade to flourish on the South Side, police 
were used to collecting bribes and looking the other way. And they were only too happy to do so 
as the organized crime so profitable for white politicians and gangsters alike took root in African 
American communities. Due to the rampant political corruption and the racist restrictive 
covenants that pushed both black people and Chicago’s illicit marketplaces south of the Loop, 
Burgess almost certainly placed black neighborhoods into the “criminal underworld” category. 
By 1937, Pontiac used scores from 1-3 for each factor, with three marking the groups with the 
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highest risk of recidivism in each category. Pontiac’s sociologist-actuary marked residency in 
“Negro areas” a three, and assumed that all African Americans in urban communities lived in 
“Negro areas” without reference to any other neighborhood descriptors that might apply and 
lower their risk score.460 
 Men and boys living in the “criminal underworlds,” “Hobohemias,” and “rooming house 
districts” in Chicago and other urban areas in Illinois were poor, nonwhite, or both. Men of color 
possessed neither the means nor opportunity to move out of neighborhoods Burgess and other 
Chicago school sociologists associated with crime. With little understanding of racist restrictive 
covenants, environmental racism, and the white supremacist violence that helped uphold the 
color line in the city and its suburbs, Burgess failed to acknowledge that African Americans lived 
in the city’s most dilapidated housing in the heart of its vice district due to forces outside of their 
control. Even if he did begin to comprehend the many evils of segregation, he made no provision 
within his predictive model to remedy the ill effect of neighborhood association on the 
prognostic scores of men of color. 
 
Tramping in the Twenties, Bumming in the Depression: Criminalizing Homeless and Transient 
Workers in Illinois 
 Poverty pushed Chicagoans into the city’s “criminal underworlds,” “Hobohemias,” and 
“rooming-house districts,” to be sure, but the low wages and unreliable employment that 
characterized many working-class occupations also motivated men throughout the state to leave 
their homes for better prospects elsewhere. Seasonal laborers “appeared marginal to both 
agriculture and industry,” but performed work that was crucial to the market for much of the 
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early 20th century.461 They moved between cities and rural areas as they harvested the state’s 
crops, built its railroads, and cut its lumber. The poverty and extreme mobility that characterized 
these workers’ lives contributed to living arrangements and conditions that contrasted with 
cultural understandings of male gender roles, and permanent residents of Illinois communities 
viewed transient workers with suspicion. Chicago’s Progressive Era reformers perceived and 
portrayed transient workers as problematic in their independence and autonomy, attempting to 
bring them under the control of city authorities and charities by founding municipal lodging 
houses and philanthropic hotels.462  
 Similarly, social scientists surveying homelessness in the 1920s and 1930s believed that 
transient workers threatened the social order. If Burgess engaged in extensive discussions of 
transience with Robert Park, he would have conceptualized the “hobo” primarily as a man 
without purpose who moved from place to place with no rational objective. In The City, Park 
argued that the hobo’s “impulse to escape from the routine of ordinary life” and constant 
mobility was akin to an addiction.463 The hobo wandered for the sake of wandering, “without a 
cause and without a country,” breaking community ties with impunity.464 Other contemporaries 
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were more precise with their language and classification, counting the hobo as just one member 
of the larger vagrant class, which also included the “tramp” and the “bum.”465 The line between 
the sometimes romanticized hobo with his particular honor code and relationship to work and the 
dissolute and idle “bum” were never quite as clear for authorities as they were for itinerant men. 
Though he may have used more complex language in his sociological studies of the city, for 
parole classification Burgess probably would have slotted any man without a permanent address 
into the transient class—including the “bums” who typically stayed in one place. 
 Historians note that the population of white American transient workers began to dwindle 
by the 1920s, but the idea of vagrancy as a form of deviance remained. This idea was pervasive, 
even as many young men followed the seasonal demands of the labor market for years before 
they settled down. These were working-class men who “shared the same demographic 
characteristics and life goals as other [more stationary] working-class and farming youths.”466 
Seasonal workers were in their 20s and 30s, mostly white, and literate, but the social stigmas of 
mobility and low standards of living marked them as problematic outsiders. Their very transience 
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“conjured up a lack of attachment and thus irresponsibility and disorder,” a freedom of 
movement that actively threatened the “moral life and stability” of communities.467  
 A last surge of working-class mass migration overwhelmed the country during the Great 
Depression. Though traveling for seasonal work was less common in the 1930s, the destabilized 
economy and cyclical layoffs that characterized many industries ensured that itinerant workers 
remained in Hobohemia’s Main Stem. Indeed, social agencies and shelters likely struggled to 
keep up with the ever-increasing population of unemployed transients and destitute families 
passing through the city.468 These Depression Era migrant workers moved from place to place in 
search of a steady job rather than at the whims of the seasonal labor market. Due to total 
economic collapse, the demographics of the transient working population shifted, skewing 
slightly older. Black homelessness also increased in the 1930s. African Americans made up 
about 8 percent of the population of major northern cities in 1931, but comprised 15 to 27 
percent of homeless persons staying in municipal shelters that year.469 Despite these differences, 
poverty and marginalization united the white male seasonal workers of the 1920s with the 
sporadically unemployed, often unhoused, diverse transient population of the Depression Era.470 
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Poverty dictated Burgess’s marking system as he assigned an “unfavorable” prognosis to 
formerly transient prisoners.  
Freedom Dreams Shattered: Race, Work, and Wages in the Great Migration 
 Former transients caught up in the criminal justice system probably chalked up an 
additional “unfavorable” rating in Burgess’s “previous work record” category due to the cyclical 
nature of seasonal labor and industrial layoffs for working-class men. Just as a man’s labor 
within the penitentiary held redemptive and rehabilitative value in the eyes of prison officials, 
Burgess believed that a regular employment record prior to incarceration could identify parole 
successes.471 It was the character of employment that mattered most to the sociologist rather than 
the fact of employment. A “casual work” record, which encompassed the “intermittent labor of 
unskilled workers,” or no work record at all counted against potential parolees.472 Throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s, men of color were far more likely to work intermittently in unskilled 
positions than white working-class men. Even before the stock market crash of 1929 left over 
40% of African American men unemployed, many black people faced underemployment or 
unemployment in Chicago.473  
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 The Urban League’s annual reports for the 1920s indicate that black civic organizations 
grew increasingly concerned about discrimination in employment and unemployment among 
African American men in the years leading up to Burgess’s parole research. The Chicago Urban 
League, formed in 1916 as an affiliate of the National Urban League, established partnerships 
with businesses and charitable organizations in order to find jobs, housing, and coordinate social 
services for black migrants to Chicago.474 The organization also conducted research on industrial 
conditions and barriers to employment for African Americans in the city. Mid-decade, League 
members felt optimistic about their work, noting in their 1926 annual report that “the year just 
closed here has been one of real achievement for our industrial department,” especially in the 
wake of the 1924 recession. The report further observed that the city’s industries were pulling 
out of the “depression,” with some black-owned businesses even providing additional positions 
for young African Americans.475 The League’s subsequent annual reports for the decade were 
not so optimistic. Migrants from the South continued to flock to the Black Metropolis, hoping to 
realize their freedom dreams, but job openings for African Americans did not keep pace with 
increased demand. In 1927, the League’s Department of Industrial Relations wrote of the 
“serious unemployment situation.” By 1928, the situation was “critical.” That year’s annual 
report pointed to poor labor conditions and high unemployment rates for African Americans in 
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the city, positing that the dearth of jobs for black workers “was greatly aggravated by the large 
number of unemployed among various groups” which led to “the dismissal of many colored 
workers in favor of other racial groups.”476  
 The Chicago Defender also noted the dearth of employment opportunities for African 
Americans as the 1920s waned, writing of the visibility of discriminatory hiring practices in the 
city and encouraging readers to take action. When discontented rumblings emanated from the 
city’s streetcar workers in 1927, the paper encouraged black Chicagoans to stand at the ready for 
their chance at a job should white streetcar workers strike for higher wages.477 In 1928, the 
newspaper bemoaned the fact that public utilities jobs were still closed to black men and women, 
writing that “the only bar to getting employment in these public places is that one’s skin must be 
white.”478 African Americans could not work in streetcars, nor could they expect job 
opportunities on elevated trains, or in the telephone service. These public utilities were not alone 
in their refusal to employ black workers. Most labor unions, too, “[shut] the doors of 
employment to able workers,” excluding black Americans either explicitly or in practice.479 Even 
the white-dominated unions that admitted black workers prevented African Americans from 
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climbing the ranks to managerial and skilled positions in the workplace. For instance, though the 
biracial Steelworkers Union fought for improved conditions in the low-ranking jobs generally 
reserved for black laborers, it did not disrupt the racist job structures imposed by white 
employers. As Title VII litigation against the union later showed, the Steelworkers Union 
ensured that only white laborers entered higher-paying, safer jobs, while African Americans 
remained in the unskilled, low-paying, and dangerous positions with higher turnover rates.480 
These jobs became fewer and farther between as the labor market shrank, and employed black 
Americans struggled to hang onto their positions as they watched employers lay off growing 
numbers of their fellow workers. The Urban League warned in 1927 that seniority rules 
supported by industrial unions generally forced “Negroes out of work first and caus[ed] more 
suffering among them than among other groups.” As more and more African Americans found 
themselves out of a job, the Defender pointed to mass layoffs and urged citizens to pay attention: 
“Something is happening in Chicago and it should no longer go unnoticed.”481 
 Like African Americans, Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans mostly worked at 
seasonal jobs, received low wages, and were among the first “to suffer a cut in wages, or to be 
laid off when curtailment in industry takes place.”482 Winters in Chicago were particularly 
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difficult for recent arrivals from the beet fields of Minnesota and Michigan. These families came 
to Chicago at the end of the harvest season instead of traveling thousands of miles back to 
Mexico, but often found it extremely difficult to find work to sustain them once the weather 
turned cold. Those who did find employment in the 1920s worked on the railroads, in factories 
and steel mills, and at hotels in the Loop. According to a paper based on research conducted by 
the Immigrants’ Protective League and the University of Chicago’s School of Social Service 
Administration, these jobs were relatively unstable and almost always cut during industry 
downturns.483 The dearth of employment could be dangerous for recent arrivals. New immigrant 
families could not obtain government aid and found themselves forced to rely on more 
established Mexican residents for assistance, including food, blankets, clothing, and shelter. The 
problem worsened later in the 1920s, when steel mills found themselves with a surplus of 
Mexican workers seeking jobs.484 Indeed, winters later in the decade were so precarious for these 
families and the unattached Mexican men who also flocked to the city for jobs that the Mexican 
Consul placed notices in Spanish language papers “warning the people not to come to Chicago in 
the winter [of 1928] expecting to find work.”485   
 As shown, men of color in the 1920s faced discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices, seasonal job cycles, and instability in employment. African American workers who did 
find employment in the 1920s usually did not advance in their careers because discriminatory 
employers refused to promote people of color and resisted hiring skilled black workers. 
Industries too often placed black and Mexican laborers in temporary jobs, which they would lose 
as seasonal demand for a product or service disappeared. Low wages, too, motivated black 
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laborers in particular to move from job to job more frequently than their European-American 
counterparts, marking their work histories as “casual” within Burgess’s rating system.486  By 
1933, Illinois sociologist-actuaries would examine prisoners’ employment histories as part of 
their actuarial prediction method, paying careful attention to each man’s ability to hold a steady 
job or remain continually employed in adulthood. Sociologist-actuaries likely held men 
convicted and sent to prison in the 1930s accountable for their employment status in the 1920s, 
perhaps more so than their work history following the stock market crash, when even jobs for 
white men became scarce. 
Policing and Punishing in the Prairie State: Criminal Records, Court Reports, and Prison 
Discipline 
“Would Believe One White Man to 9 of Ours”: Discriminatory Policing and Sentencing487 
As historian Simon Balto argues, punishment in Chicago “fell on the shoulders of the less 
powerful,” including immigrant groups, Catholics, African Americans, and others at the margins 
of society. Though black neighborhoods bore the brunt of heavy law enforcement, Balto’s work 
indicates that poor people in general were more “vulnerable to police harassment and violence 
than were people of greater means.”488 Still, Chicago police earned a reputation for 
discriminatory and often violent treatment of people of color in particular. As previously 
explored, the efforts of police and politicians had moved white vice  districts in the urban north 
from immigrant communities to African American neighborhoods well before the 1930s, and 
police presence in those areas increased accordingly.489 Police arrested black citizens with 
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impunity, having no reason to fear that they might have the right friends or the capital necessary 
to protest unwarranted detention.  
Crime statistics produced from this environment both reflected and fueled the over-
policing of black communities as well as the perception of African Americans as a naturally 
deviant population. Black social scientists like Charles S. Johnson and Kelly Miller produced 
pathbreaking scholarship in response to these numbers, questioning their validity and reliability. 
Though their work showed that racial interpretations were largely built around sloppily 
assembled data sets that reflected discrimination in the criminal justice system, it did little to 
change the national conversation. Instead, white social scientists and policymakers persisted in 
advancing culturally determinist views of African Americans and in increasing the punitive role 
of law enforcement in black communities and other communities of color. Prisoners of color 
were thus more likely than white prisoners to be identified as occasional or habitual offenders 
within the “criminal type” category and to have a record that worked against their chances of 
parole upon completion of their minimum sentence.    
During the first wave of the Great Migration, which increased the city’s black population 
from 14,271 to 109,458 souls from 1890 to 1920, Chicagoans blamed spikes in violent crime on 
the “rowdies, gun-carrying bullies and other worthless characters” recently arrived from the 
South.490 The largely white police force shared this view, and enjoyed enormous power of 
discretion to “arrest any person found under circumstances which would warrant a reasonable 
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man in believing that such a person had committed or is about to commit a crime.”491 Public and 
police perception of a connection between race and crime was thus reflected in Chicago arrest 
statistics and only grew as the twentieth century progressed. In 1920, when African Americans 
comprised about four percent of the city’s population, black arrests made up 11.3 percent of total 
arrests made by Chicago police. The percentage continued to rise over the course of the decade, 
and by 1930, when black Chicagoans made up around seven percent of the population, black 
arrests had risen to 25.34 percent of the total.492 These statistics and others like them helped 
forge the link between race and crime and justify continuing surveillance of African Americans.  
The disparity in arrest rates was obvious to black citizens and discussed in The Defender 
and other African American newspapers. In 1925, the Defender lamented the abuse of police 
discretion, commenting that officers often arrested men “merely because their skin is dark or 
their necktie loud.” The same article later invoked the specter of the Klan and suggested that 
police tactics were similar to those of the white terrorist group: “Law-abiding citizens are tired of 
being humiliated and insulted by the same vague ‘disorderly conduct’ charges and ‘fugitive 
warrants’ that were used in the Ku Klux Klan days to drag Negroes back into the South.”493 
Claude Barnett’s Associated Negro Press also picked up on the pattern of police violence and 
discriminatory arrests. In 1931, the news service sent out a story on a police “drive to ‘clean-up 
the [South Side] district.’” Police searched South Siders’ cars without warrants, broke into 
homes during the night, assaulted women, and arrested prominent African American community 
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members without apparent cause. In one case, officers raided the home of a Mrs. Mae Jones, 
striking her on the head with a flashlight “when she resented the action of the police.”494 
The 1922 publication of Charles S. Johnson’s masterful study, The Negro in Chicago, 
spurred and elevated discussions of discriminatory policing in black antiracist scholarship and 
activism—especially in work on the Windy City. Johnson’s research is attentive to racial 
disparities in the areas of arrests, offering powerful pushback to the dominant association 
between blackness and crime. The young sociologist showed that over 21% of persons held on 
criminal charges in Chicago in 1919 were African American. Moreover, according to criminal 
court judges, Chicago police were much more likely to arrest black suspects than white suspects 
because officers assumed that African Americans were more criminal in general than whites and 
that black men had “fewer resources and less influence with which to insure their fair 
treatment.”495 A few years after Johnson’s study, the National Commission on Law Observance 
and Enforcement published a report including statistics from the Chicago Police Department 
indicating that the average rate of arrests on felony charges for African Americans was more 
than ten times that for whites during the years 1925-1929.496  
Police also targeted black children, as whites became increasingly concerned about the 
problem of delinquency in African American neighborhoods. Simply growing up black in 
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Chicago virtually guaranteed a criminal record. A 1923 study of Juvenile Court records 
compared the outcomes for black children who appeared before the court with the end results of 
cases involving white defendants. Researchers for the U.S. Children’s Bureau concluded that 
twice as many black children as white children were sent to prison, the reformatory, jail, or a 
workhouse.497 The disproportionate incarceration of African American children occurred in part 
because of growing segregation in the city’s private welfare institutions. Just as Chicago’s 
African American population began to expand at the dawn of the Great Migration, most private 
child welfare institutions stopped serving “colored” children—though some of Chicago’s 
Catholic children’s homes continued to admit small numbers of African American children. 
Juvenile court authorities contended with limited options for orphaned or abandoned black girls 
and boys, and sometimes sent them to detention facilities meant for juvenile delinquents. As 
historian Marcia Chatelain notes, this policy “essentially criminaliz[ed] them for being black, 
without parents, and poor.”498 By the late 1920s, Chicago Juvenile Court officials acknowledged 
that they treated dependent African American children differently than white children, as 
“practically no institutions are to be found in the community to which this group of colored 
children may be admitted.”499 While Polish, Jewish, and Italian youth brought before the Court 
for minor offenses were sent to private welfare institutions for dependent children, black boys 
and girls were packed off to the state-run St. Charles School for Boys and the State Training 
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School for Girls at Geneva for the same infractions. This response towards black juvenile 
dependency and minor delinquency meant that when black citizens were caught up in the 
criminal justice system later in life they were more likely to have a record of time in jail, an 
industrial school, or a reformatory. Illinois sociologist-actuaries generally associated time served 
in any of these carceral institutions with failure on parole.500 
While Chicago’s cases of police repression and violence against African Americans in 
Illinois are particularly well-documented, discriminatory policing was clearly not confined to the 
Windy City. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) 
Decatur Branch records contain a scathing indictment of the downstate city’s police force. 
Following white officer A.C. Travis’s assault on Walter Blair, an unarmed black man in the 
process of surrendering to police, the Decatur Branch’s Legal Redress Committee wrote that the 
beating was only one in a long line of police offenses against African Americans. The 
Committee composed a letter to Chief of Police H.J. Schepper, warning him that if these abuses 
continued, the Decatur Police Department would cause “widespread injustice and actual danger 
to the peace and welfare of our entire city.” Committee members supported this admonition, 
nodding to their cache of records documenting many “counts of police abuse of justice and the 
discriminatory maintenance of public tranquility.” These accounts of violence and discriminatory 
arrests could be weaponized against the police department “should at any time the general 
welfare of the citizens of Decatur demand it.”501  
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NAACP files also hold accounts of police brutality in smaller towns and cities, though 
these documents are limited—the national director of the organization’s branches complained in 
1922 that even the organization’s Chicago branch had difficulty keeping good records.502 
Whether due to branch record-keeping and preservation strategies, or merely later archival 
choices, items related to police discrimination and brutality in 1920s Illinois outside of Chicago 
are few. Illinois cases brought to the NAACP’s attention in the next decade are better 
documented in the Association’s files. In 1939, for instance, African Americans living in Harvey 
founded a new branch of the NAACP after local police tortured a criminal suspect, leaving him 
“without the sight of the right eye [and] three fractured ribs.”503 NAACP lawyers filed charges 
against the Harvey police department, and pleading letters from the Harvey Branch to national 
headquarters impressed the urgency of the case upon the Association’s leadership. One 
representative of the local branch hinted at the dangers of further abuse from the police force: 
“… we must not loose [sic] this case. If we do it will be much harder for our race to live here.”504  
Even as the Chicago branch of the NAACP began to use local law and the court system 
to address discrimination and police brutality, black defendants facing criminal charges often 
found the courtroom a hostile environment. Johnson’s The Negro in Chicago revealed that black 
defendants were convicted in Municipal Court more frequently than white defendants.505 The 
personal opinions of some of the Court’s judges undoubtedly played a role in negative trial 
outcomes for black defendants—and presumably subsequent negative assessments sent to the 
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parole board. Judge Theodore Ehler of the Morals Court became particularly notorious for his 
dismissive stance on testimony offered by African Americans, declaring in 1924 that “… 
Colored people lie on the slightest provocation… That is why I believe one white witness against 
your nine.”506 Morals Court Judge Arnold Heap also distinguished himself when he railed 
against jazz in 1922. Handing down a fine of $200 for a Miss Julia Rector’s “interpretation of 
modern dancing,” the jurist snapped, “This case smacks of the barbarism of the jungle… [the] 
evil genius of this place has artfully combined the grossness of primitive sensuality with the 
gilded refinement of modern licentiousness.”507  
The stubborn and overt racism of some Municipal Court judges probably partly 
accounted for the comparatively high rates of conviction for African Americans tried in the city, 
but Chicago’s justice system as a whole worked to support and sanction the often-violent 
repression of black residents. Criminal courts rarely indicted police for illegal acts of violence 
against African American citizens, which effectively “decriminalize[d] white racial violence.”508 
black observers of the courts noted these trends. One attorney told Charles Johnson that judges 
and juries acted fairly only in cases involving black defendants and plaintiffs. In cases with white 
defendants and black plaintiffs, “the tendency is to give considerably less credibility or weight to 
Negro testimony.” Similarly, cases with African American defendants and Anglo plaintiffs found 
judges and juries “giv[ing] more weight to white testimony.”509 
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Other Illinois residents of color encountered similar levels of hostility when dealing with 
court officials and police in Chicago and throughout the state. Mexican immigrants, especially 
non-English speakers, were often arrested without cause, wrongly convicted, and sentenced in a 
courtroom without translation services or proper representation. In a study published as part of 
the 1931 Wickersham Commission Report, Paul Livingstone Warnshuis interviewed 98 Mexican 
prisoners in Illinois, finding that a large percentage had experienced discriminatory policing 
tactics. Warnshuis notes in his study that many Mexican immigrants told similar stories about the 
police. He mentions several cases in which police detained and frisked Mexican immigrants 
without cause, including one in which a Mexican man “was standing on a corner conversing with 
a friend when a policeman stopped and searched them both.” This man happened to be carrying a 
jackknife at the time and was immediately arrested for “carrying concealed weapons.”510 Many 
of the men Warnhuis talked with were jailed without knowing why they had been arrested, or 
with what crime they had been charged. Other interviewees recounted traumas endured at the 
hands of police officers, subjection to “the third degree” that left them bloodied and bruised. 
Sixteen men from Chicago and 3 men from other counties out of the ninety-eight total men 
interviewed said that they had been tortured in jail. One prisoner, identified by his initials R.R., 
told Warnshuis that officers “punched him ‘about a hundred times’ in the face” before sticking a 
gun in his mouth and threatening to kill him. “They were animals to treat me that way,” R.R. 
concluded, adding that he confessed to nothing.511  
Latinos who suffered at the hands of jailers and police had few avenues of recourse 
available to them—most had trouble even accessing legal services for their defense. Fifty-four 
percent of prisoners Warnshuis interviewed were never able to obtain a lawyer, including one 
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prisoner charged with a serious felony in a downstate county. V.C. was arrested after an 
argument with a friend turned physical. The two exchanged blows, the friend hit V.C. in the face 
with an iron bar, and V.C. retaliated with his jackknife. The (presumably former) friend pressed 
charges and V.C. sat in county jail for fifty-two days, during which nothing was done for his 
defense, “so far as the defendant knows.” One day, he was sent to the “judge’s ‘office.’” There, 
V.C. asked for an interpreter and a lawyer, but the judge simply gave him a paper to sign. V.C. 
could not read it. Subjected to pressure, he signed, and was returned to his cell where he waited 
optimistically for an interpreter, lawyer, and a trial. Instead, “the next thing that happened was 
his journey to the penitentiary.”512  
The Mexican consulate worked overtime to help immigrants like V.C. navigate city and 
state legal systems, protecting them from “the police who often accuse[d] them because of lack 
of interpreters and because they assign guilt without sufficient proof.’”513 Unfortunately, the 
consulate’s services were only available to Mexican defendants who entered the United States 
legally. Understandably bewildered upon entrance into an American courtroom, where court 
officials and lawyers spoke only English, many Mexican defendants without interpretive and 
legal services provided by the consulate undoubtedly shared the experience of Warnshuis’s 
interviewees. In the confusion and haste of the Municipal Court process, forty-five percent of 
men interviewed said they “had no opportunity to speak for themselves” during proceedings. 
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Only twenty men in Warnshuis’s study were accompanied to court by an interpreter, and nine of 
these indicated that the “service was… incompetent or unsatisfactory.” 514 Spanish-speaking 
immigrants were thus at the mercy of police, lawyers, and judges who could not understand a 
word they said, and—in some cases—immigration authorities who were quick to deport them. 
Warnshuis’s Municipal Court statistics showed that convictions were obtained in thirty-eight 
percent of cases involving a Mexican defendant, a rate much higher than the conviction rate of 
twenty-three percent for all nationalities.515  
Chicago’s Chinese population faced similar challenges. Though many Chinese avoided 
contact with police by sheltering within an “insulated ethnic enclave that was largely self-
governed,” prevailing stereotypes associated Chinese with vice.516 The sensationalized murder of 
missionary worker Elsie Sigel, allegedly committed by Chinese New Yorker Leon Ling, sent 
shock waves through the country in 1909. The homicide and ensuing manhunt marked Chinese 
men as dangerous to white women, positioned as virtuous innocents. Chicago was not immune to 
the collective panic, and the city’s police department increased surveillance of its Chinese 
residents, targeting the hundreds of Chinese-owned laundries operating outside of the Chinatown 
area.517 Historian Huping Ling contends that this panic did not result in long-term effects on the 
policing of Chinese in the city.518 Instead, growing anti-Chinese agitation caused white landlords 
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to raise rents in Chinatown, driving tenants out of this small community in the Loop. Most 
Chinese then moved to the South Side, which placed them in close proximity to vice districts. 
Overpolicing in these majority-black areas, anti-Chinese racism, and the association of Chinese 
with gambling houses outside of police protection may have caused the disproportionate number 
of arrests of Chinese residents between 1914 and 1925. During these years, 1,913 Chinese 
Chicagoans were arrested and 484 convicted of a crime, figures which are high when we 
consider that the entire Chinese community in the city numbered only 2,353 in 1920.519 Police 
pressure on Chicago’s Chinese residents only increased during the 1930s. Deportation drives 
shifted their focus from the Italian neighborhoods targeted in the 1920s to Chinese communities, 
resulting in mass arrests and reflecting the focus of national immigration restriction policies.520 
“Inhuman Cruelties”: Punishment and Disciplinary Records Behind Bars  
While historians conclude that policing records for this period are relatively reliable, the 
same cannot be said for records tracking rule violations and punishments within the Illinois 
prison system. According to a 1937 report, corrections officers reported rule infractions to the 
captain of the solitary office, who would then send for the offending prisoner and dispense 
punishment depending on “the gravity of the offense.”521 There were four types of punishments 
for adult male prisoners: solitary confinement from 1-21 days; solitary confinement and 
forfeiture of good time merit allowances; forfeiture of privileges such as attending baseball 
games or movies within the institution; and demotion in the merit system grade rating.522 The 
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most accurate records of rule infractions and the administration of punishment most likely exist 
in prisoners’ institutional jacket files, which track promotions and demotions in grades as well as 
additional punishments meted out to each man. Descriptions of rule infractions are included in 
punishment reports written up for each offense. Unfortunately, these records are closed to 
researchers under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act.523 Rule 
violations and punishments were also logged in prison register books, though it is difficult to tell 
if this was a consistent practice. There are no institutionally-generated statistics (however 
questionable these might be) available for grade demotions or for tracking which prisoners were 
placed in solitary confinement and when. In 1922, though, Charles S. Johnson reported 
significant disparities in the conduct ratings of black and white prisoners, writing that “the 
percentage of Negro inmates whose conduct was marked ‘satisfactory’ was smaller in all 
institutions than the percentage of whites.”524  
There are very few accessible archival traces that can clue us into potential disparities in 
punishment for men incarcerated in Joliet-Stateville, Menard, and Pontiac during the 1920s and 
1930s. Any documents produced during disciplinary hearings are closed to researchers. 
Moreover, it would have been difficult for African American, Mexican, Asian, and white ethnic 
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prisoners to expose extreme forms of disciplinary discrimination while incarcerated, especially 
since Joliet prisoners in D and E grades were allowed to have visitors only with special 
permission from the warden. Still, visitors and prisoners at Joliet could speak in any language 
they liked and were allowed some privacy from guards by virtue of a large visiting room 
combined with the cacophony of a great number of visits going on at once. Men incarcerated at 
Menard were required to speak English at all times during visits, and to speak loudly enough to 
be overheard by the supervising guard. Moreover, all prisoner letters at Pontiac, Joliet, and 
Menard were censored by civilian employees and their inmate assistants. At Menard, men had to 
pay for their own postage and were permitted to write letters only once each week if in grades A, 
B, or C.525 But because letters were censored by the institution, even men serving time in higher 
grades with access to funds for stamps would have found it difficult to send any negative 
information regarding their treatment behind bars out to their families.  
While many African American prisoners probably kept quiet about discriminatory 
treatment in prison even after they were released, a group of black men who had served terms in 
the reformatory at Pontiac reported abuse at the hands of guards and prison officials to the 
Chicago branch of the NAACP in 1933. These former prisoners told members of the NAACP’s 
legal redress committee that they received “excessively heavy penalties for minor infractions of 
prison rules… in contrast with light penalties for white prisoners making the same 
infractions.”526 If they filed complaints about the discrimination and poor treatment with prison 
officials, they placed themselves at risk of further punishment from guards. According to the 
Chicago Defender, these penalties included “inhuman cruelties and solitary confinement.”527 The 
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Associated Negro Press (ANP) updated the story in August, writing that the NAACP was now 
pressing for an investigation of Joliet, Menard and the St. Charles reform school for boys in 
addition to Pontiac. Since the former Pontiac prisoners filed affidavits with the Chicago branch, a 
number of ex-prisoners from other state institutions came forward to tell the NAACP of beatings, 
torture, denial of medical services, and poor quality in housing and food given to black inmates. 
Moreover, the NAACP verified testimony that prison guards demanded money from prisoners’ 
relatives and friends in exchange for protection and good conduct reports.528 There is no 
evidence that an extensive investigation into these allegations was ever conducted. Instead of 
focusing on the abuse of prisoners, those with the authority to impact prisoners’ lives 
concentrated their attention on the behavior of prisoners themselves. 
 
The Individualization of Punishment: Psychiatry, Intelligence Testing, and Personality in 
the ISP 
 When examining each prisoner’s institutional record, Burgess also came across reports 
from mental health officers employed at Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet. The three individual state 
penitentiaries adopted psychological and psychiatric services as a part of commitment 
procedures in 1917, primarily for the consideration of prison staff. Staff supposedly used these 
mental health reports when assigning each new inmate to a job within the institution and 
determining the level of individual supervision he would need. Over months and years of each 
man’s confinement, the institutions’ mental health staffers theoretically would contribute case 
notes to his institutional jacket, culminating in “a comprehensive study [of the inmate] pursued 
for at least a year” and submitted to the Parole Board.529 As Burgess discovered during his 
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perusal of the jacket files, a comprehensive examination of each prisoner over time proved 
impossible. Psychiatric evaluations remained cursory, and in some cases, incomplete. Still, 
Burgess used notes from mental health officers’ interviews, examination results, and diagnoses 
to fill in each prisoner’s “mental age,” “personality type,” and “psychiatric prognosis” for use in 
his parole prediction study.  
The Joliet-Stateville complex developed the intake measures responsible for the 
accumulation of these papers within prisoner jackets.530 New prisoners spent at least a week in 
individual cells in the observation ward, closely watched by a guard. After being photographed, 
fingerprinted, shorn, deloused, bathed, and dressed in prison garb, each new prisoner visited the 
physician, took the Army Alpha intelligence test, and met with the mental health officer. In these 
conversations with Joliet psychiatrist Dr. Walter Martin, prisoners answered simple questions 
about their “heredity, personal development, education, industrial and occupational pursuits, 
illnesses and accidence, and social interests.”531 The mental health officer theoretically used 
these materials as a starting point for continued study of each individual, informing his treatment 
within the institution and aggregating observations for prognosis statements submitted to the 
Parole Board. While Martin included each inmate’s Army Alpha score and diagnosis in the pithy 
summary statements provided to the parole board, the psychiatrist expended more words on each 
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man’s behavior in prison, attitude towards incarceration in general, and how he might fare in 
civil life if released. Perhaps Clabaugh’s dismissal of psychiatric diagnoses and mental ages 
encouraged Martin and other mental health professionals within the prisons to write up their 
reports in plain language.532 Still, Dr. Martin doubted whether prison staff or the parole board 
made use of any of his diagnoses, and likely found Burgess’s attention to his work refreshing—
three factors included in each prisoner’s actuarial prognosis relied on assessments made by the 
psychiatrist or by those under his supervision.533 
Measuring the Criminal Mind: Race, Class, and the Army Alpha Intelligence Test  
Though Hinton G. Clabaugh largely discounted intelligence test results, especially those 
which assigned a mental age to each person examined, Burgess included these classifications in 
his study. The young sociologist came of age at a time when American psychologists 
professionalized, and just as applications of their work within the nation’s educational, industrial, 
and judicial systems gained widespread acceptance. Burgess moved to Illinois only one year 
after the state’s General Assembly passed House Bill No. 655, the first piece of legislation in the 
country that permitted the “permanent, involuntary institutionalization of feeble-minded 
individuals.” The belief that spurred state representatives and senators to pass this bill—that 
feeble-minded persons were predisposed to socially deviant behaviors—faded following the 
publication of Army Alpha and Beta test results.534 In Illinois, State Criminologist Herman M. 
Adler’s discovery that the proportion of less intelligent persons within the prison system was 
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comparable to that within the general population underscored this point.535 Still, Burgess found a 
slight correlation between intelligence level and parole outcome, indicating that persons of 
superior and very superior intelligence exhibited higher rates of violation, on average, than 
prisoners of inferior mentality in certain institutional populations. He concluded that men 
exhibiting “inferior” intelligence should not be barred from parole and institutionalized 
permanently, as backers of House Bill No. 655 might have suggested over a decade earlier.  
It is somewhat surprising that Burgess should include intelligence ratings as a plausible 
factor within his prediction models, however, as his findings for Joliet did not match those for 
Pontiac and Menard.536 
Thus, his general findings 
are only partially reflected 
in a prediction table drawn 
up for Joliet, the largest of 
the three state institutions. 
Persons with “low average” or “average” intelligence are given unfavorable marks. By contrast, 
a Pontiac prediction table would assign unfavorable marks to young men of “inferior,” “low 
average,” and “superior” intelligence. Burgess’s careful coverage of the topic in the committee’s 
report to Clabaugh suggest that he may have incorporated this data as a corrective to the common 
association of “inferior mentality” with criminality. He cited Adler’s study alongside data mental 
health officer Dr. David P. Phillips collected and compiled from Illinois prisons in 1921, noting 
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that Phillips’s work exposed the “marked influence” of intelligence ratings on parole board 
decisions in the state. Phillips’s statistics indicated that inferior intelligence constituted a barrier 
to release on parole, though they were not associated with recidivism.537  
Though research on connections between measured intelligence and crime remained 
confused throughout the 1930s, Illinois sociologist-actuaries at Pontiac, Menard, and Joliet 
continued to include Army Alpha test scores in the actuarial predictions they sent to the parole 
board. A prevailing consensus emerged among professionals who administered intelligence 
tests—despite a proliferation of studies with differing conclusions—that antisocial behavior and 
low scores on intelligence tests were highly correlated. Indeed, the Illinois mental health officers 
assigned to each corrections facility controlled for misleading test results only among new 
inmates who received low scores on the Army Alpha group examination. Illinois State 
Penitentiary administrators required low-scoring individuals to take individual intelligence 
examinations, generally Stanford-Binet tests given by prison psychologists. In Illinois, 
contradictory evidence aside, the feeblemindedness theory of deviance remained pervasive.538 
These preconceived notions likely stemmed from the eugenics research that rocketed the 
feeblemindedness explanation for criminal behavior to national acceptance in the United 
States—judges, prosecutors, university researchers, lawmakers, mental health professionals, and 
many others “assumed the theory’s validity and helped propagate it.” Historians now argue that 
this theory remained influential in state institutions long after eugenic explanations of criminal 
behavior fell out of vogue.539 This helps explain why, despite Burgess’s work on 1,000 cases for 
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Pontiac which indicated that prisoners who achieved “superior” scores on the Army Alpha 
examination were poor parole risks, the institution’s sociologist-actuary ignored this finding. By 
1937, sociologist-actuary Thomas G. Hutton considered prisoners with lower-than-average 
scores on the Army Alpha group intelligence test poor parole risks, while he deemed the highest 
scoring men least likely to violate parole.540 
By suggesting a probable correlation between measured intelligence and recidivism 
without drawing concrete conclusions regarding the use of intelligence test scores in predictive 
models, Burgess opened the door for old anxieties connecting feeblemindedness and criminality 
to seep into parole prediction. The ISP’s reliance on the Army Alpha group examination 
continued until at least 1940, as did the assumption that “prisoners of superior intelligence are 
more likely to succeed on parole than those of dull or defective intelligence.”541 Moreover, after 
1933 intelligence test scores and psychiatric tests often informed the classification and 
subsequent institutional assignment of each new prisoner to Pontiac, Stateville, Menard, or that 
prison of prisons for men considered unlikely to reform, Old Joliet. The association of 
feeblemindedness and criminality alongside a growing impetus to use psychometric scores as a 
guide to hierarchical division within state institutions likely proved detrimental to working-class 
prisoners and men of color who sought release on parole.542  
 
540 Hutton, “Factors,” in Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Box 9, Folder 3, SCRC-UCL. Either Hutton conducted his 
own statistical research which indicated that men who scored D and E on the Alpha test were more likely to become 
recidivists or he bought into older stereotypes linking intelligence and crime. 
541 Paul L. Schroeder, “Division of the Criminologist, including the Institute for Juvenile Research,” in Twenty Third 
Annual Report of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1940), 711. In 1939, the 
ISP used Elsie Oschrin Bregman’s revision of the Army Alpha test, an adaption of the exam designed for the general 
population. Bregman’s revision removed exam questions considered inappropriate for individuals not connected 
with the army, though apparently it was still quite similar to the Army’s version. Psyche Cattell, “Intelligence 
Tests,” Review of Educational Research 8, no. 3 (June 1938), 225. For non-English-speaking and illiterate prisoners, 
ISP first used the Army Beta test and the Army Performance Scale, before replacing these examinations with the 
Chicago Non-Verbal Test and the Arthur Performance Scale.  
542 Historian Paula S. Fass argues that intelligence tests “provided Americans with a powerful organizing principle… 
a means for solving pressing institutional [problems]” like the classification and segregation of prisoners within the 




The history of intelligence testing is inextricably intertwined with racist science, and 
many of the intelligence-measurement instruments of the 1920s and 1930s reflect this 
background. IQ tests gauged the socio-economic advantages and cultural background of each 
subject rather than his or her “innate intelligence,” giving an edge to the white, wealthy, and 
well-educated. As such, the Army Alpha and Stanford-Binet IQ tests employed by ISP mental 
health officers to identify mental defectives further institutionalized advantages for white, 
American-born men within the prison system.543 I will briefly discuss the Army Alpha test and 
its implications for men incarcerated in the ISP here, as all Illinois prisoners sat for the 
examination upon admission. The Army Alpha group test was first devised for use during World 
War I. Test developers Robert M. Yerkes and Louis Madison Terman pressed their research on 
the Army, testing over 1.75 million recruits to illustrate the “value of psychology in the 
management of human resources.” They hoped educational institutions, policymakers, and 
 
51. There are many examples of mental testing within institutional settings in Illinois during the 1920s and 1930s. 
The Illinois State Training School at Geneva used intelligence tests to facilitate institutionalization and inform 
treatment plans for delinquent girls. Chicago public schools introduced standardized testing in the 1921-1922 school 
year. In 1925, the district attempted to administer a “classification” test to junior high school students in order to 
group them by ability. Many teachers resisted these efforts, with some fearing that the examination would “track 
students from working-class backgrounds into vocational schools” rather than high schools with stronger academic 
programs. Due to backlash from Chicago teachers, “the actual use of the tests remained uneven at best.” See 
Michael A. Rembis, “‘I Ain’t Been Reading While on Parole’: Experts, Mental Tests, and Eugenic Commitment 
Law in Illinois, 1890-1940,” History of Psychology 7, no. 3 (2004), 225-247 and Ann Marie Ryan, “From child 
study to efficiency: district administrators and the use of testing in Chicago Public Schools, 1899 to 1928,” 
Paedagogica Historica 47, no. 3 (June 2011), 354.  
543 ISP mental health officers only administered individual Stanford-Binet IQ tests to prisoners unable to adequately 
complete the Army Alpha test due to poor vision or hearing, illiteracy, insufficient fluency in English, or disability. 
Paul L. Schroeder, “The Criminologist and Institute for Juvenile Research,” in Annual Reports of the Department of 
Public Welfare, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1935), 213. 
Stanford-Binet test developer Louis Madison Terman’s personal views reflected the eugenic thought widespread 
among white academics before the 1930s. He often argued that intelligence and racial origin were linked without 
any evidence to support this assertion, allowing these views to seep into his research methodology when creating the 
Stanford-Binet test. Persons included in his norming samples “were almost exclusively white, urban, and middle-
class.” Moreover, the classist and racist professional hierarchy of Terman’s time shaped his IQ test, as his method 
for developing questions was “based on presumed progressive difficulty in performing tasks which he believed were 
necessary for achievement in ascending the hierarchical occupational structure.” Wilma Villae, “‘Termanal’ 
science? The work of Louis Terman revisited,” Roeper Review 17 No. 1 (Sept. 1994), 32-39; C.J. Karier as quoted 
in Wayne Au, “Hiding behind high-stakes testing: Meritocracy, objectivity, and inequality in U.S. education,” 




businesses would put this new technology to use after the end of the war. Yerkes and Terman 
conceived of the Army Alpha, and intelligence testing more generally, as a way to mitigate 
constraints placed on each individual by his race, ethnicity, or class background, but did not 
expect to find many geniuses among the masses. Indeed, though the test in theory “reconciled 
equality of opportunity with inequality,” the researchers’ biased test questions and interpretation 
of the statistical results from military recruits further naturalized classist and racist hierarchies.544  
 Army Alpha and Beta tests featured questions that privileged American-born and better-
educated recruits, and later, prisoners. To answer them correctly, the examinee needed a certain 
level of sociocultural knowledge that “immigrants, blacks, or the poor might not have by virtue 
of their status alone.”545 The Alpha examination consisted of eight timed sections, most 
dependent on an individual’s level of education, including a section on arithmetic and another 
evaluating the examinee’s ability to identify synonyms and antonyms. For each test question 
answered correctly, new prisoners earned one point towards their final score. Sections with a 
greater number of questions thus carried more weight in the final test score. Three sections of the 
examination were weighted more heavily than the rest: those which asked the examinee to 
 
544 James Reed, “Robert M. Yerkes and the Mental Testing Movement,” Psychological Testing and American 
Society, 1890-1930 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 76-77; Wade E. Pickren, “Liberating 
History: The Context of the Challenge of Psychologists of Color to American Psychology,” Cultural Diversity and 
Ethnic Minority Psychology 15 No. 4 (Oct., 2009): 427; Au, “Hiding behind high-stakes testing,” 8-9. It is important 
to indicate here that while the military’s intent for the Army Alpha was to assess suitability for service in the armed 
forces, test developers focused on Alpha scores’ correlations with Stanford-Binet scores. The Stanford Binet test 
was widely accepted by civilian psychologists. Using it as a basis for determining the efficacy of the Alpha test 
ensured that the Alpha would be readily accepted among psychology professionals. Though this patterning of an 
intelligence test designed for the military on a civilian assessment may be unrelated to Alpha’s use, scholars now 
note that the use of Alpha and Beta test scores were mixed. Some officials ignored the scores, while others tried to 
assemble units of men with a diverse range of scores so no unit would contain a majority of recruits with high or low 
scores. See Russell T. Warne, Jared Z. Burton, Aisa Gibbons, and Daniel A. Melendez, “Stephen Jay Gould’s 
Analysis of the Army Beta Test in The Mismeasure of Man: Distortions and Misconceptions Regarding a Pioneering 
Mental Test,” Journal of Intelligence 7 Vol. 1 (February 2019), 4; John Carson, “Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the 
Search for Army Intelligence,” Isis 84 Vol. 2 (June 1993), 296. 
545 George White, Jr. “‘I Am Teaching Some of the Boys:’ Chaplain Robert Boston Dokes and Army Testing of 




identify synonyms and antonyms, complete analogies, and demonstrate the breadth of their so-
called general knowledge. These three sections depended on the examinee’s educational level, 
socio-economic status, and even his personal interests—the test measured, in short, the 
individual’s level of preparation for the test itself. Questions designed to gauge “general 
knowledge” ranged in subject matter from geography and human anatomy to American 
advertising and industry. Yerkes’ argument that the tests “measure native intellectual ability” 
falls flat in the face of many questions in these three portions of the exam. Was John Singer 
Sargent a household name for African Americans and the working class when Yerkes and his 
team composed the Army Alpha examination in 1917? Would recent immigrants know what 
Carrie Chapman Catt was famous for? Would they know where American railroad cars were 
made?546   
 Despite the proliferation of social science scholarship that refuted race-based and 
hereditarian explanations for low scores on intelligence tests by the late 1920s, many white 
psychologists continued to view African Americans and Mexican Americans as intellectually 
inferior. Indeed, in an explanation of classification procedures, ISP Criminologist Paul Schroeder 
used “the case of Richard Roe, a 30-year-old Negro” to illustrate the assignment of “mental 
defectives” to Menard. Schroeder wrote that the downstate, rural prison for first offenders over 
twenty-one years of age, with its “slower tempo of life,” would fit this man’s “suggestibility and 
 
546 Clarence S. Yoakum and Robert M. Yerkes, comp. ed., Army Mental Tests (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1920), 274-275. My intention here is to trace the implementation of intelligence testing and its and 
potential implications for African American, working-class, and immigrant men within the ISP. For the post-
diagnostic depots ISP of 1933, intelligence testing became another way for sociologists and psychologists to divide 
new prisoners into two groups: those with potential for rehabilitation, and those without. Patrick J. Ryan’s 2011 
article in Paedagogica Historica influences my approach here. Patrick J. Ryan, “‘Young Rebels Flee Psychology’: 
individual intelligence, race and foster children in Cleveland, Ohio between the world wars,” Paedagogica 




sluggishness.”547 Similarly, a study of Mexican prisoners at Joliet found that prison psychologists 
considered Mexicans and Mexican Americans slower than average. Though one Mexican 
prisoner with no formal schooling had taught himself to read and write Spanish and a little 
English, the mental health officer’s assessment dismissed these accomplishments, noting instead 
that the man’s “difficulty with language” made it “difficult to get a true estimate” of his 
mentality. The psychologist summed up his assessment at the end of his notes: “Dumb but 
willing.”548 Assessments like this reflect the common white American view of Mexican people—
that they were unassimilable and intellectually inferior to whites.549    
Deviant Personalities: Egocentric, Inadequate, and Unstable in the Illinois State Pen 
Personality classifications within the prison records interested Burgess far more than 
intelligence test scores, as he dismissed “inferior mentality” and moved toward “the study of the 
personality of the individual offender” as a cause of crime.550 The recognizable utility of mental 
health classification and diagnosis within the prison system followed a twentieth-century 
expansion in psychiatric expertise. As historian Elizabeth Lunbeck argues, the three decades 
between 1900 and 1930 witnessed the transformation of American psychiatry, with practitioners 
moving outside of the asylum and the realm of insanity to establish “a psychiatry of the prosaic 
and routine.” It was this era’s psychiatry, a discipline Elmer E. Southard predicted would “aid 
the common man and woman to deeper, practical insights,” that Burgess eagerly hailed as key to 
 
547 Paul L. Schroeder, “Division of the Criminologist, including the Institute for Juvenile Research,” in Annual 
Report of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare, Twenty Third (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1940), 730. Roe 
arrived at Menard with the following classification attached to his file: “mental defectiveness; doubtfully 
improvable; inadequate personality; alcoholic tendency.” 
548 Warnshuis, “Mexicans in Illinois,” 320. 
549 René Luis Alvarez, “Minority Education in the Urban Midwest: Culture, Identity, and Mexican Americans in 
Chicago, 1910-1977” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2008), Chapter 3. See especially Alvarez’s discussion 
of educational psychology and Mexican American students, 100-105. 




new insights into the causes of criminality.551 Psychiatrists abandoned rigid demarcations 
between sanity and insanity. They promised to detect potentially dangerous mental defects in 
seemingly normal individuals, and in doing so embraced a continuum between those they 
perceived as abnormal and the normal. The rise of “personality” in psychiatric thought fits neatly 
within this shift towards a “science of the whole person and his or her fit to the environment.”552 
For the social scientists and clinical practitioners who deployed personality as a category of 
analysis, it comprised the individual as a product of “personal experiences, specific cultural 
milieu, and biological inheritance.”553  
As much cultural capital as psychiatry and the study of personality accrued in the United 
States during the interwar period, the professional study of each inmate’s personality within 
Illinois prisons was limited in the 1920s.554 Dr. Martin, the mental health officer retained at 
Joliet, told Dean Harno that he mostly met with prisoners during the intake process and again if 
they proved “troublesome.” He did not seem to have control over which men he saw clinically 
and when, likely giving him little insight into their personalities.555 Though Burgess enjoyed 
access to notes from initial psychiatric interviews conducted during intake, mental health 
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of Chicago, 2009), 11.  
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professionals were largely sidelined within the prison and often able to make only cursory 
observations, meaning that classifications of each prisoner’s personality type seemed tentative to 
the researchers. Martin and his colleagues could slot prisoners into one of three categories: 
“egocentric,” “socially inadequate,” or “emotionally unstable.” The limited diagnostic ability of 
the mental health professionals at Joliet, Pontiac, and Menard led to reliance on these three 
umbrella terms, along with a diagnosis indicating normalcy, “no gross personality defect.”556 
While Burgess associated only “egocentric” personality types with recidivism, men deemed 
“socially inadequate” or “emotionally unstable” likely received an unfavorable psychiatric 
prognosis, a mark against them in the prediction schema. The sociologist did not define the three 
diagnostic categories indicating psychiatric abnormality, but his classification terms were the 
same as those used by mental health personnel in Illinois correctional facilities.557 To better 
understand these classifications and the tendency of contemporary psychiatrists to pathologize 
what they saw as racial and class deficiencies, I turn to recent work in the history of psychiatry 
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and to a small collection of individual case summaries from Burgess’s parole study. These 
“parole study sheets,” tucked away in Burgess’s academic archive, often contain psychiatric 
diagnoses or the prison mental health officer’s summarized assessment of the prisoner in 
question.  
In the early twentieth century, eugenicists, mental health professionals, and social 
welfarists used the term “socially inadequate,” weighing it down with multiple definitions. 
Though these burgeoning professional groups employed the term for different purposes, all 
understood that persons deemed socially inadequate lacked self-sufficiency and economic 
stability. Those in this category were so dependent on others that they could not contribute to 
their communities or perform their duties as citizens. Psychiatrist William Alanson White, an 
early supporter of Freud and superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C., gave 
the term psychological weight in a 1917 work, The Principles of Mental Hygiene. He defined 
“the socially inadequate as ‘people who fall short in their make-up of these qualities which make 
it possible for them to react in a way which is satisfying or acceptable to the standards of society 
of which they form a part.’” Social inadequacy was not the first term used to pathologize the 
poor and marginalized in American society. Criminologist Lizzie Seal notes that the “dependent, 
defective, and delinquent” classes researched by Burgess’s disciplinary forefathers in the late 
nineteenth century were “a conceptual forerunner of the socially inadequate.” 558  
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Psychiatrists likely mobilized White’s definition of social inadequacy as a diagnosis for 
people of color and the poor confined within Illinois prisons and other carceral spaces, though 
they did continue to use the older designation, “defective,” alongside it in the 1920s. African 
American prisoner Charles Williams’s case helps us parse the diagnostic process that shunted 
poor and nonwhite prisoners towards abnormal psychiatric diagnoses and unfavorable 
recommendations from the institutions’ mental health officers. Williams’s crime was 
straightforward and seemingly committed out of desperation. While traveling through Venice in 
search of work in 1924, Williams caught a chill. He stepped into the vestibule of a church filled 
with parishioners and stole an overcoat worth twenty-five dollars “because I needed one and 
didn’t have one.” The authorities swiftly apprehended him, he plead guilty to grand larceny, and 
arrived at Southern Illinois Penitentiary on a sentence of 1-10 years. There, the mental health 
officer’s interview questions exposed Williams’s lengthy criminal record. After administering an 
intelligence test, the officer concluded that Williams had “the mind of a child about eight years 
old.” The psychiatrist seemed baffled when noting that the young man, whom he characterized as 
a “vagabond” with physical and mental health problems, related the “story of his life with 
apparent satisfaction and pride.” In recommendations to the parole board, the mental health 
officer classified Williams as “a mental defective.” He also noted Williams’ seeming 
dependency on state institutions and indicated that he would be “unable to keep out of trouble 
without supervision.”559 Williams’ numerous prison terms, his mental rating as assessed by the 
institution’s psychiatrist, and blindness in his right eye all would have placed him among the 
ranks of the socially inadequate for Burgess as he recorded personality ratings for each case. 
 
psychological and social welfarist usages of the term continued, and “social adequacy” was commonly defined “in 
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While Burgess’s statistics indicated that the socially inadequate were comparatively unlikely to 
break parole, labeling a prisoner with this term or the older terms related to it might result in the 
“unfavorable” psychiatric prognosis associated with return to the penitentiary. The Mental 
Health Officer rendered this very assessment in Williams’s case. 
Situating Charles Williams’s story within the milieu of interwar psychiatric thought both 
contextualizes the Mental Health Officer’s prognosis and exposes the racist assumptions 
undergirding it. Recent historiography has further revealed how ideas about racial difference 
circulated among practicing mind scientists in the first half of the twentieth century. In this 
literature, historians attend to the evolution of ideas about race within psychiatric thought and 
explore how this translated into practice in the institutional setting, exploring the lived 
experience of African American mental patients.560 Mobilizing this literature can help us 
understand the probable intellectual background of psychiatrists within the Illinois prison system 
and the potential consequences of racialized psychiatric thought as applied to the diagnoses of 
black prisoners.  
The institutional psychiatrists who examined Williams and other African American men 
in the 1920s likely thought about race as “though it were an essence or constitution, with each 
racial type understood as possessing a unique emotional make-up as an essential part of 
biological inheritance.” If they subscribed to and read professional journals of the period, the 
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articles within would have supported this view of race as well as the assumption of black 
inferiority. Most professional psychiatrists believed that bodies of color were less evolved than 
white bodies, and from this hypothesis surmised that black bodies produced inferior minds that 
were “more childish, animalistic, and less developed” than white minds.561 Indeed, historian 
Martin Summers points out that “the American psychiatric profession”—in talks, in papers, at 
conferences, and in clinical practice—considered “the white psyche as the norm.” Because they 
believed in a fundamental difference between African Americans and whites, psychiatrists 
therefore conceived of the black psyche as “alien and fundamentally abnormal.”562 This likely 
meant that Mental Health Officers either knowingly or unknowingly looked for signs of mental 
inferiority and psychological maladjustment in each black man admitted to an Illinois prison.  
Prisoners who revealed impoverished upbringings or mentioned economic insecurity 
might also risk an unfavorable psychiatric prognosis, especially once the ISP implemented the 
Burgess system in the mid-1930s. During the Depression, social and mind scientists studying 
poverty began to describe the problem in terms of lower-class behavior and culture. This concept 
of lower-class culture gained traction and took on “psychological overtones” by the mid-1930s, 
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as social scientists began to explain psychological disorder as a result of the social disadvantages 
of lower-class family life. The violence and instability of poor families, some argued, shaped a 
distinctive “lower-class personality type.” Mental health professionals believed that lower-class 
child thus tended towards risky behavior, “superstition, aggression, and sexual promiscuity.”563 
When this child reached adulthood, he would remain in poverty because he did not possess the 
personality traits necessary for economic success and upward social mobility. Furthermore, as 
John Landesco’s research notes indicate, some environmentalists hypothesized that the very 
living conditions that characterized poor urban communities could provoke the sudden outbursts 
of violence indicative of emotional instability.564 
Burgess eluded to this lower-class explanation in his notes and the psychiatric 
recommendations featured in the case of a second Charles Williams included in the collection of 
parole study sheets. This Williams, a white American-born man who worked as a painter and 
shoemaker, was sentenced to Joliet for 25 years for killing his wife.565 The characteristics of this 
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crime are central to the psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis. Williams’s parole hearing transcript, 
the State’s Attorney’s statement, and a letter from his brother Benjamin Williams offer a fairly 
clear account of his offense. According to the State’s Attorney, C. Williams’ wife entered the 
home where she lived with Charles and Benjamin Williams at eleven in the evening. Williams 
recalled his wife coming home drunk and raising a racket trying to get inside the apartment. The 
dwelling was dark and we have only Williams’s account of what happened next. Once she made 
it inside, she injured her hand on their stove and became enraged. Williams remembered her next 
knocking him over with a heavy “stove hearth,” or perhaps a fire poker, as Benjamin Williams 
later remembered. Either way, Charles Williams fell and found himself trapped on the floor 
between the stove and a table. He told the parole board that his wife threatened him as he lay on 
the ground, saying “‘I will kill you’ and a lot of other things [profanities] I don’t want to mention 
here.” Desperate, according to his account, Williams drew out his pocket knife and “cut her three 
times.” Witnesses in the street outside and in the apartment below the Williamses told the State’s 
Attorney that they heard sounds of a violent struggle. Soon, Williams’s wife came outside and 
stumbled into the street, dying from her wounds.566  
As Burgess read through C. Williams’s institutional jacket file, he seized on a cultural 
explanation to both make sense of Williams’s violent act and cast doubt on his ability to succeed 
on parole given his “past record and the murder of his wife.” Williams and his spouse, the 
sociologist wrote, were “of low cultural level” and had histories of “disorderly, intoxicated, and 
 
institutional jacket file, reviewed the results of his Army Alpha test, and conducted a face-to-face interview with the 
prisoner himself. This psychiatric interview offered Williams “his first opportunity to discuss at length the crime for 
which he has been committed and his motives in committing it.” Herman M. Adler, “Division of Criminology,” in 
Eleventh Annual Report of the Department of Public Welfare, July 1, 1927 to June 30, 1928 (Springfield: State of 
Illinois, 1928), 26. 
566 “Statement of State’s Atty,” “Hearing- Rhoades,” and Benjamin F. Williams to Hinton G. Clabaugh, December 
20, 1926, all included in Parole Study Sheet for Charles Williams, #5627, in Ernest Watson Burgess Papers Box 34, 




criminal behavior.” Burgess’s short notes imply that he considered the Williamses cultural 
background the root of their propensity for violence. Because of their “low cultural level,” the 
couple lacked the “self control” necessary to resolve their arguments without engaging in 
physical altercations.567 The psychiatrist who evaluated Williams, likely Dr. Martin, held a 
slightly better opinion of the prisoner, recalling a pleasant psychiatric interview. He wrote in his 
recommendation to the Parole Board that the 47-year-old man answered questions readily and 
displayed a good attitude. Still, part of Martin’s diagnosis incorporates language pointing to 
Williams’s class status. Martin referenced both the prisoner’s criminal history and his 
employment history when he noted that Williams had encountered “several previous difficulties 
in civil life.” These “difficulties” included the time Williams spent in prison and the workhouse, 
as well as his apparent inability to find legal employment—Joliet was unable to find evidence of 
Williams ever holding a job. This history indicated to Martin that Williams was unable to handle 
the stressors present in his life, and that these stressors triggered adverse emotional reactions: his 
impulsive and aggressive tendencies. Martin seemed to believe that these emotional reactions 
were connected both to Williams’s crime and to his difficulties “in adjusting properly [to his 
social environment] prior to this offense.”568 He diagnosed C. Williams with emotional 
instability.569 
 
567 Parole Study Sheet for Charles Williams, #5627, in Ernest Watson Burgess Papers Box 34, Folder 8, SCRC-
UCL.  
568 “Psychiatric,” in ibid. Though Martin’s final diagnosis did not classify C. Williams as a socially inadequate 
individual despite these markers, it is reasonable to infer that in this case the personality rating that matched his 
previous crimes took precedence over the one that defined his social condition. Williams served two terms in the 
Southern Illinois Penitentiary for robbery and assault before murdering his wife.  
569 Ibid. To make this diagnosis, the psychiatrist deemed C. Williams unable to respond rationally to emotional 
stimuli. Dr. Martin probably thought that the man had sabotaged himself in his work life and personal life by 
exhibiting “excessive emotional reactions” and making impulsive, violent decisions when faced with stress or 
conflict. This diagnosis also fits closely the State’s Attorney’s characterization of Williams’s crime. The prosecutor 
argued that evidence and witness testimony showed that Williams killed his wife in a jealous rage when she arrived 




The psychiatrist’s assessment drew on “the maladjustment model of mental health,” a 
diagnostic framework promoted in the mental hygiene movement and focused on the inability of 
a person to adapt to their social surroundings.570 State Criminologist Herman M. Adler was an 
early adopter of this model, which often gauged an individual’s level of “adjustment” by 
examining his economic success or failure. Psychiatric and social work practitioners considered 
a man’s ability to secure and hold down a steady job central to proper adjustment. In doing so, 
they tied personality classifications to employment and pushed un- and under-employed 
working-class men like C. Williams into deviant categories. An article Adler wrote while on 
faculty at Harvard Medical School, shortly before his appointment to the State Criminologist role 
in Illinois, may lend insight into the personality categories and their connections to class status. 
By investigating a group of 100 male patients at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital who 
experienced chronic un- or under-employment, Adler hoped to “help pave the way to an 
understanding of the kind of individual who is likely to get into economic difficulties” and how 
best to address these deviant personality types.571 He identified three personality types among 
men with difficulty holding down a job: the same three later used to sort men who deviated from 
the “normal” in Illinois prisons, albeit with slightly different names. Each patient was deemed a 
“paranoid [egocentric] personality,” an “inadequate personality,” or an “emotionally unstable” 
personality.  
 
570 Joseph M. Gabriel, “Mass Producing the Individual: Mary C. Jarrett, Elmer E. Southard, and the Industrial 
Origins of Psychiatric Social Work,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 79 No. 3 (Fall 2005), 450.  
571 University of California Academic Senate, “Herman Morris Adler, Psychiatry and Law: Berkeley,” University of 
California: In Memoriam, 1935-1936, UC History Digital Archives, University Archives, The Bancroft Library, 
University of California at Berkeley. Herman M. Adler, “Unemployment and Personality—A Study of Psychopathic 
Cases,” in Mental Hygiene 1 No. 1 (January 1917), 16. He noted that the men ranged from twenty-five to fifty-five 
years of age and that “only a part” of the sample suffered from identifiable mental diseases, presumably to show that 




In keeping with the focus of his article, Adler’s description of each deviant personality 
type focuses on the aspects likely to cause problems in a work environment. Later ISP 
descriptions reported in 1939 address economic and social adjustment more broadly. In both sets 
of definitions, however, the “normal” personality is only defined in the negative, and is 
presumably an assortment of characteristics allowing a man to hold steady work, exhibit proper 
moral judgment, and succeed in social relationships. This early casting of employment as a 
marker of normalcy, then, suggests that unemployed men were insufficiently “adjusted” to their 
socioeconomic environments. Therefore, they likely exhibited deviant personality traits that 
prevented them from holding jobs. This view obscured broader economic forces, like 
discriminatory hiring practices and seasonal employment, that drove un- and under-employment, 
shifting the blame for chronic joblessness to the “maladjusted” working-class or black prisoner.  
This maladjustment model adopted by Adler and widely accepted in the social and mind 
sciences in the late 1920s and 1930s was more complex and less coherent than the earlier theory 
that criminality was due to mental inferiority. Adler’s “paranoid personality” and Burgess and 
Martin’s “egocentric personality” is perhaps the best example of this and the most difficult of the 
three personality categories to pin down, historically speaking. Burgess himself asserted in a 
1923 article that egocentric behavior could be “empirically recognized by common sense.”572 
Still, when examining both contemporary psychiatric work alongside the diagnostic blurbs 
included in the parole study sheets, we can cobble together a more extensive definition for the 
egocentric personality in the Illinois prison context. By 1929, Illinois prisons apparently 
diagnosed egocentricity at a much higher rate than other American correctional facilities: about 
seventy-five per cent of Illinois prisoners were “diagnosed to be egocentric” while only five per 
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cent of prisoners were “so diagnosed in other states.”573 This likely was due to a difference in 
definition rather than marked differences between incarcerated men in Illinois and incarcerated 
men elsewhere. By 1939, Illinois found that only twenty-nine per cent of its inmates were 
egocentric, demonstrating that this definition likely shifted over the twelve years since Burgess’s 
study.574  
The definition Adler outlined in a 1920 talk given at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology implies a range of severity possible in the personality 
type. While he warned at the beginning of his paper that the traits associated with the egocentric 
personality are “fraught with danger,” he later argues that the egocentric personality “includes 
within it a great diversity of personalities”—some more dangerous than others.575 The common 
characteristics found among this range of personalities united them under the egocentric 
classification. Primarily, the egocentric individual held “a distorted perception of his relation to 
his environment” in which the ego was given “undue weight.” Such individuals were “easily 
offended,” and tended towards cruelty, vanity, selfishness, deceitfulness, and arrogance. They 
were willing to sacrifice others for their own gain. Adler also attributed a certain degree of 
cunning to the egocentric personality, noting that people who exhibited this personality type 
were perceptive—they could read others easily and used information gained to serve their 
manipulative ends.576  
 
573 E.H. Sutherland, “Methodological Significance and Limitations of Specific Statistical Methods,” Social Forces 7, 
No. 4 (June, 1929), 562. 
574 In 1939, the ISP defined egocentrics as “those individuals who are essentially selfish, disagreeable, hard to get 
along with, resistant to control, inclined to be aggressive and to take things into their own hands regardless of the 
rights of others.” In general, the egocentric man would also exhibit anti-social tendencies. Department of Public 
Welfare, Statistical review of prisons, reformatories and correctional schools (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1939), 
35. 
575 Herman M. Adler, “The Criminologist and the Courts,” Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 11 No. 3 (1920), 419-420. Adler’s introduction of levels of severity within the diagnosis may also help 
account for the disproportionate number of egocentric personalities identified among Illinois prisoners.  




Like Martin’s diagnoses of social inadequacy and emotional instability, his identification 
of men with egocentric personalities focused on the psychiatrist’s estimation of whether the 
degree of abnormality would present difficulties for the individual in civil life. Martin found no 
fault with egocentricity as long as the trait did not pose an impediment to economic and social 
success. The psychiatrist seemed to believe that personality traits could not be considered 
abnormal when they applied to the exceptions in the prison population—the high school 
graduates, the successful businessmen who, in Martin’s view, could leverage egocentric traits to 
their advantage. In a note to the parole board outlining his assessment of egg broker Henry 
Yepsen, Martin seemed impressed by Yepsen’s resume. He described the convicted forger as “a 
man of superior intelligence with a high school education who has been in business for himself 
for several years” and mentioned Yepsen’s membership in “several masonic orders.” His 
egocentricity, far from being an impediment, had helped him succeed in business. Martin found 
no “gross personality defect” lurking in Yepsen’s psyche, but instead found him “sufficiently 
egocentric to be successful in business.”577 By contrast, the psychiatrist attributed bricklayer 
John McCullough’s lengthy criminal record to his egocentricity. McCullough’s criminal record 
indicated a “difficulty with environment” and “inability to get along properly in civil life,” 
maladjustment suggestive of a defective personality. Though McCullough got along well at 
Joliet, exhibiting a positive attitude and maintaining a spotless disciplinary record, Martin 
remained leery of the man’s ability to stay out of trouble once released on parole. McCullough’s 
“disproportional egoism” would remain unchecked and his wholly average reality would chafe 
against his inflated image of himself.578  
 
577 W.B. Martin, “Psychiatric,” in Parole Study Sheet for Henry Yepsen, Joliet #94, in Ernest Watson Burgess 
Papers Box 34, Folder 8, SCRC-UCL. See chapter 3 for further analysis of Yepsen’s case. 
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In Adler’s estimation and in the ISP descriptions published two decades later, these three 
types of deviant personalities were not “absolutely fixed and permanent.” They could be 
“adjusted,” perhaps inching towards normalcy as watered-down versions of themselves. 
Associating each individual with a personality type would allow prisons and in-patient asylums 
to quickly identify a course of treatment or recommendations for supervision in parole cases. 
Before this corrective education took place, extreme features of these personality types could 
prevent a man on parole from “adjusting” to civil life—holding a steady job, supporting his 
family, avoiding alcohol, and obeying the law. For instance, Martin would have identified traits 
in C. Williams’s case that he believed prevented the prisoner from adequately adapting to the 
demands of the workplace and the emotional trials of domestic living.579 Still, Martin would have 
believed that nearly all men who fell under the deviant personality categories used by the prison 
could be pushed towards normalcy with proper management. C. Williams’s spotless prison 
record perhaps indicated for the psychiatrist that the institution’s brand of “corrective education” 
was working. However, the question for Martin and for the parole board remained: could C. 
Williams break from his past and succeed on parole? 
Other ISP mental health professionals perhaps linked poverty to mental abnormality 
without drawing on the “lower-class culture” explanations Burgess hinted at, instead keeping 
broader contemporary forces in mind while evaluating prisoners. These practitioners could rely 
on Depression-era theories about the psychological effects of widespread economic instability to 
inform their diagnoses. Many knowledge-producers and cultural commentators worried more 
 
579 The mental health officer’s notes indicate that he did not believe that C. Williams’s “emotional instability” 
defined him, perhaps partly because the man navigated prison life easily. He kept out of trouble at Joliet, where he 
knew the rules, “responded well under disciplinary treatment,” and maintained a spotless record. Instead, Martin 
wrote that C. Williams committed his crime “during a definite emotional period” and that he “displayed… rather 
hasty judgment during a stressful” time. This euphemistic description—of a “rather hasty” decision to commit 
murder—indicated that C. Williams reacted impulsively and violently to situational triggers. It was followed by 




about apathy than aggression or emotional instability in the 1930s—arguing that that growing 
unemployment and despair over the collapse of the economy had shattered the “morale” of the 
lower classes. They expressed concerns about the psychological condition of unemployed 
working-class individuals and their families. Observers fretted over the seeming indifference of 
jobless young people unable to enter the workforce and the potential suicidal ideations of their 
unemployed elders. Social workers began to identify a “psychology of relief” among their 
clients, a potentially destructive force that could dissolve the national work ethic. Historian 
James Patterson notes that these observations revealed “a widespread anxiety that the Depression 
would ultimately destroy initiative, the essence of the American dream.”580 Still, proponents of 
these ideas would later turn from structural and situational rationales to cultural explanations for 
poverty and its ills. Depression and New Deal-era anxieties about “morale” and the “psychology 
of relief” among the unemployed marked the beginnings of an interdisciplinary dialogue 
regarding the “culture of poverty” that would tear through the social sciences in the 1940s.  
The range of personality classification terms used by mental health professionals in 
Illinois correctional facilities expanded in the 1930s, eventually including fifteen distinct 
personality types. Terms listed in a 1937 list of personality ratings used by the ISP show not only 
the move away from umbrella terminology, but also the substitution of psychiatric conditions for 
personality types, including “psychoneurosis,” “epileptic,” and “dementia-praecox.”581 This 
latter category, especially, became explicitly linked to race and would have been 
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Several years after the adoption of the Burgess method, Illinois’s prison sociologists had 
institutional data that indicated that their prediction tables accurately anticipated parole outcome. 
By this point, sociologist-actuaries had also added a racial and ethnic category to the factors used 
to compile each man’s risk score. These factors were just another piece of a prediction score 
already stacked against prisoners of color—an explicit and deeply controversial component 
which would move in and out of actuarial forecasting in criminal justice later in the twentieth 
century. As this chapter argued, the racism that permeated each level of the criminal justice 
system and shaped everyday life in Illinois for people of color negatively affected their risk 
scores for many of the other predictive categories. As we will see in Chapter 5, the revised 
versions of Burgess’s method implemented within the Illinois State Penitentiary system relied 
even more heavily on the factors that reproduced the race and class discrimination present in the 
parole system since its nineteenth century beginnings. Revisions of the Burgess method thus 
continued the trend of earlier release of white, relatively economically fortunate, and well-
connected prisoners—exactly the same men who benefitted from the parole board’s original 
qualitative and hunch-based decision-making process. As criminal profiling developed based on 
the success of the prognostic scoring in Illinois, it would emphasize one feature of the Burgess 
method that marked these white, affluent men as “better” parole risks: using past delinquency to 






“Don’t Turn ‘Em Loose”: Prison, Publicity, and Parole in an Age of Carceral 
Expansion 
Public fascination with “thrill-killer” Nathan F. Leopold sold newspapers. First, it was his 
glasses. The mottled, dark-brown plastic frames lay on a railroad embankment, just a few feet 
from the poorly-concealed and lifeless body of thirteen-year-old Bobby Franks. The spectacles 
made it into the earliest stories about the Franks case, as the “single clew [sic]” found near the 
boy’s prone form. An already sensational case—Franks was the son of a Chicago millionaire—
made headlines nationwide when police traced the glasses back to Nathan F. Leopold, Jr. Only 
nineteen and from a family as wealthy as the Franks, Leopold was a law student at the University 
of Chicago. He and his friend, Richard Loeb, were perhaps the last people the Chicago police 
might initially have suspected of kidnapping young Franks for ransom, and later killing him. But 
soon after police apprehended Leopold and seized his typewriter to compare its keystrokes to the 
ransom note, the two young men separately confessed to the shocking crime they had committed 
together.583 People across the nation read their confessions in the paper and felt a combination of 
horror and fascination. Why would two wealthy, intelligent young men do such a thing?  
 The two killers dominated the news cycle for months, one golden and handsome, the 
other dark and brooding. As the question of a motive lingered, the papers and the public came up 
with their own explanations for the crime. For some, it was a thrill-killing, done for adventure. 
Others thought the murder was some sort of twisted experiment, committed in a search for 
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knowledge of death. Many believed the motive was sexual.584 The case resonated with 
Americans, and even when “Dickie” and “Babe” were safely behind bars, they still managed to 
make local and national headlines. One frequent subject of articles was their treatment in prison. 
Public fascination with this topic would once again bring parole to Illinois citizens’ attention.  
Nothing aroused public ire quite like the thought of Leopold and Loeb receiving 
privileges in prison. Americans wanted to know that the convicted killers were “getting their 
punishment,” and papers across the country reported even small changes in each man’s 
routine.585 In 1935, Nathan F. Leopold’s prison job made the news. Leopold was one of eight 
prisoners working with Joliet-Stateville’s sociologist-actuary, Ferris Finley Laune, on a new 
system for parole prediction. Legislators were shocked. “Why should any murderer have the 
slightest degree of judgment over his fellow convicts? This is another reason why I intend to 
introduce a bill in the next session, if I am re-elected, to abolish the state parole board,” the state 
representative for Libertyville snapped, when asked about Leopold’s research. State 
assemblymen fell over each other to condemn Laune for his poor judgement. The Associated 
Press delivered a scathing indictment of Leopold’s “latest experiment—a parole forecasting 
system which rates him as a good risk for freedom.”586 Because of the young prisoner’s 
involvement in Laune’s work, parole prediction made news for the first time since 1933. 
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Laune’s experiment, Leopold’s work for the sociologist-actuary, and the newspaper 
commentary that followed reveal several trends within the Illinois state parole system that 
shaped prisoners’ lives in the 1930s and early 1940s. The first two trends represent a 
continuation of earlier patterns identifiable in the work of the parole board from its beginnings. 
First, Laune’s choice to use Leopold and Richard Loeb’s “hunches” about their fellow prisoners 
as the foundation for his parole prediction method continued an earlier, very visible trend within 
parole decision-making processes. As former sociologist-actuary Courtlandt C. Van Vechten 
observed in a 1958 letter to Leopold, “the experts typically represent upper middle class morality 
and idealoogy [sic],” and reform within the prison system bound prisoners to expectations 
defined by these views.587 Even when basing his research on prisoners’ opinions about their 
fellow convicts, Professor Laune chose the two least typical men in the prison—well-educated 
sons of millionaires—to aid in his work.  
Second, newspaper coverage of the Illinois parole system greatly influenced the parole 
board’s decision-making processes. Sensational crimes committed by paroled men drove much 
of the coverage from 1935 onward, and prompted state legislators to demonstrate their 
commitment to crime control by supporting the Ward-Shnackenberg bill, which would “give trial 
judges the power to fix minimum and maximum sentences” for convicted offenders.588 As 
Burgess observed in a drafted letter to the Tribune, the newspaper seized on debates over the bill 
to advance its own “theory of penology,” which the sociologist considered “antiquated.”589 
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Others, including Chicago Crime Commission Director Henry Barret Chamberlin disagreed, 
charging the Tribune with attempting to “sabotage the system without any alternative system to 
put in its place.” But the paper did indeed have alternatives in mind, along with a conception of 
risk that, while simple, resonated with many politicians eager to fight crime. The “theory” 
advanced on the Tribune’s editorial page amounted to an alternative risk ideology focused 
primarily on the offender’s crime and criminal record. Placing no stock in the “high sounding 
theories of individual and social betterment, [and] premature theories of criminal personality for 
which the authority of science is claimed,” the Tribune rejected the work of the sociologist-
actuaries who guided board decisions and instead argued that trial judges were best positioned to 
assess and evaluate risk.590 With the “details of the crime fresh in his mind and the offender’s 
previous record before him,” the judge could set the appropriate minimum and maximum 
term.591 A man’s crime “was the index to his character” and an indication of “what might happen 
again” in the future should he be released on parole.592 This view proved particularly onerous for 
men confined to the ISP on indeterminate sentences in the late 1930s, as the Tribune and other 
papers throughout the state consistently questioned paroles granted to all but young, nonviolent 
first offenders.   
The third trend, connected to the first two, was the constant push for innovation and 
adaptation of the Burgess system in Illinois. The state hired young white men, generally from 
among Burgess’s students at the University of Chicago, to serve as sociologist-actuaries at Joliet-
Stateville, Menard, and Pontiac. These budding researchers secured their positions in the ISP 
through their connections at the university, a continuation of the preference for the middle-class 
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political appointees and professionalizing administrators who held sway over the state’s parole 
system. This marked a period of carceral-bureaucratic expansion, involving rising prison 
populations, the centralization of corrections institutions, and the ongoing professionalization of 
penology that forged new partnerships between the university social scientists and the state. 
These partnerships, both formal and informal, positioned Illinois as one of the few states with an 
“organization approaching real 
parole administration.”593 As 
prison populations rose, 
Illinois added new layers to the 
bureaucratic management of 
the prison system and worked 
to maintain control over the 
formerly incarcerated men 
they released into the 
community with a new, larger 
corps of rapidly 
professionalizing parole agents. Though state officials may have hoped that the scientization of 
the parole decision-making process could ameliorate overcrowding, the rate of paroles from the 
Illinois State Penitentiary (ISP) never kept pace with the rate of admissions. As shown in Figure 
15, admissions rose but paroles remained stagnant. The number of persons under state control 
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Figure 15 This chart shows the increase in prison population over the ten-year period from 1925 to 
1935 as compared with the parolee population. Note that the number of paroles granted each year 
remains stagnant, as the number of prisoners and parolees increases. Illinois thus maintains 
control over a larger number of persons each year, both because the parole board delays releasing 
most inmates before the expiration of their maximum sentences (plus good time) and because parole 




increased with admissions and with a rising population of parolees after Illinois lengthened the 
minimum supervision period from one year to three. This rapid expansion of the population in 
state custody and the public panics that curtailed paroles ushered in an age of bureaucratic 
development, including increased classification and segregation efforts behind prison walls, 
physical expansion of carceral infrastructure, and greater standardization of release procedures.  
This chapter first explores the research agendas pursued by sociologist-actuaries, and the 
changes they made to the Burgess method, which both expanded and solidified the number of 
predictive factors tied to race and economic status. Sociological evaluation of convicted 
offenders at the diagnostic depots, large-scale intake centers set up at Joliet and Menard in 1933, 
ensured that a lower percentage of prisoners of color moved from the diagnostic center to 
rehabilitation-oriented facilities like Pontiac. The classification work pursued by sociologist-
actuaries cast race and ethnicity-based profiling in an objective light within the criminal justice 
system and negatively affected prisoners of color at each stage of the corrections process—from 
prison admission to supervised release. When sociologist-actuaries installed at Pontiac, Menard, 
and Joliet sent predictive scores to the parole board, they consistently indicated a lower 
probability that black and brown prisoners would succeed on parole relative to white inmates. As 
the predictive system became a part of the institutional fabric, the specific risk ideology 
advanced by Burgess and retained by the sociologist-actuaries who implemented his method 
came to monopolize understandings of risk. Rather than ameliorated or mitigated by the 
institution, risk was instead mostly immutable and embodied by individual prisoners. The factors 
that comprised each prisoner’s actuarial risk score would increasingly define the kinds of 
information parole board members and prison administrators considered valuable when 




society. Still, because parts of the classification process required subjective judgment, individual 
sociologist-actuaries could use their own understandings of risk markers to inform 
categorizations in each case.  
The parole board’s decision-making processes likely were not quite so scientific as the 
sociologists and criminologists working for the Illinois State Penitentiary system might have 
believed, but neither were they entirely “arbitrary,” as historian David Rothman would later 
claim. The second half of the chapter considers incarcerated and formerly incarcerated men’s 
accounts of interactions with the board, revealing that the truth of its processes lay somewhere in 
between the rushed and “capricious” and the exacting, impartial, and scientific ideal touted by 
social scientists.594 Prisoners’ lives were at the mercy of board members and they spent hours 
analyzing accounts of hearings, speculating about board procedures, and trying to get their hands 
on any news that might affect board decisions. Sometimes, the board was irrationally cautious, as 
in 1937 when the number of paroles granted prisoners from Pontiac, Joliet-Stateville, and 
Menard dropped from an all-time high of 2,626 from 1935-1936 to just 492 from 1937 to 
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1938.595 The parole board had grown accustomed to the steady stream of articles detailing the 
criminal exploits of parolees published almost weekly in the Chicago Tribune, but the 1937 
murder of police officer Michael Toth prompted state legislators to introduce a bill that would 
abolish parole in Illinois. Prisoners’ dealings with the board during this tumultuous year reflected 
a system beholden to the headlines and the powerful political actors driven by the Tribune’s wide 
public readership. It is this anomalous period, however, that brings us one of the only extant 
sources detailing prisoners’ understandings and critiques of the parole system. Prisoners 
surveyed by sociologist Donald Rasmussen as part of his masters thesis research in the summer 
months of 1937 and 1938 portray a board mired in politics and swayed by newspaper reporting.  
Though filtered through the sociology student’s survey questions and the 1937 scandal, 
anonymous prisoners’ understanding of the board’s logic (or lack thereof), their strategies for 
navigating the bureaucratic parole system, and their approach to some of the trials that awaited 
them outside prison walls emerge from the thesis. 
Survey responses indicate that men waiting in Stateville’s cells for their chance at a board 
hearing had access to two main sources of information about life on parole: their fellow prisoners 
and a slim volume titled A New Day and How to Make It. This volume reveals that the prison 
relied on Nathan F. Leopold to do more than offer his hunches to Laune for study, manage the 
prison library, and create correspondence courses for inmates who wished to continue their 
studies beyond the eighth-grade level. Though he had been incarcerated for most of his adult life, 
someone tapped Leopold to ghostwrite A New Day and How to Make It, a manual designed to 
prepare prisoners for life on parole. Leopold therefore worked both to refine the parole decision-
 
595 W.C. Jones, “Division of Pardons and Paroles,” Table 1, Twenty-First Annual Report of the Department of 
Public Welfare (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1938), 621. W.C. Jones, “Division of Pardons and Paroles,” 




making process and to define what it meant to “make good” on parole, though he could not have 
been more different than the average prisoner. In writing the guide, Leopold could not draw on 
his own experiences—he had never lived on his own, worked for wages, or supported a family. 
Though this decision seems completely ludicrous on its face, Leopold was actually the perfect 
stand-in for George T. Scully, the Superintendent of Parole Supervision credited with writing the 
manual. In Scully’s eyes, Leopold would be ideally positioned to translate administrative jargon 
into conversational language accessible to the incarcerated men. Leopold could be trusted to 
work for the penal system, to parrot official assessments of the workings of parole, and to 
advocate for the kind of relationship the paroled man should cultivate with state officials. 
Whatever else might be lurking in his mind, Scully probably figured, the man had spent his life 
successfully navigating relationships with authority figures and he could teach these skills to 
others. The cultural capital Leopold leveraged behind bars could not be replicated, but his brand 
of respectability and knack for succeeding within institutional boundaries could serve him well 
in achieving Scully’s ends. The distribution of this manual to all prisoners within the Illinois 
State Penitentiary system meant that Nathan F. Leopold played a part in preparing each 
incarcerated man for his eventual release.  
The final section of this chapter juxtaposes Leopold’s parole preparation manual, a 
representation of the ideal workings of the system, with the diverse array of prisoner experiences 
on parole. This section of the chapter uses qualitative data from Rasmussen’s survey along with 
interviews criminologist Hans W. Mattick conducted with former parolees in the 1950s. As 
sociologist-actuary for the Stateville Branch of the ISP, Mattick conducted research on men 




supervision.596 Mattick’s desire to compare civilian and military parole experiences led him to 
record extensive conversations with men paroled in the late 1930s and early 1940s.  
These discussions reveal yet another transformation resulting from the extensive carceral-
bureaucratic expansion that took place in Illinois during the Depression—an increased number of 
newly professionalized parole agents claimed the supervisory function once allocated to 
employer-supervisors for the state. Indeed, as one agent articulated, the Division of Supervision 
of Parolees hoped to expand its influence within the community even further, so “the theory of 
parole becomes a part of the very structure of the community, whose function is as real as the 
schools, the churches, the factories, and the recreational centers.”597 Men on parole experienced 
increased contact with the state through these rapidly professionalizing agents and through 
increased policing in urban areas. Paroled men’s interactions with their agents, however, expose 
the longevity of the ex-prisoner’s negotiating power—used with great effect by parolee Charles 
Bain in Chapter 1. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, formerly incarcerated men interacted with 
their parole agents face-to-face, as well as through the mail. The outcome of these interactions 
shaped the parole experience, just as the relationship between a paroled man, his employer, and 
the prison warden had a few decades earlier. The leverage parolees had in their negotiations with 
the state’s parole agents, often dependent on the paroled man’s racial and class status, could 
mean the difference between making good and return to the institution.  
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Before the Diagnostic Depots: Clark Tibbitts Amends the Burgess System 
 Clark Tibbitts grew up in Chicago, like many of the ex-prisoners he would meet while 
volunteering for the Central Howard Association (CHA). His childhood experiences, however, 
would have differed from those of the men he encountered at the CHA, and of the young 
offenders he met later, as a statistician for the Institute for Juvenile Research. Tibbitts was raised 
in Mayfair, a quiet, middle-class community of bungalows, where it was “almost an event to see 
a policeman.”598 Parsing the reasons for his interest in crime in a paper written for Ernest W. 
Burgess’s Sociology 373 course, he recalled his closest brush with deviancy as a boy. His cousin, 
given a position of some responsibility in local government, dipped into the county coffers and 
got caught. This cousin fled with the funds, leaving his disgraced family behind. The crime had 
occurred outside Illinois, and Tibbitts’s family kept it quiet, but the cousin was later apprehended 
and incarcerated. For the first time, young Clark realized “what a stigma could be put upon a 
family that had given rise to a criminal,” and the boy learned quickly that he “should never ask 
about” his cousin.599  
 Besides some juvenile discretions of his own—the regular pilfering of candy from a local 
store—Tibbitts’s interest in and contact with crime remained low until after his college 
graduation. While in graduate school at the University of Chicago, he assisted with the study of 
the indeterminate sentence and the parole system conducted by Burgess, Harno, and Bruce. 
During his visits to Pontiac, Joliet, and paroled men over the course of the study, he developed a 
rapport with several parolees. It is clear that Tibbitts thought of these men less as friends and 
more as research subjects. In his paper for Burgess’s course, he wrote: “I enjoy the confidence of 
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these men and can get information of almost any sort relative to their criminal careers, 
incarceration, and parole experiences.”600 Whether due to a genuine interest in these men, an 
investment in the fate of the parole system, the opportunity to publish his findings, or the 
research funding, Tibbitts continued the prediction study where Burgess left off. 
 Actually, he began his work before Burgess, Bruce, and Harno sent the final committee 
report to Clabaugh in August of 1928. Burgess likely encouraged Tibbitts, then his graduate 
student, to start refining the actuarial method immediately in case Clabaugh was interested in 
using prognostic scores. State Criminologist Dr. Herman M. Adler agreed, and the study 
proceeded with support from the Institute for Juvenile Research and the Behavior Research 
Fund. Tibbitts sent the first update on this research to Burgess in June, discussing the addition of 
several new factors to the list and the diligent classification work performed by his team at 
Pontiac: “we are working about ten hours a day now and… by evening we shall have been 
through 225 cases.”601 Despite the promising signs shown by Tibbitts’s work at the reformatory, 
and the two publications that resulted, Pontiac Reformatory did not put his research to use until 
1933. By that point, Tibbitts apparently had received his doctorate and moved on to work for the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration. But Pontiac would continue to use Tibbitts’s revision 
of the Burgess method until 1938.602  
 At the reformatory, Tibbitts classified three thousand cases dating from about January 1, 
1921 to December 31, 1927 under a slightly modified version of the Burgess system in hopes of 
increasing its predictive accuracy. Part of this process involved closer reading. He skimmed 
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institutional jacket files to determine each boy’s criminal type, rather than relying on the face 
sheet’s summary of the individual’s criminal record. In reading the files, Tibbitts came to 
appreciate that Pontiac’s population skewed much younger than Joliet-Stateville’s and Menard’s, 
and made sure to eliminate certain categories that proved irrelevant for the majority of the 
youthful men confined there. Tibbits also made minor changes in the sub-classifications under 
the factor headings. As he wrote to Burgess early in the study, he added “small city industrial-
residential community” to the existing neighborhood classification choices. Finally, he tacked 
four additional factors—alcohol use, parole community, last prison work assignment, and first 
job on parole—onto Burgess’s prediction method and tested their correlation with parole 
outcome.603 Two of these broke the Burgess mold, gesturing towards the prospective parolee’s 
future.  
 Tibbitts quickly dismissed an original Burgess category, “marital status,” and a new 
category, “use of alcohol.” Only a small number of Pontiac prisoners were married. Further, their 
violation rates were neither significantly higher nor lower than those of single men included in 
Tibbitts’s sample of parolees. Inmates had considerable incentive to lie about their use of alcohol 
on written examination sheets provided by the reformatory, especially during Prohibition. 
Tibbitts suspected that each prisoner’s answer to questions about alcohol consumption was 
“more than likely to be colored by what those wiser than himself have told him, as well as by his 
own idea of what will look least bad in his jacket when it is examined by the Parole Board.”604   
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 In the classification process, the budding sociologist took particular care when 
interpreting the records to form impressions of the youths’ criminal and social types. Aware of 
the subjectivity of the categories involved in this particular classification, Tibbitts indicated that 
more than one classification within these factors often seemed a good match for an individual 
boy. He claimed, however, that he was eventually able to settle on the most relevant one for each 
prisoner. To make these classifications, Tibbitts peered into the boys’ personal lives, reading 
letters they received from their relatives and friends, letters from social agencies, and staff 
reports from Pontiac in addition to the materials included in the institutional jacket files. He 
admitted the difficulty of this endeavor, and seemingly doubted some of his own classifications 
despite drawing conclusions in each case. Reflecting on the process of identifying “gangsters,” a 
social type that comprised nearly half of the youthful population studied, Tibbitts writes: “Of 
course, only in a few cases were the records complete with information covering the individual’s 
membership in a formal gang… [but] it was possible to establish the social type in the majority 
of cases, and by means of certain symptoms to classify others accordingly.”605 Though Tibbitts 
found that the young men he classified as “gangsters” were less likely than many to violate 
parole, 46.4% of those he marked “ne’er-do-wells” were sent back to the institution after failure 
on parole. 
 The “ne’er-do-well” category proved just as slippery as the “gangster” group for Tibbitts, 
who failed to adequately define the characteristics of either of these social types—the two most 
common in his study. The graduate student attempted to define the categories by citing examples 
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of cases fitting each classification. One young man Tibbitts classified as a “ne’er-do-well” seems 
more like the “black sheep” of his family instead. This youth, called B in Tibbitts’ study, “came 
from a very respectable family,” though the home was “broken” by his father’s death when he 
was a baby. As a young boy, B was never “in serious trouble” and later entered the army. He 
received a dishonorable discharge from the armed forces, came home, and burglarized several 
wealthy homes in Chicago. Presumably well-to-do themselves, B’s family got him out of court 
with a slap on the wrist. But B violated the terms of his probation and continued criminal 
activity. As a result, Tibbitts observed, “the self-respect of the family was injured and they 
desired to have him confined.” 606  
 Tibbitts never clearly explains why the classification “ne’er-do-well” fits B’s case, but 
from the way he tells the story, it seems that the sociologist observed a pattern of numerous 
criminal offenses, several chances for B to repent and reform, and familial resources allocated to 
aid him in leading a law-abiding life. In spite of these opportunities, perhaps rare for the average 
reformatory inmate, B continued to steal. Perhaps this resistance to change given the chance to 
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Figure 16 List of "social types" used by Tibbitts in his revision of the Burgess method. Two of 
these, "black sheep" and "criminal by accident" are Tibbitts's additions to the original 




do so indicated to Tibbitts that B was set in his criminal ways. Still, this perception does not fit 
with later sociologist-actuary Sam Daykin’s definition of the category, used at Joliet around five 
years after Tibbitts’s study. Daykin defines the “ne’er-do-well” as an “irresponsible fellow who 
ditched school, stayed out late at night, never learned any trade, engaged in petty thievery, rolled 
dice and had a generally bad reputation in the community.”607 As political scientist Bernard 
Harcourt notes in Against Prediction, the “social type” labels generated by Burgess and those 
who built on his method were both extremely subjective and categorized along “strongly moral” 
lines.608 Researchers were aware of the subjective nature of the categories, but perhaps less 
aware of the moralizing tone of their descriptions. Though Illinois sociologist-actuaries, 
including Ferris Laune and Lloyd Ohlin, leveraged critiques of the subjectivity involved in the 
categorization process, they persisted in using the “social type” factor at least into the 1950s.609 
 The category “criminal type,” though constructed in a seemingly straightforward manner 
to separate the recidivist from the first offender, also left room for interpretation.610 Tibbitts used 
Burgess’s original criminal types: “first offenders,” “occasional offenders,” “habitual offenders,” 
and “professional criminals.” Like Tibbitts’s illustrations of social types, Burgess used case 
studies to help define each criminal type. His first offender classification applied to men without 
a criminal record, but was also used for “a few [men] who had been convicted of only one or two 
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minor offenses.”611 The sociologist’s discretion would presumably be used to divide the first 
offenders with minimal criminal histories from the occasional offender who committed several 
crimes in a short period of time. Burgess’s first offender, a young man convinced by a friend to 
participate in a series of stick-ups, is quite similar to his occasional offender, a youth who broke 
into sheds to steal bottles before escalating to riding in stolen automobiles and participating in 
one stick-up job.612  
 The biggest differences between the two former inmates lie in the descriptions given by 
field workers Tibbitts and John Landesco, who interviewed these men when they were out on 
parole. The first offender, the “well-built, good looking” Frank Stitch, is described as “a mere 
lad” who worked regularly but fell prey to temptation during “unsupervised leisure time” and 
“yielded to the call of criminal adventure.”613 Here, Stitch’s armed robberies are dismissed as a 
lark. By contrast, occasional offender Salvatore Vito’s crimes are described as the “beginning of 
[a] stickup career.” Vito also mentioned former nighttime habits that caused interviewer John 
Landesco concern and that were apparently not present in the cases of those classified as first 
offenders, including use of alcohol, casual sex, and a lack of discipline that led him to “run 
around till two or three o’clock in the morning” on a regular basis.614 For Landesco, these 
lifestyle considerations in addition to this man’s minor offenses that stretched over a slightly 
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longer period of time marked this man as an occasional offender rather than a first offender. This 
decision-making process accounts for details outside of the man’s criminal career, and seems 
partly based in his non-criminal leisure choices—activities that are perhaps morally questionable 
to evaluator Landesco.  
  Donald Clemmer struggled with this classification process while working as a 
sociologist-actuary at the Menard Branch of the Illinois State Penitentiary from 1931 to 1934. As 
a student, he found that criminology textbooks lacked a precise definition for “recidivism” and 
that researchers interpreted the term in various ways. For instance, while one might place a 
prisoner with a history of juvenile delinquency who spent a term at a boys’ correctional school in 
the recidivist category, another might dismiss that aspect of a man’s record. Even within the 
Illinois State Penitentiary, Clemmer observed, different members of the professional staff of 
sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists might classify the same man as a first-time offender 
and a recidivist. Clemmer noted that the professional staffers “diagnos[ed] recidivism, not 
according to previous record alone, but largely on the basis of personality make-up,” in keeping 
with Tibbitts’s classification of Frank Stitch.615  
 Though Clemmer’s monograph, The Prison Community, is centered on his time at 
Menard, it is also useful when considering Tibbitts’s inclusion of institutional work assignments 
in his prediction method. Clemmer describes a hierarchy of jobs within the prison. Low-status 
jobs at Menard went to men with punishment records and without influence in the institution. 
Race, too, governed work assignments. Clemmer found that African Americans were generally 
assigned to the most undesirable, physically taxing work in Menard’s quarry.616 At Pontiac, 
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Tibbitts observed a similar hierarchy. In the reformatory, there were over fifty possible work 
assignments for each man. The sociologist sorted these work assignment options into groups 
“according to similarity of responsibility, trust, honor, and required skill” with the aid of a 
Pontiac employee.617 While Tibbitts does not outline the reasoning behind choosing prison work 
assignments as a predictive factor, he might have supposed that certain prison jobs could give 
men an advantage once released from the institution. Pontiac’s barber shop, much praised in 
evaluations of the Illinois State Penitentiary system, acted as a vocational school for about 
seventy of the reformatory’s young inmates at a time. These men had a chance to earn state 
barbering licenses after completing an apprenticeship in the barber shop under the tutelage of a 
civilian instructor.618  
 Barbershop jobs, in addition to clerkships, chauffeur positions, and work in receiving and 
discharge, were highly desirable. Men confined to the reformatory referred to them as “politician 
jobs,” perhaps because of the level of insight and access the positions offered into the inner 
workings of the prison, or because of the influence prisoners asserted with officials to get them. 
Either way, these were groups exhibiting the lowest violation rates at Pontiac, according to 
Tibbitts. Men holding unskilled jobs akin to Menard’s quarry positions, in Pontiac’s furniture 
factory, tailor shop, and print shop exhibited the highest rates of violation. Tibbitts found that a 
process similar to the Menard Branch’s work assignment logic operated at Pontiac, in which “the 
more reliable youths are selected for certain assignments, while the more disagreeable tasks are 
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given to the more hardened criminals.”619 Black men, placed on Menard’s quarry work gangs 
and Pontiac’s factories alongside the “most dangerous and unruly men” in the prison, held their 
job assignments alongside the type of hardened prisoner who might have a police character, a 
long rap sheet, and a greater likelihood of being returned from parole.620   
 Tibbitts’s prediction method included two additional factors representing a slight 
innovation to the Burgess method—an innovation seemingly instigated and approved by Burgess 
himself. Rather than using only the past record of the individual to predict his outcome on parole, 
the young sociologist’s revision included factors that looked ahead to the prisoners’ 
circumstances once he was approved for parole. The fundamental difference of these two added 
elements, parole job and parole community, from Burgess’s original group of factors is neither 
noted nor expanded upon by either sociologist. The reasons for these additions are unclear. 
Perhaps Burgess and Tibbitts considered it worthwhile to test these factors’ correlation to parole 
outcome because the parole board traditionally considered an inmates’ future plans during its 
decision-making process.621 Or maybe they included these items because other scholars had 
previously studied the correlation of inmates’ parole plans to their parole outcome.622  
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 Tibbitts reported his intent to include a new factor relating to prisoners’ parole 
employment to Burgess early in his classification process. Apparently, this addition was made at 
Burgess’s recommendation. The information available in the records, “nature of the business of 
the sponsor” and the position given to the parolee, was used to sort paroled men into twelve 
occupational categories.623 Before parole, incarcerated men had to furnish proof that they had a 
job waiting for them outside the institution. This was exceedingly difficult, especially during the 
Depression when jobs were scarce for even men with spotless records. This dilemma prompted 
one man incarcerated at Joliet-Stateville to respond that the employment requirement was a 
“detriment and a handicap” to all men seeking parole when asked for an evaluation of the parole 
rules. This prisoner further commented: “no one is over anxious to give a parolee a job.”624 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, African American men found it difficult to secure steady work during the 
Depression even if willing to take on the most undesirable, low-paying, and dangerous jobs in 
Illinois. This particular parole guideline probably ensured that men of color would spend longer 
periods of time searching for jobs from prison both before and after they were approved for 
parole. When black youths from Pontiac finally secured employment during the period covered 
by Tibbitts’s study, they generally were paroled to unskilled positions exhibiting higher violation 
rates. Tibbitts’s inclusion of the “first job” factor further solidified the disadvantages faced by 
men of color, who had often already racked up a negative mark in the prognostic score for 
 
another departure from the Burgess method, the Gluecks weighted their factors so as to reflect the percentage of 
failures in each subcategory classification for each individual. For an explanation of the Glueck’s method and their 
critique of Burgess’s prediction model, see Harcourt, Against Prediction, Kindle Locations 768-792. 
623 Tibbitts to Burgess, June 17, 1928, 2. The twelve categories are as follows: “no record,” “farm,” “labor,” “factory 
labor,” “skilled,” “welfare agencies,” “teaming,” “mining,” “clerk,” “porter,” “railroad, road,” “restaurant,” and 
“barber.” Tibbitts, “Success or Failure,” 35.  
624 Anonymous incarcerated man #1 quoted in Donald Rasmussen, “Attitudes of Joliet-Stateville Prisoners Toward 
Parole,” (MA thesis, University of Illinois, 1938), 41, in Joseph Edward Ragen Papers, Box 5 Folder 2, Abraham 




“previous work record.” These two factors would remain in use in Illinois prediction reports well 
into the 1950s.625  
 Furthermore, by adding the parole community into a collection of factors that already 
included the incarcerated man’s old neighborhood, Tibbitts ensured that prisoners of color would 
accrue an additional negative mark. He seemed not to realize that, for African American youth, 
this amounted to a duplication of a factor in which they would already receive an unfavorable 
mark. Residential segregation in Chicago, where many black reformatory prisoners lived before 
their arrests, meant that black youth leaving Pontiac had no choice but to return to their old, 
heavily policed neighborhoods. Whether in Chicago or elsewhere, these would invariably be 
labeled “Negro areas” with corresponding high violation rates that reduced the chance for a swift 
parole for men of color.626 This did not go unnoticed in the academic community. Critics of the 
Burgess method and its revisions pointed to the potential deleterious effects for men of color 
embedded in prognostic scoring early on. In 1929, criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland briefly 
questioned the validity of Burgess and Tibbitts’s statistical methods on this basis. He first noted 
that the two categories the prediction methods were based on, successes and failures on parole, 
were “probably not entirely different in behavior with reference to law.” In other words, Burgess 
and his successors accepted the violation records as an indication of actual success or failure 
without question. Sutherland suggests that a gang member may be more able than a lone offender 
to hide his violation from a parole officer, or to leverage a strategic bribe encouraging the officer 
to look the other way. The criminologist also expressed concern about the “biased knowledge” of 
parole statistics that resulted from discriminatory policing: “It is possible that Negroes may be 
 
625 At some point, perhaps in the late 1930s, two versions of the predictive table were in use. One omitted the “first 
job” and “parole neighborhood” factors for those unable to secure a job and/or place of residence before parole. 




reported for violation of parole more frequently than white persons when their behavior is 
actually identical.”627 
 
“The Nature of the Individual Criminal”: Creating the Illinois State Penitentiary628   
Predictive methods remained in the research and development phase until 1933, when the 
Fifty-eighth General Assembly of Illinois passed five bills relevant to prison administration in 
the state. When the bills became law on July 1, 1933, the state prisons “lost their legal identity as 
institutions and became branches of the one Illinois State Penitentiary.”629 This centralization of 
corrections administration passed alongside other laws designed to help rehabilitate individual 
convicted offenders, with attention to “their differences, and to the necessity for adapting their 
training to suit their particular needs and problems.”630 All prisoners were first committed to the 
Illinois State Penitentiary (ISP) before being assigned to one of its branches. The task of 
determining which branch best suited each new prisoner fell to two “diagnostic depots,” one 
housed at Joliet and the other at Menard. Professional staffers, including sociologists, conducted 
extensive examinations of each man sentenced to the ISP, slotting him into many of the same 
categories that would later contribute to the prognostic score sent to the parole board. These 
institutional experts determined the proper branch assignment for each man based largely on 
their assessment of his ability to reform. Each incarcerated man’s experience in prison—his 
access to vocational programming, the comfort level of his living quarters, the type of work he 
would perform—was determined by his institutional assignment.  
 
627 E.H. Sutherland, “Methodological Significance and Limitations of Specific Statistical Methods,” Social Forces 7, 
no. 4 (June 1929), 561-562. This was a major admission for 1929. 
628 Quote taken from Paul L. Schroeder, The Classification of Prisoners in Illinois Under the Laws of 1933 
(Springfield: State of Illinois, 1937), 1.  
629 Henry Horner, “Modern Penology in the State of Illinois,” Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the American 
Prison Association (1936), 17. The five branches of the Illinois State Penitentiary were: Joliet, Stateville, Menard, 
Pontiac, and the Psychiatric Division. 




A battalion of medical doctors, sociologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists began 
dividing prisoners into categories as soon as they reached a diagnostic depot. Over the course of 
three weeks, staffers at the diagnostic depots classified each new male prisoner according to his 
personality, criminal record, physical characteristics, and psychiatric condition and determined at 
which branch of the ISP he should begin serving his sentence. The superintendent of each of the 
two depots, at Joliet and Menard, directed staff in the social investigation and physical, 
psychological, and psychiatric examination of each new prisoner. Staffers performing social 
investigations pored over criminal records, compiled family and social histories, located 
educational and military records, and acquired statements from a State’s Attorney for each man. 
These social investigators—sometimes the sociologist-actuaries—were aided in their efforts by 
the set of legal papers that accompanied each man to the depot. These included indictment 
papers, warrants, and a statement of facts in the case signed either by the trail judge or the 
prosecuting attorney.631 As a prisoner’s social history took shape for diagnostic depot staffers, 
physicians took blood samples and examined each new prisoner for signs of physical disease. 
Psychologists administered the Army Alpha examination to gauge each man’s “general 
knowledge, intelligence, educational achievement, and vocational interests.” Finally, the 
psychiatrist stationed at each depot conversed with each new inmate to flag any mental 
abnormalities and to generally assess the mental condition of the man as part of the intake 
process.632 These studies were gathered in each man’s institutional jacket file, to be reviewed by 
the “scientific staff” when deciding which branch of the penitentiary best suited the new 
prisoner. 
 
631 Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission, The Prison System in Illinois: A Report to the Governor of Illinois by the 
Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1937), 308. 





Based on these initial assessments, men were sent to the appropriate branch of the Illinois 
State Penitentiary. Men exhibiting “average intelligence” and “habitually criminalistic” 
tendencies were sent to the Joliet branch, while adult first offenders “who may be expected to 
adjust themselves to the community when discharged” were transferred from the diagnostic 
depot to Menard or Stateville. The Pontiac branch housed boys and men from twelve to twenty-
six years of age “expected to adjust themselves to the community” when released.633 As such, the 
institution emphasized academic and vocational training. Intake depots sent convicted men 
judged to be “insane” to the Psychiatric Division at Menard. Other mentally ill or “feeble-
minded” offenders unable to stand trial were sent directly from the courts to the Illinois Security 
Hospital at Menard. In a 1936 address to the American Prison Conference, Governor Henry 
Horner maintained that these classifications and transfer decisions were based on “the 
assumption that most prisoners at some time will return to the community and therefore their 
training should be so conducted as to help them adjust themselves to civil life” upon release.634 
Though life behind bars was undoubtedly miserable for all prisoners, the conditions and 
programming offered at each of these institutions varied widely. The quality of each prison 
reflected the quality of its occupants as determined by the ISP. A comparison between Joliet, the 
branch used for men considered more hardened offenders, and Pontiac, which housed those 
deemed most likely to reform, is illustrative of these variations. Statistics available concerning 
the classification and assignment of men by race for the mid-1930s indicate that a greater 
proportion of African American men were assigned to Joliet-Stateville than to Menard or 
 
633 Though the institution housed very young boys, its population was not comprised entirely of first offenders. 
Some inmates had served time in other reformatories, jails, and houses of correction. The Illinois Prison Inquiry 
Commission reported that “some [Pontiac prisoners] have criminal records covering long periods of time. Illinois 
Prison Inquiry Commission, The Prison System, 280. 
634 Henry Horner, Address to the American Prison Conference, September 16, 1936, in Henry Horner Papers, 1899-




Pontiac. Unfortunately, numbers for Joliet and Stateville are combined in all available data—
most of which is not classified by race—but the statistics do tell us that the ISP’s diagnostic 
depots sent significantly lower numbers of black men to Pontiac, where they would find more 
modern facilities and better academic and vocational training. In 1935, the diagnostic depots at 
Joliet and Menard sent 1,601 African American men to Joliet-Stateville, a number representing 
59% of all men of color received by the Illinois State Penitentiary system that year. Only 16% of 
black male offenders incarcerated in state prisons that year were sent to Pontiac. By contrast, 
51% of white men received at the diagnostic depots were sent to Joliet-Stateville, and 23% to 
Pontiac.635  
By the time the Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission submitted its report on the state’s 
penal facilities in 1937, it recommended that the Joliet branch be “abolished” due to the 
extremely poor conditions endured by the men living there.636 A few years earlier, sociologist-
actuary Saul Alinsky had observed that the differences between the new prison at Stateville and 
the old Joliet facilities were “comparable to the difference[s] between a modern apartment house 
and an old convict ship.”637 Though Joliet’s cells were constructed to house one person, standard 
practice in the 1920s and 1930s meant that two men, their unwashed blankets, and hundreds of 
bedbugs inhabited one tiny cell measuring 6 feet 11 inches long, 4 feet wide, and 7 feet high. 
There was no indoor plumbing.638 Prisoners instead used “the bucket system,” carrying their 
 
635 Statistics compiled by author and based on Table 6: “Classification by Race of Penal Population,” in Illinois 
Prison Inquiry Commission, The Prison System, 517.  
636 Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission, The Prison System, 227. Commission members Henry Barrett Chamberlin, 
Joseph H. Schlarman, Robert L. Kern, John Prystalski, Roy Best, James J. Barbour, Emmet Moynihan, and Preston 
Bradley sent their report to Governor Henry Horner on April 15, 1937. The Commission wrote that it approached its 
investigation “on the theory that the principal aim of the penal institution is the protection of society; that a 
penitentiary is a prison in which convicts are confined for punishment and rehabilitation—a house of correction” (7).  
637 Saul Alinsky, quoted in Sanford D. Horwitt, Let Them Call Me Rebel: Saul Alinsky, His Life and Legacy (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 28.  




bodily waste from their cells in covered tin receptacles and emptying them in an “enormous 
cesspool” each morning on their way to breakfast.639 As Alinsky recalled, “the odor of the cell 
block makes the unaccustomed visitor stop and sway.”640 Life was regimented and prisoners 
worked five and a half days a week, assigned to the textile plant, the tailor shop, the marble and 
concrete shop, the fiber shop, the mattress factory, or the quarry. Prisoners could also attend 
school for a few hours per day, up to the eighth grade. Very few of the positions available 
offered any “opportunities for vocational training,” as most similar jobs in civilian life were 
“filled by female labor.”641 
Pontiac’s cells were considerably larger than Joliet’s—even the institution’s smaller cells, 
which were one foot longer and three feet wider. Each cell had a washbasin and a toilet with 
running water. Bedbugs plagued Pontiac men and boys, too, but their cells were well-ventilated 
and well-lit, and their sheets were washed once per week. They could attend school for five full 
days per week, and complete the tenth grade while incarcerated. By 1935, Pontiac prisoners who 
completed the eighth grade were eligible to take courses in the branch’s industrial training 
school. Following a period of industrial training, including instruction in mechanical drawing 
and mathematics, the prisoner would advance to the industrial training shop. The shop included 
seven trade training units: auto mechanics, the foundry, sheet metal, woodworking, and the 
pattern, electric, and machine shops. By Ernest W. Burgess’s assessment, the “best opportunities 
for industrial and general education” could be found at Pontiac in the late 1930s—available only 
 
639 Nathan Leopold would later write in his autobiography, Life Plus 99 Years that the Joliet bucket run 
“epitomize[d] prison” life for him in the 1920s. He describes “the long, silent lines” of men waiting to wash and 
empty their waste buckets, the” indescribable” odor, and the “agility required to dodge flying spray on windy days.” 
The following march the men made across the yard to breakfast over “cobblestones worn smooth by countless 
thousands of shuffling feet and seeming to reek of… human misery,” with no chance to wash their hands, “seemed 
to be deliberately contrived to humiliate the convict and to make his lot as uncomfortable as possible.” Nathan F. 
Leopold, Jr., Life Plus 99 Years (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958): 97-98. 
640 Saul Alinsky, quoted in Horwitz, Let Them Call Me Rebel, 29. 




to “the first offender with good prospects for reformation.”642 Still, African American prisoners 
found it difficult to access the vocational training administrators touted. Memoirist Paul Warren, 
a former Pontiac inmate, recalled that black prisoners “couldn’t get a good job. The most they 
could hope for was to be a porter or some guard’s flunky.” The most strenuous and unpleasant 
work details at Pontiac “were made up largely of Negroes. They cleaned the streets, took care of 
the garbage and toilet buckets, washed spittoons, and mopped floors.”643 The same rule applied 
at Joliet, with its more limited vocational opportunities. Former Joliet prisoner Felix Thomas told 
Hans Mattick in a 1951 interview that he had been assigned to the paint shop at Joliet, where he 
was “supposed to learn painting and spraying, but you know, race relations. When I walked in 
there they gave me a broom, so I didn’t learn anything.”644  
 
Dr. Laune and Inmate X: Parole Prediction in Theory at Joliet and Stateville, 1933-1936  
 The 1933 laws that established Joliet and Menard’s diagnostic depots also provided for 
the appointment of sociologist-actuaries at each of the three men’s branches of the ISP. Ferris 
Laune began work at Stateville in the summer of that year, spending much of his time at a desk 
in the prison’s Records Office compiling prediction reports for the parole board. He quickly 
developed a rapport with the prisoners working alongside him, and one man brought him down 
to the prison library. There, this prisoner introduced Laune to ‘thrill-killer’ and former University 
of Chicago undergraduate Nathan Leopold. Laune discovered that he and the well-educated lifer 
shared scholarly interests. As such, the sociologist soon found himself making regular visits to 
the library. Their discussions inevitably addressed Laune’s work at the prison, which greatly 
 
642 Ernest W. Burgess, “Parole and the Indeterminate Sentence,” in The Prison System in Illinois: A Report to the 
Governor of Illinois by the Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission (Springfield: State of Illinois, 1937), 606. 
643 Paul Warren, Next Time is for Life (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1953), 71. 





interested Leopold, and the two spoke about the Burgess system at length. Laune harbored 
doubts regarding Burgess’s factors, and shared his skepticism with Leopold. They agreed that the 
weakness of Burgess’s system lay in the static nature of the factors that made up his prediction 
tables, concluding that any forecast made on the basis of “fixed, immutable factors” could “make 
no allowance for any change in the inmate during his period of incarceration.”645 Leopold would 
later write in his autobiography that if one accepted the validity of a system of parole prediction 
that did not consider a man’s experience within the institution, one must also conclude that “the 
entire theory upon which our prison system is based—that of reform and rehabilitation—is 
valueless.”646 From the conclusions drawn during their early conversations, Laune and Leopold 
set out to develop a prediction system that could measure the ways men changed over the course 
of their time behind bars.  
 As sociologist-actuary, Laune used inmate and civilian assistants to produce a steady 
stream of case history reports with prediction scores for the parole board while heading an 
ambitious research program devoted to improving the accuracy of parole prediction techniques. 
While Laune’s assistants Van Vechten and Daykin spent most of their work hours generating 
reports for the parole board, Nathan Leopold worked closely with Laune, devoting nearly all of 
his time to research.647 From the assumption that many prisoners change while they are 
incarcerated and that what changes about them is their “attitudes, their world outlook,” Leopold 
and Laune hypothesized that an effective method of parole prediction “must include a means of 
 
645 This quotation and the account of Laune’s introduction to Leopold can be found in Nathan F. Leopold, Jr., Life 
Plus 99 Years (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), 253.  
646 Ibid. 
647 Leopold was initially credited as co-author of Laune’s book, Predicting Criminality: Forecasting Behavior on 
Parole, but the timing of Richard Loeb’s murder made it inadvisable for publishers to acknowledge Leopold’s 
integral contributions to the project. Appreciation for Leopold’s work can be found in Laune’s acknowledgements, 
where the sociologist writes of Inmate X: “He has been my active co-worker from the inception of the study to its 




measuring attitudes.”648 A change in a prisoner’s attitude towards the world meant a subsequent 
alteration of his “social adjustment.” The researchers argued that if Illinois’s sociologist-
actuaries could measure attitudes over time and pinpoint when changes took place in each 
prisoners’ worldview, they would be able to determine the optimal time to parole each man. As 
Laune put it, the “problem in parole work is not whether to parole a man, but when to parole 
him.”649 But the researchers initially wondered how they might measure changing attitudes. 
Leopold claims to have come up with their hypothesis first. He wondered if his personal 
‘hunches’ about which men would succeed on parole and which would fail could be a predictive 
tool. Did other incarcerated men have hunches of their own, and did their predictions align with 
his? Leopold remembers that he was fascinated by this potential tool, and wondered if prisoners’ 
impressions of their fellow offenders could be the key to a new, more accurate predictive system. 
From Ferris Laune’s perspective, this idea had come up many times in discussion with students 
of criminology and penology, prison officials, and the men imprisoned at Stateville. He recalls 
hearing many colleagues and acquaintances state “that if one could get the honest opinion of an 
intelligent inmate about his fellow-inmate, one would have a better guide than any previously 
discovered.”650 
 As Leopold contemplated the potential ramifications of his research into parole 
prediction, he discussed his work in great detail with his friend and former co-defendant, Richard 
Loeb. During the early 1930s, Leopold and Loeb worked together closely, developing a 
continuing education program for prisoners who wished to advance their schooling beyond the 
eighth grade. Leopold perhaps envisioned that they would enjoy a similar collaborative 
 
648 Leopold, Life, 253.  
649 Laune, Predicting, 8.  




relationship in the study of parole prediction. He and Loeb were somewhat uniquely qualified to 
conduct research alongside Laune, as very few prisoners had the level of education required to 
assist in an academic study. Both trusted and liked Laune, but after years behind bars, they 
considered themselves members of the convict class.651 Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb 
reasoned that by participating in research that might influence the operation of future parole 
boards, they could have a hand in alleviating the suffering of prisoners who were compelled by 
that future board to serve lengthy sentences. In his autobiography, Leopold recalls asking, “Did 
we, as cons, have any right to have a hand in anything that might work to the detriment of even 
one con?”652 After instituting measures to safeguard the identity of the prisoners they were 
“hunching,” the friends concluded that if they made any scientific contribution to parole policy, 
it would be beneficial to “society as a whole.” According to Leopold, improving prediction 
methods would also work in the favor of prisoners, allowing for “the deserving” to profit: “if 
anyone were harmed, it would be the undeserving; cons as a class would be benefited.”653 
 Their consciences clear, Leopold and Loeb dove headlong into preparations for the study. 
Like others who studied prediction, Laune planned to identify measurable factors that were 
 
651 Despite this conception of himself, Leopold apparently remained on the fringes of prison society for much of the 
time he spent incarcerated. Nathan Kantrowitz, who worked at Joliet from 1957 to 1963, later recalled that “no 
inmate I knew trusted Leopold” and that “in order to keep my own contacts with inmates open, I kept my distance 
from him.” Nathan Kantrowitz, Close Control: Managing a Maximum Security Prison: The Story of Ragen’s 
Stateville Penitentiary (New York: Harrow and Heston Publishers, 2012, Kindle edition), loc. 979. 
652 Leopold, Life, 257. Historian Simon Baatz argues that Nathan Leopold wrote Life Plus 99 Years “as part of his 
campaign to win parole” and that the book should be read with that in mind. The book was not published until after 
the board considered Leopold’s case, but this cautionary note is worth repeating. Baatz argues that Leopold presents 
himself as a “lovable rogue who constantly struggles, despite adverse circumstances, to improve the life of his 
fellow prisoners.” Simon Baatz, For the Thrill of It: Leopold, Loeb, and the Murder that Shocked Chicago (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2008): 465. I think that it is probable that Leopold’s intent was to write an account of his life 
in prison as though everything he did while incarcerated was to make amends for the murder of Bobby Franks by 
helping others in need. His object, clearly, was to show that he changed while incarcerated, that he felt remorse for 
his crime, and that he had spent his time at Joliet and Stateville selflessly improving the lives of his fellow prisoners. 
I am skeptical of Leopold’s portrayal of himself in Life Plus 99 Years, but because Laune’s Predicting Criminality is 
solidly academic, I use the autobiography to help with contextual details, to describe the process of formulating the 
study, and to address the ethical concerns faced by prisoners studying their fellow inmates.  




highly correlated with either success or failure on parole.654 But, unlike other studies conducted 
in Illinois, the method used to identify these factors did not depend on information available in 
each prisoners’ institutional jacket file. Rather, Laune’s study relied on first assessing the 
reliability of different prisoners’ hunches (to determine whose hunches were most accurate). Did 
all prisoners have the same opinions as to which of their fellows would “make good” and which 
would be returned to the institution? If so, were these accurate? If not, who was best at predicting 
“parolability”? The researchers determined that Leopold, Loeb, and two other prisoners’ 
estimates were similar, but that Leopold (Inmate X) and Loeb’s (Inmate Y) estimates were both 
most closely related and most closely correlated to Burgess scores. Based on this remarkable 
correlation and, evidently, the determination that both Leopold and Loeb were trustworthy and 
exceptionally intelligent, the researchers set out to identify the factors the two friends based their 
hunches on.655  
 After the researchers determined what these reasonably accurate hunches were based on, 
they would need to find a way to replicate them—to allow any sociologist-actuary to assess a 
given prisoner’s parolability as if he were Leopold or Loeb judging that prisoner’s likelihood of 
success or failure on the basis of an acquaintance with him. This required some serious 
introspection from Inmate X and Inmate Y. The two prisoners now needed to determine why 
 
654 Like other studies, this one also includes a definition of what constituted success on parole and what counted as 
failure. These can be found in Laune, Predicting, 12-13 and 33-34.  
655 Laune’s explanation of why he chose Leopold and Loeb as the best estimators of parolability can be found in 
Predicting Criminality, on pages 15-17. Because Laune did not wait until each of the 49 prisoners for which they 
made their initial estimates had served three years on parole, he could not compare Leopold and Loeb’s predictions 
with actual outcome on parole. Though one of the central aims of his study was to revise the Burgess method, he 
considered it “entirely independent” of the hunch method he was testing and thus a good way to objectively 
understand if inmate hunches would be close to actual outcomes on parole. This was presumably because the 
Burgess method had already had been tested with some success in Illinois. He therefore judged that Inmate X and 
Inmate Y’s hunches were reasonably valid because they lined up well with Burgess scores for the same cases. Laune 
does not, however, indicate if either Leopold or Loeb—or even both men—had any familiarity with the Burgess 
criteria, which they may have been using either consciously or unconsciously when they made predictions for each 




they thought some inmates were better parole risks than others, to express their risk ideologies 
verbally. As Laune later phrased this, the second stage of research consisted of “isolating the unit 
characters which combine to form the concept of parolability,” or which factors comprised a 
“hunch.”656 Leopold and Loeb held lengthy conversations—all recorded by a stenographer—
about each case they scored. For instance, if Leopold decided that Subject One had a 65% chance 
of success on parole and Loeb determined that the same prisoner had a 75% chance of success, 
the two investigators would then attempt to justify their scores to one another. In one such 
conversation, Loeb indicated that he scored a particular prisoner as a good risk mainly “because 
of his willingness to work,” describing the man’s enthusiasm for his job in the prison 
greenhouse. Loeb indicated, however, that one strike against the prisoner was his relationship 
with and “attitude toward his family,” who were poor and could not come visit often. Loeb 
criticized the subject for complaining when his parents did not enclose money with their letters, 
concluding that “all in all he seems to care for his folks chiefly for what he can get out of 
them.”657  
 Perhaps Loeb, who then had money for all the luxuries a prisoner could acquire, never 
stopped to consider the financial precarity of this former wage earner who might not have had 
the funds to pay for necessities like edible food or physical protection at Stateville. In the early 
1930s, three gangs divided along ethnic lines controlled the prison, forcing unaffiliated inmates 
to keep their leaders and members in food from the commissary and beating prisoners who were 
unable or unwilling to pay. The gangs also controlled a booming trade in goods and privileges 
behind bars, selling narcotics, alcohol, properly-cooked food, and civilian garb to any prisoner 
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who could pay.658 The inmate evaluated by Leopold and Loeb evidently was short of cash to 
appease the gangs and purchase their goods. Leopold scored this same man slightly lower than 
Loeb, but for a similar reason: the prisoner’s expensive tastes and the potential financial 
difficulties he might experience upon release as a result. When discussing the case, Leopold 
asked Loeb, “have you stopped to consider how fond he is of clothes?” As the prisoner in 
question did not have the education necessary to secure a white-collar position upon release, 
Leopold argued that he might be tempted back into crime by the “$100 suits” or “$5 neckties” 
that would be out of reach for someone earning only fifteen or twenty dollars per week.659 
 Laune theorized that over the course of informal debates like this one the reasoning 
behind the hunches would emerge and a predictive method could be outlined. Leopold, Loeb, 
and Laune soon had a list of 42 factors, some positively weighted and some negatively weighted, 
and others which could be either positively or negatively weighted depending on the 
circumstances of the case.660 Many of the factors that comprised Leopold and Loeb’s hunches 
 
658 According to Joseph Ragen’s biographer, Irish prisoners and Italian prisoners had their own gangs, while “a 
motley assortment of desperadoes” made up a third gang, the Powerhouse Outfit. See Gladys A. Erickson, Warden 
Ragen of Joliet (New York: Dutton, 1957): 42. Also see “Warden Tells of Breaking Up Convict Gangs: Ragen 
Testifies Before Horner Commission,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 20, 1936, p. 4. “Prison a Homey Club with 
Dues, Felons Declare,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 21, 1936, p. 3.  
659 Laune, Predicting Criminality, 20. 
660 These factors were soon narrowed to the following 41: “excessive interest in clothes,” minus; “stupidity,” plus or 
minus; “timidity,” plus or minus; “industry,” plus; “sex-craving,” minus; “white lights,” or interest in nightlife in 
cities and towns, minus; “family broken,” minus; “lack of love for relatives,” minus; “family ties,” plus; “learned 
lesson,” plus or minus; “previous hoodlum activities,” minus; “recidivism,” minus; “rural type,” plus; “previous 
work record,” plus; “happily married,” plus; “character,” plus or minus; “pleasing personality,” plus; “sharp 
practices,” meaning a person’s drive to “beat the other fellow on any kind of bargain, deal, or business venture,” 
minus; “emotional instability,” minus; “shrewdness,” plus; “good job in prison,” a factor considered when a man 
had such an easy time in prison that he could not be expected to fear returning to the institution, minus; “gangster,” 
minus; “critical qualities,” plus; “selfishness,” plus; “trade,” which referred to anything the man had learned in 
prison that would allow him to find a good job on the outside, plus; “conceit,” minus; “phlegmaticness,” referring to 
a prisoner who “maintained a balanced attitude towards others and towards events in his own life,” plus; 
“argumentativeness,” minus; “outside environment,” plus or minus; “minor racketeering,” minus; excessive “love of 
comfort,” minus; “age,” plus or minus; “working ability,” plus or minus; “break in criminal record,” plus; 
“regligiosity,” plus; “wanderlust,” minus; “attitude toward future,” plus or minus; “length of time to be served,” plus 
or minus; “tendency to be an agitator,” minus; “criminal activity in family,” minus; and “physical defect,” minus. 
Some factors, such as a break in the prisoner’s criminal record, were always given a positive score when relevant, 




were similar to the Burgess factors and would be retained in predictive models used by Illinois, 
including the prisoner’s age at the time of his offense, his criminal history, and his family 
background. Leopold, Loeb, and Laune’s predictive factors built on Burgess’s system in two 
major ways. First, seemingly in lieu of the Burgess category “social type,” Laune’s system 
included a large number of factors related to the prisoner’s personality and character traits. The 
descriptions accompanying each of these factors indicate that Laune intended to measure the 
prospective parolee’s ability to navigate social situations, which seems fitting for a predictive 
system designed to replicate the observations and judgments of an acquaintance. The description 
for “argumentativeness,” for example, states that an “individual persistently engaged in 
arguments” might “strike difficulties on account of his trait,” such as losing his job for quarreling 
with his employer.661 Second, Laune accounted for change over time. He did not use the static 
portrait of each prisoner captured by his institutional record—his system attempted to assess men 
as individuals immediately before their board hearings, which ideally would reward personal 
growth that occurred within the institution. Moreover, Laune argued that “perhaps the most 
important single factor” of Leopold and Loeb’s hunch assessment was the “learned lesson,” or 
what the man would take away from his experience behind bars. Based on Laune’s description, it 
seems this factor could be scored neutrally, positively, or left blank. A prisoner earning a plus in 
this category might have learned a moral lesson, but the lesson could also be a practical one, 
such as in a case where a man determined that he would not break the law because it was a 
“losing proposition” that was too risky and would not bring a great profit. Individuals were only 
 
simply skipped over in scoring each prisoner. For instance, if a given inmate had no physical defect, this would not 
count as a plus that might make him more parolable, but would be taken as a neutral factor. Neutral factors were 
used in later iterations of the predictive model, notably those tested and advanced by Lloyd Ohlin. Laune, Predicting 
Criminality, 20-26. Lloyd Ohlin, Selection for Parole: A Manual of Parole Prediction (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1951), 52.  




given minus scores in cases where “the prison experience has had no effect at all or a deleterious 
effect.”662 The scoring system that included different combinations of plus, minus, and blank 
ratings proved difficult to implement, so Laune compiled a new list of 54 “single-signed 
favorable factor[s],” which were eventually revised down to 36 factors.663   
 To translate these hunch factors into a predictive tool, Leopold and another prisoner 
involved in the study (referred to as “investigator W”) developed 1,601 yes or no questions 
designed to score each prisoner according to the predictive factors identified. They then devised 
a questionnaire composed of these queries calibrated both to generate a prognostic score for the 
prisoner and to check the veracity of his answers. A suggestion from Burgess, who read over the 
questionnaire, caused Laune to add 10 questions designed as an additional check on each 
prisoners’ truthfulness. These questions were ones in which “the true opinion of the inmates is 
directly at variance with what they conceive to be the proper opinion to express for their own 
benefit.”664 Over the course of testing the efficacy of this questionnaire, investigators soon found 
their new instrument unwieldy and impractical.665 The institution would never be able to allot the 
time and labor necessary to administer such a lengthy set of questions to each prisoner eligible 
for parole and then to evaluate each man’s test results. Laune constructed an abridged version of 
 
662 Ibid, 22.  
663 Ibid, 32-33, 70.  
664 A few examples are (1) “Have you ever broken a prison rule?” (2) “Have you liked every guard and official with 
whom you have come into contact?” and (3) “Do you think all the meals served here are good?” Presumably, the 
prisoner willing to lie on the questionnaire would answer “No” to the first question and “Yes” to the two subsequent 
questions. According to Laune, these responses would constitute obvious lies because “every inmate or very nearly 
every inmate has at one time or another broken a prison rule,” “it would be difficult to find a prisoner who had 
never… received food other than that served him at the table,” and because prisoners found it advantageous to 
“pretend complete submissiveness and satisfaction with existing conditions.” Ibid, 41.  
665 The investigators tested their questionnaire on a “Truth Group” comprised of 57 prisoners who knew the purpose 
of the 1701 questions and had pledged to answer each question honestly and on four “Random Groups” of 57 
prisoners who made no such promise. Laune informed members of the “Truth Group” that their answers would not 
be used to their detriment, while members of the “Random Group” believed that Laune would use the answers they 
gave in preparing his report for the Parole Board. See George B. Vold, “Predicting Criminality by Ferris F. Laune,” 




the questionnaire, comprised of the 159 questions judged most likely to match up with Leopold 
and Loeb’s hunch assessments. The Illinois State Penitentiary never used this questionnaire in 
any official capacity, perhaps because of its impracticality or because other scholars of parole 
prediction expressed serious doubts about Laune’s study and the new predictive system he 
presented in his book.666 In one particularly scathing review, University of Minnesota sociologist 
George B. Vold wrote that while the research might be useful to those studying questionnaire 
construction, “as a method of predicting criminality it is far-fetched and elusive.”667 Moreover, 
Ernest W. Burgess stated in an interview that unpublished research conducted in Illinois 
indicated that predictions generated by Laune’s system were no more accurate than those 
determined by Burgess’s original 27-factor system.668 Still, Leopold and Laune’s focus on the 
individual’s experience in prison and his attitude towards release would resurface in the Level of 
Service Inventory-Revised risk assessment model in the 1970s.669  
 
666 For lukewarm reviews, see Robert Kingsley, “Predicting Criminality, by Ferris F. Laune,” Southern California 
Law Review 12 (1938), 121-122; Arthur L. Beeley, “Predicting Criminality, by Ferris F. Laune,” American 
Sociological Review 2, no. 5 (October 1937), 799-800. For an extremely negative review, see William Hurwitz, 
“Predicting Criminality,” Oregon Law Review 18, no. 2 (February, 1939), 153-155. 
667 Vold, “Predicting,” 152. He followed this jab up with an analogy, musing that Laune’s work reminded him of  a 
story of a farmer with pigs for sale who, “lacking a scale on which to weigh the animals, constructed a balance, put 
the pigs on one end and piled rocks into a box on the other end, both buyer and seller taking every precaution to see 
that an exact equilibrium was obtained—and then guessed at the equivalent weight of the rocks.”  
668 Norman Bruce Johnston, “A Reconsideration of Certain Factors in the Prediction of Success or Failure on Parole 
from the Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet” (MA diss., University of Chicago, 1951), 28. Later, Lloyd Ohlin 
compared Laune’s predictive system with Burgess’s and discovered that Burgess’s system was more accurate. See 
Karl F. Schuessler, “Parole Prediction: Its History and Status,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 45, no. 4 
(Nov. 1954-Dec. 1954), 430.  
669 The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) was first developed and used in Canada in the late 1970s. By the 
2000s, almost every American state used this risk assessment tool in some stage of the carceral process—“for the 
security classifications of prison inmates, for levels of probation and parole supervision” or to help determine a 
prisoner’s fitness for parole. The assessment is comprised of 54 questions, which address both unchanging factors, 
such as criminal history, and dynamic factors subject to change, like those involving an individual’s emotions. The 
questions are divided into ten categories: (1) criminal history; (2) education/ employment; (3) financial; (4) family/ 
marital; (5) accommodations; (6) leisure/ recreation; (7) companions; (8) alcohol/ drug problems; (9) emotional/ 
personal; and (10) attitudes/ orientation. The questions in the attitudes/ orientation section gauge the individual’s 
attitudes toward crime, convention, his sentence, and the prospect of supervision on parole or probation. See 
Harcourt, Against Prediction, Kindle Loc. 986 and Rebecca Richardson, “Minding the Gap: An Evaluation of the 
Potential Impact of Evidence-based Sentencing on Social Inequality” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, College 




 While Laune and the other sociologist-actuaries employed at the diagnostic depots 
recognized the need for “a new criterion of parolability,” they retained confidence in the basic 
premises of the Burgess system. Indeed, they determined the accuracy of the hunch system by 
comparing it to results obtained using the Burgess method. Like Burgess, Laune believed that 
criminality was not a psychiatric problem—that there was no such a thing as a ‘born criminal’—
but rather that society itself forged the criminal. “Criminality,” Laune wrote, is “a social 
problem.”670 Sociologists, rather than psychiatrists, needed to diagnose the causes of criminality 
in each individual and determine the extent of that individual’s reformation before parole. With 
this theoretical basis in mind, and understanding that his own research into parole prediction 
could not show results until his subjects of study had completed a three-year period on parole, 
Laune continued to use the Burgess system.  
“Cursed by God:” Sociologist-Actuaries, Prisoners, and Prediction in Practice, 1934-1942 
 Though ISP sociologist-actuaries devised new methods of parole prediction, quibbled 
over categories, and constantly evaluated the Burgess method, the 27 prediction criteria remained 
static from 1934 to at least 1940 for Joliet-Stateville and Menard, and into the 1950s at 
Pontiac.671 Many of the Illinois sociologist-actuaries who worked at the three major branches of 
the ISP were current or former Burgess students, including Lloyd Ohlin, Clark Tibbitts, Ferris 
Laune, Purnell Benson, Hans W. Mattick, and Daniel Glaser. These men were expected to 
conduct research into predictive methods, but the bulk of their duties involved interviewing 
 
670 Ibid, 5. 
671 Expectancy tables were revised during this time period. Experience tables are “summarized arithmetical tables 
expressing the exact numerical percentages of violation of parole observed for homogenous groups of parolees… 
graduated by the number of favorable factors possessed by the prediction groups.” An experience table might tell 
you that parolees with 14 favorable factors (out of 27) belonged to a group in which 43% were expected to violate 
the parole agreement. Definition of experience tables borrowed from Sam Daykin (?), “The Illinois Parole 
Prediction System,” 22, in Ernest Watson Burgess Papers, Box 35, Folder 7, SCRC-UCL. Ohlin developed a 12-
factor prediction method for Joliet-Stateville in the 1940s, but I am unsure when this was actually implemented at 
Joliet-Stateville and Menard (the two adult institutions), as the surviving accessible prediction reports from the 




prisoners before parole board hearings and using the information to supplement institutional 
records in the preparation of life histories and actuarial prediction reports for the board. 
Sociologist-actuaries also verified information obtained in interviews with prisoners by writing 
to their friends, families, former employers, and schools they had attended. Hans W. Mattick 
estimated in 1953 that he spent over half of his time at Joliet-Stateville on these tasks, while 
devoting 22% of his working hours to “quantitative and qualitative research in the field of 
criminology and particularly parole prediction techniques.”672 This time balance was likely 
similar to that of sociologists working in the 1930s and 1940s, including Tibbitts, Laune, 
Benson, Courtlandt Van Vechten, Thomas Hutton, Gordon R. Beers, and Sam Daykin. The 
limited amount of time that could be devoted to revision of the Burgess method, the trust 
sociologist-actuaries placed in their former teacher, and the discovery that several new 
prognostic instruments developed by researchers were no more effective than Burgess’s may 
have accounted for this stagnation. 
 Sociologist-actuaries provided the parole board with qualitative assessments of potential 
parolees in addition to the prognostic scores—likely because they intended the prediction report 
to offer up an explanation of their professional opinion in each case as a supplement to the other 
materials accessible to the board. They intended for the report to guide decision-making in each 
case rather than determine it. The sociologists working at each prison knew that the largely 
politically-appointed board members could not evaluate the materials the institutional jacket files 
with a trained eye, and thus endeavored to provide them with a professional evaluation of each 
prisoner’s history. Though Mattick claimed decades after his stint as sociologist-actuary that “it 
was always a mystery” to him if the parole board paid attention to the prediction reports, while 
 
672 Hans W. Mattick, “Position Classification Change Request and Allocation,” State of Illinois Civil Service 




he was on the job he considered the reports critical to the operation of the parole system. He 
wrote in 1954 that he feared that the state would eliminate the sociologist-actuary position and 
parole decisions would be made “on a completely irrational (or worse) basis.” Mattick saw 
himself and his fellow sociologist-actuaries as men who fought “the good fight—for what 
justice, truth, beauty, and professional guidance we pitiful… few can impart to a badly 
mismanaged business.”673 The qualitative information provided in the prediction report not only 
elaborated on the information included in the quantitative score, but could also serve as a 
summary of the more relevant materials included in the prisoner’s jacket file. Sociologist-
actuaries in the early 1940s included a short description of the prospective parolee’s crime, 
criminal record, educational history, previous employment, and family background, as well as an 
assessment of his neighborhood, friends, relationship status, and plans for parole. 
Many prisoners recognized the addition of the sociologists and mental health 
professionals within the diagnostic depots—but opinions as to the effect of these additions to the 
prison bureaucracy varied among those incarcerated. Some prisoners dismissed the restructuring 
and use of the predictive method as mere cosmetic change. These men criticized the board for 
failing to act on the recommendation of social scientists, suggesting much like Burgess, Bruce, 
and Harno that the key to an impartial parole board lay in scientization and the selection of board 
members from the professional classes. Others argued that reforms rooted in social science only 
proved harmful to incarcerated men. They worried that they fell into categories viewed 
unfavorably by the parole board, and that this would leave them behind bars as the whiter, 
wealthier, and better educated among the incarcerated received ten dollars and a handshake from 
the warden as they walked out the prison gates.  
 
673 Hans W. Mattick to Gordon R. Beers, February 16, 1954, Box 180, Folder 1, Hans W. Mattick Papers, 1944-




 Prisoners who believed in the work of the diagnostic depots also believed that the parole 
board functioned primarily as a political entity. If the men who ran the board and the prisons 
always had their eyes on the next election and thought more deeply about how parole decisions 
affected the governor than about what was right for prisoners themselves, then Illinois’s carceral 
bureaucracy would never treat social ills and “reclaim society’s misfits.” The state’s 
penitentiaries needed to begin this work of “reclamation” from the moment each new inmate 
donned his uniform. Indicating little faith in the diagnostic depots as presently organized, several 
Stateville prisoners demanded that the penitentiary ensure that new inmates were diagnosed by 
“competent psychiatrists,” segregated according to intelligence and personality, and put on 
individualized treatment plans. Others expressed the same sentiment without complex steps, with 
one prisoner calling for the institution to “segregate by classification the bad ones by themselves 
and the good ones by themselves.”674  
As Rasmussen’s survey focused on the attitudes of prisoners towards parole, most 
incarcerated men had more to say about reforming the parole board than instituting better mental 
health care or more conscientious classification procedures at the diagnostic depots. Prisoners 
who expressed belief in the impartiality and reformative power of the social sciences suggested 
that the board be comprised of “men and women who are trained for the vocation, such as 
psychologist [sic], sociologists, and their synonimous [sic] sciences…”675 The board they dealt 
with, made up of “vote getters who are real estate men, automobile salesmen, and owners of coal 
companies,” could not possibly make fair decisions in each case, as they had political incentive 
to listen to inflammatory reporting and mud-slinging candidates for office. When asked to 
suggest some changes that could improve the parole board’s decisions, five men out of 31 
 
674 Anonymous Stateville prisoners #18 and #31 as quoted in Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 51, 52.  




responding prisoners from F House wrote specifically that board members should be appointed 
from the ranks of penologists, criminologists, sociologists, and psychologists. Others wrote that 
current board members displayed their ignorance of “psychological factors” and the “underlying 
causes of past crime.”676 Incarcerated men like the survey respondents quoted here praised the 
sociologist-actuaries and hoped that their work would push the parole board towards fair action 
in each case. Two prisoners compared judges to parole boards, telling Rasmussen in separate 
interviews that they preferred for the board to set their sentences because “the judge does not 
know as much about the case as does the board… He does not have the material collected by 
sociologists.”677  
 When responding to Rasmussen’s survey and interview questions, others expressed 
doubt—sometimes even fear—of the board’s professionalized advisors and scientized reform. 
These prisoners shared the prescient view that anarchist, physician, and advocate for the poor 
Ben Reitman expressed to sociologist-actuary Courtlandt Van Vechten in the 1930s: “Van, you 
reformers are cursed by God, everything you touch you make worse.” Reitman made this 
statement in reference to parole and the indeterminate sentence, which he observed was only 
lengthening the time men spent behind bars. What might seem sound in theory, the seasoned 
activist noted, could go very wrong in practice. Those implementing the reforms sometimes 
came to agree with Reitman, too. By the late 1950s, when Van shared Reitman’s words with 
Nathan Leopold, he recalled leaving his post at Pontiac in 1936 both because he could no longer 
face the “inhuman[ity]” of prison and the realization that he did not know what the “alternative” 
to incarceration might be. He “did not know the answers, and… bowed out in favor of those who 
 
676 See anonymous Stateville prisoners #28, #33, #21, #30, #6 as quoted in Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 78, 81, 91 for 
examples. 





think they do.” Van had burned out. He no longer had “a goal… [to] believe in and work for,” so 
he left his post to the next green, idealistic social scientist.678 Poor pay and long working hours 
meant that the sociologist-actuaries and mental health professionals tasked with preparing 
predictive reports to guide the board were typically young, well-educated but relatively 
inexperienced, and did not stay in their jobs for long.679 One Stateville prisoner recognized this 
cycle, noting the parole board’s tendency to take the advice of “some young psychologist that 
has just graduated from college and thinks he is a past master at diagnosing convicts.”680 Many 
of this man’s peers had been incarcerated for long enough to understand Reitman’s assessment of 
these professional prison workers. Often fresh from college campuses and hoping to cut their 
teeth on the masses of data awaiting them in prison records, criminologists, psychologists, and 
sociologists arrived at Stateville with “excellent intentions.” These researcher-workers were 
fundamentally “well-meaning” men, but ultimately the ideas that emerged from their labors 
allowed prison administrators to justify keeping men incarcerated for longer periods of time. 
Rasmussen asked several men incarcerated at Stateville to write lengthy essays on the parole 
system for inclusion in his dissertation, and one of these prisoners wrote of professional prison 
workers: “… I have never to hear of one who did not manage, in the course of his progress 
through prison, to injure rather seriously… someone whom he desired only to help.”681 
 One such essayist advanced a more specific critique of the actuarial prediction method, 
professing to air “common… convict complaints” about risk assessment. According to this 
prisoner, many of his fellow “cons” felt that the board’s method of using “favorable and 
 
678 Courtlandt C. Van Vechten to Nathan F. Leopold, undated, possibly December 1958, Box 19, Folder 1, Nathan 
F. Leopold Papers, 1924-1970, CHMRC.  
679 Hans W. Mattick to Robert B. Phillips, February 18, 1954, Box 180, Folder 1, Hans W. Mattick Papers, 1933-
1972, CHMRC.  
680 Anonymous Stateville prisoner #17, as quoted in Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 103-104. 




unfavorable factors” to predict parole outcome was not yet dependable enough for practical use. 
They did not believe that these prognostic scores were reliable enough to separate individuals 
who would violate parole upon release from men who would not. Declining to release prisoners 
because they racked up too many unfavorable factors, this essayist argued, was detrimental to 
incarcerated men and society. Those granted parole “only after serving staggering sentences” 
may not have been poor risks when first rated by the sociologist-actuary, but would certainly be 
more inclined to return to crime after a decade or more behind bars.682 The writer imagined what 
he considered a typical conversation with a fellow prisoner about actuarial prediction. He noted 
that convicted offenders tried with accomplices often complained that these rap partners, 
involved in the same crime, were released before them due to the predictive method. A prisoner 
who remained incarcerated while his partner won parole might explain why he got more time for 
the same offense thusly:  
“I’ll tell you why. Because they’ve got a system of figuring who’ll make good on parole 
and who won’t. My folks are poor working stiffs; I’m a Dago; I’m not married; I quit 
school during the depression and tried to help my old man by getting a job—but I 
couldn’t find any work, and so I have no working record. So these jerks look on their 
cards in the sociologist’s office and find that if a man’s parents are poor, if he’s a Dago, 
not married, and has got no working record—then he’s a bad parole risk.”683 
 
This imagined prisoner displays some understanding of the prognostic scoring method he rails 
against. However, it is clear from this fictional conversation—a stand-in for many conversations 
the essayist claims to have had—that most incarcerated men were not privy to the list of factors 
used by the sociologist-actuary. Still, the accuracy of parts of this educated guess made by a 
prisoner Rasmussen considered particularly “articulate” indicates that many incarcerated men 
would have had some idea of how they might be rated by the sociologist-actuary. The typical 
 





inmate imagined by the essayist recognizes that characteristics of his life related to his 
impoverished upbringing, his marital status, and his work record will prove detrimental to his 
risk score. He likely also would have realized that institutional sociologists communicated with 
police authorities, welfare agencies, schools, and employers to verify whatever account of his life 
he may have offered during his intake interview. This fictional prisoner knew this and felt 
trapped by it. But other assumptions the essayist made while conceiving of this example reflect 
the limitations of Stateville prisoners’ knowledge of the sociologist-actuary’s methods. For 
instance, the imaginary prisoner asserts that his Italian ancestry will harm his prognosis. But 
while an explanation of the factors used in the Illinois parole prediction system indicated that 
sixteen racial and ethnic identities were associated with parole violation, in practice only 
“American-Negro” prisoners received unfavorable marks in this category.684 The imaginary 
Italian prisoner’s economic status, education level, work record, and lack of a spouse would hurt 
his chances for parole, but his ethnicity would not. Sometime Chicago Defender columnist and 
lawyer William E. Lilly neatly summed up the effect of prognostic scoring on African American 
prisoners—who likely would have found themselves in the same position as the essayist’s 
fictional inmate, except with one more negative factor on top of the others. Though not privy to 
details of the work of the sociologist-actuaries, Lilly shared a perceptive view of the parole board 
 
684 Sam Daykin [?], “The Illinois Parole Prediction System,” 1938 [?], 7-8, in Box 35, Folder 7, Ernest W. Burgess 
Papers, SCRC-UCL. According to the official description of the “nationality” factor (likely written up in 1938), 
“American-White,” Italian, Austrian, Welsh, “Slavish,” and Serbian men should be rated favorably, while 
“American-Negro,” English, German, Irish, Polish, Russian, Canadian, Scotch, Danish, Swiss, French, “Swede,” 
Bohemian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Mexican men should receive unfavorable marks. But in over two dozen 
prediction reports from Pontiac and Joliet-Stateville dating from the 1930s to the early 1940s, the only national-
racial origin category ever given an unfavorable rating was “American-Negro.” For prediction reports consulted, see 
Box 35, Folder 8, in Ernest W. Burgess Papers, SCRC-UCL; prediction reports for Charles Barry (September, 1933) 
and James Betson (July, 1938) in Secretary of State, Executive Section, “Executive Clemency Files,” Record Series 




with Defender readers in 1935: “Decidedly, [a black man’s] chances to crash the gates are a bit 
below that of the other fellow.”685  
“Frankenstein Monster of Parole”: Papers, Pop Culture, and the Paroled Man  
Despite the push for standardization of parole decision-making, most prisoners were 
wholly unimpressed by the changes in board procedure. Many bought into the Chicago Tribune’s 
ongoing narrative of a board vulnerable to patronage politics, and some prisoners argued that the 
board paroled undeserving offenders for political reasons while holding friendless but deserving 
men for too long. Though many inmates expressed opinions that mirrored those advanced by the 
Tribune’s editorial board, like allowing trial judges to set prison sentences, they also condemned 
the press’s undue influence over the board. Incarcerated men envisioned parole board members 
scared to release any man who committed a crime that had garnered publicity due to the 
Tribune’s relentless reporting.686 Additionally, the incarcerated participants in Rasmussen’s 
survey never backed the Tribune and other newspapers in supporting “stiff sentences [for] 
convicts with previous records.”687 The Stateville men who participated in Donald Rasmussen’s 
1937-38 survey bore the brunt of negative publicity directed towards the parole board.  
Rasmussen worked in the office of the sociologist-actuary at Stateville over the course of 
his internship, where he was able to establish a close rapport with seven incarcerated men and 
assure them that their conversations with him would remain confidential. After six weeks of 
acquaintance, the young student believed that he had earned the trust of the men, who “began to 
give [him]… their opinions freely and frankly.” These men also connected him with over 100 
 
685 William E. Lilly, “Attorney Airs Features of Illinois Parole System,” The Chicago Defender, December 28, 1935, 
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687 “Paroles Given to First Offenders, Hutchens Finds Board Using Discretion,” Herald and Review [Decatur], 




other prisoners who contributed responses to his study of prisoner opinions about parole.688 
Though the dissertation Rasmussen produced contains a range of views of the parole system, 
many of the incarcerated men surveyed seized on the opportunity to vent about the board in 
writing. As newspaper coverage of the board’s decisions, the Ward-Schnackenberg bill, and 
crimes committed by paroled men intensified, the parole board began denying most eligible 
prisoners their parole. Men stuck behind Stateville’s walls noted the effect negative press 
coverage had on paroles, citing “newspaper ballyhoo” as an important factor the board 
considered when making a decision in any given case.689 One third of the 81 prisoners who 
responded to the pertinent survey question believed that newspapers influenced the board’s 
rulings in cases up for parole.690 One parole violator wrote that the parole board’s “attitude 
shows that they are influenced by the newspapers, especially the Tribune from Chicago,” while 
an F House prisoner urged board members to use “their own mind instead of listening to the 
papers.” The man confined to F House noted that many prisoners believed that newspaper 
coverage of parole proved detrimental to the system: “the convict is human too and can see that 
they are swayed by the papers…”691 Another F House resident suggested that the board brought 
men back to prison for parole violations more frequently “for absolutely nothing” at the time the 
survey was administered because its members were “afraid of the newspapers.”692 
 
688 Donald Rasmussen, “Prisoner Opinions About Parole,” American Sociological Review 5, No. 4 (August, 1940), 
585. Rasmussen distributed his survey to a total of 126 men who fell into three groups: 47 were selected at random 
from Stateville’s cell house F, 39 were parole violators with average or above average scores on their IQ tests, and 
another 40 represented a random sampling of men with average or above average scores on their IQ tests. 
689 Anonymous Stateville prisoner #43 from F House sample, as quoted in Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 71. 
690 The question posed to solicit written responses from surveyed men is as follows: “List any additional factors 
which you think the board takes into consideration [aside from “the offense, previous prison terms, past life of the 
prisoner, probabilities of again breaking the law, adequacy of punishment, conduct while in prison, and welfare of 
the prisoner,” which Rasmussen already mentioned],” Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 68. 
691 Anonymous Stateville parole violator #31 and anonymous Stateville prisoner #10 from F House, as quoted in 
Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 72, 86.   




 The three “articulate inmates” invited by Rasmussen to prepare longer essays relating 
their views of parole expanded on the brief critiques offered in other incarcerated men’s written 
survey answers. One among the “articulate” calculated the potential effect of the Tribune’s 
stories on the reading public, hypothesizing that the constant headlines led citizens to believe 
“that parole laws are beneficial only for the criminal; that for society they are a deadly and 
constly [sic] menace.” This incarcerated writer further described the “metropolitan dailies’” 
description of the parole system as a cycle, in which men were “released after serving 
ridiculously short terms, to go forth and renew predatory activities.”693  
The parole board shrank away from releasing men with time remaining on their 
maximum sentences when the Chicago Tribune railed against board decisions (Figure 17), 
provided extensive coverage of every crime committed by a parolee in the city, and constantly 
published the names and criminal records of recent releasees. This press coverage only escalated 
in the wake of the murders of three Chicago policemen in the winter of 1936-1937, allegedly 
perpetrated by parolees desperate to evade re-incarceration. These killings pushed state 
legislators to draft the Ward-Schnackenberg bill (HB 382), a parole reform plan allowing the 
trial judge to determine the minimum and maximum sentence for each convicted offender in 
their courtroom. The board would then grant paroles according to the minimum and maximum 
terms set by the judge.694 Concerned citizens among Chicago’s educated elite, hailing from 
social welfare organizations including the Chicago Crime Commission and the Citizens’ 
Association of Chicago, released resolutions and sent public letters denouncing the Ward-
Schnackenberg bill (HB 382). Howard Van S. Tracy, President of the Citizens’ Association of 
 
693 Anonymous Stateville prisoner, “Essay Three,” as reproduced in Ibid., 134. Description of essayists as selected 
from ranks of “articulate inmates” found in Ibid., 122.  
694 “Four Out of Ten Violate Parole, Says Legislator: Schnackenberg Refutes Board’s 13 Pct. Claim,” Chicago Daily 




Chicago, wrote an open letter to the Tribune in June, 1937, arguing that the “theorists” behind 
the bill were “newspapers whose views are not supported by a single civic organization in 
Chicago.” Rather, legislators backed HB 382 because the press “created a sort of Frankenstein 
monster of parole.” Other prominent figures, including Ernest W. Burgess and members of the 
Executive Committee of the Chicago Association of Commerce, concurred.695  
The bill, of course, was in keeping with the risk ideology promoted most visibly by the 
Chicago Tribune. The paper sold sensational crime stories that never failed to mention a 
suspect’s parole status and consistently condemned the parole board for releasing men convicted 
of violent crimes, with lengthy criminal records, or previous parole violations.696 Despite protests 
from prominent citizens’ organizations, the Ward-Schnackenberg bill received dedicated and 
often front-page support from the Chicago Tribune during the summer of 1937. Through its 
news and editorial articles, the Tribune, the politicians it quoted, and the papers aligned with it 
promoted an alternative view of criminal risk assessment far from the holistic approach favored 
by Illinois sociologist-actuaries. According to this view, the nature of the prisoner’s crime and 
the extent of his criminal record were central markers of his risk to the community. The paper 
maintained, as did Chicago’s Chief of Detectives John L. Sullivan, that parole should be granted 
only to first offenders, not to second and third offenders who “know all the tricks” to get out of 
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prison and continue their criminal careers.697 Parole, many editorial boards concluded, was 
“strongly defended in theory” and had “miserably disappoint[ed] in practise [sic],” as so many of 
the “failures forced on public attention” demonstrated.698 Though some of the state’s periodicals 
defended the parole board and opposed HB 382, the Tribune and other newspapers clamored for 
its passage and the institution of a different kind of risk assessment. 
Many of the newspaper editorial boards that supported the Ward-Schnackenberg bill 
expressed a lack of trust in the social-scientific methods used to generate actuarial risk scores, 
and instead called for a simpler assessment of the offender’s risk to society. The parole system’s 
belief in its risk scores were premature, charged the Decatur Herald and Review in an editorial: 
“It is apparent that we do not yet know as much as we ought to about the classification of 
offenders for parole…” No “convenient psychological test” or infallible “set of standards” 
existed to differentiate men who would make good from those who would reoffend.699  All the 
“systems, regulations, theories and statutes” in the world could not “analyze individual 
characters which are as different as individual faces,” Herald and Review editors reiterated a 
year later.700 The Moline Dispatch also criticized the work of the sociologist-actuaries, claiming 
that though parole officials believed that they could judge when a prisoner’s “punishment has 
been sufficient or reform complete,” the “grist in the parole mill” proved otherwise.701 Instead of 
using social scientific methods and developing “theories of criminal personality,” supporters of 
the Ward-Schnackenberg bill insisted that the prisoner’s offense should serve as an index of his 
risk to the public. As one legislator articulated, “the gunman will return to his gun and the 
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burglar to the breaking and entering of our homes.”702 The murder of policeman Arthur Sullivan 
by parolee Joseph Schuster should be the last word on the present parole system and a guide to 
future decision-making. The Tribune summed up its risk ideology in one short anecdote in 
response to the crime:  
Schuster, the paroled convict who killed Policeman Sullivan, was sent to Pontiac for the
 crime of robbing and shooting a bank messenger. The shooting was an index to his
 character. It indicated when might happen again and prophesied what did happen when
 the policeman was shot down.703 
 
Though Governor Horner vetoed the Ward-Schnackenberg bill, the parole board 
responded to the media outcry. In 1938, the number of men paroled from Pontiac, Menard, and 
Joliet-Stateville decreased dramatically. Though statistics are unavailable for 1937, Figure 2 
shows that the number of men paroled during 1936 reached a high of 2,626, only to drop down to 
just 492 in 1938.704 Some state newspapers praised this reduction, with the Peoria Star writing 
that “the rumpus raised by the people, attorneys, judges, and members of the legislature” over 
“the parole situation” caused the board to be more cautious. This proved an old adage: “the 
people get just the sort of government they wish.”705 The change had a profound effect on 
incarcerated men and parolees in Illinois, as is demonstrated by Donald Rasmussen’s interview 
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and survey responses, collected during the summers of 1937 and 1938—when the number of 
prisoners released by the parole board dipped dramatically.  
These newspaper representations of parolees mirrored front-page stories run in other 
states and seeped into popular culture, perhaps most notably with the RKO Pictures film Don’t 
Turn ‘Em Loose. As The Washington Post reported in July, 1936, film studios increasingly 
mined newspaper headlines for plots, realizing “that Mr. Reading Public and Mr. Theater-going 
Public are one and the same.”706 Don’t Turn ‘Em Loose offers one such headline-based plot—
turning on the “evils of the [parole] system.”707 The film lays a façade of “investigation, reform, 
and exposé” over the top of the usual shoot-‘em-up gangster movie fare, offering a view of the 
incompetent parole board procedures responsible for the release of dangerous criminals.708 
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Figure 17 Total number of men paroled from Pontiac, Joliet-Stateville, and Menard as compared 
to the number of men returned for parole violations. Note that for the year 1938, the number of men 




The first scene finds Robert Webster, aka Bat Williams, before the New York State 
Parole Board pleading for his release with his wife and baby at his side. He vows to go straight 
and is granted parole. But when he enters his lawyer’s car for a ride home minutes later, 
moviegoers learn that Bat (Bruce Cabot) is unmarried, his 
wife and baby mere actors hired for the board hearing. Bat is a 
“snarling, tight-lipped killer” and the head of a dangerous 
band of criminals.709 He returns to his gang and they 
immediately plan their next job. Two heists, and three 
murders later, Bat is returned to prison. His family knows 
nothing of his crimes, believing that their boy Robert Webster 
is a successful engineer hired for assignments around the 
world. The tables turn on Bat when his father is appointed to 
the parole board, objects to Bat’s parole because of his 
lengthy record, and does a double-take when he finds his son 
brought in for a hearing, hanging his head and promising 
repentance. After talking with his son, John Webster (Lewis Stone) agrees to another parole for 
Bat, provided he leave town and never contact his family again. The film ends when Bat returns 
for his sister’s wedding, attempts to pull off a payroll robbery, and is shot by his father while 
attempting to murder a police officer.710  
Some reviewers were skeptical of the picture’s hard line against parole boards, treating it 
as just a new angle on the somewhat tired gangster film genre. If film viewers believed this 
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portrayal of the parole system, a New York Times reviewer deadpanned, they would be “of a 
mind today to toss all parole boards before a grand jury on charges of veniality, stupidity, and 
flagrant disregard of law and order.”711 Others were less skeptical of the film’s message. A 
Baltimore newspaper described it as an “astonishing picture of flagrant flaws in prison parole 
systems.” The Chicago Tribune concurred, praising the film’s stand “against sentimental parole 
boards who turn loose on a helpless world confirmed criminals who, for all their sheep-eyed 
repentings [sic] in jail [sic] intend to keep right on being—confirmed criminals.”712 
 Exaggerated media portrayals of incompetent parole boards and the hardened criminals 
they released had a very real effect on Illinois prisoners and parolees in the late 1930s. This 
popular representation of the system, whether for political ends or pure shock-value 
entertainment, proved dangerous for paroled men, who were at risk of police harassment and 
return to the penitentiary for minor violations. One returned violator quoted in Rasmussen’s 
dissertation described his constant anxiety while on parole: “You are assured that your 
supervisor is just the charmingest fellow, but that the omnipresent chap might pop out of the 
shadows at the most unexpected times—might be hiding in the next doorway, or lounging in 
your parlor…” This man felt as though he might be returned at any time, that the prison had kept 
his blue shirt “with its big black number stamped on it” just waiting for him to slip up.713 Former 
parolee Oswald Hooper told Hans Mattick that “parole on the street makes a man a coward, more 
or less. It gets in his soul.”714 The threat that unscrupulous parole agents and the Chicago police 
posed to paroled men was more than a figment of Hooper’s imagination.  
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A New Day: On Parole in Wartime Illinois 
Just as the board strove to standardize parole decision-making, the Division of 
Supervision worked to professionalize parole agents, expanding control over the growing 
number of men in custody outside of prison walls. If a man actually won the approval of the 
parole board, he would be released to the supervision of one of the state’s 53 parole agents.715As 
the prison population increased over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, the number of parolees 
rose as well, though the number of yearly paroles from the state’s prisons and reformatories did 
not change dramatically (see Figure 1). By the 1930s, men released on parole were required to 
spend at least three years under the watchful eyes of parole field agents, sworn to apprehend 
them for any violation “whether it be technical or criminal.” Despite this punitive function of the 
role, the parole agent job description suggests that the Division of Supervision of Parolees in the 
Department of Public Welfare conceived of the role of the agent as split equally between duties 
involving advocacy on behalf of the paroled man and duties related to the exercise of state 
policing power. Agents were charged with protecting the parolee “against peonage,” 
“unscrupulous attorneys,” and false criminal charges.716 A handbook designed to prepare 
incarcerated men for life on parole encouraged them to “look upon your parole agent as your 
friend,” further stating: “he is a staff for you to lean upon, not a rod ready to punish you.”717 This 
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pre-parole handbook can perhaps be excused for presenting an idealized view of parole 
supervision, for it was written by Nathan F. Leopold, a man who had never experienced parole 
and who had been incarcerated since he was nineteen years old. Paroled men, by contrast, 
complained that agents were often incompetent or corrupt. They claimed that field parole agent 
positions were given to supporters and friends of state politicians in return for services 
rendered—part of the patronage system. One prisoner suspected that parole agents were “all on 
the make,” just waiting for a parolee to slip up so they could demand a bribe, while another 
opined that the agents were “of the lowest sort” and were often former prison guards.718 
Leopold’s pamphlet portrayal of the parole experience stands in stark contrast to the anonymous 
prisoners’ assessments of the parole system Donald Rasmussen recorded just a few years later.  
 Leopold’s manual included stories designed to illustrate that the parole agent was 
“always more than anxious to give the parolee the benefit of the doubt,” that he would act almost 
like a father figure to the ex-prisoner. The booklet advised the paroled man to approach his 
“parole agent without hesitation when difficulties arise; follow his advice; accept him as your 
friend and protector.” The two parolee-agent relationships Leopold touted as examples both 
involved potential pitfalls a paroled man might encounter when beginning or returning to a 
romantic partnership upon release from prison. The wisdom of the older parole agent is the topic 
of the first, in which a young man comes to the agent asking permission to get married. The 
agent asks the man if the lady in question knows he is on parole. When the parolee admits he has 
not told her for fear of rejection, the agent suggests he bring her to the parole office. There, the 
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parole agent first “satisf[ied] himself that she was the kind of a girl who would be a help rather 
than a handicap to the parolee,” before explaining the circumstances of her husband-to-be’s 
parole. If the paroled man had not informed his agent of his intent to marry, he would have 
violated parole and “have been headed straight for marital unhappiness.”719  
In the second story, a devious wife files a complaint against her paroled husband with his 
agent in an attempt to get him returned to prison. The parole agent makes an investigation of her 
charges and discovers that the woman had been living with another man during her husband’s 
incarceration. She wants her husband returned on violation so she can resume this extramarital 
affair. Leopold used this example to assure the potential parolee that he would never be “framed” 
while on parole—“when you are in the right, the entire power of the State of Illinois… is behind 
you.”720 Both examples illustrative of the good intentions of state parole agents involve womanly 
influences on the parolee, an image of life on release dependent on the maintenance of traditional 
gender roles. Indeed, women in the orbit of the male parolee were subjected to the exacting eye 
of state investigators.  
As Leopold’s examples and the accounts recorded by sociologist-actuary Hans W. 
Mattick indicate, the paroled man’s gender could offer leverage in his dealings with state agents. 
Rather than questioning the paroled man’s influence on his prospective fiancé in Leopold’s first 
example, the agent instead sizes her up to ensure that she will make a suitable helpmeet. This 
interview with the paroled man’s romantic partner was common practice in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s. Wesley F. Jameson, paroled from Pontiac in the early 1940s, recalled that when he 
met the woman he dated while on parole he did not tell her about his record at first. But he soon 
“had to explain it to her because I had to bring her down to the parole office.” Though Jameson 
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did not consider the relationship a serious one, his parole agent “had to approve of her even for 
you to keep company with her.”721 The suspicious eye of the state polices the woman first, 
placing the blame for any male transgressions onto her in the event that her conduct deviates 
from the feminine standard. Mattick’s interviews show that this pattern of protecting the male 
parolee from devious women, or women who behaved improperly, was clearly not a figment of 
Leopold’s imagination.  
Parolee Damon Gillian even entered the Army at the behest of his parole agent after “one 
girl tried to blame him for giving her a baby.” Gillian earned his agent’s trust after being “no 
trouble” during the two years he had spent on parole. The former parolee recalled a good 
relationship with the agent, who “used to encourage him and give him advice.” To avoid 
Gillian’s possible return to prison, the agent arranged for him to join the Army.722 Though 
having a baby out of wedlock was not an express violation of the parole agreement—for a man— 
the parole agent helped Gillian dodge potential responsibility, fiscal or otherwise, for a child he 
may have fathered.723 But male prisoners also faced gendered challenges. The image of the 
parolee crafted by Chicago newspapers—armed, aggressive, and extremely dangerous to the 
public—was always male. He was a second- and third-offender, possibly “a vicious gunman,” “a 
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killer who has no compunctions when he has the impulse to take a life,” or perhaps a rapist who 
kidnapped young girls from the streets of Chicago. Whatever his crimes, he was always “a 
roving menace to the safety and property of anyone he encountered.”724 
Though parole experiences differed widely, the average parolee’s reality likely fell 
somewhere in between the bleak accounting of the parole system offered by Rasmussen’s 
anonymous survey-takers and Leopold’s rosy view of post-prison life. The parolee-agent 
relationship was just one of many factors that shaped a man’s experience on parole in the 1930s 
and 1940s. The unique amalgam of each ex-prisoner’s familial relationships, his mental and 
physical health, his post-prison encounters with the legal system, and his ability to find steady 
work, among other facets of his life, helped define his parole experience and outcome. Though 
each man’s trials and tribulations within the parole system differed, many of the challenges 
paroled men faced were influenced by their race and class status. Unlike parolees three or four 
decades earlier, these men faced a robust parole system, a gradually professionalizing corps of 
parole officers, and a much larger city police force. Contacts with law enforcement were more 
frequent for all, and especially for African American men, who lived in heavily—if selectively—
policed areas on the South Side.   
Despite civil service regulations, professionalization efforts, and Nathan Leopold’s 
idealized depiction of the parolee-agent relationship, many parole agents were political 
appointees.725 One angry man who passed the civil service examination for the field parole agent 
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position wrote to the Chicago Daily Tribune expressed doubts that he would ever be hired 
without the right political connections.726 Still, there were competent and even kindly agents 
among the men who won their jobs by services rendered in an election year—those who behaved 
more like mentors than state agents, who “tried every way in the world” to aid the paroled men 
under their supervision.727 Parole agent Russell Higgins believed that his colleagues could 
approach each parolee “as a friend” in spite of the discretionary disciplinary power the agents 
wielded. The parole agent, Higgins argued, should establish a strong relationship with the 
paroled man, such that the releasee saw the agent as “one in whom he can confide and discuss 
the many problems which may confront him on the road to normalcy, without fear of being 
misunderstood or unduly penalized.”728 But the risk of landing in the custody of an unscrupulous 
or overly strict agent was well known to every prisoner waiting for their chance at parole. Many 
of the incarcerated men surveyed by Donald Rasmussen believed parole agents were lazy, 
incompetent, or corrupt, with some citing personal experience with agents “that want a man to 
pay money to stay out and if you do not pay you are to come back for violating.”729  
Men who spent time on parole in the late 1930s and early 1940s related their experiences 
with incompetent and corrupt parole agents to Hans W. Mattick even as the Division of 
Supervision struggled to professionalize. Joliet parolee Roger Barlow got lucky with his first 
parole officer, who treated him with respect and “sat down with the family like a member of the 
family,” but his next agent was more difficult to get along with. He remembered that the man 
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was a “political appointee” who “had to let everybody know he was a parole agent” and 
embarrassed Barlow in front of his neighbors as a result of this indiscreet behavior. Moreover, 
this agent always “made it obvious that he wanted something” by spending time perusing 
Barlow’s pay stubs and examining the labels in his clothing.730 Former Pontiac prisoner Henry J. 
Blake recalled similar behavior from his parole agent, and told Hans Mattick that he was always 
feeling as though his parole agent was waiting for him 
to break a rule “so I’d have to buy him something.” 
Blake also shared memories of his job at Pontiac, as a 
secretary in the parole office. What he witnessed 
while incarcerated, he said, led him to lose respect for 
the parole system. During his interview with Mattick, 
Blake stated that it was routine practice for parole 
officers to use Illinois’s system for picking up 
violators in other states as an excuse to take an all-
expenses paid vacation to the part of the country 
where they wanted to travel. This manipulation of the 
system for personal gain, carried out in full view of 
inmate workers, caused many to feel vindicated when 
violating their parole contracts or breaking laws once 
released.731 No good could possibly come of the 
parole rules for the paroled man himself, many reasoned.  
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RULES FOR PERSONS ON PAROLE IN 
ILLINOIS (1934)* 
1. Do not carry weapons of any kind. 
2. Do no frequent disreputable 
establishments nor criminal “hang-outs.” 
3. Do not associate with any one who has a 
police record. 
4. Do not write or visit any inmate of a 
penal or correctional institution. 
5. Do not get drunk. 
6. Do not use drugs or narcotics. 
7. Do not get married without first getting 
permission from your parole agent. 
8. Do not drive or ride in an automobile for 
pleasure without first getting permission 
from your parole agent. 
9. Do not be away from home after 9:00 
P.M. without permission from your 
parole agent. (Parolees living in 
metropolitan districts are allowed an 
extra half hour. They must be home by 
9:30 P.M.) 
10. Do not leave the county to which you 
are paroled without permission.  
 
*From Nathan F. Leopold, A New Day and 
How to Make It, p. 16-17. These rules are the 




In personal interviews with Donald Rasmussen, dozens of incarcerated men stressed their 
opinion that many of the rules governing parole were “a lot of foolishness” and the rest just 
“rules that anyone would call common sense.”732 Though some indicated an intent to live by the 
parole contract if released—one man told Rasmussen that “the parolee can get along with the 
rules… [that] are designed to help him”—others found it laughable that the state expected them 
to adhere to a “useless and senseless” list of don’ts. Ron Guglielmo told Hans Mattick that he 
“didn’t pay no attention to that ten o’clock” curfew and simply got home whenever he pleased 
while on parole. Another man stated confidently that “every one breaks the parole rules.”733 
Nearly every prisoner interviewed for Rasmussen’s thesis mentioned that rule enforcement 
depended on the paroled man’s agent assignment, and some viewed the rules as instruments to be 
used in a “crude way” to the advantage of the parole agent.734 The gap between the intention of 
the rules and their use, between theory and practice, seemed clear to many of Rasmussen’s 
interviewees. One prisoner argued that the parole system served only to oppress paroled men 
while enriching politically appointed parole agents.735 While the rules might have been written 
with the intent to “do some good,” the way they were interpreted in practice generally proved 
detrimental to men on parole.  
For some men on parole, adherence to parole rules and interactions with their parole 
agents were simply inconveniences. While these inconveniences had potentially major 
consequences, such as return to the penitentiary, some of Mattick’s interviewees spoke of their 
parole periods as petty annoyances. After his parole from Pontiac in 1942, Frederick Giesen 
 
732 Anonymous Stateville interviewee #15, as quoted in Rasmussen, “Attitudes,” 156. For other men expressing 
similar opinions, see Ibid., 153-158. 
733 Anonymous Stateville interviewees #14 and #16, as quoted in Ibid., 156-157. Ron Guglielmo, interview with 
Hans W. Mattick, June 12, 1951, 1, Folder 38 in Hans W. Mattick Papers, 1944-1972, CHMRC. 
734 Anonymous Stateville interviewee #13, as quoted in Ibid., 155. 




recalled joining the Army to escape parole supervision. Giesen was quite young, having been 
convicted of larceny and sent to Pontiac while still a high school student, and he chafed against 
the parole rules when released at age 21. He complained of the “rather restricted life” he led 
while on parole and was bothered by the disruption caused by parole agents who “came stalking 
into the house late at night” whenever they chose to see if he might be violating his curfew. 
Further, he resented entitled “meddlers and bleeding hearts” for prying into his “private life” 
while he was on parole. Giesen characterized his parole as “an inconvenience” and denied any 
feelings of apprehension about joining the armed forces, as he had participated in ROTC at his 
high school and many of the men in his working-class Scottish family had served during the first 
World War. His Army induction could help him escape “the possibility of going back to the jug 
for some minor infraction of the rules.”736  
It is possible that some interviewees downplayed their fear of arrest and re-incarceration 
to indicate to Mattick, of whom they may have been suspicious, that they were “going straight” 
and had not returned to a life of crime while on parole. Others likely enjoyed good relationships 
with their parole officers or had money to bribe the right people and worried less about being 
sent back for minor violations. Some with honest parole officers simply believed in the integrity 
of the system. Another Pontiac parolee, Gordon Jennings, stated that he had “no trouble at all” 
while on parole after following the advice of his parole agent, who told him “if you keep your 
eyes open and your mouth shut, you’ll be alright.” He characterized the parole rules as “pretty 
strict,” but believed they were justified “because they’re taking a chance on a fellow.” Jennings 
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was on parole for two and a half years before entering the Army. While the police in this man’s 
neighborhood knew who he was and occasionally checked up on him, he remembers that they 
left him alone once they saw that he was working steadily and avoiding other men with criminal 
records. Jennings opined that success on parole was up to each individual man: “He has to keep 
his nose clean, then he can do his parole anywhere.”737  
Even former parolees who found it simple to abide by the rules and avoid contact with 
law enforcement encountered difficulties with employment outside the prison. Finding that first 
outside job—with an employer to sponsor your parole—was undoubtedly the most significant 
challenge faced by many potential parolees. Though, to judge by Mattick’s interviews, few 
paroled men stayed in their first “out-job” for long, prospective parolees were required to secure 
employment and (if paroled in Chicago) a reputable sponsor prior to release. Incarcerated men 
generally located sponsors and jobs either by sending letters from prison to former employers or 
by appealing to friends and family with connections at certain workplaces. As one of 
Rasmussen’s “articulate inmates” wrote, this requirement proved particularly difficult to fulfill 
during the Depression, when many “free members” of a prisoner’s family likely found 
themselves facing unemployment. Most prisoners hailed from the ranks of “lower middle class 
families, from those of factory workers, from… the unemployed, from slums” and lacked the 
kinds of influential relatives and friends who could secure jobs for them at a time when millions 
of men without criminal records searched desperately for work.738  
The first issue of the Division of Supervision of Parolee’s Parole Supervision News 
called for agents to find employment for men without connections, that “submerged group” of 
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imprisoned men unable to leave the institution on parole because they did not have a “home 
and/or employment waiting on the outside.”739 From the first issue on, the professional 
newsletter began with a letter from Superintendent of Supervision Milton H. Summers, 
dispensing advice to agents, offering praise, and occasionally admonishing employees for some 
dereliction of duty. In his first missive, Summers articulated the problem of the “submerged 
group” in financial terms without mentioning the physical and emotional costs to the men who 
remained incarcerated. He reminded parole agents that these men were a drain on state finances, 
as it cost far more to keep the “poor unfortunates” in prison than to supervise them on parole.740 
Language such as this provides clues to how Summers and his parole agents approached their 
jobs and thought about paroled men—often in terms of the bottom line rather than the man’s 
overall wellbeing. Agent Sam Adler embraced Summers’ capitalistic tone when writing about his 
approach to finding jobs for parolees. After getting “acquainted” with prospective employers, 
Adler would make his pitch, trying to “convince [them]… that my merchandise is the best.” He 
cited selling points for the paroled men he called “merchandise,” reminding his fellow agents to 
stress “that our men must be in by 10 o’clock at night, they are not permitted to… become 
intoxicated, with the result that they will have a clear head” for a full day’s work. Still, Adler 
warned, “[you should] never forget the fact that you are selling damaged goods.”741  
Though the challenge of finding an out-job diminished as the wartime economy 
expanded, employers willing to pay good wages were still wary of formerly incarcerated men. 
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Raymond Garrett, paroled from Joliet during the war, told Mattick that “the toughest thing” he 
faced on parole was finding “a good job.” Perched on one of the six stools at the counter of his 
small restaurant, the fifty-year-old chef and business owner remembered working at a vinegar 
factory for the first month after he was released from prison. He filled bottles there for forty 
cents an hour and looked for a new job in his spare time because “they wasn’t paying me 
anything and the only reason I worked there is because they got me out on parole.” Garrett soon 
returned to the job he had before his incarceration, as an ice puller with Adams Ice Company. He 
made ninety-five cents per hour and never told anyone he was on parole.742 Many men kept their 
parole status secret and obscured their criminal records when searching for better-paying jobs 
while on parole. Hiding one’s record proved advantageous beyond the hiring process. Former 
parolee Christopher Cawley explained, “[it’s] a disadvantage when the people you work for 
know you have got a record. People can take advantage of you for that reason. If any trouble 
comes up their word is better than yours.”743 When Damon Gillian searched for jobs during his 
parole, he first checked the application to see if it asked about criminal history. If so, he would 
get up and leave “because if anything came up later you’d catch it or get blamed.”744 
 For others, making it through three years on parole without being returned to prison was 
more complicated than following all the rules, keeping their record a secret, and landing a decent 
parole agent. A paroled man’s racial identity and—to a lesser extent—his economic status could 
be downright dangerous, leaving him more open to exploitation, arrest, physical harm at the 
hands of police, or the risk of return to the penitentiary. Indeed, unscrupulous employers hoping 
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for cheap laborers likely sought paroled men out for exploitation. Many of the accounts of parole 
diligently recorded by Hans Mattick in the 1950s include painful memories of scraping by on 
extremely low wages paid out by crooked employers, unwarranted arrests, and police 
harassment. Already trapped in low-paying, hazardous industry jobs under the best of 
circumstances, African American men on parole sometimes found themselves at the mercy of 
exploitative sponsors. Wade Marshall’s story justifies one Stateville prisoner’s critique of 
“parole status as a form of peonage.”745  
When forty-year-old Wade Marshall arrived at Mattick’s office to discuss his parole and 
Army experiences, Mattick first noted the shabbiness of his clothes and his thick southern accent. 
Marshall was clearly battling alcoholism and stuck in a string of low-paying, temporary jobs at 
the time he spoke to Mattick, but rapport during their interview was “very good” and the former 
Pontiac parolee was generous with information. He was on parole for over a year before being 
drafted, during which time he had difficulty making ends meet. Marshall secured a job at an 
upholstery shop where he had worked before going to prison. Though his boss rehired him 
because he was “a good and responsible worker,” promising him fifteen dollars per week, the 
employer barely paid Marshall at all. Marshall told Mattick, “I was promised the $15.00 but for 
the first four months I didn’t get a penny. I was just working and in the last two months he paid 
me $6.00 per week.” The boss informed the paroled man that if he left his job at the upholstery 
shop he would be returned to prison as a parole violator. Terrified of this potential outcome, and 
perhaps leery of his parole agent, Marshall waited six months before he shared his plight with the 
parole office.746  
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Marshall clearly did not believe that the Division of Parole Supervision would protect 
him from “unjust treatment,” as promised in A New Day and How to Make It.747 Growing up in 
the South, the young Wade would have learned to be extremely careful around police officers, 
who routinely murdered African American suspects and took part in or otherwise condoned 
lynchings in the name of preserving racial order.748 Later, as he navigated life in Chicago, 
Marshall would have learned that the police functioned to control working class people rather 
than protect them, to enforce the color line, and to reap the benefits of the white-owned vice 
operations that diminished the quality of life in black neighborhoods. He would perhaps have 
read about disproportionate arrest and conviction rates in the Chicago Defender, and almost 
certainly would have heard horrific accounts of the “third degree” method: beatings perpetrated 
by the Chicago police to induce confessions.749 Distrust for law enforcement may have led 
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Marshall to worry that any complaint about the employer who sponsored his release from prison 
would get him in trouble with his parole agent or the police.  
 As an African American man and a parolee, Marshall was right to be wary of law 
enforcement. Men on parole and with criminal records, especially black men, were far more 
vulnerable to arrest and police harassment than men who had never been arrested or convicted. 
Out of the sixty-five interviews with former parolees preserved in Hans W. Mattick’s papers, 
forty-seven pertain to white men and eighteen to black men. Thirteen (28%) of white men and 
five (38%) of black men formerly on parole reported being arrested or harassed by the police 
while on parole or as a result of their criminal record. Parolees were often picked up by police on 
suspicion and forced to participate in the “show up” where they could be examined by crime 
victims. Henry J. Blake remembered “if there was a robbery within a block, you [as a parolee] 
were a mortal cinch to be taken in to be questioned.” Police interrogation, as discussed in chapter 
four, could be extremely brutal and lead to extensive injuries as well as the loss of several days’ 
wages. Sometimes men were unable to return to work for “three or four days” after being 
questioned.750 A man’s criminal record, too, could be justification enough for law enforcement to 
haul him down to the station. Police waited for World War II veteran and former parolee Sam 
Brennan to arrive home, arrested him, and booked him for disorderly conduct. “… I wasn’t doing 
anything,” he told Mattick. “The policeman knew me from before so he took me in.” Brennan, 
who was white, spent three days in jail and was paraded past witnesses at a show up before he 
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was released.751 Former Pontiac parolee Jackson Finley reported similar treatment. Cops “who 
knew me from when I got in trouble” would pick him up, charge him with disorderly conduct, 
force him to participate in a show up, and then let him go.752 Brennan reported that men with 
criminal records would often bribe police not to be taken in so as not to lose a day’s wages.   
While white interviewees usually reported being arrested by police officers they knew on 
sight from previous encounters with law enforcement, the African American men Mattick spoke 
with reported being picked up in raids, shakedowns, or on suspicion by officers they did not 
know personally. Lawrence Mathis was picked up on suspicion and spent three days in jail away 
from his job, his wife, and his two children. Desperate, his wife located the woman complainant 
and brought her to the lockup to prove his innocence. The woman told police he “was not the 
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man” and they let him go. Over the course of speaking with dozens of African Americans who 
were paroled to the Army or drafted during parole on the street, Mattick found that many could 
not avoid contact with law enforcement. 
 Former Pontiac parolee Royce Hall told Mattick that the police often bothered anyone in 
black neighborhoods who was “dressed clean and decent,” presumably hoping for a bribe or cash 
they could appropriate. Hall was chatting with a friend on a street corner when the two were 
arrested and searched. His friend had a winning lottery ticket, worth ten dollars, in his pocket. 
Police confiscated it.753 Though the daily numbers lottery was illegal, the “policy kings” who ran 
the games paid the police handsomely to turn a blind eye, or even to assist with its operation. The 
officers who stopped Hall and his friend likely cashed the ticked in after seizing it.754 Arrests 
could be expensive for former prisoners, even if they were never charged, jailed, or tried for a 
crime. Wade Marshall recalled being arrested after a night of drinking. He was headed home in a 
cab with two friends, a white man and a black woman, when the three and the cabbie driving 
them were picked up and brought to the police station. They were never charged and Marshall 
could not figure out why they were stopped, but he had to pay a fine and costs amounting to 
twenty-five dollars. He could not afford to pay this amount and was sentenced to the House of 
Correction for eight days to work off his debt. As a result of this, Marshall would likely have lost 
his job along with eight full days of wages. Though Marshall “used to take anything that wasn’t 
nailed down,” he had abandoned crime after starting a family. He doted on his young daughter, 
telling Mattick, “the only thing that would get me in trouble now is if anything happened to her.” 
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Still, he was arrested three times and imprisoned in the House of Correction twice since his 
discharge from the Army.755  
Conclusion 
Illinois’s foray into prognostic criminology was precocious in the New Deal era—few 
other state criminal justice systems adopted actuarial methods to predict criminality or recidivism 
during this period. But the sociologist-actuaries working in Illinois inspired a proliferation of 
academic work on parole prediction, ensuring that it remained a subject of study and debate 
among social scientists and corrections professionals from the 1930s onward. By the 1970s, the 
federal government and parole boards in several other states used predictive methods. The 
United States Parole Commission relied on the Salient Factor Score, a streamlined version of the 
Burgess system, to predict parole performance for prisoners held in federal institutions.756 The 
application of sociological risk-assessment techniques in Illinois corrections formed the 
foundation for the actuarial turn in the American criminal justice system in the last few decades 
of the 20th century. It began the tradition of using seemingly race-neutral factors that were deeply 
rooted in the structural inequalities faced by Americans of color, from the effects of 
discrimination in housing and employment to racial biases in intelligence testing. The erasure of 
the race category in criminological risk assessment models, or the use of tens of other factors 
along with ethnic or racial background, lent a pretension of objectivity to discrimination against 
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From Illinois to the Nation: The Spread of Actuarial Prediction 
“For the greater portion of the Illinois community parole exists in name only,” Governor 
Adlai E. Stevenson declared. In a 1950 speech to the Congress of Correction, held annually by 
the American Prison Association, Stevenson reflected on the growth of the Illinois prison system 
and the chipping away of the parole board’s discretionary powers.757 The 1943 amendment to the 
indeterminate sentencing law, intended to remedy alleged parole board leniency, granted the 
courts the power to set the minimum and maximum limitations on indeterminate sentences 
within the statutory limits for specific offenses. This limited board discretion and diminished the 
number of prisoners released under parole supervision.758 By the 1950s, though about 92% of 
prisoners in Illinois were held under indeterminate sentences, far less than half were released 
under parole supervision. Still, by 1960 these numbers had climbed back up, with the parole 
board releasing 52% of the state’s prisoners.759 The board relinquished some of its power to set 
terms of incarceration to the judiciary, but parole remained a significant component of the 
Illinois corrections landscape through the 1970s.760 
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 Actuarial prediction, too, withstood the test of time. It would remain an integral part of 
the Illinois parole system until 1978, when the state abolished parole for all except those 
grandfathered in under previous indeterminate sentencing laws. By 1967, the Office of the 
Sociologist-Actuary was dissolved and its duties taken up by the Division of the Criminologist in 
the Illinois Department of Corrections. The Illinois parole board relied on sociologists’ reports 
and prognostic scores well into the 1970s.761 The Burgess method evolved from Daykin’s 1938 
twenty-seven-factor model down to Lloyd Ohlin’s twelve-factor assessment, used at Joliet and 
Menard, and Glaser’s seven-factor instrument for Pontiac. The three branches of the Illinois 
State Penitentiary used the twelve and seven-factor methods from the 1950s onward. A group of 
legal scholars concluded in a 1976 article that board rulings from 1970-1972 were very strongly 
correlated with “official predictions or ‘prognoses’ about an inmate’s future behavior that are 
recorded by correctional sociologists within the institutions.”762 These prognoses likely hewed 
closely to actuarial risk scores. But even in the unlikely event that the Illinois Parole Board 
routinely ignored the actuarial assessments included in the sociologists’ reports, parole prediction 
began to catch on in a nation desperate for solutions amidst another perceived crime wave. By 
the 1970s, the same decade Illinois abolished parole, paroling authorities across America began 
to adopt the actuarial tools first developed in the Prairie State. 
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From the late 1970s through the early 2000s, twenty-eight states and the federal 
government adopted actuarial tools, and the twenty-three states with active parole systems still 
used these methods by 2004.763 Penal officials throughout the country would have been familiar 
with actuarial parole prediction as early as the 1940s, given the attention it received in the 
massive, multivolume study of release procedures published by the U.S. Attorney General in 
1939. So why did actuarial prediction, long debated in the criminological literature, take so long 
to catch on outside of Illinois? Why was it eventually adopted? What happened to parole in 
Illinois between 1943 and 1978? And how do these predictive models, so closely related to those 
developed in the Prairie State by Burgess and his mentees, continue to guide criminal justice 
decision-making today?  
In 1939, the Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures bemoaned the “subjective 
and emotional elements” that drove decision-making for most state parole boards, but cautioned 
against any reliance on statistical prediction.764 Attorney General Homer S. Cummings began 
this research in 1936 in response to “recently aroused public sentiment against parole” observed 
in Illinois and across the country mid-decade.765 Funded by the WPA, the project employed over 
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750 persons to survey jurisdictions across the country to assess release practices, develop 
uniform standards, and consolidate crime prevention efforts. A major focus of the study’s fourth 
volume addressed the problem of selection for parole, including a chapter devoted to ascertaining 
“which of a set of certain characteristics are significantly associated with outcome on parole.”766 
This section approached potential factors in much the same way Burgess had over a decade 
earlier, albeit with 100,000 cases instead of 3,000 and a focus on qualitative assessment. A 
shorter section included in volume four addressed the use of prediction tables in evaluating risk.  
While the Survey resisted dismissing actuarial prediction altogether, it concluded that 
existing actuarial tools remained underdeveloped. While the factors used for statistical prediction 
could serve as a guide for paroling authorities, they could not be considered exhaustive. Extant 
methods, including those used in Illinois, had not established criteria for a comprehensive list of 
factors that might be associated with parole outcome, the most significant categories to use in 
constructing an actuarial device, or determined “the best method for constructing a prediction 
device.” The Survey argued, moreover, that the “degree of unreliability of some of the official 
statistics,” including the use of documented violations as measures of parolee success or failure, 
significantly undermined the “validity” of prediction tools based on official records.767 The 
Department of Justice found that the worth of actuarial tables instead lay in their emphasis of the 
“general traits which stamp offenders as ‘good risks’ or ‘poor risks’ for parole.”768  
Still, the compilers of the report conceded that predictive methods merited further 
research, with an eye towards developing more advanced statistical techniques and encouraging 
better record-keeping at the state level. Scholars in criminology and penology produced over 150 
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publications, conference talks, and unpublished dissertations relating to adult and juvenile parole 
prediction, and countless others addressing statistical prediction of delinquency, probation 
outcome, and prison adjustment in the two decades following the Attorney General’s Survey.769 
With the ebb of the 1920s and 1930s crime panic and the resulting reduction in prison 
populations, tinkering with parole may not have seemed essential for most jurisdictions. Illinois 
remained the only state to use parole prediction until the 1950s, when Minnesota’s St. Cloud 
Reformatory experimented with Lloyd Ohlin’s version of the Burgess method.770 
Illinois sociologist-actuaries also forged ahead with prediction research in between life 
history interviews. Parole prediction in the state evolved in much the same way it was developed, 
through researchers hired based on professional connections with local universities. At first, 
Burgess recommended many of his students for the sociologist-actuary position, as highlighted 
in Chapter 5 of “Getting Out.” Graduate students could earn a small salary working at the Joliet 
or Menard diagnostic depots while writing up their dissertations, and many did just that. In 
addition, with ready access to reams of data on incarcerated men and women, some budding 
sociologists were inspired to conduct research from the workplace. Both Lloyd Ohlin and Daniel 
Glaser, who received their PhDs in sociology from the University of Chicago, submitted doctoral 
dissertations on parole prediction using data they gathered while working for the Illinois State 
Penitentiary as sociologist-actuaries.771 Hans W. Mattick earned a masters degree from the 
 
769Information Center on Crime and Delinquency of the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency, International Bibliography on Crime and Delinquency 2, no. 1 (Bethesda: U.S. 
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bibliography tallied by author.  
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University of Chicago, 1954) and Lloyd E. Ohlin, “The Stability and Validity of Parole 




University of Chicago. In 1956 he finished “Parole to the Army,” a 400-page thesis based on 
data collected while working on the Selective Service Felon Project.772 As Mattick would recall 
in an interview given shortly before his death, some of these young sociologist-actuaries would 
later hold key administrative and management roles at the national level, while others shaped 
criminal justice policy and practice within state and local jurisdictions. But from the 1940s 
through the 1970s, professional sociologists hailing from Illinois universities would help revise 
the Burgess method, create updated experience tables based on decades’ worth of prisoner data, 
and help drive the study of actuarial prediction in criminology.  
Sociologists comprised the majority of the professional staffers at the Joliet and Menard 
diagnostic depots in the 1950s and were expected to prepare routine reports on each prisoner as 
well as further criminological research in the field of parole. Nine sociologists worked at the 
Joliet depot to prepare advisory materials for prison staff, wardens, and the parole board. During 
prisoner intake, these professionals conducted classification interviews with newly imprisoned 
men. Sociologists established rapport with each new inmate in order to secure a truthful life 
history, form a “personality appraisal” of each man, assess his “improvability,” and offer specific 
recommendations to prison staff as to his personal needs while incarcerated. The researchers 
communicated these assessments of “social behavior,” “personality characteristics,” “abilities,” 
 
based on this research in 1951. See Lloyd E. Ohlin, Selection for Parole: A Manual of Parole 
Prediction (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1951). Several other sociologist-actuaries 
would go on to write monographs based on research they conducted while working for the ISP. 
See Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) 
and Nathan Kantrowitz, Close Control: Managing a Maximum Security Prison: The Story of 
Ragen’s Stateville Penitentiary (New York: Harrow and Heston Publishers, 1996). Famous 
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actuary while earning his degree from the University of Chicago’s sociology department.  
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and vocational, educational, recreational and health requirements “in clear, commonplace 
terminology” so that the classification report could be useful for the man’s custodians at Pontiac, 
Joliet, Stateville, or Menard. 773  
The classification and prediction processes pioneered by the Division of the 
Criminologist’s sociologists attracted national and international attention. Barely a year after the 
Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures cast additional doubt on the validity of 
actuarial instruments, the Federal Bureau of Prisons began experimenting with prediction tables. 
H. Birnet Hovey, Warden’s Assistant at the Department of Justice Medical Center for Federal 
Prisoners, wrote Illinois’s Division of Pardons and Paroles in the summer of 1940 requesting the 
experience tables in use at Joliet-Stateville, Pontiac, and Menard, as well as information 
concerning their workings and success at the state level. The Federal Bureau of Prisons intended 
to use Illinois materials as a guide in compiling a dataset “to be used in connection with 
prediction of probable success on parole.” After receiving copies of the experience tables and 
other information from sociologist-actuary Sam Daykin and parole board Chairman W.C. Jones, 
Hovey thanked the two men and assured them that “we shall draw heavily upon the advanced 
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technique you have developed in your state” in what he anticipated would be a years-long 
process of “develop[ing] our factors and weights.”774  
As prediction gained popularity as a criminological research topic in the 1950s, out-of-
state and even international researchers and officials came to Illinois to tour the diagnostic 
depots. Mattick recalled that the Joliet diagnostic depot taught visitors from as far away as Cape 
Town, South Africa, “about our program of classification for prisoners.” College students 
attending schools across the country wrote in for materials concerning the classification program. 
Other groups of university students attended yearly clinical conferences run by the Division of 
the Criminologist “as a means of furthering our educational aims” for those interested in entering 
the penal field as practitioners or researchers. The Division ultimately created an internship 
program in penal sociology in the summer of 1956, inviting three graduate students from the 
University of Illinois to train at the Joliet Diagnostic Depot. State Criminologist Roy G. Barrick, 
head of the Division during Mattick’s stint as a sociologist-actuary, also acted as a consultant for 
state officials from Michigan and Iowa.775  
Though classifying prisoners and compiling reports for the parole board consumed large 
chunks of the sociologists’ daily schedules, these materials allowed the institutional researchers 
to revise and refine parole prediction methods and experience tables. While many academics 
eager to test and sharpen prediction scales quibbled over the number of factors included in a 
“prediction battery” or gravitated towards Sam Daykin’s 1938 experience table—even a decade 
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later—Lloyd Ohlin developed a method to adjust experience tables on an annual basis.776 In his 
1954 dissertation, Ohlin found that Daykin’s experience table proved outmoded and inaccurate, 
as observed rates of violation for 8,103 parolees from 1936-1944 were much lower than the 
violation rates the 1938 table predicted.777 After testing two hypotheses related to this “time 
factor,” he concluded that this serious issue could be remedied by revising the experience table 
each year using the parole outcome of men paroled during the prior year.778 But how to do this? 
Using his sample cases, Ohlin compared the number of total-parole-period violations in each 
prognostic score group to the number of men in his sample who violated during their first year 
on parole. He found that this ratio remained quite stable over time. This ratio would allow the 
sociologist readjusting a prediction table to estimate the number of parole violations that would 
be likely to occur during the entire parole period for the men who fell into each prognostic score 
group. As such, he would be able to readjust the expected violation rate for each prognostic score 
group on a yearly basis, using cases of men who had been paroled during the year prior.  
 
776 Karl F. Schuessler, “Parole Prediction: Its History and Status,” Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology & Police Science 45, no. 4 (1954-1955), 429. For sample studies in the validation 
of Daykin’s revision of the Burgess method, see Pontiac sociologist-actuary Michael Hakeem’s 
“The Validity of the Burgess Method of Parole Prediction,” The American Journal of Sociology 
53, no. 5 (March 1948), 376-386 and John L. Gillin, “Prediction of Parole Success in 
Wisconsin,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 34, no. 4 (1943-1944), 236-239.  
777 Recall that Sam Daykin based his 1938 experience table on a sample of men paroled from 
1925-1935.  
778 Ohlin hypothesized first that: “The predictive stability of time efficient factors will be 
maintained if the basis of subcategory classification accurately reflects the changing 
opportunities and conceptions which alter the conditions for parole adjustment from one time 
period to another.” As such, his dissertation needed to propose a method to remedy errors in 
prediction caused by this time problem. He set out to test a second hypothesis: “Errors in 
prediction for new cases can be reduced by utilizing estimated total-parole-violation rates as a 
basis for routine readjustment of the prediction tables.” Tables adjusted on a yearly basis, Ohlin 
figured, would allow for stability in the accuracy of prediction tables from the original sample of 




His 1951 monograph, Selection for Parole, outlined this process and recommended that 
paroling authorities also use the annual revision to assess the reliability of each predictive factor 
that contributed to final prognostic scores. Illustrating loss in predictive power could help 
institutional sociologists eliminate unreliable factors when necessary.779 In testing the reliability 
of the twenty-seven factors in Daykin’s 1938 table, Ohlin discovered that fifteen of them did not 
meet “the statistical standards necessary for making effective distinctions between parole 
successes and failures.”780 Ohlin’s revised table, used at Menard and Joliet-Stateville, included 
the following twelve factors: “type of offense,” “sentence,” “type of offender,” “home status,” 
“family interest,” “social type,” “work record,” “community,” “parole job,” “number of 
associates,” “personality,” and “psychiatric prognosis.” A few years later, Daniel Glaser would 
introduce a similar pared-down prediction instrument—this one with only seven factors—at 
Pontiac. Selection for Parole became a classic in the field. In 1963, the United States Courts’ 
Assistant Chief of Probation argued that the monograph “should be in the library of every parole 
board member, penal administrator, and correctional worker.”781  
Federal funding pledged towards the standardization of parole selection standards and 
towards further study of parole prediction likely kept interest in Ohlin’s work alive among 
corrections professionals and criminologists. Ohlin’s personal involvement in federal crime 
control initiatives couldn’t have hurt, either. John F. Kennedy’s President’s Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime welcomed social scientists, including Ohlin, into the 
federal policy conversation as never before. The government officials who brought social 
scientists into the fold “sought to reform the social conditions that gave rise to delinquency,” an 
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effort based on theory advanced by Ohlin and his Columbia colleague Richard Cloward.782 Ohlin 
and Cloward developed “opportunity theory,” arguing that a person’s proclivity for criminal 
activity did not originate in cultural or individual characteristics, but was instead triggered by 
childhood neglect, a dearth of resources, and “punitive responses to… [everyday] behavior in 
childhood.” To curtail juvenile delinquency, therefore, government would need to build 
institutions where disadvantaged children could access “education, training, and development 
programs.” 783 Kennedy officials convinced by this theory and looking to translate it into policy 
hired Ohlin and other scholars to develop and assist with programs aimed at crime prevention. 
By 1962, the Committee promoted Ohlin from advisor to chief researcher.  
Though primarily focused on juvenile delinquency, the President’s Committee also 
helped support the National Parole Institutes of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
(NCCD). The National Parole Institutes collected and reported information on parole in state 
jurisdictions to the federal government and helped train parole board members at professional 
conferences. The NCCD also created the Uniform Parole Report (UPR) organization in 1966 to 
collect and distribute statistical information on parole decisions and characteristics of paroled 
men, women, and juveniles. The Parole Institutes and the UPR shared a common goal: to 
 
782 Historian Elizabeth Hinton shows that the Committee’s programming focused “almost 
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Kennedy established a foundation for the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty initiatives. 
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improve parole board members’ ability to make release decisions.784 These two initiatives were 
in keeping with federal crime control policy, and the United States government continued to fund 
such studies after the passage of the Safe Streets Act of 1968, which invested $400 million to 
modernize American law enforcement. The newly-created Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) would distribute and direct this funding.785 The LEAA poured money 
into projects related to probation and parole—funding research studies to develop federal 
guidelines, building up corps of parole and probation officers at the state level, and funding other 
programs to assist parolees with their transition from prison to the community. It dispensed $32 
million to federal and state-level probation and parole programs and research projects in 1971 
alone.786 
The year prior, the NCCD and the United States Board of Parole had applied to the 
LEAA for a small slice of its funding: a grant to support a three-year study of parole decision-
making. This grant application was in part prompted by “unprecedented criticism” of the U.S. 
Parole Board from lawmakers and the press. These individuals and media outlets railed against 
the federal board in much the same way the Tribune attacked Illinois paroling authorities, 
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charging board members with “secrecy, arbitrariness, capriciousness, susceptibility to Executive 
pressure… [and] failure to specify reasons for parole denial…”787 After the LEAA awarded the 
funding, the project’s leaders, Drs. Donald M. Gottfredson and Leslie Wilkins began the work 
they hoped would address these critiques. They set out to develop and demonstrate “model 
programs to provide information to paroling authorities for improving parole decisions by an 
increased utilization of experience in these decisions.”788 As Wilkins and Gottfredson described 
it, they and other research workers from the NCCD collaborated with the U.S. Board of Parole  
for a series of studies, eventually producing fourteen reports summarizing their efforts.789 
Cooperation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Bureau of Prisoners, and state 
parole systems were also crucial to the project. Nineteen state paroling authorities, including the 
Illinois parole board, filled out a survey to provide the project with “information on perceived 
objectives and information needs of the paroling decision.” Wilkins and Gottfredson also 
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collected opinions and observed the work of parole officials from forty state agencies at three 
national meetings in 1971, 1972, and 1973. 
As a direct result of the research conducted under the LEAA grant, the U.S. Parole Board 
began testing a set of parole decision-making guidelines developed by Wilkins and Gottfredson’s 
work, in part to ensure consistent, timely, and fair parole decisions. By 1972, the chairman of the 
United States Board of Parole emphasized the importance of constructing a stable and accurate 
experience table for use at the federal level while testifying before members of the House 
Judiciary Committee. Chairman George Reed told the assembled representatives that “the 
ultimate goal” of the LEAA-funded research project “is the improvement of parole 
decisionmaking [sic] by utilizing ‘base expectancy’ or ‘experience’ profiles with which the 
members of the Board may compare similar offender types and their adjustments to the 
community while on parole.” Though the decision-making project built on the work of “Glueck, 
Ohlin, Glaser, and others,” generous federal funding would allow Gottfredson and Wilkins to 
follow-up with paroled individuals over a period of five years to find out “what really happened 
to these people after they are released from prison” and further assess the validity of their 
actuarial method.790 
The paroling policy guidelines eventually developed took the “form of a two-dimensional 
grid” in which the seriousness of the offense for which the prisoner was serving time could be 
mapped on the vertical axis and his or her parole prognosis charted on the horizontal axis. The 
meeting point of these two measurements on the grid would determine the length of the 
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prisoner’s sentence, assuming good conduct within the institution.791 This model allowed for 
consideration of the offense characteristics alongside the offender’s characteristics that measured 
his or her parole prognosis. To measure parole prognosis, the U.S. Parole Board used an actuarial 
device called a “salient factor score,” a pared down version of Burgess’s experience table. 
Federally-funded studies found that the “simple additive scoring of predictive items” used to 
arrive at prognostic scores in Illinois forty years earlier predicted parole outcome “as well as, and 
sometimes better than, those constructed by use of mathematically more sophisticated 
methods.”792 Researchers working for the United States Parole Commission praised the 
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(1974-1977), 48. 
Figure 20 The chart above shows options for a high severity offender with a good parole 
prognosis, who might serve 20 months before consideration for parole, and for a low 
severity-poor prognosis prisoner, who might serve 14 months before parole 





“simplicity and ease of scoring of a Burgess type device,” features which “commend[ed] it for 
operational use.” 793  
The “Burgess-type” salient factor score in use between 1973 and 1977 had nine factors, 
eight of which related to the prisoner’s past and one to future plans.794 Researchers arrived at the 
final predictive factors through a process of elimination.  First, they tested sixty-seven variables 
extracted from prisoner case files considered potentially predictive of success on parole. Like 
Bruce, Burgess, and Harno before them, federal researchers interviewed staff of the U.S. Board 
of Parole to identify predictive items for testing. Staffers were later credited with twenty-five of 
the factors considered for inclusion in the final prognostic score.795 Each of these potentially 
salient factors, whether identified by parole board staffers or researchers, fit into four general 
categories of information deemed significant in other parole prediction studies: the “nature and 
circumstances” of the offense committed; the “length and severity” of the individual’s prior 
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criminal record; “personal history variables”; and elements related to the prisoner’s behavior 
within the corrections institution.796 Next, the pieces of information that predicted favorable or 
unfavorable outcome on parole were separated from the rest. Careful scrutiny of each of these 
potential predictive factors allowed for elimination of those judged ethically problematic, those 
that did not appear often enough in the files to justify use, and those that overlapped with other 
factors. The final nine items included in the salient factor score are shown in the figure above 
and listed here for reference: (1) number of 
previous convictions; (2) number of prior 
incarcerations; (3) age at time of first 
period of incarceration; (4) whether or not 
the commitment offense involved auto 
theft; (5) whether the individual had ever 
had parole revoked; (6) history of drug use; 
(7) level of education; (8) stability of 
employment status or school attendance; 
(9) nature of living arrangement as outlined 
in release plan.797 When scored, these 
factors produced a number between zero 
and eleven—the higher the score, the 
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tested can be found in Don M. Gottfredson, W.H. Brown, and G.E. Pasela, “Working Papers on 
Parole Prediction for the United States Parole Commission,” Supplement to Classification for 
Parole Decision Policy (March 1977): Appendix A. 
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Figure 21 The nine-item Burgess-style experience table as tested by 
Don M. Gottfredson and colleagues for the United States Parole Board 
in 1977. Note that the first two factors are weighted more heavily than 
the rest. Found in Gottfredson et al, “Working Papers on Parole 




higher the likelihood of success on parole. The version of this experience table adopted in April 
of 1977 slightly revised several of these predictive items—for example, adding forgery to the 
auto theft factor—and reduced the number of total factors to seven items by eliminating 
education level and planned living arrangement for the parole period.  
 The federal system’s salient factor prognosis relied on Illinois research for more than just 
its simple, unweighted scoring method. The small number of predictive factors comprising the 
salient factor score represented a trend in actuarial prediction popularized by University of 
Chicago sociologist Albert Reiss, a Burgess advisee and Ohlin protégé. Reiss pioneered the use 
of pared-down prediction devices in his 1949 dissertation. Though experience tables with a large 
number of predictive factors were generally considered more reliable at the time, Reiss argued 
instead that tables with a small number of “stable and efficient predictors would yield more 
accurate and efficient prediction in the long run than a large number of predictors.”798  The 
pared-down versions of Burgess’s experience table caught on among Illinois sociologist-
actuaries in the early 1950s—Ohlin’s experience table for Joliet-Stateville and Menard used 
twelve factors, while Daniel Glaser’s Pontiac table used seven.  
By the 1950s, Glaser and Ohlin’s parole prediction research also emphasized the 
predictive power of factors related to the offender’s crime and criminal history, much as federal 
researchers would two decades later. As the earlier Burgess-style experience table pictured above 
and the 1977 revision show, researchers weighted prior convictions and prior incarcerations 
slightly more heavily than other factors. This indicated the perceived importance of criminal 
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history in the prediction of parole outcome. A 
similar pattern can be observed in the revisions 
of Burgess’s experience tables in Illinois, 
particularly in Ohlin’s 1951 experience table 
and Glaser’s 1954 revision for Pontiac. In Sam 
Daykin’s 1938 experience table, only seven of 
twenty-seven factors relate directly to the 
offender’s crime or criminal history, as 
compared to over one-third of the predictive 
factors used in Ohlin’s table and three of seven 
factors in Glaser’s table.799 Glaser’s method 
also added to the statistical dominance of 
 
799 Ohlin’s five factors related to the crime for which the offender was presently serving time or 
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commits minor crimes en route.” Six of Ohlin’s ten social type categories involve reference to 
criminal activity. Ohlin, Selection for Parole, 52, 127. For Burgess’s definition of “social type,” 
see Ernest W. Burgess as quoted in Glaser, “A Reformulation,” 194. Glaser’s “social 
development pattern” factor is similar to Ohlin’s “social type” factor, and three of his seven 
social development pattern types mention prior criminal activity. A “socially maladjusted” 
person, by Glaser’s definition, is someone who “seems to have been unable to adjust to society at 
all, who by reason of major personality deviations or obsessive criminal orientations is more 
remote from the respected citizen than any of the other categories.” Note, too, that the social 
development patterns identified by Glaser are arranged on a continuum, from most socially 
favorable to most socially unfavorable, in contrast to Ohlin’s “series of discrete types.” Glaser, 
“A Reformulation,” 204, 206.   
Figure 22 Daniel Glaser's seven-factor experience table with 
numerical scoring guide. Note that the three categories involving 
the offender's crime and criminal history are generally weighted 
more heavily, often accruing the highest or lowest scores 
permitted for a single factor, +2 or -2. Glaser, “A Reformulation 




criminal history in the weighting of the final prognostic score, as shown in Figure 22. The 1977 
seven-factor revision of the federal experience table excised two factors arguably unrelated to the 
individual’s criminal history, leaving five factors describing the prisoner’s criminal history. 
Though scoring was still conducted in the Burgess style, using simple addition, three of five 
factors involving criminal history were weighted slightly more heavily than the rest. Once the 
salient factor score was calculated, it would be mapped on a grid with the severity of the offense 
for which the prisoner was currently serving time.800 Under the guidelines for parole decision-
making dictated by the salient factor score and the offense severity index, past criminal history 
determined each prisoner’s risk score and the time they would spend incarcerated.  
Still, almost immediately following the federal government’s development of the salient 
factor score, Canadian psychologists developed an actuarial instrument that embraced a more 
diverse set of factors. The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) includes fifty-four 
questions, which are divided into ten categories of predictive factors thought to be related to 
recidivism: (1) criminal history, (2) education and employment, (3) financial, (4) alcohol and 
drugs, (5) family and marital, (6) accommodation, (7) leisure and recreation, (8) emotional and 
personal, (9) companions, and (10) attitudes and orientations.801 The LSI-R resurrected the 
lengthier questionnaire format and two broad categories of factors first seriously considered by 
Ferris Laune and Nathan Leopold in the 1930s. The blending of both a large number of static, or 
unchanging, and dynamic, or elastic, factors first realized within Laune’s model achieved 
practical application with the LSI-R’s fifty-four item questionnaire. Additionally, both the LSI-R 
 
800 See Appendix IV. 
801 Ashley Leigh Dickinson, “Utility of the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) in 
Predicting Recidivism: Do Gender and Offense Type Matter,” (PhD diss., Indiana University of 




and Laune’s method include factors related to the prisoner’s emotions and those designed to 
measure his attitudes and orientations toward himself, his crime, and his future. Though Laune 
foregrounded prisoners’ hunches in his actuarial model, his insistence that the measurement of 
change over time be taken seriously in prediction research remains his most important 
contribution to the field. The indices Laune used to measure change, related to the individual’s 
“social adjustment” and attitudes, are strikingly similar to those employed by the LSI-R.802 And 
like Laune, who hypothesized in 1936 that “if some means could be found of determining 
attitudes periodically, one might be able to ascertain the exact point of greatest probable success 
on parole,” the creators of the LSI-R intended that their questionnaire capture and assess the 
 
802 Though the exact questions used in the LSI-R are closely guarded corporate secrets hidden 
behind a paywall, the broad categories and questions found in scholarship on the instrument 
evoke factors first introduced by Leopold and Laune. Questions designed to gauge the 
individual’s use of leisure and recreation time match up neatly with Laune’s “factors connected 
with high life.” And the many questions developed by Laune and Leopold to understand the 
prisoner’s position within social groups inside and outside of the institution proves eerily similar 
to the “companions” category in the LSI-R. The LSI-R’s general questions include: Does the 
individual in question have “criminal friends and acquaintances”? Is he a “social isolate”? By 
comparison, Laune asks a variety of similar questions, including: “Do you make inquiries about 
a man’s reputation before becoming friendly with him?” “Were you the only one in your group 
engaged in criminal activity?” “Are you very particular about the people with whom you 
associate?” “Have you many friends?” “Is it easy to become friendly with you?” “Did you make 
friends only with cultured people?” “Have any of your friends on the outside police records?” 
Additionally, a focus on the prisoner’s emotional state and personality measured in Laune’s 
“psychological factors” seems closely related to the LSI-R’s emotional and personal category. 
And the measurement of the prisoner’s attitude toward crime and “convention” comprising the 
final section of the LSI-R questionnaire lines up neatly with Leopold and Laune’s questions 
related to attitudinal elements included under their “psychological factors” category. The LSI-
R’s general questions read: “Supportive of crime?” “Unfavorable toward convention?” A 
sampling of Laune’s questions follows: “Have you any moral scruples against stealing?” “Did 
you ever live in a house of ill-fame?” “Do you think the intimidation of witnesses is a good way 
to beat a rap?” “If something that you could steal was very necessary to your complete happiness 
and there was an excellent chance that you would not get caught, would you steal it?” “Are you 
often influenced by what others may think of your actions?” “Would you be uncomfortable if 
you had to remain in one town very long?” “Would you be happy just taking it easy?” Laune, 




most recent information for each individual.803 The LSI-R can be administered periodically, 
generating a new risk score each time. It is currently the most popular prediction tool among 
American state jurisdictions that “have not adopted their own state-specific instrument” and is 
most often used by courts at the sentencing stage.804 
Indeed, our criminal justice system has embraced actuarial tools like the LSI-R at every 
stage of law enforcement, from the apprehension of suspects to the determination of parole 
eligibility. Many risk assessment tools are still developed in much the same manner as the 
Burgess predictive method, albeit on a larger scale. Social scientists examine a population of 
former prisoners and collect hundreds of pieces of information about their lives. Then, they track 
these individuals over a period of time, usually several years, to determine which “traits are 
associated with further criminal activity.” Social scientists now know “that well-designed risk 
assessment tools ‘work,’ in that they predict behavior [slightly] better than unaided expert 
opinion.”805 
Actuarial instruments in use today are explicitly touted as “race-neutral” tools that 
replace subjective and biased human evaluations of cases with scientific and objective 
judgment.806 The tools themselves are shrouded in mystery, as the exact algorithms used in risk 
prediction are often developed by private corporations that jealously guard their components. But 
the jurisdictions that consult actuarial math before setting bail, sentencing convicted individuals, 
 
803 Laune, Predicting Criminality, 8. 
804 Richardson, “Minding the Gap,” 40. 
805 Risk assessment tools accurately predict outcome in 10% more cases than do experts without 
the assistance of actuarial scores. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman, and Dana Goldstein, 
“The New Science of Sentencing,” The Marshall Project, August 4, 2015, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing.  





and approving applications for parole insist that risk scores allow them to bypass implicit biases 
and combat racial disparities. Still, we know that these tools draw on existing criminal justice 
data—including arrest and recidivism rates—generated by a system that polices African 
Americans and Latinxs very differently than white suspects and defendants. As Kara Gotsch of 
The Sentencing Project argues, “There’s racial bias inherent at every step of the criminal justice 
system… so an algorithm that uses those things to determine whether to release you is not going 
to be fair to people of color.”807 Almost all risk assessment models consider prior criminal 
activity the most predictive factor, and weight it accordingly. Algorithms in use today, like the 
Burgess model, also account for offenders’ socioeconomic characteristics, which are generally 
highly correlated with race and ethnicity. A developer of the Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) admitted in 2016 that it is difficult to construct a 
risk assessment measure that does not include these factors, including poverty and joblessness: 
“If those are omitted from your risk assessment, accuracy goes down.”808 These markers of 
socioeconomic disadvantage invariably drive up an offenders’ risk score.  
Without access to the full questionnaire and assessment criteria used in the compilation 
of risk scores like COMPAS and the LSI-R, it is difficult to analyze them in great depth or to 
compare them to the historical predictive models “Getting Out” has explored. But news 
organizations like ProPublica, The New York Times, and The Marshall Project tell us that we 
can be certain about their effects. Risk scores considered in sentencing and the other decision-
 
807 Kara Gotsch as quoted in Eli Hager, “How Bill Barr’s COVID Prisoner Release Plan Could 
Favor White People,” The Marshall Project, March 28, 2020, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/28/how-bill-barr-s-covid-19-prisoner-release-plan-
could-favor-white-people. 
808 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, “Machine Bias,” ProPublica, 





making processes integral to the operation of the carceral state consistently rate poor people and 
minorities as high-risk offenders.809 The use of these actuarial tools leads to grave and profound 
consequences within the criminal justice system. Most recently, Attorney General Bill Barr’s 
plan to release incarcerated persons at risk of dying from the coronavirus instructed the federal 
prison system to “release only those prisoners who receive the minimum possible score on a ‘risk 
assessment’ algorithm called PATTERN.” According to Justice Department statistics, only seven 
percent of black men in federal institutions would receive low enough scores on PATTERN for 
medical release, as compared with thirty percent of white men.810  
As for Illinois, the state may have abandoned parole in 1978, but its lawmakers and 
officials have come to embrace risk assessment. Burgess’s legacy lives on in the Windy City. 
There, the University of Chicago’s Crime Lab has developed data sets to predict where shootings 
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• Acting under the influence of Governor John P. Altgeld, the state legislature passes the 
General Adult Parole Act, applicable to the prisons for adult males at Joliet and Menard. 
This first parole law applied to persons convicted of misdemeanors and all felonies 
except for treason and murder. Under this act, the Board of Prison Management 
(comprised of the wardens and the penitentiary commissioners) acted as a parole board. 
1897 
• The Act of 1897 adds manslaughter and rape to the excepted crimes. It also instituted an 
habitual criminal exception, which stated that the parole law did not apply to persons who 
had previously been sentenced to the penitentiary in Illinois or any other state. 
• A provision for indeterminate sentencing is added for all crimes except for treason, 
murder, manslaughter, and rape. It reads: The court “shall not fix the limit or duration of 
the sentence and the term of imprisonment of any person so convicted, and sentence shall 
not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the person was 
convicted and sentenced, making allowance for good time as now provided by law.” This 
provision did not set a minimum term of incarceration for any crime.  
• Permits the creation of a State Board of Pardons to exercise paroling powers. Stipulates 
that the board must be made up of three persons appointed by the Governor and approved 
by the Illinois State Senate.  
1899 
• The legislature establishes the minimum time to be served on an indeterminate sentence: 
“not less than one year.” 
• Repeal of the habitual criminal exception included in the Act of 1897. 
1917 
• The legislature passes the Civil Administrative Code and creates the Department of 
Public Welfare. This act abolishes the former Board of Pardons and creates a new Board 
of Pardons and Paroles as a subdivision of the Department of Public Welfare. The new 
Board is headed by the Superintendent of Pardons and Paroles.  
o The Department of Public Welfare is made up of a director, an assistant director, 
and six divisions, presided over by: an alienist, a criminologist, a fiscal 
supervisor, the superintendent of charities, the superintendent of prisons, and the 
superintendent of pardons and paroles.  
o This new law also included provisions for closer supervision of parolees, allowed 
prisoners serving definite sentences to be paroled after serving the minimum time 
set by law for their crime, and set measures to ensure cooperation between the 





• The Illinois state legislature provides for the Division of Pardons and Paroles to hire 
twenty parole agents. An appropriation of $194,000 is made to the Division to pay 
salaries and cover travel expenses.  
• Parole agents must visit parolees in their care ate least once per month.  
• The Illinois parole law requires that each person paroled from a corrections institution 
must serve at least six months on parole.  
• Out-of-state paroles are introduced. 
1921 
• The Chicago parole office consists of one assistant chief parole agent, five parole agents, 
and five sergeants of police. The police sergeants were assigned to the parole office by 
the Chicago Police Department. 
1924 
• Stateville Penitentiary opened. 
1927 
• On July 6, 1927, a bill amends the Civil Administrative Code, stipulating that “The 
Parole Board shall consist of the Supervisor of Paroles, who shall be chairman, and nine 
other members.” The nine members could be appointed by the Governor and did not need 
to occupy any other position in the Department of Public Welfare.  
• The Board of Paroles is separated from the Board of Pardons. 
• The Bureau of Pardons and Paroles is placed under Department of Public Welfare 
jurisdiction. 
• The responsibility for supervision and after-care of paroled men and women rests with 
the Supervisor of Paroles and with the Superintendent of Supervision. The 
Superintendent of Supervision is subordinate to the Supervisor of Paroles.  
1928 
• The Division of Supervision of Parolees consists of 60 personnel, including the 
Superintendent of Supervision, two assistant superintendents of parole agents, thirty-eight 
male parole agents, six female parole agents, among others. Twenty-four male agents 
work out of the Springfield office, while fourteen are assigned to the Chicago office.  
o Chicago parole agents visit each paroled man and his sponsor at least once per 
month. The paroled man was required to report to the Chicago office on the first 
day of each month. 
1930 
• Reformatory for Women at Dwight is opened to replace the Women’s Prison at Joliet. 
1933 
• Illinois state corrections facilities lose their legal identities as institutions and become 
branches of the Illinois State Penitentiary System. Each branch of the penitentiary is 




• Diagnostic Depots are established at Joliet and Menard for the purpose of studying and 
classifying newly admitted prisoners. 
• A Classification board, consisting of a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, and 
sociologist is appointed to assign new prisoners to the proper branch of the penitentiary.  
• Sociologist-actuaries and their assistants are employed and assigned to the Joliet-
Stateville, Pontiac, and Menard branches to study individual prisoners during their 
incarceration and create prediction reports for the parole board.  
1937 
• Governor Henry Horner prohibits the parole board from entering an order to parole an 
individual until the Division of Supervision of Parolees has thoroughly investigated his or 
her sponsor, place of employment, and place of residence.  
1941 
• United States Secretary of War granted authority to exercise discretion regarding the 
induction of ex-felons into the armed forces. Administrative measures later provided for 
prisoners eligible for release on parole to be released directly to the army.  
• Paroled men begin enlisting in the Army, either from civilian paroles or directly from 
prison through mobile Selective Service draft boards. 
• Prison and parole administration transferred to the Department of Public Safety from the 
Department of Public Welfare. 
1943 
• Legislature amends the indeterminate sentence law, permitting courts to set the minimum 
and maximum term for each offender between statutory sentence limitations. This 
reduces the parole board’s discretion. 
1952 
• Terms of members of parole board staggered, extended to 4 years. 
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DONALD RASMUSSEN’S SURVEY QUESTIONS 
As reproduced from Donald Rasmussen, “Attitudes of Joliet-Stateville Prisoners Toward 
Parole,” (MA thesis, University of Illinois, 1938), 41, in Joseph Edward Ragen Papers, Box 5 
Folder 2, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library. 
I. Questions for the “Essay Type Questionnaire” (answers appear on pages 34-57) 
a. “The Conditions on Parole, Their Purposes, and the Achievement of the Purposes 
i. The following are rules in the Illinois parole contract. (1) Do not carry 
weapons; (2) Do not frequent disreputable establishments nor criminal 
‘hang-outs’; (3) Do not associate with another parolee or anyone who has 
a criminal record; (4) Do not write or visit any inmate of a penal or 
correctional institution; (5) Do not get drunk; (6) Do not change 
employment or your home address without permission; (7) Do not use 
drugs or narcotics; (8) Do not get married without first getting the 
permission of your parole agent or the Superintendent of Supervision; (9) 
Do not be away from home after 9:00 P.M. (10:30 in Chicago) without 
first getting permission from your agent or the Superintendent; (10) Do 
not drive or ride in an automobile for pleasure without getting permission 
from your agent or the Superintendent; (11) Do not leave the county to 
which you have been paroled without permission 
1. What do you think are the purposes of having special rules of the 
sort listed above for persons leaving prisons? 
2. Which of the above rules do you think should be included in the 
contract? 
3. Will the supervision under the above rules be worthwhile to you? 
Why or why not? 
4. Do you think it is worthwhile of other prisoners? To society? 
5. Are the purposes of parole which you have outlined reasonably 
achieved in actual practice? If they are not achieved, what are the 
reasons? (Include a consideration of parole agents.) (32) 
b. Violations of Parole 
i. How do you think the parole board should enforce the following rule 
concerning violations of the parole contract? 
“A violation of any of the above rules forfeits the parole contract on the 
part of the party paroled and renders him liable to be returned at once to 
the institution for such action as the Parole Board deems advisable.” 
ii. Do you think the Board is just and fair in the way that it enforceds the rule 
at the present time? If not, why? 
c. Preparation for Parole 
i. Has there been anything in your prison experience which has prepared you 
to make good on parole? If so, what? 
ii. Has there been anything to produce the opposite effect? If so, what? 





d. [Indeterminate versus Fixed Sentencing] 
i. By which of the following methods would you rather have your sentence 
determined? (1) an indeterminate sentence with the parole board setting 
the exact date of paroles [sic]; (2) an indeterminate sentence law with the 
trial judge setting maximum and minimum limits within which the Parole 
Board can set an exact date of release; (3) an indeterminate sentence law 
with the trial judge setting the exact sentence; or (4) a flat sentence 
determined by law? 
ii. Why do you prefer the method which you chose over the others which are 
listed? 
iii. Which method of determining sentences would tend to bring about the 
most justice? Why?  
iv. What do you think the opinions of other prisoners are on the above three 
questions? 
(Add anything else concerning parole which you may think valuable. The more you write the 
more your criticism will become valid.)” (33) 
II. “Objective Type Questionnaire” (58) 
Information on questionnaire sheet distributed to participating prisoners: “It is the 
belief of those conducting the survey that the opinions of newspapers tell a small part 
of the whole parole story—that in addition to newspaper ‘hot air,’ we need 
information concerning the attitudes of the public, the attitudes of public 
administration officials; and, especially, the attitudes of those men who have been on 
parole or who are going to be on parole. Although the viewpoint of the latter group is 
important, little is known about it. And only after students and the general public 
know and consider all of these aspects, will there be a sensible, a fair, and a just 
parole system. 
 
To see all sides, we must depend upon the cooperation of persons willing to give 
honest criticism. On the following pages is a questionnaire to aid in expressing 
opinions toward parole.” (61) 
a. “Have you ever been on parole? Number of times   
b. For what type of offense are you now serving?   Amount of time served   
c. Board action on your case (number of continuances, amount of time before next 
appearance, etc.)” (61) 
“The parole board is supposed to take into consideration the following items when it 
determines a sentence: (a) the offense; (b) previous prison terms; (c) the past life of 
the prisoner; (d) the probablities of his ever again breaking the law; (e) the adequacy 
of his punishment; (f) his conduct while in prison; (g) the welfare of the prisoner 
d. List the above factos in the order which you think the board gives them weight in 
determining a sentence. (For instance, if you think the board gives the most 
consideration to the adequacy of a prisoner’s punishment, put an e in the blank 
after No. 1.) 




e. List the factors in the order which you think the board should take them into 
consideration. 
1   2   3  4   5   6   7   
 
f. List any additional factors which you think the board takes into consideration. 
g. List any additional factors which you think the board should take into 
consideration. 
h. Granting that no group of men can give perfect justice, list the reasons for the 
injustice that the board might do. 
i. List some changes which you think would improve the decisions of the board. 
Following are four methods of determining sentences: (a) an indeterminate sentence 
with the parole board setting the exact date of parole; (b) an indefinite sentence law 
with the trial judge setting the maximum and minimum limits within which the parole 
board can set an exact date of release; (c) an indefinite sentence law with the trial 
judge setting the exact sentence; (d) a flat sentence determined by law. 
j. List in order the methods as you prefer them for setting the date of your release. 
(designate your choice with the latters [sic] a, b, c, d) 
1   2   3  4   
k. List them in the order that you think a majority of other prisoners would prefer 
them for their cases. 
1   2   3  4   
l. List them according to their soundness in theory. 
1   2   3  4   
m. List them according to the justice you think they do or would do in actual 
practice. 
1   2   3  4  ” (61-63) 
“ADD ANY COMMENTS CONCERNING THE QUESTIONNAIRE ITSELF, THE PAROLE 






HANS W. MATTICK’S SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Reproduced from Jimmy Grable, interview with Hans W. Mattick, January 19, 1951, Box 175, 
Folder 1 in Hans W. Mattick Papers 1944-1972, Chicago History Museum and Research Center. 
I. Screening Experience of Direct Inductees. Description of screening procedures and 
Subject’s reactions. 
a. Were you ever in military service prior to your induction in World War II? Give 
details of previous service. 
b. What steps were taken in the institution to classify you for Army service? 
c. How much time elapsed between the time you were classified 1A and the time 
you were actually drafted? 
d. When were you due for parole consideration if you had not been accepted for 
service? 
e. Were you given a parole hearing before being released for induction? Were any 
men denied parole by the board at this stage after having been accepted by the 
institutional draft board? How did these men account for such an action of the 
parole board? 
f. What were the actual steps you went through prior to leaving the institution for 
the induction center? 
g. When you knew you were going to be paroled to the Army, how did you feel 
about it? 
i. Did you volunteer for service for any of the following reasons? 
1. Did you think that you could get an earlier parole than otherwise? 
2. Did you regard it as a way of escaping parole supervision and 
getting an early discharge from parole after six months? 
3. Why did you feel that you would prefer an Army parole to a parole 
to civilian life? 
4. Did you see it as a chance to serve your country? 
5. Did you have any feeling of ‘paying off a debt to society’ by 
entering the Army?  
6. Would you have preferred a job in civilian defense industry instead 
of Army service? 
7. Did you regard Army service as giving you a chance to start with a 
clean slate? (1-2) 
II. Post-Army and Post-War Adjustment (9) 
a. Residential History 
i. Did you return to your old neighborhood after release from service? 
1. With whom did you live? 
2. What changes had occurred in your absence? Were you able to 
renew old acquaintances? How did they treat you? Did they treat 
you differently than before your entry into the service? 
3. If you did not go back to your old neighborhood, why not? Did you 




4. What are the different places you have lived in since your release 
from service? What are the reasons for your moving? Did you 
experience any special difficulty with the problem of finding living 
quarters? What did you do? 
b. Marital and Family History 
i. Has there been any change in your marital status since your return from 
service? 
ii. Has there been any change in the status of your family since the war? 
c. Employment History 
i. What types of jobs have you had since the war? 
1. Describe the jobs, duration and steadiness of employment. 
2. What have been your average earnings? Is this better than before 
the war? 
3. Do you feel satisfied with the work you are doing? Do you feel 
you have been given a fair chance to earn a living within the limits 
of your skills? 
4. Have you noticed any tendency on the part of employers to 
discriminate against you because of your past record in spite of 
your war service? 
5. If you received any other than honorable Army discharge has this 
affected your ability to get a job? 
6. What other kinds of problems have arisen with regard to 
employment that you have not already mentioned? How have you 
solved or handled these problems? 
d. Associations and leisure-time activities 
i. Have you formed new associations in the post-war years? 
1. To what extent do you still associate with former civilian friends? 
Do any of them have a record that you know of? 
2. To what extent have you continued friendships which you made in 
the Army? (10) 
3. In what way do your present associations differ from your past 
contacts? 
4. Where did you meet your present friends? On the job? In the 
neighborhood? Etc. 
5. Has there been any indication of discrimination among your 
acquaintances as the result of your past record? To what extent has 
your Army service improbed [sic] your ability to make friends? 
ii. Have your leisure-time activities changed in the post-war period? 
1. How do you spend your spare time? Alone or with friends? What 
do you do? 
2. Have your habits as regards drinking, gambling, woman-chasing, 
and night-clubbing changed since your release from service as 




3. Have you joined any veterans’ organizations or associations? 
a. What organizations of veterans have you joined since the 
war? 
b. Do you attend meetings? 
c. Do you hold any special post or job in this organization? 
d. How active have you been in the organization’s affairs? 
Illustrate. 
III. Veterans Benefits 
a. Unemployment compensation? For how long? 
b. G.I. Bill, etc. 
c. Home or business loans? 
d. Medical facilities? 
e. Advice or counseling? 
f. Did you receive an Illinois bonus? 
g. Did you have money saved up when you left the Army? How much? 
h. Did you get money for accumulated leave from the Army? (11) 
i. How have you spent the money which you had on leaving the Army or which you 
secured as a result of having been in Army service? 
j. Do you feel you have benefited from the various provisions made by the 
Government for veterans’ adjustment to civilian life? How do you feel these 
benefits increased or decreased your chances of making a good adjustment? 
IV. Post-war violational behavior 
a. Have you been in any trouble since you got out of the Army? 
b. Have you ever been arrested since the War? Explain. 
c. What dispositions have been made of your case in any trouble that has occurred 
since the war? 
d. Do you feel that the ‘law’ hounded you because of your past record in spite of 
your Army service? Or do you feel that you were given breaks because of your 
service? 
i. Has your Army service actually helped you to escape your reputation as a 
man with a record? 
V. General Evaluations 
a. In general, do you feel that it has been an advantage for you to be a veteran? In 
what ways, not already mentioned, has this been true? 
b. Give us some of your ideas of the advantages or disadvantes [sic] of being paroled 
to the Army as compared to being paroled to civil life. 
i. Possible advantages of Army life 
1. Did you like the idea of not having to worry about jobs, food, 
housing, clothes and money? 
2. Did you like the idea of knowing where everybody stood in 
regards to rank, job and income? 
3. Did you feel a sense of common interest with the other men in 




4. Did you like the idea that everybody knew what his job was and 
was told what to do when a new situation came up? 
5. Did it seem that you could trust your friends in the Army more 
because you had to depend on each other when the going got 
rough? (12) 
6. Was it easier for you to hide your record in the Army than in civil 
life? 
ii. Possible advantages of civil life. 
1. Would you have preferred to take your changes with getting a job 
and making your own way in civil life? 
2. Would you rather make your own decisions about anything that 
affects you in any way? 
3. Do you think there is just as much cooperation and working 
together in civil life as there is in the Army? 
4. Do you feel you would have made a lot of money in the defense 
industry and would have been better off in civil life? 
c. As a result of your observations and experiences do you think a parolee is better 
off doing a parole in the Army or in civil life? Why? 
d. As a result of your experience as a parolee in the Armed service, what proposals 
would you make for changes in the system of paroling men to Army to make it 
easier for the men to adjust? (13) 
Reproduced from Christopher Cawley, interview with Hans W. Mattick, January 12, 1951, Box 
175, Folder 2 in Hans W. Mattick Papers 1944-1972, Chicago History Museum Resarch Center. 
I. Parole and Screening Experiences for Indirect Inductees 
a. Were you ever in military service prior to your induction in World War II; give an 
account of your previous service. 
b. How long were you on parole before you were inducted? Were you drafted or did 
you volunteer for induction? 
c. Residential History. 
i. Did you return to the same neighborhood on parole as you lived in before 
being sent to the institution? If not, why did you change neighborhoods? 
Did you cut off your former contacts in the old neighborhood? How many 
of your former friends entered the service? 
ii. Describe the places you lived in while on parole? With whom did you 
live? What type of neighborhood was it? 
iii. What kind of contacts did you have with your neighbors? Did you enter 
into community activities? What kind of activities? Did you feel that 
people avoided you because of your record? 
d. Marital and family life. 
i. What was your marital status on leaving the institution on parole? If 
single, divorced, or widowed did you marry while on parole? Did you 




ii. What contacts did you have with other family members? Parents, brothers 
and sisters, etc? How did you get along with them? How did they react to 
the fact that you had a record? Was this ever a source of trouble? 
iii. What persons were dependent on you for support during your parole 
period? Did your family ever accuse you of backing out on obligations to 
them? How did you feel about this? (1) 
e. Work history. 
i. ‘Out-job’ on parole? 
ii. Jobs while on parole. 
iii. Reasons for changing jobs? Knowledge of trade? Institutional vocational 
training? 
iv. Discrimination by employers because of record? 
f. Leisure-time pursuits and associations. 
i. How spent? Differ from before institutionalized? 
ii. New friends on parole? 
iii. Keeping out of trouble with former associates, their activities. 
iv. Trouble making new friends because of record? 
v. Habits changed after institution? 
vi. Problems while on parole?* 
1. Quarrels with family? 
2. Problems created by record? (2) 
3. Attention paid to record during screening and classifying 
procedures? 
4. Most difficult problems of a parolee? 
*Interview forms appearing later in the files also include a question about the interviewee’s 
relationship with his parole agent. These forms also prompt the interviewer to ask for the man’s 
“evaluation of self in relation to others and experiences” while on parole. See Walker Divola, 
interview with Hans W. Mattick, March 7, 1951, Box 175, Folder 9 in Hans W. Mattick Papers 






















*From Peter B. Hoffman and Sheldon Adelberg, “The Salient Factor Score: A Nontechnical 
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